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ABSTRACT 
As in many other developing countries, an official policy of user fees was adopted for the Lao 
health system in the 1990s. In principle, the poor were to be exempted from paying user fees 
at public health providers. This study aimed to contribute to policy on financial protection of the 
poor by (1) improving understanding of health care utilization and strategies adopted by 
households to deal with costs of Illness; (2) examining attitudes of policy makers and actual 
practice of public health care providers on fee exemptions of the poor; and (3) proposing better 
ways of protecting the poor. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were employed. Data were collected from 172 
households of 4 villages in Savannakhet Province; 26 public providers in Savannakhet Province 
and 3 public providers in Vientiane capital; and 22 policy makers in Vientiane capital, between 
October 2005 and July 2006. 
The exemption policy has been ineffectively implemented. In practice, criteria for identifying the 
poor were not specified and no budget was provided to hospitals to finance exemptions. 
Providers preserved exemptions for 'the destitute'. The payment of user fees could be delayed 
without interest when 'the poor' had insufficient cash. Villagers strongly believed in the principle 
of paying user fees to providers either at the point of service or through delayed payment, even 
though they lived In difficult conditions and their average consumption was below $US1.00 a 
day. Importantly, they did not perceive exemption from fees to be possible for 'the poor'. The 
majority of households did not access health care serviCes when III for reasons such as financial 
and geographical barriers; some of them suffered adverse health consequences as a result such 
as death or disability. The better the socia-economic group, the better was access to health 
care services. Among a total of 172 sampled households, twelve households were faced with 
catastrophiC health expenditure, most from the middle and poorest socio-economic group. The 
villagers managed health crises themselves mainly through drawing on social networks within 
the community in order to sell assets, borrow, and get other forms of support from neighbours. 
Although the study of households was small in scale, it was likely to echo households' 
difficulties elsewhere as the stUdied villages were similar to other rural areas without roads of 
Lao PDR. 
This study suggests that there is an urgent need for the government to improve two main 
areas: accessibility to adequate health care for everyone, everywhere; and reform of the 
nationwide policy on health financial risk protection for the poor and the less-poor In order to 
reduce catastrophiC health expenditure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The poor and the health of the poor have received an increasing amount of attention 
not only in the literature worldwide but also in the international policy agenda recently 
(Yazbeck et al. 2005). Resource poor settings tend to have worse health outcomes 
than better-off setting countries. Within the same area, poor people have worse health 
outcomes than better off people (Wagstaff 2002). Poverty is both a cause and effect of 
ill health (WHO 2001). The poor often have inadequate resources to pay for health 
services and ill health can push them further into the poverty trap. 
Many developing countrie s have adopted user fees in their health care financing 
systems with an argument that user fees would enhance the effectiveness and equity 
in health services by generating more revenue, reducing frivolous demand, and 
improving quality (Newbrander et al. 2001). User fees in the public sector and out of 
pocket payments in the private sector are currently the main source of health services 
financing in some countries, especially low income countries (Musgrove et al. 2002; 
Poullier et al. 2002). However, out-of-pocket financing is not an equitable source of 
financing. Where there is a lack of provision to grant partial or full waivers to the poor, 
user fees provide a financial barrier which leads to inequity in access to health care 
services (Newbrander et al. 2001). This is a dilemma of user fees. 
With the intention of making user fees achieve the policy aims of raising revenue, 
improving health system efficiency and enhancing equity in access to the health 
system, the mitigation of the impact of user fees on access to health services by the 
poor is important. Exempting the poor from paying user fees is a critical issue in the 
debate over user fees. If the poor are effectively exempted, then many criticisms of 
user fees drop away. The ideOlogy of price discrimination - the rich pay for health 
services, thereby generating adequate revenue to improve quality, whilst the poor 
have proper access to health services via reduced or non-existent user fees - could be 
achieved, if exemptions work well. However, the experience suggests that a policy of 
exempting the poor from paying user fees has generally not been effective (Gilson et 
al. 1995) for many reasons. Frequently, there is a substantial conflict between effective 
exemptions and the objective of raising revenue from user fees as long as providers 
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mainly rely on income from fees. This problem can be substantial, especially in low-
income countries where a majority of the population may be the poor who deserve 
exemption. 
User fees combined with an ineffective exemption system, in addition to the 
unpredictable nature of healthcare, could lead to financial hardship of households 
through paying fees at health care providers. It can impose catastrophic health 
expenditure on households. The households that access healthcare would em ploy 
strategies to cover user fees. These can be risky and potentia lIy plunge households 
into poverty or pus h indigents deeper into chronic poverty (WHO 2005). 
This study has its main focus on how and why the exemption mechanism succeeded or 
not in protecting the poor from paying user fees in the public health sector of the Lao 
Peoples' Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), one of the world's least developed counties 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2006). In the context of the current 
situation of health care financing in Lao PDR, the study aims to contribute to health 
financing policy on how to improve protection of the poor from health expenditure. 
Three key stakeholders namely households, public health care providers and policy 
makers, were studied. The study scrutinizes households' health care utilization 
patterns, illness costs, and coping strategies to deal with illness costs, including 
receiving exemptions. The study assesses the implementation of a national policy on 
fee exemption of the poor from public health care providers' and policy makers' 
perspectives. Subsequently, according to evidence from the study combined with 
reviews of relevant documents, the study makes suggestions which contribute to 
debates about how to improve health financial risk protection to the poor in Lao PDR in 
particular, as well as developing countries in general. 
The rest of this thesis is organized into nine chapters (chapter 2-10) as follows; 
Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature on user fees; what are user fees, their features 
and objectives and arguments pro and con user fees. Protection mechanisms, 
especially exemptions to the poor, are reviewed with equity as the main concern. 
Community financing is reviewed as providing other options for protecting the poor. 
Subsequently, gaps of knowledge are identified in the last section. 
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Chapter 3 presents the aims and objectives of the thesis. Literature on models of the 
determinants of supply and demand, health care utilization and household coping 
strategies to deal with illness costs are reviewed in this chapter in order to develop a 
conceptual framework for the thesis. This chapter also summarizes the study setting. 
Methods used in this study are presented by four sub-studies; (1) households' 
perspective, (2) public providers' perspective, (3) policy makers' perspective and (4) an 
analysis for improving health financial risk protection. 
Chapter 4 provides ba ckground information on the household sites for instance location 
of the four selected villages in the districts and the province, ge neral living conditions 
and availability of health care facilities. The second half of the chapter presents the 
main findings of the poverty assessment of the villagers from four parameters: wealth 
groups, household consumption, asset index and food security. 
Chapter 5 examines information from all 172 households in the four sampled villages in 
terms of reported illness, utilization of outpatient COP) treatment, admiSSion, and direct 
financial cost of treatment. These variables are presented by villages and by wealth 
groups. 
Chapter 6 presents data for all 172 households on the cost burden of treatment costs 
on monthly household non-food consumption and coping strategies adopted by the 
households to deal with costs of treatment. Household catastrophic health expenditure 
is identified. Qualitative data are provided for better understanding of the economic 
consequences on households due to illness. In addition, the chapter addresses the 
perceptions of households on user fees and exemptions at public health providers. 
Chapter 7 describes the national policy on user fees and exemption (known as Decree 
52 PM) from the viewpoint of policy makers and public providers at all levels of the 
country from the nationa I level to comm unity level. The chapter examines public health 
care providers' behaviour and attitudes on exemption mechanisms and the perceptions 
and preferences of national policy makers on fee exemption policy and implementation. 
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Chapter 8 aims to recommend a financing model which can improve health financial 
protection to the people, and draws together the findings from the study, the literature 
review and the current context of health care financing in Lao PDR. The analysis 
suggests financing options for better protecting not only the poor but also the less-
poor. This chapter analyses the financial implications of alternative protection 
mechanisms applying geographical a nd direct targeting. 
Chapter 9 discusses the strengths a nd weaknesses of the research design and the 
methods employed by the study. The main findings are summarized and then 
discussed. 
Chapter 10 presents substantive conclusions of the study and provides policy 
recommendations. The chapter identifies how the study contributes to knowledge and 
suggests further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature on user fees and protection 
mechanisms. In the first section, user fees in theory and practice are reviewed in order 
to understand what user fees are meant to achieve, their features and the arguments 
for and against them. Protection mechanisms, focusing on ta rgeting, are explored in 
the second section. The third section presents examples of three countries, namely 
Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam on user fees, exemptions and other types of 
protection mechanisms. The fourth section reviews another form of protecting the 
poor, focusing on community based health insurance. Its potential to protect the poor 
is explored. Knowledge gaps, as revealed in the literature review, are identified in the 
final section. 
2.1 User fees 
This section outl ines the theory of user fees, the three main objectives of user fees, 
and the arguments for and against such a system in practice. 
2.1.1 What are user fees? 
Newbrander et al. (2000) define user fees as payments made by individuals or families 
in exchange for the use of health services and goods: this is sometimes called cost 
sharing or cost recovery. Health systems charge user fees in order to access private 
resources to help finance their services and to improve the effiCiency of utilization. The 
type and form of user fees vary from a usual fee for each service provided (fee-for-
service) to fees based on an episode of illness or per case. Co-payments made by 
patients under prepaid insurance systems are not con~idered user fees in this 
definition. 
User fees in this study refer to out-of-pocket payments, out of pocket from patients at 
the point of service delivery for buying public health care services with whatever form 
of charge and at whatever level of public health care provision. 
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2.1.2 What is the purpose of user fees in theory? 
Most of the literature indicates three purposes of user fees which are: to improve 
efficiency, to improve equity; and to generate more revenue for the health care 
system. User fees can have both efficiency and equity benefits for health care systems 
(Gilson 1997). User fees are recommended in two situations. Firstly, they can be 
introduced as a way of improving effiCiency when health expenditure is high. Secondly, 
they are recommended as a way to mobilize more resources into health systems than 
currently exist (Creese 1997). The three purposes of user fees are discussed in terms 
of theoretical concepts in the following sections. 
Efficiency improvement 
Demand for health care can, in theory, be analysed like the demand for other goods 
and services (McPake et al 2002). The law of demand in economic theory indicates 
that 'other things remaining the same, the higher the price of a good, the smaller is 
the quantity demanded' (Parkin et al. 2000). Figure 2.1 illustrates an individual's 
demand curve for health care. 
Price of 
health care 
Pl 
Pe 
o Qe Q2 Ql Quantity of health care 
per unit of time 
Figure 2.1 An individual's demand for health care 
According to the demand curve, once health care services are free (price is equal to 
zero), the highest demand on health services arises which might be due to patient 
needs or frivolous health care usage or careless resource consumption. When user fees 
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are introduced, it has been argued that patients will be concerned about appropriate 
use and cost effectiveness of health care services and this leads to efficiency of the 
health care system (World Bank 1987). 
Assuming market price of Pe, the optimal point of consu mption and provision of 
services can be defined as the point at which demand, representing marginal benefit, 
equals price, representing marginal cost, Qe on figure 2.1, i.e. where marginal benefit 
equals marginal cost. The inefficiency of zero price in comparison with a perfect market 
can be represented by the shaded triangle AQeQ1. The amount of over consumption is 
represented as Qe - Q1. This over consumption results in a welfare loss to society 
represented by the area ABQ1. For instance, the benefit of care consumed at Q2 is 
defined by the distance between Q2 and C w,hile the cost of care is Pe. The existence 
of positive externalities shifts the demand curve outwards, justifying a subsidy to the 
point where marginal social benefit equals the price. 
Equity improvement 
In theory user fees can improve the equity of the health care system by collecting fees 
from the better-off and redistributing revenue to the worse-off (World Bank 1987). 
Revenue generated from user fees can cross subsidize services for the poor by 
reducing the price or providing free care for the poor. It can also be administratively 
feasible to set up an effective pricing structure in order to raise more revenue from the 
better-off and modify the revenue support to the worse-off, for example, by setting a 
higher price in a private room for those who can afford it. The hospital can then 
allocate revenue from these fees to provide basic health care for the poor. According 
to the demand curve, the poor will receive more services when the price of health care 
services falls. It results in greater access to health care services by the poor and 
enhances equity of accessibility to health care services. 
Revenue generated 
Another objective of user fees is to raise more revenue in the health care system. In a 
World Bank Policy Study (1987), the World Bank proposed four policy reforms. The 
first promoted the adoption of user fees for health care in the public health sector of 
developing countries with three main objectives. The first objective of introducing user 
fees was to raise additional money while effiCiency improvements and improving 
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equitable access to health care for the poor were second and third objectives (World 
Bank 1987). In the public health sector, user fees are usually introduced or increased 
to supplement public funds when public funds cannot cover the cost of providing 
services. Sometimes user fees are set up in a health system for a particular reason, for 
example, to generate cash for drugs procurement in a health facility (Newbrander et al 
2001) as well as to operate revolving drug funds which is the case in Vientiane capital, 
Lao PDR (Murakami et al. 2001). Increasing revenue from user fees can also support 
quality improvement if it ensures an adequate financial flow for drug procurement and 
stocks in hos pita Is. 
2.1.3 Arguments for and against user fees in practice 
The purposes of user fees were confirmed by an international survey of health service 
user fees in 26 low- and middle-income countries (Russell and Gilson 1995). 
Respondents from all countries identified several policy objectives of user fees, the 
most common being to raise revenue (80%) and improve service quality (62%). Other 
objectives were: extending service coverage (around 55%), discouraging unnecessary 
visits (around 38%) and encouraging appropriate use of referral systems (around 
35%). The objectives of improving service quality and extending service coverage were 
related to equity improvement. The objectives of discouraging unnecessary visits and 
encouraging appropriate use of the referral system were related to effiCiency 
improvement. 
Although most articles agree with the three broad objectives of introducing user fees 
to health care systems, some main arguments for and against the welfare- enhancing 
effects of user fees are shown in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Main arguments for and against the potential welfare-enhancing 
effects of user charges 
Potential sources of 
welfare gain 
Efficiency 
improvements 
Improving 
equitable access 
Supporting-arguments 
• Encourage rational utilization of 
services among users by 
(i) limiting the use of services for 
'frivolous' or 'unnecessary' 
reasons; 
(ii) reducing patients' 
inappropriate use of referrals; 
(iii) curbing moral hazard 
behaviour. 
• Increase the degree of accountability 
which service providers have towards 
community. 
• User charges plus quality 
improvements make the government 
health centres more attractive to all 
income groups as retained revenues 
and the freed government budgetary 
resources are used to Increase 
coverage and quality of services, 
especially those used by the poor. 
• The demand for medical services Is 
not generally sensitive to changes In 
price levels. 
• It Is administratively feasible to 
formulate and Implement an effective 
pridng and collection mechanism that 
protects the poor. 
• Many households are able and willing 
to pay moderate user charges for 
services of perceived quality and 
these charges are less likely to 
impose undue burden on household 
resources. 
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Counter-arguments 
• Many patients are not in a position to 
judge the seriousness of their 
symptoms and their medical needs. 
• Most unnecessary utilization may have 
already been curbed by high indirect 
costs of accessing services. 
• User charges do little to curb the 
unnecessary use by the affluent 
groups. 
• In the presence of Information 
asymmetry and incomplete agency 
relationship between the provider and 
patient, user charges penalize patients 
for decisions made by providers over 
which the patient has little or no 
discretion. 
• Where part of the fee revenue is 
retained by local fadlltles and used 
appropriately, It allows for only small 
improvements In coverage and 
quality. 
• User-finanCing does little to improve 
the health status of the poor, 
particularly the rural poor, as long as 
the existing resource allocation within 
the health sector continues to favour 
urban, facility-based, curative 
services. 
• Fees deepen regional inequality In 
favour of populated and rich regions. 
• Money prices Influence households' 
choice and utilization of health care 
services and the demand of low-
income households Is more sensitive 
to price changes than the demand by 
other households. 
• There are considerable Informational, 
administrative, sodo-cultural and 
political constraints that tend to 
undermine the Implementation of an 
effective exemption scheme. 
• Some households, especially the poor 
and chronically III who persist In 
paying with the greatest difficulty may 
do so by diverting funds from the 
purchase of food and other basic 
necessities or selling off a productive 
asset vital for the future well being of 
the household and Its members. 
• A willingness to pay for traditional 
care may not Indicate a willingness to 
pay for allopathic care If these two 
types of care are perceived not to be 
substitutes for all groups of illness. 
Potential sources of 
welfare gain 
Raising 
additional money 
Supporting-arguments 
• Increase the financial resources of 
the health sector by (i) shifting part 
of costs to the users and (ii) freeing 
resources as 'frivolous' or 
'unnecessary' use of services is 
curbed. 
• Moderate user charges increase 
revenues assuming that the demand 
is price inelastic and the cost of 
designing and implementing an 
effective user charge system is 
negligible. 
• Collected fee revenues are retained 
in the local health facilities allowing 
for (i) noticeable improvements in 
coverage and quality of services in 
the short-term: (Ii) reorientation of 
govemment resources away from 
curative toward preventive care in 
the long term. 
• Make the health sector finanCially 
more self-sufficient and insulate 
health sector from contractions in 
govemment budgets. 
• Encourage community-participation 
in decision making in areas affecting 
the health-status of the community 
members. 
Source: Sepehri and Chernomas (2001) 
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Counter-arguments 
• The revenue-raising potential of user 
charges has proven to be mixed in 
practice and generally well below the 
expected 10-20 per cent of total 
government recurrent health 
expenditure. 
• The revenue-generating potential of 
user charges is severely constrained in 
practice by several factors, including 
weak administrative and management 
capacity, seasonality in the availability 
of cash, and the absence of a credit 
system. 
• Collected fee revenues are rarely fully 
retained locally and where they are 
retained there are few institutional 
arrangements in place to ensure that 
these resources are used effectively. 
• The resources generated through user 
financing may lead to central 
govemment substitution away from 
the health sector. 
• User charges are often imposed on 
communities with little or no prior 
consultation. 
Raising revenue can be achieved only if there is demand for the health services for 
which fees are charged and if the system is able to deliver those services. If there is 
little demand for the services or if the demand is highly elastic (that is sensitive to price 
changes 1), then charging user fees will generate little additional revenue. Although the 
political objective and some particular reasons for user fees are to generate more 
revenue, it is important to recog nize that the total amount of revenue generated is 
unlikely to be sufficient to meet the growing need and demand for high-quality hea Ith 
care due to several factors as mentioned in the above table. Net revenue from user 
fees is on average only 5 percent of operating costs and is inadequate to alter current 
quality of services (Russell and Gilson 1997). However, the net revenue from user fees 
may represent a significant proportion of n on-labour recurrent costs (Creese and 
Kutzin 1995). 
lPrice elasticity of demand is a measure of the responsiveness of demand to changes in the price of 
the product. A high price elasticity of demand shows that purchasers are price sensitive, whereas a low 
price elasticity of demand shows purchasers are less sensitive to price. Mathematically, the own price 
elasticity of demand (OPed) is calculated as follows: OPed = % change in demand / % change in price 
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Some early studies of the empirical evidence using econometric demand models to 
predict the elasticity of demand for health care showed that medical demand in terms 
of amount of utilization is inelastic to the price (Heller 1982). But these models did not 
adequately explore price elasticity of demand by income group. Later studies on 
demand models which looked at this found that the poor are sensitive to prices and 
less able to pay higher prices (Ching 1995). Since the poor are less able to pay higher 
prices, they reduce utilization proportionately more than the rich. This is supported by 
empirical evidence using various study methods. A field experiment comparing 
utilization before and after the introduction of fees found that poor households in 
Bangladesh, especially the landless, reduced access to medical care after user fees 
were introduced in public health care services (Stanton and Clemens 1989). 
Information from a cross-sectional survey of the rural poor in Northern Vietnam shows 
that after introducing user fees at community and district level, the poor in poorer 
communes were most affected by user fees (Ensor and San 1996). The poor generally 
delay treatment, make less use of government health facilities, and pay more for each 
episode of illness than the rich. One study of articles searched since 1995 on the 
impact of various health care financing systems on access to medical services in low 
income countries concludes that, in general, user fees deterred utilization in many 
settings, although it is often unclear to what extent and what kind of use is most 
affected (Palmer et al. 2004). 
User fees not only affect demand for health services. A critical aspect of user fees is 
when patients must pay cash for health services. It can have a significant impact on 
their care-seeking behaviour, especially if they are poor (Russell 1996). It can also 
undermine households' economic circumstances. User fees increase the probability of 
catastrophic health s pending by households, which has been defined as 40 per cent of 
non-food income, a nd it occurs disproportionately among the poor (Xu et al. 2003). 
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2.2 Protection mechanisms within user fee policy 
This section reviews literature related to protection mechanisms, mainly focusing on 
targeting, under a user fee system. The section starts by considering the equity aspect 
in order to provide general background on the importance of providing protection to 
the vulnerable group to user fees. The following sub-sections present types of 
targeting, the process of implementing the targeting mechanism and its performance 
evaluation. The last sub-section emphasizes the mechanisms designed to protect the 
poor under user fees. 
2.2.1 Equity when introducing user fees 
Generally, the concern of equity is interpreted as providing basic health services to all 
(Braveman and Gruskin 2003). But equity is about fairness and unequal may be judged 
to be fair. In health care it may be judged equitable to have unequal access to 
services, for example people who are more likely to be ill should have more 
opportunity to access medical services. Two definitions of equity, horizontal and 
vertical equity, should be described in term of their dimensions (Donaldson and Gerard 
1993). Horizontal equity is concerned with equal treatment for equal need. The most 
common types of horizontal equity are equality of expenditure, utilization and access. 
Vertical equity is concerned with unequal treatment for unequal need. People who are 
unequal in society should be treated differently. 
The World Health Organization defines equity as "equal access to available care for 
equal need, equal utilization for equal need, and equal quality of care for all" (WHO 
1999). The term access refers both to financial access and geographical access. 
WHO's description of what is necessary for equity supports the importance of equity as 
a principle of social justice and fairness: striving for equity in hea Ith and health care 
means doing what is necessary to (1) reduce avoidable, unfair, and unjustifiable 
differences in health status, health determinants, and risk factors; (2) improve access 
to and utilization of quality health care services by all population groups according to 
need; and (3) create an enabling intersectoral policy and resource environ ment for 
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establishing and sustaining equity in health and health care as a national development 
policy (WHO 1998). 
The greatest risk in introducing user fees is that the poor and vulnerable may be 
limited or prevented from accessing the health services they need, based on their 
financial circumstances. 
2.2.2 Targeting protection against user fees 
The purpose of targeting is "to concentrate resources on those who need them most" 
(Newbrander et al. 2000). Targeting is a response intended to maintain equity by 
shielding these populations from some or all of the fees imposed for health services. 
Different authors have offered different typologies of targeting methods. Grosh (1995) 
recognized th ree main methods: individual assessment mechanisms, group or 
geographic targeting and self-targeting. Newbrander et al. (2000) identified three 
methods: direct targeting, characteristic targeting and self-targeting which meant the 
same as Grosh's methods. Willis and Leighton (1995) distinguished between two types 
of targeting: characteristic targeting (equivalent to Grosh's group targeting) and direct 
targeting (based on direct individual or household assessment). Bitran and Giedion 
(2003) classified four categories of targeting, (a) Individual identification (b) 
Identification based on group characteristics (c) Self-identification (d) Self-selection by 
type of service, plus one untargeted programme namely universal provision. However, 
it was indicated that unive rsal provision is too costly and fa ils to have much impact on 
poverty and that targeting can promote cost-effectiveness. 
Protection mechanisms relevant to this review rely on three main methods of targeting, 
as categorised by Newbrander et al (2000). 
Direct targeting is the provision of free or reduced-price benefits to people who cannot 
pay because of their low income. It involves identifying speCific patients or families 
who cannot afford to pay the full or even partial fee for health ca reo Identifying these 
individuals requires determining thei r ability to pay by examining external evidence, a 
process called "means testing". When an individual is shown by a means test to have 
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an income that falls below the income level set by policy, he or she is eligible for free 
or partially subsidized hea Ith services. 
Means testing is time-consuming and costly. It can be done by using actual inform ation 
on income and wealth or using proxy information or other processes. For example, in 
Thailand the low-income card scheme is means tested using a local committee's 
assessment of the applicant's wealth (Gilson et al. 1998). 
Characteristic targeting is the provision of free or reduced-price benefits to people with 
certain attributes, special Circumstances, or special needs regardless of income level 
(e.g. certain contagious illnesses or vulnerable groups, such as children). Exemptions 
are the means of applying characteristic targeting. This form of targeting may cover 
some of the poor but does not directly target the poor for benefits. Typically, the 
services promoted under this system are those with positive ext~rnalities-services 
whose benefits extend beyond the individual receiving care. 
Self-targeting involves an individual's self-selection for participation (or not) ina 
programme. It is a mechanism that encourages poor and non-poor patients to use 
separate services, such as a special room, a special time, or waiting in line. The 
principle underlying this strategy is that, given a chOice, patients who can afford to pay 
will prefer to be treated separately and possibly in a more private and much more 
timely manner. (A caveat: It is important for equity to ensure that providing services 
separately does not result in creating two tiers of service quality: high-quality services 
for the non-poor and low-quality services for the poor (Newbrander et al. 2001).) 
Most of these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and can be used individually or in 
combination. They differ in ease of application, cost of determining eligibility, extent to 
which the poor and non-poor receive benefits, and sensitivity to regional differences. 
Direct and characteristic targeting are summarised in table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Overview of the Two Primary Targeting Mechanisms 
Feature 
Population targeted 
Qualification for 
reduced or no fees 
Examples of qualified 
individuals 
Means of determining 
qualification 
Result of qualification 
(term used for receipt 
of a total or partial 
subsidy) 
Advantages of the 
protection mechanism 
Direct Targeting 
• The poor 
• Determined by income level 
• Members of poor families 
• Means test 
• Evaluation by social worker 
• Proxy means test 
• Visual assessment (e.g., of 
clothing or housing) 
• Certification by village elder or 
chief 
• Waiver 
• Targets the poor directly 
• Reaches the poor more 
effectively 
Disadvantages of the • Requires much information 
protection mechanism • Risks missing some poor 
(potential under-coverage) 
• Risks including some non-poor 
(potential leakage) 
• Stigmatizes those receiving 
the waiver 
• May be more bureaucratic and 
arbitrary 
Source: Newbrander et al. (2000) 
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Characteristic Targeting 
• Individuals of specified target 
groups 
• Determined by individual's 
cha racteristics 
• 
• Armed forces 
• Civil servants 
• TB patients 
• Children under five 
• Pregnant women 
• AIDS patients 
• Age (under five or elderly) 
• Geographical residence 
• Employment (military, civil 
service) 
• Nutritional status (at-risk 
child) 
• Diagnosis 
• Exemption 
• Requires less Information 
• Requires less cost to 
administer 
• Has less stigma attached 
• May not exempt all of the 
poor from paying fees (under-
coverage) 
• Exempts many who can afford 
to pay (leakage) 
• Accrues benefits to the non-
poor 
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2.2.3 Process of implementing and performance of targeting mechanisms 
Bitran and Giedion (2003) identified three steps to accomplishing equitable access to 
health care services by employing targeting mechanisms (either direct or 
characteristics targeting) under a user fee system as shown in figure 2.2. Firstly, it is 
important to identify who is eligible for protection. The population to receive 
preferential treatment with respect to user fees must be identified. Secondly, types of 
targeting must be selected, designed and implemented. Thirdly, an evaluation of the 
performance of the targeting mechanism is necessary with the purpose of ensuring 
that the protection policy is working effectively (Bitran and Giedion 2003). 
Figure 2.2 Steps in the adoption of targeting mechanisms 
Step 1 
Identify beneficiaries r---\ 
of targeting L-..j 
Source: Bitran and Giedion (2003) 
Step 2 
Select, design and 
implement a type of 
targeting 
Step 3 
Evaluate performance 
of selected targeting 
mechanism 
All three steps of the whole process involve three key actors; policy makers, health 
care providers and communities. Performance assessment of the targeting mechanism 
is mainly evaluated on five key indicators which are; coverage, leakage, administrative 
cost, access and financial burden (Bitran and Giedion 2003). 
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Coverage and leakage evaluation 
Performance can be assessed by comparing actual exemption and waiver levels with 
targets and measuring coverage and leakage of the targeting mechanism. 
• Under-coverage. Occurs when the intended beneficiaries do not receive 
benefits intended for them and either have to pay for care or do not use it at 
all. 
• Leakage. Occurs when the non-intended beneficiaries receive benefits that 
were intended for the intended benefiCiaries, resulting in the problem of 
charging people less than they can afford to pay. 
• Effectiveness. The ability of waiver and exemption mechanisms to ensure that 
the benefit of not having to pay for health services reaches the intended 
beneficiaries and that those for whom the benefit was not intended do not 
receive that benefit. (table 2.3) 
Table 2.3 Leakage and under-coverage in the application of targeting 
Applicant 
classified as 
Intended 
beneficiaries 
Non-intended 
beneficiaries 
Actual group of waiver applicant 
Intended beneficiaries 
Applicant correctly given 
benefits 
Under coverage. Intended 
beneficiaries are not given 
benefits 
Non-intended beneficiaries 
Leakage. Non-intended 
beneficiaries given benefits 
Applicant correctly denied 
benefits 
Source: Newbrander et al. (2000) 
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Influencing factors 
Bitran and Giedion (2003) described design and implementation features of protection 
mechanisms that affect their performance, as briefly summarized in table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Main features of design and implementation of targeting 
mechanism that affect performance 
Design and im plementation 
Genera/design and 
implementation features 
Design and implementation 
features influencing the 
supply of exemptiohs 
Design and implementation 
features influencing the 
demand for exemptions 
Main features 
1. Funding: Public resources available to finance 
exemptions 
2. Health benefit covered: explicitly defined or not. 
3. Existence and clarity of national policy 
4. Exemption criteria: criteria for identification of 
benefiCiary 
5. Assigning responsibility for determination of those 
eligible: person or entities within or outside of 
health facility 
6. Taking into account the multiple dimensions of 
vulnerability of the intended beneficiary: 
stigmatization problem 
7. Updating fees and income eligibility thresholds: 
subject to changing context 
8. Institutional aspects: clear guidance and 
appropriate support to impleme nter 
1. Provider compensation: sufficient subsidy covers all 
levels of exemption and administrative cost 
2. Timeliness of compensation 
3. Harmonizing the incentives created by different 
payment mechanisms: provider attitude and 
behavior on "the best paying patients" 
1. Disseminating information: knowledge for both 
health staff and potential beneficiaries 
2. Access cost to exemption system: If the 
participation costs are high, it may deter demand to 
take up exemptions. 
3. Social importance of stigma and discrimination of 
the exempted patient: Responsiveness of health 
care staff and eligibility examiner is important for 
encouraging the poor to take exemptions. 
Source: Bitran and Giedion (2003) 
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If user fee systems are to reach an effective level in protecting equity while generating 
revenue, the following im portant issues need to be addressed (Bitran and Giedion 
2003): 
• The leaders must have commitment to the equity principle. 
• For implementing the user fee system and exemption mechanism, clear 
guidelines are fundamental. Information about the user fee system, guidelines 
on the use of fee revenue and eligible criteria must be provided by the policy. 
• At a facility level, administrative capacity is necessary for implementing a user 
fee system, collecting the fees, properly using the revenue to benefit the 
community and the poor, and exempting the poor. 
• The accountability of the facility on use of fee revenue should be announced to 
the community. 
• Effectiveness of the system can be measured according to the two types of 
protection mechanism (direct and characteristics targeting). Targeting is 
effective to the extent to which: 
o The eligible people who come for care are properly identified and 
granted wa ivers; 
o The non-eligible people who come for care are properly classified and 
not granted waivers; 
o The eligible people who do not come to the facility are reached; 
o Revenues are collected from those who should pay; 
o The eligible people, patients, and community are aware that waivers are 
available for the intended beneficiaries; 
o Staff know how to g rant waivers and apply the guidelines consistently. 
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2.2.4 Mechanisms to protect the poor within user fee policy 
The above sub-section provides information on both direct and characteristics 
targeting. This sub-section focuses only on direct targeting or exemptions to protect 
the poor under user fees. Russell and Gilson (1997) suggested two key strategies to 
promote access for the poor under a user fee system as can be seen in figure 2.3. 
Targeting to protect the poor and resource use to benefit the poor are facilitated by 
decentralization. 
1. Perceptible service improvements. When user fees are introduced in the health care 
system, utilization might not decline if users recognize health services to be more 
effective and of greater value for money. Two other important preconditions for 
improvement of health services are decentralized financial control to keep and use user 
fee revenue at the point of collection and policy guidelines for health care facility 
management to use user fee revenue for health care service improvement and benefit 
for the poor. 
2. Carefully designed fee schedules with exemptions. The choice of fees and targeting 
mechanisms depends on the situation in the individual country. National priorities, 
issues of social solidarity and the structure of the health care system must be of 
concern. 
Figure 2.3 An idealized view of promoting access for the poor within a user 
fee system. 
Exemptions to 
protect the poor 
Resource use to 
benefit the poor 
Source: Russell and Gilson (1997) 
1---+---1 Ability to 
pay 
Increased coverage 
t--:~--1 and lor quality 
improvements 
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The success of introducing a us er fee system in public health facilities with effective 
protection of the poor depends on many factors. Environmental factors and design 
factors are two main factors facilitating protecting the poor by means testing (Willis 
and Leighton 1995). A variety of factors result in differences in waiver practices across 
hospitals. Willis noted that hospitals were reluctant to charge fees, reducing fee 
revenue that might have been used to benefit the poor. Other factors included 
differences in equity objectives, eligibility criteria, availability of information of patient 
incomes and incentives faced by the facility. 
Gilson (1988) emphasized that two main features required to protect the poor are an 
exemption mechanism and retention of sufficient revenue to extend and improve 
services in health care facilities. Introducing user fees within public health sectors 
requires management expertise. In order to promote improvement of management 
practices on user fees and exemptions, decentralization as a part of a financing policy 
package is recommended. Planning and budgeting autonomy as well as incentives to 
collect fee revenue should be authorized to local managers. Revenue retention might 
provide some incentives to better management of user fees. In addition, the successful 
implementation of user fee systems will be possible if there are adequate and 
appropriately trained staff and relevant management information systems. Gilson et al. 
(1998) suggested that one key element on the supply-side of success in relation to 
exemption mechanisms was careful planning for implementation, including training and 
information dissemination to health workers and those benefiting. Meng et al. (2002) 
recommended that hospitals required both adequate financial and political support for 
implementing effective protection from hospital charges for the poor. 
However, Gilson (1988) indicated that the effective administration of these procedures 
was beyond many government health systems at that time. Gilson et al. (1998) found 
that eligibility for free care within the Free Medical care Project in Thailand was based 
on the subjective judgment of the directors of health care providers but. they did not 
have time or capacity to do a detailed assessment of the income of patients in order to 
apply the principle uniformly. Russell and Gilson (1995) indicated that apart from the 
greatest constraint to effective implementation of exemptions, lack of information 
about people's income, economic incentives was another major constraint. Providers 
felt reluctant to grant exemptions. This may arise because providers personally benefit 
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from the income from user fees (eg because fees are used to pay staff bonuses), or 
their facility benefits from improved working conditions made possible by user fee 
revenue. Newbrander et al. (2001) showed similar constraints to effective application 
of protecting the poor: for example staff were more concerned with generating 
revenues than granting waivers and exemptions and staff responsible for exemptions 
were untrained, might be too few, and faced time constraints. If the reason for an 
ineffective exemption scheme is "not enough time", "inadequate staff" and "untrained 
staff", it implies that the leader of the health facility and other staff gave this scheme a 
low priority compared to other tasks. This might have been because they lacked 
commitment and motivation to achieve the goals of the scheme. The only international 
publication on Lao POR, on an urban area by Paphassarang et al. (2002), found that 
user fees at public providers were the main barrier for the poor and the exemption 
mechanism was not functioning. One reason was because of poor staff attitudes 
towards the poor and the less-poor patients. Bad staff attitudes were likely to have 
greater consequences for the poor, since they discouraged the poor from benefiting 
from exemptions. 
However, no evidence clearly points out the incentives and disincentives for providers 
to provide exemptions to the poor. Moreover, in international health policy, there is no 
clear evidence as to whether exemption policy and practice influence the poor's coping 
strategies or not. Most studies have looked at numbers of exemptions, not household 
behaviour in terms of why households do/do not take them up. It is unclear what 
factors might encourage the poor to take up exemptions 
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2.3 Asian experience on user fees and protecting the poor 
Literature from Southeast Asian countries, namely Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand, 
are reviewed as they are the neighboring countries of Lao PDR. Their socio-cultural 
contexts are similar. The main concern of the review is to seek information relevant to 
the application of exemption arrangements and some other protection mechanisms. 
cambodia 
A cost recovery scheme was introduced in the National Maternal and Child Hea Ith 
Center (NMCHC) of cambodia, a public hospital in 1997. The study of NMCHC's 
experience with user fees during 1997-2000 suggested user fees can produce 
supplementary hospital revenue and can improve hospital services (Akashi et al. 2004). 
Utilization by patients also increased. User fees generated a sustainability cycle which 
contributed to an exemption programme for the worse-off patients, alleviating the 
government's financial burden and decreasing donor aid. Staff awareness was key to 
the effective implementation of this user fee scheme. 
A case study of the introduction of user fees at operational district level, Kirivong 
District Hospital in cambodia, revealed that user fees created a 'medical poverty trap' 
which had significant health and livelihood impact including untreated morbidity and 
long-term impoverishment (Jacobs and Price 2004). The exemption mechanism system 
was constrained by at least three main problems. First, there was a limitation of 
administrative capacity and it was expensive to operate. Second, the administration 
and monitoring of exemptions was fraught, as there was no clear guideline on the 
application of exemptions which resulted in misallocation of benefits. Finally, 
insufficient information and stigmatization prevented the poor from taking up 
exemptions. These three problems combined to make targeting expensive and 
ineffective. 
One study pointed out that the amount of out-of-pocket payment for health care 
expenditure mostly depends on choice of health care provision. Health care 
expenditure was considerably higher for people using the public hospital in 
combination with the private hospital, and much higher for those using exclusively the 
private hospital (Van Damme et al. 2004). The study showed that even relatively 
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modest out-of-pocket health expenditure of a relatively short disease episode, such as 
dengue in a young child, frequently caused catastrophic health expenditure leading to 
debt in households and could lead to poverty. 
An interesting functioning mechanism is the Health Equity Fund managed by a local 
NGO in Sotnikum, cambodia. The Health Equity Fund identifies the poor and pays user 
fees on their behalf. It appears to effectively improve access to medical care for the 
poor by improving 'ma rketing' and inform ation sharing. The Health Equity Fund in 
Sotnikum is able to operate effectively within three conditions (Hardeman et al. 2004). 
First, the fund is only a complement to a relatively well-functioning health service, in 
which health staff are adequate and qualified, drugs are available and there are no 
informal charges. Second, substantial socio-economic di fferentiation in rural cambodia 
makes it possible to generate revenue from user fees from the majority of the 
population, while targeting support to those unable to pay. Third, a local NGO has 
considerable experience in the region and shows a positive attitude and ability to serve 
the poor. A recent publication by Noirhomme et al. (2007) reviewed the experience of 
implementing four different Health Equity Funds in cambodia. It confirms that a Health 
Equity Fund is able to improve access to hospital services by the poorest people under 
the user fee system. Some lessons learnt are that subsidizing hospital care is an 
absolute need and targeting techniques can be used in combination. The four funds 
are financed by external sources and the paper argues that local sources of funding 
alone are not able to meet the health care costs of the eligible poor. Nonetheless, the 
paper does not provide any argument on the sustainability of the external sources. 
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Vietnam 
User fees were introduced to public health facilities in Vietnam in 1995. Revenue from 
user fees constituted 30% of public hospital revenue by 1998 (Sepehri et al. 2005). 
Another study by Sepehri et al. (2003) showed that the system led to widespread self-
treatment by both the poor and non-poor, people faced financial abuse by public and 
private providers and health care costs were substantial for many low- and middle-
income households (Sepehri et al. 2003). There were formal exemption mechanisms 
for vulnerable groups such as war veterans, the disabled, orphans, ethnic minorities 
and the very poor. Quantitative studies in north Vietnam found that poor households 
delayed health service seeking (Segall et al 2002), and had lower use of public health 
facilities (Ensor and San 1996). The exemptions mechanism failed to protect the poor 
under user fees. About 60% of the rural households were in debt, with a third of the m 
citing payment for health services as the main reason. Ensor and San (1996) called for 
a completely new protection mechanism for the poor. 
Vietnam's Health care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) started in 2003. The government 
mandated all provincial governm ents to provide free health care to the poor, ethnic 
minorities in mountainous provinces deSignated as difficult, and all households living in 
disadvantaged comm unes. The HCFP received two sources of finance; 75% from the 
central government and the rest from the provincial government. Analyzing the 
Vietnam Household and Living Standard Survey in 2004, Wagstaff (2007a) found that 
the HCFP covered the poor well but was not able to cover all intended groups. The 
programme functions fairly well in terms of increasing the utilization of services and 
reducing the risk of catastrophiC health expenditure. However, the utilization impacts 
are rarely Significant a mong the poorest decile and the poor households were still at 
considerable risk of catastrophiC spending. 
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Thailand 
Before the Universal Coverage Scheme in 2001, Thailand had had long standing user 
fee schemes among public health providers. It had raised a significant amount of 
revenue for hospitals providing, on average 40% of total hospital revenue. Of this user 
fee revenue, around one-third was collected from drug selling on a fee-for-service 
basis. The government developed the Low Income card Scheme (UCS) for the poor as 
well as other vulnerable groups such as monks, students, and elderly people. The 
identification of the poor was conducted at community level. People who qualified we re 
given a beneficiary card. Special funds were set aside to compensate public providers 
for waived services. The UCS experienced difficulties with targeting: using formal 
income criteria, leakage, under coverage, stigmatization of the poor and, the most 
important issue, inadequate funding (Gilson et al. 1998). A problem of inequity in 
budget allocation for UCS was shown with budget allocations favouring the better-off 
regions, and not focused in those regions which had higher numbers of poor people 
eligible for UCS (Mills 1991). Another study showed that the poor were more likely to 
pay for health care expenditure out of their own pocket than the better-off group, and 
they paid more as a proportion of their household income compared to more privileged 
groups (Pannarunothai and Mills 1997). The underprivileged gro up was least likely to 
be covered by a government health benefit scheme and about two-thirds of family 
members in the poorest quintile were not covered by the UCS. 
The Thai government fully implemented the Universal Coverage Scheme throughout 
the country in October 2001. The scheme was funded by the government budget. 
Limwattananon et al. (2007) reported that the overall incidence of catastrophic 
expenditure reduced to 3.3% and 2.8% in 2002 and 2004. Despite health financial risk 
protection for the entire population, household catastrophic health expenditure and 
impoverishment could still be found, mainly due to use of services in private hospitals 
which were not covered by the scheme. 
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2.4 Protection mechanism for the poor: community-based health insurance 
The two sections above provide information on mechanisms to protect vulnerable 
groups (including the poor) using targeting under user fees. Examples from three 
neighbouring countries of Lao PDR suggest that exemptions, generally, did not 
function well to protect the poor and other types of protection mechanis mare 
required. This section looks at literature which describes protecting the poor from user 
fees using community-financing. The form of health insurance, community based 
health insurance (CBHI), is reviewed because it exists as a pilot project in Lao PDR. 
Other forms of insurance, for example social health insurance for workers in public or 
private sectors, are unlikely to expand to protect the poor. The literature is reviewed 
below, therefore, in terms of whether or not CBHI potentially promotes protection for 
the poor. 
Common features of CBHI 
Definitions of community hea Ith financing are provided by many experts in the health 
financing area. Jakab and Krishnan (2004) characterized those broad definitions into 
five categories. 
"First, the community (geographic, religious, professional, ethnic) is actively 
engaged in mobilizing, pooling, and allocating resources for health care. 
Second, the beneficiaries of the scheme have predominantly low income, 
earning a subsistence from the informal sector (rural and urban), or are socially 
excluded. Third, the schemes are based on voluntary engagement of the 
community (although not necessarily of the individual community members). 
Fourth, the structure of resource mobilization and benefits reflect principles of 
solidarity. And fifth, the primary purpose of the schemes is not commercial 
(that is, not-for-profit)." 
There are various types of community financing, with the concern here being CBHI. 
The basic model of the CBHI scheme suggested by Bennett (2004) showed that 
scheme members pay premiums to the CBHI fund. The scheme pays health care 
providers for services and the providers provide health care services to the members. 
The basic model of CBHI could be extended. The non-members of the scheme could 
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access and use services from the providers but they might h ave to pay user fees. The 
scheme could directly get support from the government or exte rnal donors. At country 
level, it could be a multiple risk- pooling scheme by combining the CBHI with other 
existing health insurance schemes e.g. social health insurance schemes and 
government financing of services. Bennett (2004) recommended that the CBHI scheme 
needed to move away from its specific objective and tie into the broader goals of the 
government or the health system. 
Performance of CBHI contributes to health financing 
carrin (2005) suggested that the performance of CBHI contributes to the health 
system when it can respond to the three sub-functions of health financing; revenue 
collection, fund pooling and purchasing. Table 2.5 presents the three financing sub-
functions, determinants affecting the performance of CBHI, and some results of CBHI 
performance from literature reviews. 
Revenue collection. CBHI schemes can have multiple sources of finance, including 
prepayment by members, user fees at point of services, government subsidy and 
donor assistance. Prepayment contribution schemes might automatically prevent the 
poorest from joining the schemes. Therefore, membership is the most significant 
feature of the scheme which would affect risk pooling. A variety of factors was 
suggested for improving the ince ntive of people to join the schemes. For example, the 
timing of collecting the contributions should match the income pattern of members. 
Members' trust in the integrity and competence of the managers would facilitate 
establishment of CBHI. Premiums should be affordable for members. A study by Dong 
et al. (2005) suggested that premiums could be adjusted in relation to income and 
exemptions and subsidies for the poor to enroll in CBHI were important if the objective 
is to improve equity of health. 
Pooling risk. Due to the nature of voluntary membership, CBHI schemes normally face 
a problem of adverse selection which leads to small size of the scheme and then 
insufficient risk pooling. The small scale of CBHI puts pressure on the financial viability 
of the CBHI and could even result in bankruptcy. The managerial capacity of the 
scheme could be undermined if there was insufficient money to hire a professional 
manager. Carrin (2005) suggested many alternative strategies for greater risk pooling, 
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for example to have reinsurance (to buy insur ance with a re-insurer in order to protect 
against unexpected high-level health expenditure) and to set larger risk pools via 
management of many small scale schemes, or the establishment of a federation or 
network. 
Purchasing. WHO (2000) defined the purchasing and resource allocation function of 
CBHI schemes as 'health services package to purchase, providers to purchase from and 
payment methods and contracting arrangements'. An attractive benefit package might 
be a factor affecting people's decision to join the scheme. However, it was found that 
benefit packages were weakly defined (Carrin 2005). Lack of management and 
administrative skill of schemes was mentioned (Jakab and Krishnan 2004). Salary and 
budget was the most frequent payment used in CBHI, followed by fee-for-services and 
capitation payment. Many CBHI schemes established a waiting period before a member 
can use services from CBHI. It was one way to prevent adverse selection of the 
scheme. 
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Table 2.5 Performance of CBHI on financing sub-functions 
Health financing Factors influencing performance 
sub-functions * of CBHI * 
Revenue collection Enrolment 
- Affordability of 
contributions 
- Unit of membership 
- Distance 
- Timing of collection 
- Quality of care 
- Trust 
Prepayment ratio 
- Mix of contributions by 
household, central and 
local government donors 
Pooling of Trust 
resource Mechanisms for enhanced risk 
poolll}g 
Purchasing of Contracting 
services and Provider payment mechanism 
resource allocation Referrals 
Waiting period 
Note * Suggested by Camn (2005). 
** from the literature. 
Impacts on health financial protection 
Performance ** 
• Low percentages of enrolment 
compared to the target population 
(carrin 2005) 
• Small size of the schemes e.g. fewer 
than 500 members (Palmer et al. 
2004, Jakab and Krishnan 2004) 
• A combination of revenue sources; 
prepayment, user fees, central and 
local government subsidy and donors 
(Jakab and Krishnan 2004, carrln 
2005, Bennett 2004) 
• Small risk pools and potential problem 
of adverse selection (Jakab and 
Krishnan 2004 carrin 2005) 
• Lack of the management and 
administrative skills necessary for the 
successful design and operation of 
the schemes (Jakab and Krishnan 
2004) 
• Benefit packages weakly defined 
(carrln 2005). 
• The most prevalent payment methods 
were salaries and budgets, fee-for-
service, and capitation payment 
(Carrln 2005). 
CBHI could increase access to health for members covered by the schemes and reduce 
the financial burden of those seeking health care (Palmer et al 2004, Jakab and 
Krishnan 2004, Ekman 2004). However, the effects of CBHI were small and the 
schemes served a limited number of people. The poorest were usually excluded from 
coverage. The voluntary contri butory nature of CBHI was unconvincing as a viable 
option for sustainable financing for essential health services in low-income countries as 
it mobilized insufficient amounts of resources (Jakab and Krishnan 2004, Ekman 2004). 
In order to protect the poor, the schemes could com bine a variety of sources of 
finance. Government subsidy and donor assistance could be sources to support 
protection of the poor by these schemes as mentioned earlier. 
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has reviewed literature relating to user fees and protecting the poor. The 
review reveals that user fees, official payments made by patients at the point of 
service, were introduced or increased in order to fill a revenue gap for under-funded 
services. However, in practice, user fees have not fulfilled the expectations set for 
them when they were established. Exemptions systems rarely work, especially for the 
poor, as they are generally inadequately funded and health workers have an incentive 
not to promote them. The demand side might not recognize the exemptions due to 
lack of knowledge or stigmatization or could not afford transportation cost to get free 
care. 
Acknowledging all the literature reviewed above, some knowledge gaps in relation to 
protecting the poor or the exemptions to the poor can be identified as follows: 
• There has been little exploration of provider motivations to grant exemptions. 
• There is no clear evidence of households' perspectives on taking up or not 
taking up exemptions. 
• Most health care financing research in developing countries has focused on the 
limited scope of one particular topic. Little research has been conducted with a 
comprehensive view from demand and supply-sides as well as policy makers' 
perspectives to provide policy implications and recommendations for protecting 
the poor. 
• Research on user fees and exemptions in Lao POR is very limited. 
Therefore, studying the implementation of exemption policy from the experiences of 
three main stakeholders; households, public health care providers and policy makers, 
in Lao POR, a least developed country, will contribute to filling these knowledge gaps. 
46 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes and justifies the methods employed in the study. It consists of 
seven sections in total. The first section presents the aims and objectives of the study. 
Section two illustrates the conceptual framework of this study, while the third section 
briefly describes the study setting. Section fou r provides details of methodology, as 
used in each of four sub-studies. Data processing and data analysis are described in 
the fifth section and quality control of the study is described in section six. Finally, the 
limitations of the study are presented in the last section. 
3.1 Aim and objectives 
Overall aim 
In the context of the current situation of health care financing in Lao PDR, the study 
aimed to contri bute to health financing policy on how to improve protection of the poor 
from health expenditure. 
Objectives 
1. To assess the socio-economic circumstances of villages and distinguish poverty 
differences between households. 
2. To assess health service utilization patterns and household illness costs. 
3. To assess illness cost burden to households including identifying catastrophic 
health expenditure and assess the strategies households use to cope with costs 
of illness with an emphasis on taking up the exemption mechanism. 
4. To assess public health care providers' behaviour and attitudes on exemption 
mechanisms. 
5. To assess the perceptions and preferences of national policy makers on fee 
exemption policy and implementation. 
6. To analyse the financial implications of alternative protection mechanisms, and 
identify implicati ons for pro-poor financing and provide recommendations on 
improved ways of protecting the poor. 
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3.2 Development of the methodology 
3.2.1 Theoretical framework 
In order to have a genuine understanding of health care financing dominated by a user 
fee system, this study required a comprehensive analysis. The study needed to seek a 
variety of opinions from all key persons involved in a protection mechanism in order to 
understand all possible different perspectives and expectations. Three main concepts 
which are (1) the determinants of supply and demand for health services, (2) health 
care utilization models and (3) coping strategies to deal with costs of illness are applied 
in this study. 
The determinants of supply and demand for health services 
In a health system, many determinants influence outcome from both dema nd and 
supply sides at many levels. The demand for health care is decided by individuals and 
households. These individuals and households compare benefit and costs and their 
capacity to pay across barriers of access to their preferred choices. The characteristics 
of health care systems encompass health policy objectives through to health worker 
behavior. Government has responsibility to make the system work for people. The 
policy makers are key persons in deciding the adoption of health policy. This study 
applies a framework of various determinants of supply and demand for health services 
from the World Development Report 2004 (World Bank 2003 ). Figure 3.1 shows the 
overall conceptual framework in terms of supply and demand side points of view, the 
first part of a comprehensive analysis. 
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Figure 3.1 The determinants of supply and demand for health services 
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Health care utilization models 
In order to complete a comprehe nsive picture, the framework from the World Bank 
above is combined with four other concepts which are (1) a health care utilization 
model, (2) exemptions promoting access for the poor within a user fee system, (3) 
performance assessment of protection mechanisms and (4) coping mechanisms that 
households use to deal with cost of illness. 
This study applies the socio-behavioral model or Andersen model both the initial model 
(Andersen 1968) and a final phase model (Andersen 1995). The initial model was 
designed and developed to aSSist understanding of why families use formal personal 
health services. The model suggested that health services use is a function of different 
characteristics of families including predisposing factors (e.g., age, gender, education, 
ethnicity, health belief), enabling factors (e.g., having regula r source of medical care 
and health insurance) and need (e.g., their perceptions on their health). The diagram 
of the model is shown in figure 3.2. The major goal of the Behaviour Model is to 
provide measures of access to· medical care. 
Figure 3.2 Health Care Utilization Model: An Initial Model (19605) 
Predisposing 
factors 
e.g.; age, 
gender, 
religion, 
education 
Enabling 
factors 
e.g.; availability of 
services, finandal 
resources, health 
Insurance, social 
network support 
Source: adapted from Andersen (1968) 
e.g.; perception of 
severity, number of 
sick days, days 
missed from work 
or school 
Health 
e.g.; rest, horne 
remedies, drug store, 
traditional healers, public 
health providers, private 
health providers 
The Behavior Model has been reviewed and updated ove r time. The final, Phase 4, 
model portrays the multiple influences on health services use and comprises feedback 
loops recognizing the dynamic nature of the model as shown in figure 3.3. The 
dynamic model is applied in the conceptual framework of this study. 
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Figure 3.3 The Health Care Utilization Model: An Emerging Model - Phase 4 
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Coping strategies to deal with costs of illness 
Sauerborn et al. (1996) identified seven types of strategies for households to cope with 
financial costs of illness. These coping strategies are using cash and mobilizing 
savings, sale of assets, loans, income diversification, wage-labour, free care and gifts. 
Initially, most households spend any available cash or saving on health care costs. 
Selling assets is also a common method to pay medical bills such as the sale of 
animals, cereals, or equipment. However, selling assets under pressure often results in 
a low price. Taking loans is one option however; it is usually obtainable for wealthy 
households who are in a position to pay back. People can earn additional Income from 
leisure time, for example building fences, weaving straw mats/hats and tailoring. 
Working as a wage-labourer is a last resort for people who lack assets, lack access to 
credit and lack community support. Accessing free care can be in many ways such as 
by waiver letter, exemption card, vouchers, and exemption at point of service. Patients 
may take or not take up free care. Gifts may be from kin, community and/or health 
staff. Households may apply only one coping strategy or combi ne many strategies to 
deal with the cost of medical bills. 
Russell (1996) showed that when households face health care expenditure beyond 
their routine budget, households can modify health care consumption, for example 
delay consumption, reduce attendance rate or length of stay, cut level of treatment, 
51 
1 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
not complete treatment regime, shift demand to other providers, only treat priority 
individuals and not seek treatment. Russell (2005) also emphasizes the importance of 
access to social resources in helping hous eholds cope. The concept of coping strategies 
is used in this research as a guideline for asking patients what they did when they 
were faced with medical bills and why they took or did not take up exemptions for the 
poor. 
The concept of exemptions promoting access for the poor under a user fee system 
from Russell and Gilson (1997) is matched with a health care financing system 
dominated by user fees. Performance assessment of the protection mechanism in 
terms of funding, policy design, supply-side implementation, demand-side features and 
effectiveness of the programs, coverage and leakage, and factors influencing its 
success are drawn from Bitran and Giedion (2003) and Newbrander et al. (2000). 
In conclusion, the theoretical concepts mentioned above are combined together and 
applied into one conceptual framework to facilitate comprehensive analysis in this 
study. The concepts determinants on supply and demand side for health services are 
used for evaluating all perspectives from policy maker, supplier and households who 
are major stakeholders in the health care financing system. Concepts of health care 
seeking behavior, exemptions under the user fee system, assessment of performance 
of the protection mechanism and coping strategies are used in this study in terms of 
evaluation of policy design, implementation, effectiveness of the protection 
mechanism, factors that affect its success and the reaction of the household to the 
protection mechanism. 
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3.2.2 Conceptual framework of this study 
The conceptual framework is shown in figure 3.4. Three main components directly 
involved in the health care financing system are taken into account in this study. 
Firstly, governments at both national and local level are policy decision makers whose 
decisions lead the direction of the health care system. Secondly there are sub-health 
systems which mainly focus on public health care providers at all levels namely health 
centres (called Suk Sala), district hospitals (called Rong Moh Muang) and provincial 
hospitals (called Rong Moh Khaeng). They translate health policy into practice in the 
actual context of the community in order to provide health care services to people. 
Thirdly, household members that live together in the community will obtain health care 
services from available health care providers under the prevailing conditions of health 
care financing especially user fees and the exemption mechanism set by policy makers 
and practised by health care providers. This results in different treatment seeking 
patterns for each individual. 
For the policy maker perspective, national policies as well as local poliCies on health 
care financing and exemption policy including design of the exemption system will be 
explored. For supply-side perspective, health care financing information at all levels of 
public health care facilities, exemptions in practice and attitudes on exemptions will be 
investigated. For demand-side perspective, illness, treatment seeking pattern, cost of 
illness and impact of treatment costs on household budgets will be thoroughly 
examined. Coping strategies for households to deal with cost of illness and exemptions 
will be scrutinized from household experiences. And then all results above would reflect 
the success of existing exemption mechanisms. 
The aim is thorough investigation and development of genuine understanding of pro-
poor financing by combining information of utilization patterns of people, health care 
financing system in health facilities, and financing models on effective protection of the 
poor. The research will come up with recommendations for the effective protection of 
the poor. 
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Figure 3.4 Conceptual framework of health care services, financing and . 
exemptions from perspectives of policy maker, and supply and demand sides 
Policy l Public health care expenditure implications \ recommendation 
i 
I 
I Policy options for I ~ Pu bl ic Hea Ith ca re I \ Utilization pattern \ protecting the poor financing 
i i 
Government Public healthcare Household! community 
(Policy maker providers (Demand-side perspective) 
perspective) (Supply-side perspective) 
I ~ I .. I ~ .. 
Policies on Public health Treatment seeking Illness 1 Barriers on pattern health care care providers access to 
financing and • Health health care ~ exemption Centre ~ services ~I 1--policy • District Cost of Illness Hospital Impact on 
• Provincial 
+ household Hospital budget 
Coping strategies f-+ 
T for treatment cost 
Take of Illness Supply-side design up? V 
and implementation // • 
Policy design and Implementation of 
" Demand-side design and 
1 
implementation -+ Exemption 
mechanism implementation 
Note: The main concerns of this study are shown in gray boxes with bold borders: coping 
strategies for cost of illness, implementation of exemption mechanism, taking up the exemption 
mechanism and financing models for protecting the poor. 
54 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3 Study setting 
Prime Minister of lao PDR: 
Poverty is the lack of ability to fulfil basic human needs such as not having 
enough food, lacking adequate clothing, not having permanent housing and 
lacking access to health, education and transportation services.. (Instruction 
No OlD/PM, June 25, 2001). 
Vientiane Times April 7, 2005: 
It is commonly believed that before 1975, the law discriminated in favour of the 
rich, and the poor could not get hospital treatment After 1975, this changed. 
Now, everybody is equal before the law, and the poor can receive medical 
treatment whether or not they can pay. 
Dr.80uavang Senhsathit says the Mother and Child Hospital welcomes poor 
patients. The hospital says that the first duty of a hospital is to save lives and 
restore health, rich or poor even though budget subsidy from government is 
well below the need. The hospital charges those who can afford it for medical 
treatment, and uses the money to help the poor. It does not only judge 
whether people are poor by the clothes they wear, as some rich people try to 
get free treatment by wearing old clothes. But staff point out that usually, 
people do not come to the hospital when they have no money unless they have 
a serious health problem. 
Mrs Lee Her, Ban Nakhoung, Xaythany district, lives 30 km from the hospital. 
She was admitted in the hospital and got success in operation. She did not 
immediately go to the hospital because she had no money and thought that 
only the rich could be treated there. 
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Coyntry backgroynd 
Lao PDR is located in the heart of the Indochinese peninsula, in Southeast Asia. Lao 
PDR is a land-locked country and it is classified as one of the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) (United Nations 2004). The north borders China, the south borders 
Cambodia, the east borders Vietnam, the west borders Thailand and the northwest 
borders Myanmar. Three-quarters of the total area in Lao PDR consists of mountains 
and plateaus. The country has three distinct regions; central, north and south. The 
north is dominated by mountains. The other two regions comprise large and small 
plains along the Mekong River. 
Data from the Population Count 2003 showed that the total population on the 1 July 
2003 in the Lao PDR was 5.34 million (National Statistical Centre 2004). The average 
population density is 21 per square kilometer, giving Laos the lowest population 
density in Asia. The three largest population sizes are in Savannakhet province with 
15% of the total population (782,617 people), Vientiane Capital with 12% of total 
population (524,872 people) and Champasak Province with 11% of the total population 
(578,669 people). Data indicate that most of the population lives in rural areas, about 
74% of the total population. The Lao PDR has a highly diverse population, with more 
than 68 ethnic minority groups who mostly live in geographically isolated mountain 
areas. The Human Development Report 2006 shows GOP per capita in 2004 to be 419 
US$ with life expectancy at birth to be 55.1 years and adult literacy rate 68.7% (United 
Nations Development Programme 2006). Data from Lao Expenditure and Consumption 
Survey 2002/2003 indicates that the proportion of people liv ing in poverty is 32.7 % of 
the total population (Lao PDR 2003). 
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Health sector in Lao PDR 
The health care delivery system in Lao PDR is composed of a public and private sector. 
The public sector comprises 3 central, 5 regional, 6 specialized, 13 provincial and about 
122 district hospitals, as well as 533 rural health centers 2 • The private sector includes 
1,9903 licensed pharmaCies and 261 4 private clinics, as well as unlicensed providers 
(Paphassarang et al. 2002). Information from the Lao National Health Su rvey in 2000 
indicates that the nearest health centre, hospital or pharmacy is quite far with regional 
variations of 4 to 96 kilomete rs. It is estimated that only 26% of the population live 
within a three-kilometre radius of a health facility, and more than two-thirds of the 
population have limited or no access to health services (National Statistical Centre 
2001). The Population Count 2003 shows that only 7.1 % of total villages have health 
centres. A comparison between urban and rural areas shows that there were 6.9 % of 
villages in rural areas and 8.9 % of urban areas with health centers. 
Health care financing in Lao PDR 
The World Health Report 2006 (WH02006) states that, in 2003, the total health 
expenditure (THE) of Lao PDR was 3.2% of GOP, equivalent to 11 USD per capita - the 
smallest share of GOP and the lowest THE in USD per capita compared to its 
neighbours, Cambodia (THE 10.9% of GDP and 33 USD per capita), China (5.6% and 
61), Thailand (3.3% and 76) and Vietnam (5.4% and 26). Of the THE, about 38.4% 
was paid from government sources, 30% from external sources and 46.4% from 
household out-of-pocket payment (OOP). A greater proportion of THE came from OOP 
than from government funds. This profile is similar to Cambodia, China and Vietnam 
but contrasts with Thailand. About one-third of OOP in Lao PDR was spent on user fees 
for public health providers and the remainder on private services (WHO 2003). This 
pattern is similar to Thailand and Vietnam where 34.9% and 37.2% of total OOP 
respectively was spent on the public sector (Van Doorslaer et al. 2005). 
In Lao PDR, like other developing socialist countries such as China (Carrin et al. 1999) 
and Vietnam (Segall et al. 2002), a major reform in health financing occurred during 
the 1980s, as a consequence of a shift from a socialist planned economy to a market-
2 Data In 2000 
3 Data In 1999 
4 Data In 2000 
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based economy, as well as decentralization and privatization. In addition, user fees 
were introduced in the public health sector in many developing countries in 1987 
(World Bank 1987). The Lao health system has officially endorsed a national policy on 
user fees and exemptions for the poor since 1995 (MOH 1995a) with the particular aim 
of generating more financial resources to operate revolving drug funds (Murakami et 
al. 2001). 
There are no national health insurance schemes in Lao PDR. It is estimated that 16% 
of the total population are covered by the Government Employee Scheme, less than 
1 % of total population (about 40 ,000 beneficiaries) are under Social Health Insura nee. 
These two schemes are compulsory contributory schemes. As of July 2006, about 
18,829 people in 5 small scale pilot districts voluntarily contributed to Community 
Based Health Insurance (CBHI). The major limitation of CBHI is its capacity in coverage 
extension. Major challenges of CBHI were identified, for example, financial 
sustainability, voluntary nature and adverse selection, potential moral hazard and high 
use rate by members (Ron 2006). The monthly membership put the Scheme at risk of 
a sudden fund disruption if all members withdraw from the scheme. 
Currently, the majority of populati on, about 85% of the total of 5.3 million population, 
has no health insu rance and is directly faced with user fees at point of service. An 
expensive medical bill might not have a negative effect on a household, especially a 
poor household, if it is exempted from paying user fees. However, as in other 
countries, exemption policy in Lao is thought to be not well functioning (Paphasarrang 
et al. 2002). Some poor urban households could not pay medical fees and did not seek 
care or delayed care-seeking or sought alternative provision, wh ile others were able to 
manage using a variety of coping strategies e.g. using savings, selling assets, receiving 
assistance from relatives and neighbours, borrowing money and requesting credit from 
private providers (Paphasarrang et al. 2002). 
The government aims to eradicate poverty by 2015. The National Growth and Poverty 
Eradication Strategy (N GPES) was launched in June 2004 by the government (Lao 
2004). The objectives of poverty eradication in the NGPES are in line with the country's 
commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 2015. According 
to the NGPES, a total of 142 districts in Lao PDR were classified into two main groups; 
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72 poor districts and 70 non-poor districts. Among 72 poor districts, 47 of them were 
identified as the priority for poverty eradication and other improvements in 2003-
2005 (figure 3.5). The NGPES has highlighted health problems as one objective to 
solve in order to achieve the poverty eradication objective by 2015. 
Within the policy context, a financial protection mechanism for improving access by the 
poor to health services is most relevant. In the current situation in Lao POR, improving 
the health of the poor using health care financing reform is difficult due to several 
limitations, including inadequate finance (Ministry of Health 2002). Protection from 
poverty due to the cost of illness in the Lao context is feaSible, but far from automatic. 
There is a need to scrutinize and carry out an in-dept investigation to understand 
health care financing in Lao POR from not only policy and provider perspective but also 
from a household perspective. 
Study setting 
Savannakhet (SVK) Province in Central Lao POR was selected for the fieldwork. It 
consists of 14 districts with 4 poores t districts as the govern ment priority, 3 poor 
districts but not the priority and 8 no n-poor districts (map in figure 3.5). Feasibility to 
travel within this province, the possibility to cond uct fieldwork without a dialect 
problem, and safety for the researcher were the main incentives for choosing the site 
of the fieldwork in SVK Province. 
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LAO PDR: 2 DISTRICTS IDENTIFI ED AS POOR 
Savannakhet 
Province 
A L'(Y)/'Y{ing /Q percentage 0/ poor 1t00~:I/OIcJ:,· 
47 JJOOI' tlLl/rtCI> lellfl/lfl(1 IS prlOl Q' (}OO.I·llY)5) 
B lJ (/'.lfrt('/) Icltllf(Jl('(/ (/$ {XX .. JO lla 1(/('11ll/1rd IY 1)()()/'dlSfrk1 
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Data Sotlrtl'.<: 1'00WI)·Stnllslh. R('fNJItS. l'mwIINnl 
IYJ/lunlrtfi'lil Allllwrhln. 
Figure 3.5 LAO PDR: 72 Districts Identified as Poor 
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3.4 Methodology 
Studies of health seeking behavior not only need to include a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods but should include data collection about people 
who do not have access to health care facilities as well as those who do (Ward et al. 
1997). The study by Russell (2001) employed an in-depth approach using qualitative 
methods to gain better understanding of households' economic consequences from 
illness costs and coping strategies. 
Drawing on this literature, several methods were applied in this study in order to 
respond to all the objectives and indicators needed. Each method has its own benefits 
and limitations so village census, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, 
household in-depth interviews, document review and secondary financial data 
collection and analysis were chosen to complement each other. In addition, after the 
completion of data collection in the fieldwork, a workshop was arranged in order to 
present and verify preliminary results to key partners. 
The study was divided into four sub-studies. The first sub-study was Intended to obtain 
information from the household side on past experiences of villagers of illnesses, 
utilization of health services, costs of treatment and coping strategies to deal with 
health expenditure including exemptions from paying user fees at public health care 
providers. The second sub-study obtained information from public health care 
providers. This would reflect the real situation of provider practices on user fees and 
exemption to the poor in the local context, including evidence from financial reports. 
The third sub-study sought information from health policy makers at national and 
provincial level which would focus on interpretation and implementation of national 
exemption policy. Finally, the fourth sub-study was an analysis of the main findings 
from all methods in order to provide financing model for a better approach for 
protecting the poor. All the methods used in the sub-studies are summarized in table 
3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Sub-studies: objectives, methods, samples and result chapters 
Sub-study Objective Methods used Sam~le Cha~ter 
The first 1. Economics status • Village census • 172 households 4,5 
sub-study of sampled • Household consumption in 4 Villages (2 in and 6 
households survey poor district and 
2. Household • Key informant interviews 2 in non-poor 
utilization • Focus group discussions district) 
patterns and • Household in-depth 
costs of illness interviews 
3. Cost burden, 
including 
catastrophic 
expenditure and 
coping strategies 
of household to 
deal with costs 
of illness 
The second 4. Providers' • Key informant interview • 2 central 7 
sub-study practice on user • Collecting financial hospitals 
fees and reports • 2 provincial 
exemptions health offices 
• 1 provincial 
hospital 
• 7 district 
hospitals 
• 14 health centres 
The third 5. Policy makers' • Key informant interviews • 22 key 7 
sub-study perceptions on • Document reviews Informants 
exem~tion policY 
The fourth 6. Recommendation • Document reviews 8 
sub-study on financing • Analysis of main findings 
model and Its from previous sub-
financial studies and discussion at 
Implications for workshop on the current 
better ways to context 
~rotect the poor 
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3.4.1 The first sub-study: household side 
The study of household perspectives did not aim to represent a district or a province. It 
aimed to gain insight into the nature of the village. The desire to obtain in-depth 
understanding of households' perspective limited the scope of the study. Therefore, 
four villages of two districts were selected - districts were selected first and after that 
villages in the district were selected. 
Sampled districts 
When getting ethical approval from the Ministry of Health, Lao PDR in October 2005, 
possible districts and villages for the first sub-study had been explored and selected 
between October and November 2005 using three approaches; seeking advice from 
senior staff of SVK Provincial Hea Ith Office; analysis of the most update financial data 
(fiscal year 2004) and rapid surveys of the real situation in several district hospitals. 
Subsequently, exclusion and inclusio n criteria were set as follows; 
• Excl usion criteria 
o The district in the catchment area of SVK Provincial Hospital was excluded. 
o Due to transportation, safety and dialect problems, two districts on the 
border with Vietnam, namely Nong and Xepone were excluded. 
o Vilabouli hos pital reported using 25% of user fee revenue for exemptions in 
2004. As this figure was dramatically different from all the other hospitals, it 
was considered to be unreliable and therefore excluded (table 3.2). 
• Inclusion criteria 
o Poor and non-poor districts: A total of 14 districts in SVK were divided into 
seven poor districts and seven non-poor districts according to the NGPES in 
2003. Due to time and budget constraints a limited number of districts 
could be sampled and needed to cover both poor and non-poor districts so 
one poor and one non-poor district was sampled. 
o High utilisation rate at district hospital: In order to have enough cases for 
the household in-depth interviews, districts with the highest utilization rate 
of out-patient visits and admission were the first priority. 
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Following these exclusion and inclusion criteria, Phine and Atsaphangthong (APT) were 
chosen from poor and non-poor districts, respectively. The next step was to choose 
villages. 
Table 3.2 Information on 14 district hospitals in SVK province, FY 2004, for 
choosing study sites 
% exemption OP use rate* Admission 
out of (visit per rate** 
expense from person per (admission per 
user fee year) person per year) 
District hos~ital of revenue 
Non-poor Atsaphangthong (APT) 1% 0.237 0.037 
district Songkhon 1% 0.135 0.023 
Outhoumphon 0% 0.108 0.008 
Xa I bou II 0% 0.071 0.008 
Champhon 1% 0.060 0.018 
Atsaphon 1% 0.053 0.012 
Xaiphouthong 0% 0.036 0.003 
Average Non-poor districts 1% 0.095 0.016 
Poor Phine 5% 0.258 0.026 
district Xepon (excluded) 0% 0.179 0.031 
Phalanxal 2% 0.153 0.029 
Thapangthong 0% 0.146 0.016 
Xonbouli 0% 0.062 0.010 
Vilaboull (excluded) 25% 0.061 0.014 
Nong (excluded) 3% 0.058 0.009 
Average Poor districts 3% 0.141 0.020 
Note * OP use rate = total OP visits I num ber of population 
** Admission rate = total discharges I number of population 
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Sampled villages 
In order to understand the utilization patterns of households in the different settings, 
two villages per district were chosen based on location - one which had difficulty in 
accessing the district hospital and another which did not. The difficulty of access was 
relative between villages and village within the district. The researcher consulted with 
the director and senior staff of the District Health Office (DHO) to carry out a rapid 
survey of several villages. Finally, four villages were chosen from two districts (table 
3.3), abbreviated as TAL for Tang Alai, KY for Ka Yang, SPX for Sisaphanxai and KK 
for Kok Kong village. 
Table 3.3 Four sampled villages in two districts for the first sub-study: 
household side 
Status of the district 
Phine APT 
(Poor district) (Non-poor district) 
location: Difficult* (1) TAL (3) SPX 
62 households 36 households 
Not much (2) KY (4) KK 
difficulty* 34 households 40 households 
Note: *difficulty in accessing district hospital (relative within the district) 
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Conducting the first sub-study 
The fieldwork was conducted in the Lao language by the researcher with the 
assistance of a research assistant (RA) who held a position in SVK Provincial Health 
Office. Although the researcher is not Laotian, she is able to speak and read the Lao 
language fluently. The researcher and RA made pre-fieldwork visits to each of the 
sample villages before the fieldwork of each village in order to rna ke informal 
communication with villagers, especially village comm ittees, and make logistical 
arrangements. These visits lasted for one day, except for the first village which was 
very far away, necessitating a visit of seven days. 
The first sub-study fieldwork was conducted between December 2005 and April 2006. 
The researcher and RA stayed in each village for 10-18 days (depending on the size of 
the village), and completed the fieldwork in one village before moving to the next. 
During the period of staying with the villagers, there were opportunities for informal 
conversation which ena bled the researcher to build a rapport with vi lIagers as well as 
observe a real situation of well being in the village. In every village, according to local 
etiquette, the researcher was formally introd uced and entrusted to the villagers' care 
by the director or a member of senior staff of the district health office (DHO). At the 
end of the study she was formally collected by staff of the DHO following a traditional 
farewell event arranged by the villagers. 
The fieldwork for the first sub-study employed both quantitative and qualitative 
methods; (1) village censuses, (2) key informant interviews, (3) focus group 
discussions (FGDs), (4) household in-depth interviews and (5) household consumption 
survey. Details of each method are described in the following sections. In the first 
village, key informant interviews were conducted first, followed by FGDs, village 
census, household in-depth interviews and, finally, household consumption surveys. By 
the end of the fieldwork in the first village, it was found that the village census would 
be extremely helpful for developing rapport between the researcher and the villagers 
as well as obtaining good qualitative data. Therefore, for the remaining three villages, 
the sequence of methods was changed and the village census was conducted first, 
followed by key informant interviews, FGDs, household in-depth interviews and 
household consum ption surveys. The difference in sequencing in the remaining three 
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villages did not have any effect on results of the study but it led to more effective data 
gathering. 
Before the fieldwork, the issue of using a camera and tape recorder had been 
discussed with the director of DHO who did not anticipate any problem. Interviews 
were recorded at the beginning of the fieldwork in the first villages but proved to be 
problematic. For exam pie many villagers were distracted by the tape recorder and 
wanted to listen to the recording of their own voice, others were afraid to talk while 
the recorder was working. It was therefore decided to stop recording and rely on 
notetaking for collecting qualitative data. The tape recorder was tested again at the 
beginning of the fieldwork in the second village and the result was similar to the first 
village. Thereafter, only notetaking was used. However, the respondents were co-
operative and intermittently stopped talking or discussing in order to provide enough 
time for notetaking. At the end of every day, there was debriefing in order to 
summarize data, share notes and prepare tasks for the next day. 
Village census 
The objectives of the village census were: (1) to quantify household members' 
information on rates of self-reported illness, use of health services, costs of illness, 
type of coping strategy used, knowledge of exempting the poor, take up rate of 
exemptions and reasons for not taking up exemption if eligible and (2) to provide 
information for selecting household for in-depth interview. 
The village census was applicable because the number of household in each village 
was low enough to conduct a cross sectional survey for all households In the village 
(62, 34, 36 and 40 in each of the four villages) which could depict the situation of the 
village from all households, not just the sampled households. It also provided a chance 
for every household to be a part of the study which could not happen with qualitative 
methods or even a sample household survey. This was important in the context of Lao 
where the community is comm unist. In addition, interviewing all t he households in the 
village further developed rapport between the researcher and the villagers. Normally, 
at least one village com mittee member assigned by the village head would accompany 
the researcher and RA to each household for conducting the village census. This 
villager is hereafter referred to as the local administrator (LA). This was to facilitate the 
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village census and for the security of the researcher. Therefore, during the village 
census the researcher team consisted of three people; (1) the researcher, (2) RA and 
(3) LA. 
The study questionnaire was developed by applyi ng knowledge from several sources. A 
four-step construct of household decision- making on child health care consisting of 
perception of illness, care seeking, choice of provider and health care expenditure 
(Pokhrel and Sauerborn 2004) provided a guid eline for questionnaire development on 
treatment seeking pattern. To make the questionnaire particularly suitable for the Lao 
context, many existing questionnaires related to socio-economic status and health 
systems in Lao were studied, for instance questionnaires of the Lao Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey III 2003, LECIII (Lao PDR 2003), and the Lao National Health 
Survey 2000 (National Statistical Centre 2001). Possible strategies to cope with 
financial costs were based on two articles and one thesis report namely 'Household 
Strategies to Cope with the EconomiC costs of Illness' by Sauerborn et al (1996), 
'Ability to pay for health care: concepts and evidence' by Russell (1996) and the thesis 
'Can household afford to be ill? the role of the health system, material resources and 
social networks in Sri Lanka' by Russell (2001). In addition, 'Microfinance Poverty 
Assessment Tool' of the World Bank (Henry et al. 2003) was also used to provide 
guidelines for food, hunger, dwelling and asset ownership indicators. The questionnaire 
was developed in English only, without translation into Lao, because all interviews 
were conducted by the researcher who asked questions in Lao and completed the 
questionnaire in Thai using Lao words. 
The questionnaire comprised five main modules; (1) personal information about 
household members; (2) illness, treatment seeking pattern and direct financial costs 
due to illnesses - self-reported illness in the past two weeks and hospitalization in the 
past twelve months; (3) coping strategies to deal with costs of illness including 
exempting the poor; (4) household economic status and living arrangements including 
asset ownership and (5) immunization of children under 6 years old. Unfortunately, the 
last module, child immunization, was developed after the end of the first village census 
_ when preliminary results from qualitative methods showed that only a few children 
had been immunized. Because immunization coverage represented a good indicator of 
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accessibility to public health services, the last module was developed for the rest of the 
villages. The questionna ire is shown in Appendix I. 
Key informant interview 
The objectives of key informant interviews were (1) to generate general information on 
the community and socio-economic well being of households, (2) to generate 
information about health care systems in the community such as number of health 
care facilities, location, transportation to the nea rest public health care facilities, health 
care preferences, utilization patterns and barriers to access to services and (3) to 
develop rapport between the researcher and the community. 
A semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix I) was developed for the interviews using 
preliminary results from the rapid viSits to several villages. The interview was 
conducted using one questionnaire per village. Key informants were village committee 
members who were appointed by the district governor and some senior villagers, for 
instance a village founder, a local leader who normally conducted traditional spiritual 
ceremonies in the village. 
Focus group discussion (EGO) 
The focus group discussions had two main objectives; (1) to learn about community 
perceptions of user charges and exempting policy and the process of exemptions, 
including attitudes towards taking up exemptions and (2) to conduct a wealth ranking 
exercise within the village. The EGO was based on a semi-structured questionnaire 
which is shown in Appendix I. 
In order to achieve the first objective of FGO, guidelines for discussion were developed 
focusing only on the exemption policy and process. However, information from the first 
and second villages clearly showed that none of the villagers had known about the 
exemption. Before conducting fieldwork in the third and fourth villages (In the non-
poor district), informal discussions were held with the director of the district hospital 
and the head of the pharmacy department in order to probe the situation. The 
discussion suggested it was likely that as in the first and second villages, the villagers 
in the third and fourth villages would not be aware of the exemptions. These 
discussions, based on the officers' experience of the health protection system in Lao 
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PDR, led to further consideration of health financial risk protection for Laotians, 
including the non-poor. It was therefore important to solicit opinions from the villagers. 
In addition to the questions on exemption for the poor, questions on protecting non-
poor people were inserted in the guideline of FGDs in the third and fourth villages. 
These included questions on the attitude of villagers towards voluntary or compulsory 
contributions to a health insurance scheme, level of acceptable premium and co-
payment. It was, however, impractical to go back to conduct these questions in the 
first and second villages. 
The second objective of FGD, ranking households in the village into wealth groups, 
comprised three elements: grouping households into different wealth groups, criteria 
for differentiating better-off and worse-off households, and establishing the proportion 
of the population that fell into each wealth group (Seaman et al. 2000). FGD members 
were firstly asked to rank households into different wealth groups. Based on the village 
census, the name of every household head was written in Lao and shown to all the 
FGD members, FGD members then classified each household head name into a wealth 
group based on their personal opinions. Initially, no specific wealth groups were 
indicated to FGDs in the first village. The results of the first village showed that three 
wealth groups were easily understood by villagers. Therefore, three wealth groups: 
better-off, middle and worst-off were applied in the remaining three villages. After 
completion of the wealth ranking, FGD members were asked about the criteria for 
classifying households into different wealth groups with open-ended questions. The 
proportion of the population falling into each wealth group was calculated later us ing 
household members from the village census. 
In each village, three focus group discussions (FGD) were conducted with three 
different groups - the village committee, male villagers and female villagers with a 
variety of ages. FGD members of each of the three groups were recruited through 
consultation with the village head and some well-known villagers. FGD members 
consisted of a wide range of villagers in terms of gender, age and wealth group. 
Characteristics of FGD members are shown in table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 FGD member of four villages 
Village 
(1) TAL 
(2) KY 
(3) SPX 
(4) KK 
FGD 
Village 
committees 
Male 
Female 
Village 
committees 
Male 
Female 
Village 
committees 
Male 
Female 
Village 
~ommittees _ 
Male 
Female 
Total Age, 
members average 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
7 
11* 
7 
6 
8 
6 
9 
(min-max) 
43 
_ 29- 63) 
45 
__ (2L::: §1) __ 
37 
(27 - 50) 
43 
(34 - 48) 
49 
. ___ (~':1: .. ::: ... §_~) 
49 
(33 - 63) 
47 
. (28 - 72) 
45 
. j39 - 59) __ 
34 
(18 - 49) 
56 
(33 - 78) 
41 
..... (~?_.:- 6_5) 
49 
(27 - 63) 
Wealth group 
Better-off Middle Worst-off 
3 4 o 
1 4 1 
o 5 2 
3 3 o 
4 2 1 
2 4 1 
7 4 o 
1 3 3 
3 1 2 
3 3 2 
2 1 3 
7 2 o 
Note: *FGD members of village committee group were all men except for one woman 
in SPX village. 
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Household in-depth interviews 
Household in-depth interviews aimed to obtain detailed information on treatment 
options, costs, and coping strategies including exemptions. They mostly focused on 
how and why questions in order to understand the reasons for household decision 
making such as; 
• Utilization pattern of the last illness episode: why did they choose this 
treatment and not others, 
• Cost of treatment and coping strategies: how did they pay the health cost, why 
do they choose that strategy, 
• Exemption mechanism: how do they get the exemption (explanation of the 
process), why they did or did not take the exemption, what do they expect 
from exemption. 
Semi-structured questionnaires and observations were applied to sample households 
with the patient, breadwinner or carer. Using data from the village census, sample 
households for in-depth interview were purposively selected from those who had had 
experience of illness in the previous two weeks for conditions treated on an out-patient 
(OP) basis, and 12 months for admissions to a health facility and death. The wealth 
group of the household was also taken into account. Fina lly, in-depth interviews were 
carried out in a total of 29 households (table 3.5). 
Table 3.5 Wealth group and type of illness of 29 households' in-depth 
interview 
____ ..,....--___ T-'-vu:D=e-=o;.;...f .:..:..:ill.:..:.ne::s;::.s-,-______ Total per 
Village and wealth group OP Admission Death Combination* Total village 
(1) TAL _13_ett~.r-of.f_ ... _ . ___ . _ .. ____ ._ .. __ _ ___ . ___ .. _______ 0 
Middle 3 2 1 6 8 
Worst-off 1 1 2 
(2) KY ~ett~.r-ofL_. _ _ -=l __ ._ .. __ L ._ .. _ 1 __ .. __ .. _. ____ ... _ ... _. _ 2.. _ . 
Middle 1 1 1 __ .L _ 7 
Worst-off 1 1 
(3) SPX ~~n~r::QfL___ __~______ ._. ____ .. ____ . __ ._ ... ____ . .£ _ . 
. _.Miggl~_._. __ . ____ . ____ J.______ ... __ . ______ ... _ .2 __ ._ _ _ L __ 7 
Worst-off 2 2 
(4) KK ~~tter-o.ff __ ._ 2 ___ J _____ 2.. .. 
Middle 1 2 _ _ _ _ _.L ._ 7 
Worst-off 1 1 
Note *refers to a combination of either OP or admission or death. 
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Household consumption survey 
A measure of household economic status was required in order to identify household 
catastrophic health expenditure. Household consumption wa s chosen because these 
four villages had a subsistence economy and household income would have been 
difficult to quantify. 
Ideally, information on household consumption would have been obtained from every 
household sampled but time constraints meant this was not possible. Instead, a 
practical framework for quantifying household consumption was constructed (figure 
3.6) using both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It was constructed applying 
two main processes of the Health Economic Approach (Seaman et al. 2000) - to define 
categories of household wealth within the community and then, for each wealth 
category, to collect information of household budgets in a baseline year. With the aim 
of compiling consumption of a typical household, but not attempting to construct a 
statistically representative sample, based on wealth ranking, three households were 
randomly chosen from each wealth group in each village. A consumption questionnaire 
was developed applying food and non-food item questions from the Lao Expenditure 
and Consumption Survey III in 2003, LECIII, (Lao PDR 2003) and questions were 
asked based on three main sources for these items; own production, buying and gift. 
The consumption questionnaire was then applied to nine households in each village. An 
average consumption per equivalent person per day was calculated for each wealth 
group. Based on LESCIII, the equivalent members were at 1.0, 0.9,0.7 and 0.4 for the 
first adult, other adults, children 7-15 years old and children less than 7 years old, 
respectively. An average household consum ption was then assigned to every 
household according to the wealth group that the household belonged to. Finally, 
monthly household consumption for each household was calculated by multiplying 
average household consumption per equivalent person per day for 30 days a month by 
the number of equivalent members in a household. Household non-food consumption 
was calculated using a proportion derived from the consumption survey. 
73 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
Figure 3.6 Diagram of methods used to quantify household consumption in a 
village 
All households in a village 
Three FGDs 
(village committees, males and females) 
Middle group I I Worst-off group 
Random selection 
Consumption survey 
interview using consumption questionnaire 
~---+~~ ~ ~~+----~ 
Average consumption (per equivalent person per day) assigned to every household 
according to its wealth group 
~ ~ ~ 
Monthly household consumption = average consumption per equivalent per day 
x 30 days 
x number of equivalent.members 
Household consumption of every household in a village 
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3.4.2 The second sub-study: public health care providers 
The second sub-study was set up to assess public health care providers' behaviour and 
attitudes to exemption mechanisms (Objective 4 of the study). The study was intended 
to gain a better understanding from all levels of public health care providers. 
Sampled public health care providers 
Due to budget and ti me constraints, the second sub-study did not comprise a detailed 
investigation of all public health facilities in SVK provi nce. Traveling safety was the 
major concern in selecting district hospitals in SVK province and districts near the 
setting of the first sub-study were targeted. Apart from public health facilities in SVK 
province, some health facilities at provincial level in Vientiane Capital were selected in 
order to gain information from the highest level of health facilities. All levels of health 
facilities were recruited in this study (table 3.6) which conSisted of 2 central hospitals, 
1 provincial hospital, 2 provincial health offices, 7 district hospitals and 14 health 
centres. 
Table 3.6 Sampled public health facilities for the second sub-study 
Place Method 
Code 
using in 
this 
study Organization 
PVD1 - Provincial level 
PVD3 (two central hospital and Vientiane 
VTE 
Capital 
SVK 
Province 
___________ .P.rQ.Yl!1ci9.L.tt~q!!:!LQffice L .. ____ _____ / -. ___ _ 
PVD4 Provincial level 
._._(?'_Y_IS __ PIQ~llJfi.~-':!~~J~h.9ff1s:.~L--.-------.-.-_--,-1 __ 
-PVDS--- Provincial level 
_(?VK.proyincJi!L!:IospitaD _____ . __ . 
- P-V-D-6-- - 3 district hospitals in three poor 
1 
Quantitative 
(financial 
report) 
Qualitative 
(key 
informant 
Interview) 
.. _ -'-- _ .. _--
_ __ .L*... _____ .. _ J __ __ . 
L .. __ .. ___ -.l ___ . 
~~QJ3 __ .-S!!?tricts __ . _______ . ___ .. _________ . 
_ -'1'---- _ .. _ 1_. __ . __ .. _ 1 __ . 
PVD9 - 4 district hospitals In four non-poor 
P.~Qt? _ ... __ ... _ <;Il~~r.i~~ __ .. _ .... __ .... _ ... _. ____ .. __ ....... -.. -...... -.. -..... -.... ---........ ---- --.-.----
-·PVD13 4 Health Centres in Phine, poor 
___ -:district ___ _ 
3 Health Centres In APT, non-poor 
district 
PVD14 
-·-PVD 15 -----7 Health-CentresTrl·another-non- .-.. -----------
/ / 
1 __ .~ ___ L _ . 
poor district / / / 
Note: * means financial report in Provincial Health Office format, presenting data of all hospitals 
in SVK (a provincial hospital and 14 district hospitals) . 
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Conducting the fieldwork 
In SVK province, every sampled public health facilities at provincial level and district 
level were visited and then staff were interviewed. Four health centres in Phine district 
and one health centre in APT district were visited. Owing to the distance of the other 
two health centres, the lrIeads of the centres were invited to APT District Hospital and 
the study was conducted the reo The heads of seven health centres in another non-poor 
district (PVD 15) were interviewed as a group at the district hospital. 
In Vientiane (VTE) Capital, all sampled public health facilities were visited and staff 
interviewed. The researcher was accompanied by counterpa rts from the National 
Institute of Public Health (NIOPH) working on a related study on 'the formulation 
process of user fees and exemption policy in Lao PDR'. 
Key informa nt interviews were carried out in each health facility and their financial 
reports were collected. Key informant interviews of health facilities at provincial level 
took 3-7 days per facility while in the district hospitals and health centres this took only 
one day per facility. The financial documents in fiscal year 2005 of each facility were 
copied or arrangements made for them to be forwarded to the researcher. Details of 
the key informant interviews and financial data collection are as follows; 
Kev informant interview 
The objectives of the key informant interview at health facilities were (1) to generate 
information on background, funding, design and implementation of user fees and 
exemptions from the health care facility's point of view, (2) to determine attitudes on 
user charges and exemption policy from the public health care providers' perspective, 
(3) to explore criteria for a means testing mechanism at health care facilities and (4) to 
search for factors affecting the exemption practice at facilities. 
Key informa nt interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix I) were 
carried out with health personnel in high ranking pOSitions in a health facility such as 
the director and/or the deputy director of the facility and heads of some departments 
in hospitals (e.g. pharmacy department, financial department and laboratory 
department) in order to gain a comprehe nsive understanding on the existing 
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exemption mechanism in health care facilities, how they treat the poor and the 
attitudes of providers to exem ptions. 
The main findings from health care facilities were intended to indicate how the system 
is working (process of exemption and who decides). Key variables needed from the 
health care providers' perspective were: 
• Adjustment of fees and income criteria to changing economic circumstances. 
Who controls the fee policy of each facility? 
• User fee revenue kept at facility 
• Relationship between staff remuneration, user fee revenue and exemptions 
• Existence and level of compensation on exemptions and time frame of 
compensation 
• Who decides means testing? What criteria are used for means testing? 
• Encouragement of patients to take up exemptions by health staff 
• Alternatives to the exemption mechanism, how to finance (tax, pre-payment), 
which option is feasible, not feasible, who and what package will be protected, 
priority setting. 
Secondary data collection on hospital financing 
Objectives of collecting financial data were (1) to have a thorough understanding of in-
flow and out-flow of financial resources of public health facilities, (2) to measure the 
level of revenue from user fees and expenditure from user fee revenue, including for 
exemptions and (3) to evaluate the effectiveness of exempting the poor in practice in 
terms of leakage. 
The financial report for fiscal year 2005 of each health facility was examined. Variables 
needed from the financial report were: 
• Total hospital revenu e disaggregated by sources of revenue (budget for salary 
and materials, user charge for drugs, laboratories, accommodation) 
• Total hospital expenditure disaggregated by types of expenditure such as 
salary, over time payment, drugs, public utilities, medical supplies, diagnostic 
reagents, other materials and total amount of exemption 
• Outputs of health ca re facilities for example num ber of out patient visits, 
number of admissions and total length of stay. 
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• Details of user charges by number of patients and amount classified by type of 
services such as out-patient, in-patient, diagnostic or accommodation in order 
to see magnitude, and its impact on total revenue from user fees. 
• Number of people receiving exemptions and the amount of exemption by 
categories of patient (civil servant, monk, student, the poor and other). 
Even though all the district hospitals in SVK province we re not visited, the ir summary 
financial report could be obtained from SVK Provincial Health Office. However, 
although these summary reports presented some information, not all were as detailed 
as the full financial report available at the health facility. 
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3.4.3 The third sub-study: policy maker perspective 
The third sub-study aimed to (1) generate information on background, funding, design 
and implementation of user fees and exemptions from the policy makers' points of 
view, (2) determine attitudes on user charges and exemption policy from the policy 
makers' perspective and (3) evaluate attitudes on effectiveness of exempting the poor 
in terms of leakage and under-coverage. Key informant interviews and reviewing 
documents were applied to obtain information from the policy makers' perspective. 
Key informant interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire were applied to key 
informants who were policy makers in the Ministry of Health such as minister, 
Secretary General of MOH and some heads of department in MOH, as well as the 
director and some heads of department in the National Institute of Public Health 
(NIOPH) and other relevant organizations e.g. Poverty Reduction Fund. A total of 22 
policy makers and policy relevant people (table 3.7) were interviewed. All the 
interviewees were men staying in Vientiane capital. At the beginning, a number of 
potential interviewees were purposively selected by the researcher on the basis of 
current policy makers who were directly involved in the user fee and exemption policy. 
The list of key informants interviewed was eventually expanded to cover current- and 
ex-policy makers mentioned by other respondents or emerging from other sources of 
information during the fieldwork. The interviews were carried out in Lao by the 
research team without tape recording. The research team consisted of 2-3 health staff 
of the NIOPH and the researcher. The interviews were conducted in Vientiane capital 
between April and May 2006. 
Reviewing relevant documents on user fees and exemptions was used as a 
supplementary method to gain more understanding of the exemptions endorsed by the 
government. 
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Table 3.7 List of key informants on policy maker perspective 
Code Organization Age, average Role 
(min-max} 
PMK1- Ministry of Health 57 3 Policy formulation In a past position 
PMK15 (45 -70) 2 Policy direction at current position 
2 Policy Implementation 
1 Implementation of CBHI 
1 Implementation of primary health care 
3 Implementation of RDF 
3 Revision of policy 
PMK16 - School of Public 53 Training centre for health staff 
PMK17 Health, National (50 - 56) 
Institute of Public 
Health 
PMK18- Ministry of Finance 45 1 Budgeting, 2 Practice of obligatory 
PMK20 (36 - 50} remittance 
PMK21 Poverty Reduction 54 Poverty eradication project 2003 - 2008 
Fund 
PMK22 Independent 40 WHO consultant on Implementation of 
consultant of RDF 
WHO, Lao PDR 
The main features on exemption policy from the policy makers' view point included the 
following variables: 
• The purpose of user fees. 
• Adjustment of fees and Income criteria to changing economic Circumstances. 
• Existence and clarity of national policy on exemptions. 
• Public resources available to finance exemptions. 
• Who decides means testing? What criteria are used for means testing? 
• Relationship between criteria and national poverty criteria. 
• Alternatives to an effective exemption mechanism, how to finance (tax, pre-
payment), which option is feasible, not feasible, who and what package will be 
protected, priority setting. 
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3.4.4 The workshop after the completion of the fieldwork 
Following completion of the fieldwork, two one-day workshops called 'Consultative 
Meeting on Health care Financing for the Poor in Lao POR' were held in Vientiane 
capital on 17-18 July 2006. The workshop served two linked studies on user fees and 
exemptions in Lao POR. One was the first, second and third sub-studies of this thesis. 
Another was a collaborative study involving the National Institute of Public Health, Lao 
PDR (NIOPH) and the International Health Policy Programme, Thailand (IHPP) with the 
support of the Consortium for Research on Equitable Health Systems (CREHS). It was 
conducted during April-May 2006, aimed at describing the process of formulating user 
fees and exemptions policy and used a literature review and in-depth interviews of key 
informa nts. 
The objectives of the workshop were (1) to report back on the two studies in Lao PDR 
on user fees and exemption policy to audiences, (2) to verify preliminary results with 
Lao partners and (3) to discuss ways of protecting the poor in Lao POR. No key 
respondent in the study understood the whole story of this thesis so the workshop 
provided a great opportunity to inforl11 them and acknowledge their contribution to the 
study. Participants in the workshop were all key partners at all levels including pol icy 
makers, public health care facilities and village heads who were directly Involved in the 
studies (table 3.8). 
Table 3.8 Two one-day workshops at the end of the fieldwork 
Meeting 
date 
Monday 
17 July 
Tuesday 
18 July 
Participants 
POlicy makers e.g. MOH, MOF, 
Poverty Reduction Fund, World 
Bank, WHO, National Institute of 
Public Health, School of Public 
Health (A total of 23 partldpants) 
providers and oeople from SVK 
Province e.g. provincial health 
office, provincial hospital, district 
hospitals, health centres and 
village heads (A total of 29 
participants) 
Chaired by 
Vice Minister of 
Health for the 
whole day meeting 
Moming: NIOPH 
Director 
Afternoon: NIOPH 
Deputy Director 
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Agenda 
(same agenda for 2 days) 
Four main topics: 
1. User fee policy formulation 
(presented by NIOPH) 
2. User fee and exemption 
policy implementation, 
provider response and 
household implication 
(presented by the 
researcher) 
3. Health systems In resource 
constrained setting: 
International experiences 
(presented by the 
supervisor) 
4. Discussion (led by the 
researcher) 
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3.4.5 The fourth sub-study: improving protection of the poor 
The fourth sub-study aimed to analyse the financing models of alternative protection 
mechanisms, identify its financial implications and provide recommendations on 
improved ways of protecting the poor. Findings from the first, second and third sub-
studies, including the workshop at the e nd of the fieldwork, as well as information from 
relevant documents, were used as inputs for the analysis of the fourth sub-study. 
A literature review on financial protection was done at the beginning of the study and 
during the study period. Initially, relevant literature was searched for in PubMed and 
the catalogue of the LSHTM library with key words of: user fees, exemptions, 
targeting, the poor, protection mechanism. During the study, many relevant 
documents on Lao PDR were obtained from many sources. For example, government 
regulations and laws relating to health financial protection were obtained from the 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and health care providers. Statistical reports of 
the country and provinces were obtained from the National Statistical Office, the 
Ministry of Health, the Provincial Health Offices and the web. 
The analysis of the fourth sub-study is presented in chapter 8 of the thesis. It shows 
the financial implications for health care provider budgets of various options for 
protection mechanisms and discusses better ways to provide health financial risk 
protection for the poor. Expenditure of health services for beneficiaries was estimated 
under the status quo and several financing models. Financial resources to subsidize 
health facilities were also investigated under several options e.g. general tax revenue, 
premium paid by household and donors. 
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3.4.6 Overview 
In summary, the study applied several methods (both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches) to all levels of key stakeholders involved in user fees and exemptions 
policy (figure 3.7) 
Figure 3.7 Diagram of samples and methods for this study 
National level 
MOH, MOF, NIOPH, 
Poverty Reduction Fund 
and WHO consultant 
. . ... .......................... . 
<·.'.'.'.'.'.'i 1 • KI interviews ~ 
....................... .... ... .. 
................. .. ............. ......................................... .. .. .. ....................... ....................... ........ .......................................................................................... 
....................................... 
. . 
Provincial level 2 central hospitals, 2 .A .. ..... : . KI Interviews Provincial Health Offices ........... :: • Financial data 
and 1 provincial hospital' : collection 
.... ...... ........ .... .. .. ... ....... ... 
....... ·.··········································f·· .. ................... ................................... ........ ................... .. ................. .................................................................. . 
.. .. .... ...... .. . 
District 
in S 
Prov 
level All 14 district hospitals :,.: ..... ,.: ~ • Finanei al data 
collectl on from SVK 
Village level 
inSVK 
Province 
VK in SVK Province .. ,: ... .. . : : 
cial Health Office ; ince I 
.. 
I 3 district hospitals in I 
poor district I 
..... .. ........................... ................. .... ......... .... .. .. 
4 health centers 
in Phine district 
I 
Phine 
I (Poor district) 
~. .. 
(1) TAL (2) KY 
village village 
Far and Less far and 
Provln 
........... ...... .... ............ .... ... : 
.. 
......... ... ... ........ .... ...... 
; • KI Interviews ~ 4 district hospitals in ............ ; • Financial data : 
non-poor district ......... 
· collection ~ 
· . ..... ..... .... ... ..... .. ..... .. : 
. ................... .. ...................................... 
3 health centres in APT 
and other 7 health 
centres in another non-
poor district 
APT 
I (Non-poor district) 
.. .. 
(3) SPX (4) KK 
village village 
Far and Less far and 
........................... .... .. 
. . 
l : . KI interviews 
..... ':; • Financial data 
'. c'''; collection 
. . 
............ .... .. .. ......... .... 
............... .... ..... ... ... ... 
1 • Village census 1 
: • Household : 
· : . 
.' ... . :: 
consumption 
survey 
difficult* less difficult* difficult** less difficult** 
: • KI Interviews 
: • Focus group 
discussions 
Household in-
depth 
Interviews .j • • • •. : 
..... ...... ..... ... ....... .. ... : 
.................. ................................................ ........... ..... ... ..... ..... ......................... ...... ......... ... .. ... .. ... .. ......................................................................... 
Note: * Far and difficult in terms of travelling to Phine district hospital. 
** Far and difficult in terms of travelling to APT district hospital 
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3.5 Data processing and data analysis 
3.5.1 Quantitative data 
yillage census 
Questionnaires were checked by the researcher on a daily basis during the fieldwork. 
Individual and household data were keyed in using Excel® software. Data analysis was 
done using SPSS®. 
Household consumption survey 
Questionnaires were checked by the researcher during the fieldwork. Data processing 
and calculation was done using Excel® software. 
financial data of health facilities 
Financial data of a II 14 district hospitals were received from SVK Provincial Health 
Office in electronic form and were analysed using Excel®. Financial reports from the 
health facilities were in document form. These reports were read and the necessary 
financial data extracted and added to the Excel® programme. Excel was used for the 
analysis. 
3.5.2 Qualitative data 
The analysis of the qualitative data was done manually in the Lao language using a 
thematic content approach which is commonly used in health care research and is 
appropriate to exploratory research (Pope et al. 2006). It was a deductive process -
started deductively from the specific objectives of the study. Main themes were 
established in relation to each of the specific objectives of the study. Keywords were 
highlighted and grouped under relevant headings and sub-headings of each main 
theme (Appendix II). The main findings were presented as a descriptive narrative 
based on each theme, heading and sub-heading. The original quotes of the interviews 
and FGDs were translated to English and shown in italics in the text. The household In-
depth interviews are described household by household in boxes. 
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3.6 Quality control of the study 
3.6.1 potential biases from the researcher, RA and health staff 
The position of the researcher and RA in the research process is important to the 
quality of qualitative research. The researcher has held a position in the Thai Ministry 
of Public Health. She also has previous experience of the Lao health system having 
worked as a consultant between 2003 and 2004 which meant she had previous 
contacted with some health staff in SVK province and Vientiane Capital but had never 
had contact with the villagers. The RA had worked in some district hospitals in SVK 
Province before moving to SVK provine ial health office. Due to her current position in 
the provincial health office, she had professional activities with health staff of district 
hospitals in SVK province. In addition, her father was well-known in SVK province 
because he was a district governor before retirement. 
The fieldwork of each sub-study was officially started and ended according to the Lao 
culture. As stated earlier, in the first sub-study, the arrival and departure of the 
researcher team were facilitated by the director or senior staff of the district health 
office. In the second and third sub-study, the sampled providers and policy key 
informants were formally notified by official letter from SVK provincial health office or 
by the NIOPH for those in Vientiane Capital. 
These facts might have influenced the villagers' and respondents' responses in terms of 
trying to please the researcher and the RA. It is more likely that the respondents 
provided information on all aspects of the study. Nonetheless, the study investigated 
facts or past experiences of respondents, not their attitude towards health services or 
health staff behaviour. It was common that all respondents described the limited 
resources of their situation. The villagers substantially said they were very poor. The 
providers frequently mentioned insufficient resources for operating hospitals. The 
policy makers often referred to inadequate resources of Ministry of Health and 
government as a whole. However, these data could be triangulated with other sources 
of data as described in the next section. 
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3.6.2 Validity and reliability 
The quality of qualitative research is another major concern. In order to improve the 
validity and reliability of investigation, this study applied cross-checking as suggested 
by Seaman et al. (2000). This included many forms as follows; 
A. Participants checking. This process was carried out during the interviews or 
FGDs. The advantage of no tape recorder was that the researchers 
intermittently took notes during the interview/FGD and then read them back to 
the respondents to test the validity of the notes. This facilitated a lively 
discussion within the group. 
B. Cross-checking of the results between groups of FGD. For example the results 
of wealth ranking among three FGDs in the village. 
C. Cross-checking between the researcher, RA and the local administrator (LA), a 
villager who accompanied the researcher and RA during the village census. At 
the end of every day in the village, the researcher, RA and LA had a debriefing 
session in order to summarize main findings of the day, share information, 
discuss achievements and challenges of the day and then prepare tasks for the 
followi ng day. 
D. Triangulation of data across sources. Results from many sources were gathered 
together and compared. This was a very useful approach for validating 
subjective information from respondents and tangible information, for example; 
01. Results of wealth groups from FGOs were compared with quantitative 
information from village census e.g. availability of own rice products for 
household consumption in the past year, housing material and assets (more 
detail in chapter 4). 
02. Providers' perception on inadequate resource to operate the hospital 
was verified with financial reports from the hospital on government budget 
expenditure and user fee revenue. 
03. Policy makers' perception of insufficient government resources was 
compared to financial information from the official gazette. 
The first three forms of cross-checking (A - C) and the first example of the last form 
(01) above were done during the fieldwork period while the last two examples of the 
last form (02 and 03) were done after the fieldwork during the analYSis period. During 
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the fieldwork, when major inconsistencies arose, the researcher consulted the RA, the 
LA and the village head. Sometimes, it was re-confirmed with the origina I source. 
When there was a rational explanation, the majority opinion among the groups was 
accepted. For exam pie; one household was ranked into the better-off group by the 
female FGD but the worst-off group by the other two FGDs. Cross-checking with 
information from the village census showed that it was comparatively poor. 
Subsequent checking with two females of FGD members confirmed that although they 
believed the household should be in the worst-off group, the father of the household 
head was a founder of the village and the women considered it inappropriate to 
categorise his household as worst off. After discussion between the researcher, the 
RA, the LA and the village head it was agreed it should be the worst-off group. 
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3.7 Limitations of the study 
One limitation of this research was the study setting. The households' perspective was 
from four villages in one province and they cannot represent all Laotians in the country 
or even all villagers in the province. The providers' perspective was from some districts 
of two provinces and they cannot represent all provinces of the country. Findings on 
health-seeking pattern, impact of illness costs on household consumption and coping 
strategies of the villagers varied across villages and districts and cannot be generalised 
to other provinces, especially villagers with different ethnicity. Even in the same 
province, it could be seen that providers' practices on the exemption policy varied 
across districts. However, the findings reflect fundamental information on how villagers 
react to their illnesses, the consequences of illness to the household economy, how 
well the villagers were protected by the exemption policy and the challenges of 
improving protection for the poor. 
The aim of this thesis was to obtain insight into the exemption policy to protect the 
poor from paying user fees to public health providers which automatically excluded 
private practices from the providers' perspective. Evidence from the national health 
account in 2001 showed that about two-thirds of out-of-pocket in Lao PDR was spent 
on user fees for private services (WHO 2003). These meant that health financial risk 
protection not only in the public sector but also In the private sector is significant. 
This study mainly focused on inaccessibility to health services due to geographical and 
financial barriers. Some barriers were not investigated in detail such as quality of care 
and cultura I barriers. These barriers might affect households' decision making on 
choosing public or private services. 
Two one-day workshops were arranged at the end of the fieldwork as mentioned 
earlier. One of their objectives was to verify the analysis and interpretation of 
preliminary findings with the key stakeholders. Nevertheless, only the main pOints of 
the first, second and third sub-studies could be presented in the workshops due to the 
time limitations. 
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Despite these limitations, this study can contribute to debates about how to improve 
public health financial risk protection for the poor in Lao PDR in particular, as well as 
developing countries in general. 
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HOUSEHOLD WELL BEING 
This chapter responds to the first objective of the study (to assess the socio-economic 
circumstances of villages and distinguish poverty differences between households). It 
presents information from the four selected villages in two districts of SVK province 
which is useful for understanding the situation of the households. Methods used are 
presented in the next section. The findings are presented according to two main 
topics; characteristics of the four villages and the poverty assessment of the 
households. Three main aspects - living cond itions, health facilities near the village and 
the situation of maternal and child health in the village, are used to explain different 
characteristics of the villages. Four parameters, namely wealth groups, household 
consumption, an asset index and food security are used to demonstrate the poverty of 
the villages and the households. An overview of findings and discussion are presented 
in the last section of the chapter. 
4.2 Methodology 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches was used to obtain 
information from the households. These methods included key informant interviews, 
focus group discussions (FGDs), a village census and a consumption survey. In each 
village, semi-structured interviews were applied to village committee members and key 
informants in order to understand the general context of the village, especially 
livelihoods, treatment choices around the village and treatment preferences of the 
villagers. Three focus group discussions were separately conducted with three different 
groups - the village committee, male villagers and female villagers - each including a 
wide range of people in terms of age (range from 18 to 78 years old) and wealth 
groups (better-off, middle and worst-off group). Members of each of the three FGD 
groups were recruited through consultation with the village head and some well-known 
villagers. FGDs were conducted for many objectives but for this chapter, the FGD was 
used mainly for classifying households in the village into three groups (the better-off, 
middle and worst-off group), or 'wealth ranking', according to a consensus of the 
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members using their own criteria. The village census, with a structured questionnaire 
including asset indicators and food security, was applied to all households in the 
villages. The study was not able to quantify the consumption of every household in the 
villages so a consum ption su rvey was applied to sample households. According to the 
result of the FGDs, three households were randomly chose n for each wealth group. 
After that the consumption questionnaire was applied to all nine households in a 
village. Mean consumption per equivalent person per day was calculated for each 
wealth, group in the four villages and is presented in this chapter. The process of 
estimating consumption of every household based on data from the consumption 
survey was earlier presented in the methodology chapter. Household consumption is 
used as the denominator for calculating the health financial burden of the household 
(health expenditure as per cent of household consumption) in the following two 
chapters. 
Analysis of qua ntitative data was done by SPSS® and Excel®. Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) was applied to asset indicators obtained from the village census in order 
to calculate an asset index score for each household. A mean asset index score of each 
wealth group in each village was estimated. Analysis of qualitative data was manually 
done using a thematic content approach. 
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4.3 Characteristics of the four villages 
4.3.1 Living conditions ofthe villagers 
The study was carried out in four selected villages in two districts in Savann khet 
province. The first two villages, Tang A Lai (TAL) and KaYong (KY) Village, belong to 
Phine District, a poor districtS and the other two villages, Sisapanxai (SPX) and 
KokKong (KK), belong to Atsaphangthong (APT) District, a non-poor districf . TAL and 
SPX were relatively far from the main road compared to KY and KK (figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Model of mapping of the four villages 
Savannakhet 
Province 
APT District 
(Non-poor 
APT 
District 
Phine District 
(Poor district) 
(2) KY 
C:: lCTM 
2.5 km "" centre 
Phlne 
District ~ Health v To O~----6-0-km----~"'--------1-00-k-m----~:""O~It- ... Vietnam 
Symbols and meanings 
Main road 
Dirt road 
I"V\6 Cart road 
© Province 
• District 
::: Village 
(4) KK 
Phine 
District 35 km 
Hospital 
Tad Hal 
Health centre 
S According to NGPES 2004, National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategies. 
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Table 4.1 summarizes the main characteristics of villagers and of the four villages. 
Villagers in the two selected villages in Phine District were Lao Theung 6 while those in 
APT District were Lao Lum. The four villages had a similar population structure. The 
majority of village members were in the reproductive age group while a minority was 
in the elderly group. N umbers of males and females were fairly equal in the four 
villages. Neither births nor deaths were registered in the four villages. No villagers had 
identity cards. KY village showed the lowest education indicators - 12% adult literacy 
rate and 4% school enrolment among children 6-10 years old. The other three villages 
had adult literacy rates. of 31%-42% and school enrolment of 65% - 89%. 
Table 4.1 General information on the four villages 
Phine District APT District Four 
(Poor district} (Non-poor district} village 
(I} TAL (2} KY (3} SPX (4} KK s 
Demography 
• Number of households 62 34 36 40 172 
• Total villagers 455 248 233 203 1,139 
• Mean household size 7.34 7.29 6.47 5.08 
Lao Lao 
• Ethnicity Theun9.. Theun9.. LaoLum LaoLum 
Public facilities 
• Distance from village 65 km 3.5 km 17 km 2km 
to market 
• Electricity No No No No 
• Toilet No No No One public 
toilet 
• Water for general use 3 public 2 public 2 public 1 broken 
wells wells wells ~ublic well 
Source: Village census, key informant interviews and observation 
TAL was the farthest village from a market. KY and SPX were comparatively near to a 
market, while KK was the nearest. There was no public transport reaching any village. 
The most popular form of transportation was the Tak-Tak, a multi-purpose engine 
used by farmers (figure 4.2). Villagers had difficulty accessing telecommunications 
such as public telephone or post office. There was no electricity supply In any village. 
The light source is a torch, dung or battery. Neither public nor private toilets were 
6.62 
6 Three main ethnic groups in Lao are Lao Lum (lOW land, 66% of total population), 
Lao Theung (mid land, 24% of total population) and Lao Sung (high land, 10% of total 
population). 
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available in the villages except KK. There was one public toilet in KK but t he villagers 
rarely used it, using instead the bush or field. 
Figure 4.2 Tak-Tak, the preferred transportation of the villagers 
Tak-tak is a diesel engine with additional 
equipment for ploughing and a wooden 
cart for transport. 
One to three public well water machines, sealed with hand-pumps, were available in 
each village. However, KK village had only one public well water machine and it had 
broken 1-2 months before the fieldwork period. All KK villagers relied solely on a deep 
waterhole surrounded by a wood which was approximately 1 kilometre from the village 
(figure 4.3). There was a severe drought during the dry season, including the fieldwork 
period. Although public wells we re available in the villages, the main source of drinking 
water was pond water. Almost all villagers normally drank water from ponds without 
boiling it. 
Figure 4.3 Drought in KK village 
Severe drought during April 2006 A deep waterhole, 1 km's walk 
The villagers maintained a subsistence economy in the village and mostly consumed 
their own products (glutinous rice) and collected wild vegetables (e.g. bamboo, 
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mushroom) and animals (e.g. snake, mouse, cricket and frog). The villagers in these 
four villages had a similar habit of eating. Meals were served in a shared container for 
everybody. Everyone ate with his/her hands. Soup was eaten with a shared spoon for 
everybody. Water was drunk with a shared cup. 
Villagers had established relationships with persons both inside and outside the village. 
In the same village, members were likely to be related in some way. Moreover, they 
had inter-household connections for social events, as well as for routine life such as 
cooperative farming and meal sharing. Village governance was managed by an elected 
administrative committee consisting of a village head and a village com mittee who 
were in charge of economic affairs, self-defense, agriculture and social events. 
Nonetheless, villagers' feeling of loneliness and lack of social support was found in KK 
village. The KK village head and villagers had pleaded for help from the district hospital 
for repairing a broken public well but their pleas had been rejected. They felt that they 
were unable to access any support and were completely alone in confronting the 
drought. 
'We requested help from the district hospita/. A staff member said he could not 
help. He did not have a device and that's it .. We tried to fix it ourselves but 
could not buy the necessary piece of equipment in the district market ... 
Nobody could help us. We gave up fixing It ' 
(Key informant interview: KK village committee members) 
4.3.2 Characteristics of health facilities 
Health facilities were categorized into three groups; local facilities at village level, 
private providers and public providers (table 4.2). 
Local health facilities (available at village leveO: Village health volunteers (VHV) and 
revolving drug funds (RDF) were available in all four villages. However, the RDF did 
not work well in any of the four villages. Only 3-4 items of medicine were available 
compared to a total of 27 items at RDF initiation. Some expired medicines were still in 
cupboards. Nonetheless, the RDF in SPX was relatively well used by the villagers, but 
mostly for one item of analgesic medicine. A trained traditional birth attendant (TBA) 
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was also available in all the villages except TAL. According to the culture, pregnant 
women were not comfortable receiving selVices from a male TBA. The male TBA at KY 
and SPX never provided ANC or delivery selVices to pregnant women unlike the female 
TBA in KK. Apart from government authorized local health facilities, traditional healers, 
herbs and traditional ceremonies were also the main sources from which villagers 
sought selVices for their illness. A traditional healer mainly applied Seang-Pao and/or 
herbs to patients. Seang-Pao was an animistic belief that a village healer could explain 
a cause of illness (such as spirits from forest or rice field or house) and would treat it 
by blowing an alcoholic beverage from his mouth to the patient in order to exorcise the 
malevolent spirit from the patient. The healer might or might not gi ve the patient 
herbs depending on the patient's condition. Herbs could be applied without Seang-Pao. 
There were some other traditional approaches applied to patients such as ''Puk Khan" 
and ''Heet'~ The Puk Khan was a ceremony that calls all thirty-two spirits back to the 
sick person as the villagers believed that illness occur when one or more of spirits left 
the body. Cotton strings were tied around the wrists of the patient to keep the spirits 
in place. Normally, the Puk Khan was performed after recovering from an illness and to 
greet a newborn. The Heetwas a spedal event of the offering ritual. The village spirit 
speCialist, called a Sanadee, who was the executive local authority, presided over the 
heetwhich involved the sacrifice of an animal - usually a buffalo or a cow - and 
offering of rice liquor. 
Private providers: comprised private practitioners, private drug stores and private 
clinics. Private practitioners were unregistered and worked as a private business. Some 
often came to the villages, especially in TAL, but some practised at home. The villagers 
could access private drug stores and private clinics which we re normally near a market. 
Public providers: comprised health centres, district hospitals and provincial hospital. 
According to the zones of public health responSibility, TAL, KY and SPX belonged to a 
nearest health centre but KK belonged to a district hospital because it was close to the 
district hospital. TAL was farthest from all levels of public providers and TAL villagers 
had the most difficulty to reach any level of public provider. KY and SPX were 
comparatively near to the public providers. KK was nearby the district hospital and not 
far from a provincial hospital. 
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In terms of physical geography, local health facilities were the easiest accessible option 
for the villagers in every village. TAL was the farthest village from both public and 
private providers, KY and SPX were comparatively near, whereas KY was the nearest 
village to both public and private providers. 
Table 4.2 Health facilities of the villages 
1. Local facilities 
• Traditional hea lers, 
herbs, traditional 
Phine District 
(Poor district) 
(1) TAL (2) KY 
Available Available 
ceremoniec.::..s ___ . __ _ 
• Village health 1 1 
APT District 
(Non-poor district) 
(3) SPX ( 4) KK 
Available Available 
1 1 
____ . ~.Q~!.1teeE_(YJ:l..YL_ .. __ . ___ . ____ . _______ . __ .... ______ ...... __ ._ .. __ ... _ .. _. 
• Revolving drug fund Yes but not 
(RDF) at village level functioning 
• Trained traditional 
Birth Attendant (TBA) 
2. Private roviders 
• Private practitioners 
• Drug stores and 
private clinics in 
market 
No 
Farthest but 
often come 
to the village 
Farthest 
Yes but not 
functioning 
Male TBA 
Comparativel 
y near 
Comparativel 
y near 
Yes and 
limited 
functioning_ .. 
Male TBA 
Comparativel 
y near 
Comparativel 
y near 
3. Public ~oviders ____ _ 
------- _._-- .--
- .- Nearest health center 35 km 
(km from the village) 
-:- District hospital -- ------67km--
(km from the village) (8 hours by 
Tak-tak 
--;-- SVKprovincial---'-- 227 km 
hospital 
(km from the village) 
4. The most preferred 
health facilities 
Traditional 
healers, 
private 
practitioners 
who often 
visited the 
village 
Source: Key informant interviews and FGDs 
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2 km 
20 km 
(40 minutes 
by Tak-tak) 
145 km 
A private 
clinic run by 
ex-health 
staff of 
health centre 
2 km 
17 km 
(40 minutes 
by Tak-tak) 
77 km 
Traditional 
healers, 
health centre 
Yes but not 
functioning 
Female TBA 
Nearest 
Nearest 
NA 
(catchment 
area of 
district 
hospital) 
1.5km 
(30 minutes 
by walk) 
62 km 
A traditional 
healer, 
private drug 
stores, 
district 
hospital 
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4.3.3 Basic maternal and child health services 
Evidence from the village census showed poor 
maternal and child health services for the 
villagers. Although few pregnant women had 
received ANC and only around 14% of total 
live births were attended by skilled hea Ith 
personnel, there had been no maternal 
mortality in the twelve months prior to the 
interview. Normally, women gave birth at 
home or in a farmhouse in a rice field with or 
without assistance from her husband or 
relatives or TBA. Women usually gave birth on 
the ground in a temporarily built shed beside 
a house and then continued post natal living 
for 7 days in the shed (figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.4 Temporary shed for 
delivering 
The villagers normally made a fire burn for boiling water all day nearby the shed. Six 
babies out of a total of 50 live births died during the previous 12 months (table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 Some indicators of maternal and child health in the villages 
Pregnant women with at least 
one ANC / total pregna ncy 
Phine District 
(Poor district) 
(I) TAL (2) KY 
0/6 1/2 
during the fieldwork period ____ ._ 
sirthsattended by skilled health 
personnel* / total lived births, 
during the previous twe Ive 
0/22 5/12 
APT District 
(Non-poor 
district) 
{3} SPX ( 4) KK 
5/11 2/2 
0/12 1/4 
~m~o!!nt~h~s_~~--:-::-----;-:-:--:--__ -:-:-:::::-_ __ . __ _______ _ 
Infant death / total lived bi rths, 1/22 0/12 5/12 0/4 
during the previous twe Ive 
months 
Source: Village census 
Four 
villages 
8/21 
7/50 
6/50 
Note: * 'skilled health personnel' refers to an accredited health professional - such as 
a midwife, doctor or nurse - who has been educated and trained to proficiency in the 
skills needed to manage normal pregnancies. Traditional birth attendants (TBA) are 
excluded. (WHO, 2004) 
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Concerning child health, BCG and DTP3 coverage were selected to show child 
immunization performance in the village. SPX and KK had high BCG and DTP3 
coverage while KY had particularly low BCG and DTP3 coverage (figure 4.5). 
Unfortunately, the questionnaire on child immunisation was developed just after 
finishing the fieldwork in TAL so it wa s applied to the othe r three villages (KY, SPX and 
KK), but not TAL. Nonetheless, the village head of TAL said that child immunisation 
coverage might be very low because many women took their children away when 
health staff came to give immunisation. In addition, many women in TAL said that they 
were not convinced about immunisation and sometimes the children had fever after 
the immu nisation. 
Figure 4.5 BeG and DTP3 coverage in the villages 
1000/0 -------------------------------------------
83% 
80% 
60% 
40% -----------------------
20% 
NA 
O% ~--------~----·----L--
TAL KY SPX KK 
Source: Village census 
4.4 Poverty assessment 
OBCG 
- DTP3 
This section presents four main parameters used for assessing the poverty of the four 
villages and households of the villages. First, within the village every household was 
categorized by the FGDs into three wealth groups; better-off, middle and worst-off 
group. Second, a consumption survey of sampled households was employed to obtain 
a mean household consumption of each wealth group. Third, an asset index of each 
wealth group was computed and is presented. Finally, food security of the villagers is 
demonstrated by two indicators; insufficient own rice products and hunger. 
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4.4.1 Wealth groups 
For each village, not more than one third of the total households (as well as villagers) 
were classified by the FGDs into the worst-off group (table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 Household wealth ranking by three FGDs in each village 
Phine District APT District 
(Poor district) (Non-poor district) 
(1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
Total households 62 34 36 40 
• Better-off 11 % 26% 39% 38% 
• Middle 63% 47% 31% 30% 
• Worst-off 26% 26% 31% 33% 
Total villagers 455 248 233 203 
• Better-off 13% 31 % 47% 45% 
• Middle 64% 46% 30% 27% 
• Worst-off 22% 23% 23% 28% 
Source: Households from village census classified by wealth groups from FGDs. 
Four 
villages 
172 
26% 
45% 
28% 
1,139 
30% 
47% 
24% 
After the ranking, the FGDs discussed what criteria they used for classifying 
households and which criterion was more Important than the others. Although the 
twelve FGDs were conducted in different places and times in the four villages, all 
twelve FGDs had the same four main criteria for classifying households into three 
wealth groups. These criteria were as follows; 
1. Rice (the most important criterion) - own rice production adequate for whole 
year's consumption. Everyone agreed that the better-off household could produce 
rice not only for household consumption but also for trading whereas the worst-off 
household did not have enough rice for household consumption. 
2. Housing materials in terms of permanent and non-permanent material. The 
house of the better-off was built from permanent material such as corrugated zinc 
sheeting and wood while the worst-off group had less permanent housing materials 
such as bamboo, dry leaves or dry straw which had to be repaired every 1-2 years. 
3. Livestock Buffalo and cows were the most valuable and important livestock. In 
addition, they were not only assets but also a resource for rice cultivation. The 
better-off households usually owned many while the worst-off household might 
own only a few or none. 
4. Clothes and household eqUipment Normally, FGDs referred to clothes, kitchen 
utensils and sleeping materials in terms of quantity and quality. 
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4.4.2 Household consumption 
In the consumption survey of nine sampled households in each village, the mean 
household consum ption of three sampled households per wealth group was calculated. 
Overall, villagers of the four villages lived on less than one dollar per person per day 
(0.8 USD per person a day). In terms of consumption by villages, KK villagers lived on 
1.29 dollar per person per day while villagers in the other three villages (TAL, KY and 
SPX) lived on less than one dollar per person per day (table 4.5). The worst-off group 
of all villages lived on less than one dollar a day. The profile of non-food and food 
consumption showed that, overall, villagers spend more on food than non-food. More 
than two thirds of total consumption was for food. 
Table 4.5 Mean household consumption and profile of non-food and food 
consumption from consumption survey of sampled households 
Mean HH consumption 
(USD / equivalent 
person/day) 
• Better-off 
• Middle 
• Worst-off 
• Overall of three groups 
• Two villages in the district 
Mean profile of non-food 
and food consumption 
• Better-off 
• Middle 
• Worst-off 
• Overall of three groups 
• Two villages in the district 
SOurce: Consumption survey 
Phlne DIstrict APT District 
(Poor district) (Non-poor district) 
(1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
1.05 0.84 1.02 1.71 
0.68 0.42 0.42 1.42 
0.44 0.27 0.65 0.81 
0.69 0.51 0.72 1.29 
0.61 1.00 
30:70 23:77 36:64 39:61 
12:88 20:80 20:80 28:72 
16:84 24:76 18:82 33:67 
19:81 23:77 24:76 33:67 
21:79 29:71 
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0.73 
0.54 
0.80 
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20:80 
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4.4.3 Asset index 
The results of wealth ranking and asset information of each household were combined 
together for computing the asset index. Every household was classified into ?I wealth 
group by the FGDs. Asset information of every household was obtained in the village 
census. The asset index score of each household was calculated according to a total of 
17 asset indicators for each household using Principal Component Analysi s (PCA). 
These asset indicators were categorised into four groups as follows; 
• Housing material (3 indicators: roof, wall and floor) 
• Durable asset ownership (11 indicators: Tak-Tak, motorcycle, bicycle, TV, radiO, 
mobile phone, mill machine, buffalo & cow, pig & goat, poultry and household 
appliances e.g. pillow, mattress, blanket, pot, spoon, bowl) 
• Having adequate own rice production for household consumption throughout 
the year 2004 (1 indicator, adequate or inadequate) 
• Characteristics of family (2 indicators: family size and age of household head) 
The mean asset index score of the three wealth groups of households was computed. 
Within the vi lIage, the better-off groups had the highest mean score while the worst-
off groups had the lowest mean score (table 4.6). TAL had the lowest mean score 
compared to the other three villages. The two villages in Phine District (poor district) 
had lower mean scores than the two villages in APT District (non-poor district). 
Table 4.6 Asset index score of three wealth groups in the four villages 
APT District 
Phine District (Non-poor 
(Poor district) district) 
Mean asset index score (1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
• Better off 1.10 1.25 1.14 0.82 
• Middle -0.22 0.17 0.25 0.03 
• Worst off -1.18 -0.84 -0.86 -0.66 
• All households in the village -0.32 0.19 0.26 0.10 
• Two villages in the district -0.14 0.17 
Source: Wealth groups: FGDs and asset index score: village census 
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More details of the PCA are noted here. The first five most relevant indicators for the 
asset index score were Tak-Tak, roof material, household appliances, age of household 
head and wall material (table 4.7). Having adequate own rice production for household 
consumption was ranked as the sixth significant indicator. The better-off households 
were likely to have an older household head and family size was larger than in the 
poorer group. The better-off households had more probability of permanent housing 
material (i.e. corrugated sheet for roof and wood for wall) and durable asset ownership 
(e.g. Tak-Tak, radio, lV and bicycle). Few households, even in the better-off group, 
owned a motorcycle. None of the worst-off owned a mill or a mobile phone. Poultry, 
pig and goat were the last two relevant asset indicators. They were commonly owned 
by all three wealth groups, including the worst-off households. 
Table 4.7 Factor score of each indicator in the first principal component and 
proportion of indicator among three groups 
0/0 of household with asset 
Worse-
Indicator Weight Better-off Middle off 
1 Tak-Tak 0.71 78% 28% 4% 
2 Roof made from permanent 
material 0.65 96% 73% 35% 
3 Appliance in household > 50 
items 0.64 96% 65% 41% 
4 Age of household head* 0.58 52.24 43.67 37.94 
5 Wall made from permanent 
material 0.58 76% 46% 27% 
6 Having enough rice for whole of 
2004 0.51 62% 33% 4% 
7 Floor made from permanent 
material 0.47 100% 95% 84% 
8 Buffalo and cow 0.47 98% 87% 53% 
9 Radio 0.40 71% 53% 41% 
10 lV 0.40 42% 15% 8% 
11 Motorcycle 0.37 22% 4% 2% 
12 Bicycle 0.36 67% 36% 33% 
13 Family size* 0.33 7.56 6.81 5.47 
14 Mill 0.27 9% 0% 0% 
15 Mobile Phone 0.18 7% 3% 0% 
16 Poultry 0.13 84% 91% 80% 
17 Pig and goat 0.10 78% 83% 65% 
Total number of household 45 78 49 
{26°/0) {45O/0) {29O/0) 
Note * Figures in the row of age of household head and family size are means. 
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Figure 4.6 plots the asset score of each household by the wealth group they were 
assigned to. For TAL and KY, all households falling within the better-off group had 
higher scores than the worst-off group. However, for SPX and KK, some of the less 
well-off households ranked by assets had a lower score than the better off amongst 
the worst-off. The asset index scores of the middle group of all four villages had a wide 
range and overlapped with either the better-off (in case of a high score) or the worst-
off group (in case of a low score). This suggests that wealth ranking by FGDs 
distinguished households at the top from those at the bottom but could not clearly 
differentiate the middle group from the better-off or the worst-off. Some households in 
the middle group (especially TAL and KK) had very low scores which were similar to 
those of the worst-off group. 
Figure 4.6 Asset index score and wealth group of each household in the four 
villages 
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4.4.4 Food security 
The village census showed that all four villages faced food insecurity. Table 4.8 shows 
that two thirds of all house holds in the four villages (67%) did not have enough own 
rice production for household consumption throughout the year 2004 although 
circumstances were normal. The pattern was clear in all the four villages that the 
poorer households were more at risk of insufficient own rice production. Even in the 
better-off group, only 62% had enough own rice production for household 
consumption. The situation was much worse for the worst-off; only 4% of them had 
enough of their own rice. 
Nonetheless, not all households with inadequate rice of their own experienced hunger. 
Around two thirds of them could combat the lack of rice. The most common strategies 
to fight a lack of rice were (1) to borrow rice from neighbours and relatives within or 
outside the village, and (2) to earn cash for buying rice on a day-to-day baSiS, for 
instance by selling vegetables from their plots as well as wild products in a market (this 
applied only to villages near a market), or by daily labour for wood sawing or selling 
livestock (poultry first). However, one third of household with inadequate rice of their 
own could not successfully deal with the crisis and then suffered hunger. 
Data of TAL and SPX showed that the worst-off group were more likely to succumb to 
hunger than the better-off group. KY showed that every wealth group had a similar 
capacity to fight successfully against lack of rice. As a result, households in the poor 
district had a higher percentage of hunger than those in the non-poor district and 
poorer households were more likely to be faced with hunger, except in KK village 
although many of its households (78% of total households) had inadequate rice of 
their own. The most common strategies for combating hunger were to reduce 
quantities of stiCky rice per meal and to consume cassava instead of rice. The worst 
case was no rice at alii just cassava. 
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Table 4.8 Food insecurity of the four villages in the year 2004 
Phine District 
(Poor district) 
(1) TAL (2) KY 
Total household (HH) 
Better-off 7 9 
Middle 39 16 
Worse-off 16 9 
Total 62 34 
Not enough own rice (as % of total HH) 
Better-off 14% 67% 
Middle 67% 75% 
Worse-off 100% 89% 
Total 69% 76% 
Two villages in the 
district 72% 
Hunger* (as % of HH not enough own 
rice) 
Better-off 
Middle 
Worse-off 
Total 
Two villages in the 
district 
0% 
38% 
75% 
51% 
Hunger* (as % of total HH) 
Better-off 0% 
Middle 26% 
Worse-off 75% 
Total 35% 
Two villages in the 
51% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
33% 
38% 
44% 
38% 
APT District 
(Non-poor district) 
(3) SPX (4) KK 
14 
11 
11 
36 
14% 
36% 
91% 
44% 
0% 
25% 
50% 
38% 
0% 
9% 
45% 
17% 
62% 
31% 
15 
12 
13 
40 
53% 
83% 
100% 
78% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
district 36% 8% 
Source: Village census plus wealth ranking result from FGDs. 
Four 
villages 
45 
78 
49 
172 
38% 
67% 
96% 
67% 
18% 
33% 
45% 
35% 
7% 
22% 
43% 
24% 
Note: *Hunger means household had at least one day in a month without enough food 
for normal eating. 
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4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Discussion of methodology 
At the beginning of the quantitative fieldwork, conducting the village census was not 
smooth. Age was asked for in the first module of the questionnaire (out of a total of 
seven modules) in the village census. Asking age was time-consuming and ineffectively 
prolonged the time needed to complete one questionnaire. The villagers needed to 
provide as accurate an answer as they could. However, they did not know their age. 
They had neither birth and death registration nor identity card. Rnally, the problem 
was solved by a rough estimation comparing the individual with other villagers who 
were of a similar age. 
Normally, there is a hierarchical relationship between government staff and villagers, 
especially in a communist society. This might affect the perception of the villagers 
towards the village committee members who were appointed by the local governor. It 
is also common in many developing countries for society to be dominated by men. 
Against this background, three groups of FGDs (village committee, male and female) 
were conducted separately in order to avoid domination by some groups. Members of 
each FGD were mixed from the three wealth groups with different ages from young to 
elderly. It was of concern that the presence of elderly or wealthier members might 
inhibit the discussion of younger or poorer members of the group. But it was found 
that the mixing of members in each FDG did not prevent discussion. The discussion 
was enjoyable with the different experiences between the elderly and young people. 
FGD members were not concerned about the mixing of wealth groups. 
FGDs were used as a tool for wealth ranking. In every village, three FGDs were 
separately conducted. From the total of 172 households, the overall result was that; 
• 114 households were classified into a wealth group with the consensus of all 
three FGDs in the village. 
• 56 households were classified into a wealth group by a majority of FGDs - 2/3 
FGDs had the same opinion. This usually happened in a middle group or a 
border line group. For example two FGDs ranked a household as middle group 
while the other FGD ranked it in the better-off or worst-off. 
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• 2 households were classified into three different groups (better-off, middle, and 
worst-off) by the three FGDs without an obvious logical reason. These two 
households were assigned into the middle group. 
Cross-checking between the results of wealth ranking and some main asset indicators 
(e.g. housing material, having enough own rice production, cow and buffalo) from the 
village census was done during fieldwork in order to roughly validate the wealth groups 
before applying them in the consumption survey. This did not indicate any obvious 
contradictions. The decision to select a wealth group based on majority FGD decision 
(2/3 FGDs had the same opinion) was confirmed. For example, one household was 
ranked into the worst -off group by two FGD s but in the better-off group by the female 
FGD. Asset indicators from the village census showed that this household was relatively 
poor. Some members of the female FGD explained that the father of this household 
was a founder of the village. Out of respect for the householder, the women had 
ranked this household as better-off. 
Wealth ranking by FGDs was able to distinguish the relative poverty of households. It 
was simple, did not require technical expertise about poverty, was not time-consuming 
and provided low-cost tools for making poverty comparisons between households. 
Importantly, it encouraged comm unity participation. In contrast, measuring poverty 
using household consumption, an asset index or a hunger indicator was more 
complicated, ti me-consuming and ex pensive and required a technically skilled person 
to conduct the study. 
Results from the PCA showed that the asset index score obtained from the village 
census was reasonably well correlated with the results of wealth ranking by FGDs. The 
top and bottom groups of households could be differentiated by the FGDs. However, 
the FGDs could not dearly differentiate the middle group from the worst-off group. The 
results of wealth ranking by FGDs to identify the poorest households must be treated 
with caution given the apparent problem of under-estimation (ie some households 
classed as poor by the asset index were ranked in the middle group by FGDs.). 
It was surprising that villagers could fairly well answer questions in the cons umption 
survey (i.e. estimate the value of food consumption and expenditure on non-food 
consumption), although they lived in a subsistence economy. Most respondents easily 
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converted the value of a meal they consumed into money by comparing with a price a t 
the nearest market. They provided expenditures on non-food consumption without 
difficulty e.g. stationary for children to go to school, clothes and shoes. They firstly 
answered quantity they consumed and then its price. The researcher calculated a total 
amount and reported back to them item by item including a total amount of 
consumption at the end of the interview. For example, their answers were five pairs of 
shoes last year, three were 5,000 kip each and the other two were 10,000 kip each. 
Normally, a household head and a housewife were key respondents. It was found in 
one household that a housewife never went to a market and she did not know any 
prices of food. In this case, the housewife gave answers on quantity and a household 
head estimated the price of each item. 
Applying various methods of both qualitative and qualitative approaches enabled the 
cross-checking of information for validity and reliability. For example, in the first 
village, a household was ranked as better-off by all three FGDs, but the village cens us 
showed that the household lacked own rice products and faced hunger. The 
information was inconsistent between the village census and the FGDs. After consulting 
the village head, it was established that the household head had under-reported. It 
was explained that it mi ght be because the household head had been given rice 
assistance many years ago (approximately in 1997) and was hoping for assistance 
again in the future. Information from all households in the first village related to having 
enough own rice products over 2004 was then re-checked with the village he ad and 
the deputy village head. There were three possible answers: (1) enough for household 
consumption plus trading, (2) enough for household consumption and (3) not enough. 
The issue was then informally discussed with the other three village heads before 
conducting the village census. Every household was reassured that this study was not 
related to any assistance from domestic or international agencies. In the first village, 
the explanation had clarified only that the study was not linked to any tax system of 
the government. The re-checking of data between wealth ranking from FGDs and 
having rice from the village census was applied to all villages. 
Regarding the asset module in the village census, villagers' answers about num ber of 
assets owned by households were less problematic than those related to food security 
indicators. Assets were visible and could be observed whereas having sufficient rice of 
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their own and hunger were subjective and could not be observed during the interview 
period. 
4.5.2 Overview of findings 
This chapter has provided information on characteristics of the four villages including a 
poverty assessment using quantitative and qualitative methods. The results highlighted 
that all the four villages were poor which was unsurprising. The villagers had difficult 
living conditions - about 24% of all households in the villages experienced hunger 
during 2004. The mean consumption of the four villages was less than 1 USD per 
person per day. The villagers lived at subsistence level, making them highly vulnerable. 
All villagers' livelihood was based on agriculture and the rearing of livestock without 
high technology support. The four villages still had a primitive infrastructure; had no 
road and public transportation reaching the villages, no electricity and extremely 
limited telecommunications. Basic sanitation was still a fundamental problem; there 
was an inadequate water supply and no potable drinking water, no private toilet in 
houses or even a public toilet in the villages (except KK village) and poor hygiene in 
relation to eating habits. Local health facilities located in the community were 
perceived to be the most accessible treatment option for the villagers. Maternal health 
services in the four villages were not performing well. 
Comparing among the four villages, they had similar poor public sanitation but some 
differences were found (Table 4.9). TAl village had the most difficulty in accessing 
private and public health providers. Access was comparatively easy in both KY and SPX 
but easiest in KY. Indicators on consumption and hunger of TAL and KY were worse 
than SPX and KK. TAl had the lowest asset index score compared to other three 
villages. Comparing by district, the two villages in the poor district showed worse 
figures for mean household consumption, asset index and hunger than the non-poor 
district. 
It can be conduded that Ph ine district (the poor district) was poorer than APT district 
(the non-poor district). TAl was the most disadvantaged village. Both SPX and KY were 
moderately advantaged villages, while KK was the most advantaged village. 
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Table 4.9 Summary indicators of the fou r villages 
Phine District APT District 
(Poor district) (Non-poor district) 
(1) TAL (2)KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
Ethnidty £Do Theung £Do Theung LaoLum LaoLum 
Public sanitation e.g. water, toilet Deprived Deprived Deprived Deprived 
Access to public health fadlities The most Easy Easy Easiest 
diffirulty 
Household consumption 
(USD per person per day) 
• Data by village 0.69 0.51 0.72 1.29 
• Data by district 0.61 1.00 
Asset index score 
• Data by village -0.32 0.19 0.26 0.10 
• Data by district -0.14 0.17 
Food security: hunger 
(% of total households) 
• Data by village 35% 38% 17% 0% 
• Data by district 36% 8% 
From a total of 172 households of the four vill~ges, about 28% of them were identified 
by FGD as the worst-off, 45% were in the middle group and 26% were in the better-
off group. Main criteria from FGDs to identify the worst-off were mainly related to 
routine life e.g. inadequate own production of rice for the whole year's household 
consumption, poor shelter, few livestock and few utensils. Household consumption 
data and asset index score showed that the worst-off group had the worst figures 
whereas the better-off group had the best figures. Regarding food security, it was clear 
in TAL, KY and SPX that the worst-off households had higher possibility to fall into 
hunger whereas the better-off had the least possibility. However, no KK villagers had 
faced hunger. 
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4.5.3 Discussion of findings 
Comparing characteristics of the four villages to national data 
Data of the four villages was compared to national data from the Lao Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey III (LECS III) in 2003 (Lao PDR 2004) which classified data into 
three groups; urban, rural areas with access to road and rural areas without access to 
road. Most indicators from the four villages were comparable to the data of 'rural areas 
without access to road' from the LECS III (table 4.10). The sampled villagers had 
similar main economic activities to the rural areas without access to road - 83% of 
working time was spent on their own farm. In terms of infrastructure, all four villages 
had no electricity and no toilet which made them more disadvantaged compared to the 
'rural areas without access to road'. The four sampled villages had slightly higher 
percentage of food consu mption (75%) out of total co nsumption than th ose in the 
rural areas without access to road. For education indicators, the sampled four villages 
had relatively poorer adult literacy rate but slightly better school enrolment than those 
in the rural areas without access to road. 
Table 4.10 Indicators of the four villages compared to the rural areas 
without access to road from the lEes III 
Indicator 
• Household size (people per 
Data of rural areas 
without access to 
road from lEe III 
6.6 
Mean figures of 
the four villages 
6.6 
household), __________________ ______ _ 
• De enden ratio 90* 
• % of working time spent on their 
own farm 
• Food consumption as % of total 
household consumptions 
• % of 0 ulation without toilet 
• % of villa es without electricit 
• % of villages with bus stop in 
villa e 
• Adult literacy rate, who can read 
and write (% of adult greater than 
15 ears 
83% 
71.4 
83% 
87% 
11% 
54% 
98 
Nearly 100% 
75% 
Nearly 100% 
100% 
0% 
32% 
• School enrolment (% of children 6- 53% 57% 
10 years) 
Note: * Data of rural areas without access to road was not available and this figure 
referred to all rural areas 
112 
CHAPTER 4: HOUSEHOLD WELL BEING 
It can be concluded that the characteristics of the four villages and the villagers were 
similar to other rural areas without access to road of Lao PDR but their public facilities 
were more deficient. The LECS III showed that the rural areas without access to road 
were the worst-off area, followed by the rural areas with access to road and the urban 
areas were the best. Throughout the country, about 28% of total households lived in 
urban areas, 54% in rural areas with access to road and 18% in rural areas without 
access to road. 
Poverty aSsessment 
From the villagers' perspective, the most important criteria for wealth were the 
essentials of daily life: i.e. rice availability, dwelling, livestock for rice cultivation and 
valuable assets and dothes and house equipment. These were very different from 
those in two previous reports. One was the study by Paphassarang et al. (2002) which 
dassified the socioeconomic position of urban households by five physical conditions: 
permanent house structure, flushing toilet inside the house, gas or electricity used for 
cooking, television and private car. The criteria from this study were not appropriate to 
the rural setting of this the sis. The other was the National Growth and Poverty 
Eradication Strategy, NGPES, (Lao PDR 2004) which defined a poor household as 
having an income level (or the equivalent in kind) of less than 85,000 kip or 8.5 USD 
(10 USD for urban and 8.2 USD for rural) per person per month at 2001 prices. This 
amount was sufficient for purchasing milled rice of 16 kilograms per person per month 
but the rest was insufficient to cover other necessities e.g. dothing, shelter, schooling 
and medical costs. The criteria from the NGPES were not applicable to this thesis 
because the four sampled villages were in the subsistence economy. An approach of 
quantifying household income was not practical. 
Comparing the two a pproaches of poverty assessment, asset indicators by PCA and the 
wealth criteria by FGDs, similarity and difference were found. Housing material, 
livestock, dothes and housing appliances were important indicators of poverty in both 
approaches. The PCA suggested that buffalo and cow owne rship was more significant 
than ownership of poultry and pigs since all of three wealth groups commonly owned 
poultry and pigs. Normally, these were mainly for trading, ritual sacrifiCing and taking 
care of their guests, not for food for the household. 
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From the PCA, age of household head was one of the top five Significant indicators. 
The better-off households were likely to have an older household head and family size 
was larger than in the worse-off group. These were not Significant criteria from the 
FGDs' view point. Nonetheless, all the female FGDs agreed that a new family tended to 
be poorer than a mature family. A new household set up by a new couple would be in 
the worst-off group because they had just detached themselves from their parents. 
Later, some of them could shift to a better-off status but some could not and remained 
in the worst-off group. This depended very much on hard-work and luck, where luck 
referred to the quality of their rice field(s) in terms of producing more rice products. 
Tak-Tak was the most significant asset indicator in the PCA but the FGDs did not 
mention Tak-Tak ownership as an important criterion to distinguish a wealth group. 
The FGDs gave an example of a household that became poorer due to purchasing a 
Tak-Tak. The household had traded their buffalos and cows for a Tak-Tak and 
thereafter did not have enough cash to buy gaSOline to' operate it and/or could not 
afford the cost of its maintenance. This household had lost their livestock and gained a 
useless machine. Moreover, selling a second hand Tak-Tak would get them an 
unacceptably low price. 
From PCA, having adequate rice production for household consumption was ranked as 
the sixth significant indicator whe reas FGDs revealed that it was the most Significant 
indicator. This was understandable as it implied multiple factors, for example having a 
water buffalo or a Tak-Tak for rice cultivation, suffICient labour (either own labour or 
hired from a neighbour), or having resources to invest in a paddy field (e.g. buying 
fertilizer). 
Q>mbating food insecurity 
The findings of this chapter show that about two thirds of households with insufficient 
rice of their own could cope with the lack of rice but one third could not and then 
suffered hunger. No household in KK faced hunger, although many hou seholds lacked 
rice. One possible reason was that the village was close to a market and the villagers 
could easily reach the market. They could sell natural products they fetched from the 
forest and buy a minimal amount of rice for day to day consumption. The villagers said 
that by doing this, housewives were able to limit the amount of rice consumed per day 
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and family members would accept it without difficulty. Access to road (and market) 
was significant for the villagers to fight a crisis of lack of rice and hunger. In order to 
fight with insufficient rice of their own, coping strategies using both intra-household 
and inter-household mechanisms were mentioned e.g. borrowing rice, sell poultry and 
income diversification were commonly used by households. 
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4.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has showed that the villagers were poor which was unsurprising for a 
LOC. Compared to the national survey, the four villages had similar conditions to the 
rural areas without access to road (the most disadvantaged area) of the Lao PDR, for 
instance agricultural activity on own operated rice farm and poor infrastructure. The 
sampled villages and households were typically rural in the Lao context with very poor 
access to public services. 
In general, the villagers had difficult living conditions e.g. inadequate water, unsafe 
potable water, inconvenient transportation, insufficient opportunity to access 
information, and poor sanitation. Between the villages, geography appeared to be the 
main determinant affecting the activity of villagers, especially when they had to deal 
with difficulty in their life. It was clear that the closer to the main road and market a 
village was, the more scope it had to solve a problem e.g. earning income, combating 
hunger, and accessing health facility when ill. Within the village, the poorer households 
were more vulnerable than the better-off in terms of food insecurity and precarious 
shelter. In addition, they owned fewer livestock which roughly reflected their fewer 
resources. 
Regarding poverty assessment, wealth ranking by FGDs successfully differentiated the 
relative poverty of households. Comparison of the asset index with wealth ranking by 
FGDs suggested that wealth ranking can be used to identify in general terms the 
worst-off households in a village. The consumption survey was used to quantify the 
mean household consumption of each wealth group in the villages. This enabled 
monthly household consumption of each household to be calculated and used for 
caiculating illness cost burden on the hous ehold and identifying catastrophic health 
expenditure, as shown in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTERS 
HEALTH SERVICE UTILIZATION 
S.llntroduction 
This chapter analyses the data of households in the four villages in order to assess 
health service utilization patterns and illness costs and respond to objective 2 of the 
study. This analysis provides the context for better understanding of demand-side 
reactions to illness and access and use of health services. A brief methodology is 
presented in the next section followed by the results of the study. A summary and 
discussion of the findings are presented subsequently, at the end of the chapter. 
S.2 Methodology 
Data used in this chapter were obtained from the sampled households using the village 
census, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. These studies were 
conducted in the four villages during December 2005 - April 2006; December 2005 for 
TAL village, February 2006 for KY, March 2006 for SPX, and April 2006 for KK. The 
researcher and RA stayed in each village for 10-18 days (18 days for TAL and 10 days 
for each of the other three villages) and completed the fieldwork in one village before 
moving to the next. 
In each village, the questionnaire for the village census was applied to all households 
in the village (a total of 172 households with 1,139 individuals in the four villages). The 
interview using semi-structured guidelines was applied to key informants who were 
village committee members. Three focus group discussions were conducted for three 
different FGD members; village committees, males and females. 
Analysis of quantitative data was done using SPSS® and is presented using descriptive 
statistics. Analysis of qualitative data was manually done using a thematic content 
approach and is presented in descriptive narrative. 
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5.3 Illness and health service utilization 
All villagers in each village were asked whether they had been ill in the previous 2 
weeks and had subsequently accessed and used services for OP treatment and had 
been admitted to health providers in the previous 12 months. The number of 
households and individuals reporting illness, use of OP treatment and admission in the 
four villages are set out in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Individuals reporting illness, service use for OP treabnent and 
admission 
Phine District APT District 
(Poor district) (Non-poor district) Four 
(1) TAL (2)KY (3) SPX (4) KK villages 
Total households 62 34 36 40 172 
Total vill~rs 455 248 233 203 1139 
Illness in the previous 2 weeks 
• Number of illness episodes 52 25 10 16 103 
o Episodes without seeking care 31 5 3 1 40 
o Episodes with seeking care 21 20 7 15 63 
• Reported illness rate (as % of 
total villagers) 11% 10% 4% 8% 9% 
o Episodes where care not 
sought (as % of total villagers) 7% 2% 1% 0.5% 4% 
o OP service utiliZation (as % of 
total villagers) 5% 8% 3% 7% 6% 
Admission in the previous 12 
months 
• Number of people admitted 2 7 16 13 38 
• Admission rate (as % of total 
villagers) 0.44% 2.82% 6.87% 6.40% 3.34% 
• Mean length of stay (days/person 
admitted) 9.5 1.3 1.4 4.0 2.7 
• Reported cause of admission Ruptured Delivery (4) Diarrhea Diarrhea (4), 
appendix (1), Pneumonia (7), Fever (2), 
Malaria (1) (1), Abscess Abdominal Hemorrhagic 
(1), Malaria pain (4), fever (2), 
(1) Fever (2), Jaundice (1), 
Malaria (2), Malaria (1), 
AccIdent (1) Abdominal 
pain (1), 
Explosion 
accident (1), 
Fatigue {I) 
Source: Village census 
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A total of 92 households (out of 172 households) reported illness in the previous 2 
weeks or admission in the previous 12 months or a combination of illness and 
admission. A majority of households experienced one episode of either illness or 
admission. Some households faced 2 or 3 illness episodes in the previous 2 weeks. A 
minority of households suffered from multiple illness and admissions in a year. There 
were 103 self-reported illness episodes in the two weeks prior to the village census; 
subsequently only 63 illness episodes received OP services and 38 people were 
admitted to health facilities in the previous twelve months. 
Individuals in TAL and KY reported more perceived illness (11% and 10% of total 
villagers in the village, respectively) than SPX and KK villagers (4% and 8% 
respectively). 'No treatment' was the most commonly reported first action (40/103 
illness episodes). Individuals in TAL (the most disadvantaged village) were least likely 
to access OP services when ill (7% of total villagers in the village did not seek care), an 
indicator of inaccessibility to health services; both KY and SPX villagers (the moderately 
advantaged villages) showed figures lower than TAL (1-2%); in contrast individuals in 
KK (the most advantaged village) showed the lowest (0.5%). 
TAL villagers reported the lowest admission rate (0.44%) in the previous 12 months 
compared to higher admission rates in SPX and KK (6.87% and 7.39%). Mean length 
of stay and reported cause of admission were useful in exploring these differences. 
Mean length of stay (LOS) of TAL villagers' admission was 9.5 days while mean LOS of 
the other three villages was shorter at 1.3, 1.4 and 4.0 days for KY, SPX and KK village 
respectively. Although the other three villages had higher reported admissions than 
TAL, it should be noted that causes of admission in TAL were ruptured appendicitis and 
malaria, while there were 4 deliveries out of a total of 7 admissions for KY, 7 diarrhoea 
cases out of a total of 16 admissions in SPX and 4 diarrhoea cases out of a total of 13 
admissions in KK. It can be interpreted that the two admissions of TAL were more 
serious than those for the other three villages. 
Data were analysed by wealth group and are shown in table 5.2. For all four villages, 
the better-off reported a lower level of illness (6%) than the worst-off (11%). All 
wealth groups had a similar utilization rate of OP treatment (about 5-6%). The better-
off reported more admissions (8%) than the worst-off (1%). Due to small sample sizes 
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in each village, it was difficult to compare data among the three wealth groups in the 
village 
Comparing districts (table 5.2), the two villages in the poor district had a higher illness 
rate than the non-poor district but the utilization rates of these two districts were 
similar. The poor district showed a lower admission rate than the non-poor district. 
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Table S.2 Reported Illness, use of OP treatment and admission by wealth group 
Phine District APT District 
(Poor district) (Non-poor district) Four 
(1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX {4} KK villages 
Number of villagers 
• Better-off 61 78 109 92 340 
• Middle 292 114 70 55 531 
• Worst-off 102 56 54 56 268 
• All groups in village 455 248 233 203 1139 
• Two villages In the district 703 436 
Reported Illness (episodes) 
• Better-off 2 10 4 6 22 
• Middle 29 12 4 6 51 
• Worst-off 21 3 2 4 30 
• All groups In village 52 25 10 16 103 
• Two villages in the district 77 26 
Access and use of OP treatment 
(episodes) 
• Better-off 0 9 2 6 17 
• Middle 14 9 3 5 31 
• Worst-off 7 2 2 4 15 
• All groups in village 21 20 7 15 63 
• Two villages In the district 41 22 
Access and use of hospitalization 
(person admitted) 
• Better-off 0 3 13 10 26 
• Middle 1 3 3 3 10 
• Worst-off 1 1 0 0 2 
• All groups in village 2 7 16 13 38 
• Two villages in the district 9 29 
Reported Illness 
(as Ofo of villagers In each category) 
• Better-off 3% 13% 4% 7% 6% 
• Middle 10% 11% 6% 11% 10% 
• Worst-off 21% 5% 4% 7% 11% 
• All groups In village 11% 10% 4% 8% 9% 
• Two villages In the district 11% 6% 
Access and use of OP treatment 
(as % of villagers in each category) 
• Better-off 0% 12% 2% 7% 5% 
• Middle 5% 8% 4% 9% 6% 
• Worst-off 7% 4% 4% 7% 6% 
• All groups in village 5% 8% 3% 7% 6% 
• Two villages In the district 6% 5% 
Access and use of hospitalization 
(as Ofo of villagers In each category) 
• Better-off 0.0% 4% 12% 11% 8% 
• Middle 0.3% 3% 4% 5% 2% 
• Worst-off 1.0% 2% 0% 0% 1% 
• All groups In village 0.4% 3% 7% 6% 3% 
• Two Villages In the district 1% 7% 
Source: Village census 
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5.4 Treatment seeking patterns 
5.4.1 Treatment seeking pattern for illness In the previous two weeks 
Table 5.3 shows the proportion seeking different types of health care of villagers who 
reported illness within the previous 2 weeks. Those who sought care chose herbal 
medicines and private practitioners. Herbs are naturally available in the community. A 
private practitioner frequently came to the village. N either the private clinic nor the 
public health care providers were the choice of treatment for TAL villagers because the 
village was very far from health care providers and it was difficult to travel. Only one 
household used analgesic drugs which had been bought from a private drug store in a 
market and were kept in the house. 
The most popular choice of KY vi lIagers was a private practitioner (26% of total OP 
contacts) who was an ex-head of the nearest health centre. KY villagers remained 
confident in him and continued seeking care from him at his home near the health 
centre at any time. Several choices of treatment were available around KY village and 
the villagers also obtained health services from them. Only one individ ual in all four 
villages that lived in KY sought OP trea tment from a district hospital. 
The most preferred choice of SPX village was a VHV (37% of total OP contacts) even 
though data from key informant interviews and observation showed that only 4 drug 
items were available from the original list of 27 drug items. SPX villagers had a good 
impression of the VHV. 
"It is no problem to find him. We can reach him easily. He is friendly and never 
complains when he has to walk back to his home in order to get drugs for us. 
Moreover, we can buy with a little amount Sometimes, we get drugs first and 
pay him later. " 
(FGO of females, SPX village) 
The KK villagers preferred the private drug stores (41 % of total OP contacts) in the 
market. The village was very near the market and the housewives regularly went to 
the market by 20 minutes walking. It was interesting to see the high proportion of 
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Seang-Pao (32%) in KK. This was because a famous village healer lived in the village. 
Not only KK villagers but also members of other villages, other districts and other 
provinces often came to seek care from him. KK village was in the catchment area of 
the district hospital, so data on the health centre in table 5.3 is shown as NA (not 
available). 
It should be mentioned that a VHV as well as a village Revolving Drug Fund (RDF) 
were available in all four villages. But the VHV was functioning well in only one village, 
SPX. One case of use in KY occurred because the VHV provided drug s from the RDF to 
his family. The VHV was never used by TAL and KK villagers. Findings from key 
informant interviews of TAL, KY and KK villages showed that the villagers claimed that 
it was not convenient to find the VHV. The VHV said that he had other important 
responsibilities e.g. earning for his own family (TAL) or being the village head (KK) or 
the vice village head (KY). Another reason from KK was that the village was very near 
the market so the villagers could easily reach many drug stores with a variety of drugs. 
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Table 5.3 Treatment seeking pattern for illness in the previous two weeks 
Phine District APT District Four 
(Poor district) (Non-~oor district) villages 
Tl~es of ~rovider (1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
No treatment 52% 15% 27% 5% 32% 
A) Local facilities 26% 30% 54% 50% 34% 
A1. Herb 19% 18% 18% 18% 19% 
A2. Seang-Pao 5% 9% 0% 32% 10% 
A3.VHV 0% 3% 36% 0% 4% 
M. Traditional ceremony (Heel) 2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
8) Private providers 23% 44% 9% 46% 31% 
81. Private practitioner 15% 26% 9% 0% 15% 
82. Drug Store 8% 12% 0% 41% 14% 
83. Private clinic 0% 6% 0% 5% 2% 
C) Public providers 0% 12% 9% 0% 4% 
C1. Health Centre 0% 9% 9% NA* 3% 
C2. District Hospital 0% 3% 0% 0% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total OP visits 62 34 11 22 129 
Total episodes 52 25 10 16 103 
Mean visits ~er e~isode 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.3 
Source: Village census 
Note: Bold figure shows the highest proportion in the village. NA* means there was 
no health centre for KK villagers. 
The health care seeking pattern shown in table 5.3 clearly highlights the frequency of 
each provider but it does not provide details of the sequencing for one illness episode. 
The diagram in figure 5.1 has therefore been drawn in order to illustrate the process of 
health care sought for every episode. 
Most of the illness episodes had one contact with one health provider, especially in SPX 
village. A minority of illness episodes had more than one contact with a health service 
(8 out of 52 episodes in TAL, 6 out of 25 episodes in KY, lout of 10 episodes in SPX 
and 4 out of 16 episodes in KK). A case in KY had the maximum number of four 
contacts per episode. 
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Figure 5.1 Outpatient treatment seeking patterns of villagers who reported 
illness in the previous two weeks 
(1) TAL Village: 52 episodes, 62 OP visits 
First choice Second choice Third choice 
Do nothing (32) 
Seang-Pao (2) Seang-Pao (1) 
Herbs (9) Herbs (3) 
Practitioner (6) Practitioner (2) Practitioner (1) 
Drug store (3) Drug store (2) Ritual spirit (1) 
(2) KY Village: 25 episodes, 34 OP visits 
First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice 
Do nothing (5) 
Seang-Pao (3) Herbs (1) ~ Herbs (5) Practitioner (2) Dist hospital (1) 
VHV (1) 
Practitioner (7) Drug store (1) 1---1 Private clinic (1) H Health centre (1) 
Drug store (3) Health centre (2) 1 
Private clinic (1) 
(3) SPX Village: 10 episodes, 11 OP visits 
First choice Second choice 
Do nothing (3) 
Herbs (2) 
VHV (4) Health centre (1) 
Practitioner (1) 
(4) KK Village: 16 episodes, 22 OP visits 
First choice Second choice Third choice 
[ Do nothing (1) 
5eang-Pao (7) Herbs (2) Private clinic (1) 
[ Herbs (2) Drug store (2) Drug store (1) 
[ Drug store (6) 
source: Village census 
Note: Each line indicates one case sought further health service otherwise number of cases Indicated above line. 
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Typically, the first treatment obtained was from local facilities (herbs, Seang-Pao and 
VHV) or private providers (private practitioner, drug store or private clinic) and the sick 
would seek an upper level of health care service for further treatments. For example, 
the sick person in KY applied Seang-Pao as an initial response to her illness followed by 
two visits to a private practitioner but her symptoms remained and finally she went to 
the District Hospital. Public health care providers (either health centre or district 
hospital) were not the first contact for the villagers even if the village was very near to 
these public providers. This was clearly explained by the FGD on the question of the 
most preferred health care providers in the village. This revealed five main factors 
influencing decision of households on seeking treatment. These included: perception of 
household on severity of symptoms, geography, availability of choice in the 
community, finance and trust in provider. As mentioned earlier, approximately half of 
reported illness (41 out of 103 episodes) did not seek any treatment. It was very 
common to hear during the interview that "it is a simple symptom and it can 
automatically recover'~ The geographical barrier was referred to only for the remote 
area like TAL village. The finance problem was mentioned by all respondents from 
FGDs and household in-depth interviews. The respondents strongly perceived that 
seeking care from health care providers required money for user charges. They also 
emphasized user fees at public providers. Moreover, they spelt out that user charge 
payment was more flexible and more convenient at private providers than public 
providers. The details of financial barriers will be further discussed in the next section. 
'If there is no money, there is no treatment at all. .. If the sickness is not serious, 
we wont go to the district hospital. It is too difficult to go and it costs a lot of 
money for gasoline as well as payment at the hospital. ' 
(FGD of village committee, TAL village) 
\ ... The private practitioner or clinic is easy to reach and easy to talk with. Before 
giving treatments, they will ask us whether we have enough money or not. We 
can discuss with them. This is opposite to public hospita/. They will give 
treatments first and then give us a bill. We have to accept how much the bill is 
as long as they have given treatment already. , 
(FGD of male, KK village) 
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Trust in providers was mentioned by some respondents, for example, the case of the 
ex-head of a health centre at KY village as mentioned above. 
'Ve/y rew villagers seek care from the district hospital. Pao is the first choice for 
us. And then most of us go to see the doctor who previously worked in the 
nearest health centre for a long time. He just retired in the last year (2004). 
But we still can see him at his home at any time. He is really good for us. He 
does not prerer to have further practice; he needs to rest but we really request 
him to treat us. If some disease can not be cured by him, he will tell us to go to 
the hospital. ' 
(FGD of female, KY village) 
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5.4.2 Treatment seeking pattern related to person admitted in the previous 
twelve months 
The villagers who had experience of admission in the previous 12 months were asked 
about all health facilities where they sought care from the beginning of the illness up 
to and including admission. Someone admitted in a health facility might seek treatment 
locally as an OP condition before admission in a hospital. Therefore, health service 
utilization for one person admitted can combine both OP treatments before the 
admission and hospitalization. A patient wh 0 was admitted and received OP treatments 
in the last 2 weeks was counted as 'person admitted in the last 12 months'. The data 
on OP visits in relation to persons admitted does not therefore duplicate the data on 
OP visits in the previous section. 
Table 5.4 shows the proportion of different types of health care sought by the villagers 
who reported an admission in the previous twelve months. The district hospitals were 
the most frequently contacted for admission, at 28% of all contacts in the four villages. 
TAL had only two admissions. The highest proportion of contacts in TAL was the 
district hospital because the two cases sought treatment from district hospital for three 
actions. The highest proportion of contacts in the KY villagers was a traditional 
ceremony (29%) which was an event of greeting (called Puk Khan) after a mother and 
a new born had been discharged from the providers. In addition, the KY villagers had a 
preference for seeking care from the private practitioner and the district hospital (24% 
each). The SPX villagers mostly preferred to go to the health centre for admission as 
well as buying drugs from the VHV before admission. The KK villagers did not seek 
treatment from local facilities for admission but they sought treatment from public 
(81%) and private providers (19%). 
Conditions needing admission involved more encounters than OP treatments without 
admission. The mean of 2.2 encounters per person admitted of the four villages (table 
5.4) was greater than the mean of 1.3 OP visits per episode (table 5.3). Comparing 
acrosS the four villages, the two villages in the poor district had a greater mean 
number of encounters per person admitted than those in the non-poor district. 
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Table 5.4 Treatment seeking pattern related to the last admission in the 
previous twelve months 
Types of provider 
A) Local facilities 
A1. Herbs 
A2. Seang-Pao 
A3. VHV 
A4. Traditional ceremony 
B) Private providers 
61. Private practitioner 
62. Drug store 
63. Private clinic 
C) Public providers 
C1. Health centre 
C2. District hospital 
C3. Provincial hospital 
Total 
Total encounters (n) 
Total persons admitted (n) 
Mean encounters per person 
admitted 
Source: Village census 
Phine District 
(Poor district) 
(1) TAL (2) KY 
54% 
18% 
18% 
9% 
9% 
9% 
9% 
0% 
0% 
36% 
0% 
27% 
9% 
100% 
11 
2 
5.5 
34% 
0% 
5% 
0% 
29% 
29% 
24% 
0% 
5% 
39% 
10% 
24% 
5% 
100% 
21 
7 
3.0 
APT District 
(Non-poor district) 
(3) SPX (4) KK 
38% 
6% 
3% 
26% 
3% 
6% 
3% 
0% 
3% 
56% 
410/0 
9% 
6% 
100% 
34 
16 
2.1 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
19% 
0% 
6% 
13% 
81% 
NA* 
75% 
6% 
100% 
16 
13 
1.2 
Four 
villages 
32% 
5% 
5% 
12% 
10% 
15% 
9% 
1% 
5% 
54% 
20% 
28% 
6% 
100% 
82 
38 
2.2 
Note: Bold figure shows the highest proportion in the village. NA* means there was 
no health centre for KK villagers. 
The diagram of admissions in figure 5.2 clearly shows that, compared to other villages, 
KK villagers had the shortest pathway to reach admission at the district hospital or the 
provincial hospital. TAL village showed the highest mean of 5.5 encounters per person 
admitted; 7 encounters for the ruptured appendicitis case and 4 encounters for the 
malaria case. KY and SPX village had a mean of 3 and 2.1 encounters per person 
admitted, respectively. Nevertheless, one case in SPX, injuries on a patient's left leg by 
falling from a bicycle, had the maximum of 7 encounters by the end of interview 
period. The patient might continue to seek further treatment from several choices 
around him if his symptoms did not get better. 
Interestingly, the majority of the 18 people admitted (15/18) who started treatment 
with public providers used only one treatment source. In contrast, all of the 20 people 
admitted sta rting with local or private providers went on to seek care from other 
sources. 
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As might be expected, when the patient obtained care from many encounters, they 
would firstly seek care from the simplest choice and then seek further care from an 
upper level provider. For example, one case sought initial care from herbal medicines, 
followed by buyi ng drugs from the VHV; continued seeking care from the health centre 
and finally ended up at the district hospital. However, two cases in KY showed different 
patterns. One case, a better-off household, initially chose the district hospital, only one 
contact for admission, to cure a housewife's abdominal pain. It was because at that 
time they lived in their farmhouse which was on the main road and the district hospital 
was the most accessible for them. Another case, a better-off household, tried three 
ways of treating the abdominal pain of their 9 year old daughter. The first choice was 
Seang-Pao followed by the health centre and finally the provincial hospital. The parents 
decided to take the girl to the provincial hospital, not the district hospital, because the 
health centre suggested it. They accepted that suggestion and they could afford 
transportation costs, treatment costs and living costs. 
The provincial hospital was never the first choice for admission (flQure 5.2) and this 
was clarified by FGOs. Only serious cases would reach the provincial hospital. 
Furthermore, FOG of males in KK revealed their opinion that they totally relied on 
themselves as to whether they would seek care from the provincial hospital or not, 
even if the district hospital suggested referring the patient to the provincial hospital. 
This was because the household shouldered all the expenditures including the 
transportation cost of th e referral. 
'Although the distrid hospital referred the patient to the provincial hospita~ we 
had to consider our financial ability. Sometimes we did not go to the provincial 
hospital but we sought care from other sources instead. Perhaps, the patient 
might get better and we could avoid expensive treatment at the provincial 
hospital. I 
(FOG of male, KK village) 
In the context of Lao, ritual spirit could represent different steps of the treatment 
process. It might be at the beginning or the first choice like Seang-Pao. It might be in 
the middle of the process of all treatments such as Heet, a ritual offering to the spirit, 
(admission of TAL village, figure 5.2), or it might be at the end of the treatment 
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process such as Puk Khan, a greeting for a newborn or a welcoming the patient back 
home (admission of KY village, figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Treatment seeking patterns of admissions in the previous twelve months 
(1) TAL Village: 2 people admitted, 11 encounters 
First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice Sixth choice Seventh choice 
Seang- Herbs Practi- Ritual 
Pao r-2-- (2) r-- tioner f--- spirit* f---
(2) (1) (1) 
VHV Dist 
(1) f--- hospital (1) 
(2) KY Village: 7 people admitted, 21 encounters 
First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice 
Seang- Practi - Dist 
Pao tioner hospital 
(1) (1) (2) 
Practi- Private 
tioner clinic 
(4) (1) 
Health Dist 3 Ritual 
centre hospital Spirit** 
(2) (3) (3) 
Ritual 
Spirit** 
(2) 
(3) SPX Village: 16 people admitted, 34 encounters 
Prov 
hospital 
(1) 
Dist 
hospital 
-(1) 
Fifth choice 
Ritual 
Spirlt** 
(1) 
Prov Dist 
hospital 1- hospital 
(1) (1) 
First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice Sixth choice Seventh choice 
Seang-
Pao 
(1) 
Herbs 
(1) 
VHV 
(8) 
Health 
centre 
(5) 
Dist 
hospital 
(1) 
VHV 
(1) r-
--2- Health centre I--\ (8) 1\ Private clinic 
(1) 
Health Dist 
centre 
-
hospital ' 
(1) (1) 
Prov 
hospital 
(1) 
Dist Herbs Prov Private Ritual 
hospital 
-
(1) f-- hospital - practice - Splrit*** (1) (1) (1) (1) 
(4) KK Village: 13 people admitted, 16 encounters 
First choice Second choice 
Drug 
store i\ (1) Private District 
clinic hospital 
(2) (2) 
District Prov 
hospital hospital 
(10) (1) 
Note: Each line indicates one case sought further health service otherwise 
number of cases indicated above line. 
Ritual spirit * Heet 
** Puk Khan 
*** Aap Num mon 
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5.4.3 Treatment seeking pattern by wealth groups 
In the two sub-sections above, treatment seeking patterns were presented by village 
and in this section they are presented by wealth group. The number of reported 
illnesses and admissions was too small to disaggregate by village and by wealth group, 
for example only one admission in each middle group and worst-off group in TAL. 
Therefore, the treatment seeking pattern by wealth groups was explored by pooled 
data of all four villages. Types of providers are shown by three categories; local 
facilities, private providers and public providers. 
Figu re 5.3 Distribution of treatment options (0/0 of total actions) 
.. 
c 
.S! 
tl 
.. 
~ 
.l! 
... 
o 
-j. 
Treatment-seeking pattern tor Illness 
100% -r--_pooo-__ - ___ --- -----, 
80% -
-
60% - f--
-
40% · -
-
20% - - I- - - - -
Better-off Middle Worst-off 
n = 22 n = 51 n = 30 
Source: Village census 
Treatment-seeking pattern tor people adm Itted 
~PUblic providers J o Private providers o Loca l fa t~itles o No treatment 
Better-off Middle Worst-off 
n = 26 n = 10 n = 2 
Source: Village census 
Figure 5.3 shows that the worst-off had the highest proportion of not seeking 
treatment when they had illness. Of those who sought treatment, local facilities were 
the main source of treatment for the better off and middle group, but private providers 
were the most used by the worse off (although also popular among the other groups). 
Across groups, public providers were the least frequently chosen source of treatment, 
and nobody sought treatment from a provincial hospital. 
Both local facilities and public providers were important as the first choice for 
treatment in relation to admiss ion across wealth groups, with private providers least 
used (figure 5.3). However, the better off the household, the more likely it was to 
access public providers for admission. 
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5.5 Costs of treatment for outpatient care and related to admission 
Not all 103 illness episodes incurred costs since some of them did not involve seeking 
treatment and some treatment did not incur costs. Sixty three episodes sought 
treatment and costs were incurred for only 48 episodes. The analysis of cost of OP 
treatment was based on the 63 episodes where treatment seeking was involved. Costs 
of admission were incurred in all 38 people admitted and all of them were analysed. 
This thesis focuses on financial or direct costs of treatment and does not consider 
indirect costs such as production loss caused by illness. Costs are presented in USD 
(10,000 kip = 1 USD). Financial costs of treatment were defined as all expenditures 
related to seeking care for relieving symptoms of the specified episode. They included 
(1) user fees at paint of service plus costs incurred on all types of local facilities e.g., 
healers, traditional ritual, (2) transportation costs, and (3) living costs of patient as well 
as carers. Considering all 48 OP episodes with costs of treatment, user fees were 
incurred in all episodes but transportation costs and living costs were rarely incurred; 
only 1 OP episode at a health centre incurred transportation costs and 1 OP episode at 
a district hospital incurred transportation costs and living costs. User fees were nearly 
100% of the illness costs while transportation and living costs were tiny. It was 
because villagers sought care locally which they normally reached by walking. In 
contrast, the majority of admissions (29 out of all 38 people admitted) Incurred all 
three items of direct costs (user fees, transportation and living costs). Figure 5.4 
presents the profile of costs incurred. It shows that user fees constituted the largest 
proportion at 81% of total costs while transportation and living costs represented 
smaller proportions at 9% and 10%, respectively. Transportation and living costs were 
incurred because the patient and carer(s) had to seek care from a district or provincial 
hospital. KK presented the lowest proportion of transportation costs (2%) as It is very 
near the district hospital and KK patients could easily reach the district hospital by 
walking or by wheel cart. Nevertheless, KK had the highest proportion of living co sts of 
the four villages. This might be because the district hospital was near a market and the 
KK villagers used to spend money in the market. 
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Figure 5.4 Profile of financial cost of all 38 people admitted 
512 222 301 723 1,758 (Total costs In U5D) 
100% 6% 2% 16% 10% 
9% 12% 
2% 9% 
80% 
60% o Uvlng costs 
• Transportation costs 
85% 1% 
o User fees 
40% 82% % 
20% 
0% 
(1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK Four 
villages 
n =2 n = 7 n = 16 n = 13 n = 38 
Source: Village census 
5.5.1 Mean cost of OP treatment 
Table 5.5 presents mean direct costs incurred in all 48 OP episodes by each type of 
health care services. The mean cost per visit was 2.2 USD. VHV and herbs were the 
cheapest option at 0.1 and 0.2 USD per visit, respectively. On the other hand, 
traditional spirit (Heel) was by far the most expensive at 93 USD per visit because 
livestock sacrifice is an important ritual for Heet It was 7 times higher than the mean 
cost at a district hospital and 103 times higher than that at a health centre. Across the 
villages and types of providers, the mean cost was lowest at the private providers, 
higher at the local facilities, and highest at the public providers (1.7, 2.6 and 3.5 USD 
per visit, respectively). One visit at public providers incurred high costs at 13.9 USD 
which comprised user fees, transportation and living costs. In addition, the public 
providers had a small number of visits (5 visits), whereas the local facilities made up 
43 visits and private providers 40 visits. Comparing data among villages, TAL had the 
highest mean cost per visit (4.2 USD) because it had the highest mean cost of local 
facilities, especially Seang-Pao and Heet It should be noted that the mean cost per 
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visit of villagers in the poor-district (2.8 USD per visit) was higher than that in the non-
poor district (1.0 USD per visit). 
Table 5.5 Mean direct costs for outpatient treatment by village and type of 
provider 
Phine district APT district Four 
(Poor district) (Non-~oor district) villages 
(1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
Total illness episodes 52 25 10 16 103 
Not sought any treatment 32 5 3 1 41 
Treatment but not incurring cost 
(OP episodes) 5 3 2 4 14 
Treatment and incurring costs 
(OP episodes) 15 17 5 11 48 
Mean cost per OP episode (USD) 8.5 2.8 1.4 2.0 4.2 
Mean cost per OP visit at (USD) 
A) Local facilities 6.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.6 
(16) (10) (6) (11) (43) 
A1. Herbs 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
(12) (6) (2) (4) (24) 
A2. Seang-Pao 2.8 0.2 0.3 0.9 
(3) (3) (0) (7) (13) 
A3. VHV 0.1 0.1 0.1 
(0) (1) (4) (0) (5) 
A4. Traditional 93.0 93.0 
Ceremony (Heef) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
B) Private providers 1.5 1.5 5.0 1.9 1.7 
(14) (15) (1) (10) (40) 
B1. Private practitioner 1.5 2.2 5.0 2.0 
(9) (9) (1) (0) (19) 
B2. Drug Store 1.5 0.3 0.8 0.9 
(5) (4) (0) (9) (18) 
B3. Private clinic 0.7 12.3 4.6 
(0) (2) (0) (1) (3) 
C) Public providers 4.0 1.5 3.5 
(0) (4) (1) (0) (5) 
C1. Health centre 0.6 1.5 0.9 
(3) (1) (4) 
C2. District Hospital 13.9 13.9 
(1) (1) 
Mean cost per OP visit for 4.2 1.4 0.9 1.0 2.2 
all types of providers (30) (29) (8) (21) (88) 
2.8 1.0 
(59) (29) 
Source: Village census 
Note: Number in brackets is number of visits in the previous two weeks. 
.. means no visit. 
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5.5.2 Mean cost of services related to admission 
Across providers, the mean cost of services related to admission was higher than that 
for OP treatment. The public providers were the most expensive option for both OP 
treatment (3.5 USD per OP visit) and treatment related to admission (35.7 USD per 
encounter). All provider costs were high compared to mean villagers' consumption (0.8 
USD per person per day). 
Table 5.6 presents mean direct costs incurred in each type of health care service for 
each admission-related encounter and mean costs per person admitted of the four 
villages. This paragraph presents mean direct cost per encounter. The mean cost was 
lowest at the local facilities, higher at private providers, and highest at the public 
providers (4.2, 9.5 and 35.7 USD per encounter, respectively). As in the case of OP 
treatment, the VHV and herbs 7 were the cheapest option of services at 0.3 and 0.5 
USD per encounter, respectively. Among the public health care providers, as expected, 
the mean cost of treatment related to admiSSion at a health centre was the cheapest, 
followed by district hospital and provincial hospital (7.1, 38.4 and 115.7 USD per 
encounter, respectively). Similar to OP treatment costs for illness, the mean cost per 
encounter of villagers in the poor-district (23.7 USD per encounter) was higher than 
that in the non-poor district (20.5 USD per encounter). 
Considering mean cost person admitted, TAL had the highest mean cost per person 
admitted (255.8 USD). However, the sample size was small with only two people 
admitted in TAL. KK village showed a very high mean cost at 55.7 USD per person 
admitted. SPX had the lowest mean cost at 18.8 USD per person admitted, and most 
services related to admission were at a health centre. 
7 VHV, seang-Pao or herbs were Involved In admiSSion-related costs because a patient sought 
care from local facilities as an OP condition before went to a hospital for IP treatment. 
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Table 5.6 Mean direct costs associated with admission by villages and type 
of provider 
Phine district APT district 
(Poor district) (Non-~oor district) Four 
U) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK villages 
Total people admitted 2 7 16 13 38 
Mean cost per person admitted 
(USD) 255.8 31.7 18.8 55 .7 46.3 
Mean cost per encounter at (USD) 
A) Local facilities 11.5 5.0 0.4 4.2 
(6) (7) (13) (0) (26) 
A1. Herbs 0 1.0 0.5 
(2) (0) (2) (0) (4) 
A2. Seang-Pao 3.8 1.0 0.0 2.1 
(2) (1) (1) (0) (4) 
A3. VHV 0.4 0.3 0.3 
(1) (0) (9) (0) (10) 
A4. Tradition event 61 5.7 0.0 11.9 
(e.g., Puk khan, Heef) (1) (6) (1) (0) (8) 
B) Private providers 8.9 4.5 8.4 20.2 9.5 
(1) (6) (2) (3) (12) 
B1. Private practitioner 8.9 5.4 3.0 5.6 
(1) (5) (1) (0) (7) 
B2. Drug store 1.0 1.0 
(0) (0) (0) (1) (1) 
63. Private clinic 0.0 13.8 29.8 18.3 
(0) (1) (1) (2) (4) 
C) Public providers 145 19.9 14.7 51.0 35.7 
(3) (8) (19) (13) (43) 
C1. Health centre 4.4 7.5 7.1 
(0) (2) (14) (0) (16) 
C2. District hospital 41.3 19.1 21.7 50.1 38.4 
(2) (5) (3) (12) (22) 
C3. Provincial hospital 351.3 55.0 55.0 62.2 115.7 
(1) (1) (2) (1) (5) 
Mean cost per encounter for 51.2 10.6 8.9 45.2 21.7 
all types of providers (10) (21) (34) (16) (81) 
23.7 20.5 
(31) {50) 
Source: Village census 
Note: Number in brackets is number of encounters. 
.. means no visit. 
Costs of all encounters at health centre, district hospital and provincial hospital were for 
admission itself. 
Three encounters (out of 4 encounters) at private clinic were for admission. 
One encounter at a private practitioner was for admission but the rest (6 encounters) 
were treatment as OP condition. 
All encounters of herbs, Seang-pao, VHV, traditional event and drug store were 
treatment as OP condition. 
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5.5.3 Mean cost for OP treatment and admission-related treatment by 
wealth groups 
Cost levels differing by types of provider have been shown in table 5.5 and 5.6 above. 
In this sub-section, mean cost by wealth groups is shown for three categories of 
provider (local facilities, private providers and public providers). 
Table 5.7 shows that costs of health services differed between wealth groups. The 
middle group faced the highest mean cost for OP treatment (6.9 USD per OP episode) 
but the worst-off group faced the highest cost related to admission (246.4 USD per 
person admitted). 
Table 5.7 Mean direct costs across wealth groups reporting OP treatment 
and treatment related to admission 
All 
Better-off Middle Worst-off villagers 
Reported Illness 
Total illness episodes 22 51 30 103 
Not sought any treatment (episodes) 5 20 16 41 
Treatment without cost (OP episodes) 5 6 3 14 
Treatment with cost (OP episodes) 12 25 11 48 
Mean cost per OP episode (USD) 1.8 6.9 0.7 4.2 
Mean cost per visit at (USD) 
A) Local facilities 0.01 4.3 0.4 2.6 
B) Private providers 1.8 2.3 0.5 1.7 
q Public ~rovlders 0.2 5.2 1.5 3.5 
Admission 
Total people admitted 26 10 2 38 
Mean cost per person admitted (USD) 30.3 47.7 246.4 46.3 
Mean cost per encounter at (USD) 
A) Local facilities 1.2 2.5 17.5 4.2 
B) Private providers 3.9 15.9 7.0 9.5 
q Public ~rovlders 24.3 41.4 136.3 35.7 
Source: Village censuS 
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5.6 Discussion 
5.6.1 Discussion of methodology 
The village census health module was applied to every household member. In order to 
get the most accurate arid reliable data, it was intended that every household member 
would answer the questions themselves except children less than 15 years old and 
elderly over 60 yea rs old. The most knowledgeable person in a household, either the 
household head or housewife, was assigned to provide an a nswer for the latter. 
However, if adults (15-60 years old) were absent at the interview period, a proxy (the 
most knowledgeable person in the household) was allowed to answer on their behalf. 
In practice, almost all household members including children and the elderly were 
present at the interview period and a Imost all expected respondents participated in the 
interview themselves. Therefore, the study did not have a problem of using proxy 
respondents. 
All interviews and focus group discussions were mainly conducted by the researcher 
with the assistance of the research assistant (RA). One advantage of the RA was that 
she had some background of Lao Theung and some of her relatives were Lao Theung. 
Villagers in TAL and KY villages were Lao Theung. All of them spoke Lao fluently but 
they generally spoke the Lao Theung language amongst themselves. It was found in 
the focus group discussion that, sometimes, they discussed in Lao Theungfor a while 
and then turned into Lao. The RA or some FGD member translated that conversation 
for the researcher. Fortunately, this rarely occurred and it was In two villages, not all of 
four villages. 
A problem occurred in all four villages when there was a question asking something 
related to timing (i.e. days and months). Questions were clearly asked about illness in 
the previous two weeks and admission in the previous twelve months but many 
villagers referred to illness and admission many years ago. Therefore, when villagers 
reported that s/he had experience of illness or admission, they were asked to specify 
themselves when (hOW many years or days prior to the interview date) to confirm 
whether their answer was relevant to the question or not. This type of cross checking 
with a respondent was needed for every question or discussion related to date and 
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time in every village. One possible explanation was that, from observation, no 
household had either calendar or clock and from the village census, few villagers had a 
watch. So recalling timing was probably difficult for the villagers. Only one household 
(out of a total of 172 households) could provide the exact year when their children 
were born and experiences of major events in the house because the household head 
recorded this information on a piece of paper. 
It was surprising that costs of health services were not very difficult to obtain from the 
villagers. It seemed that they remembered fairly well how much they paid for user 
fees. Only two difficulties occurred. One was when they sacrificed livestock or poultry 
for a traditional ceremony; they needed to estimate how much it would be. For 
example they needed to think about the size of the livestock or poultry (e.g. small, 
medium or large) because it would yield different amounts. Another was that, 
sometimes, they forgot some treatment options they had sought. When they were 
reminded about that treatment option, they would simply answer an amount of user 
fees. One pOSSible explanation might be related to local currency. The smallest value of 
local currency was 500 kip but it was rarely used. 5,000 kip and 10,000 kip were 
common. The villagers normally answered using thousa nd values e.g. 5, 10, 15, 20 
thousand kip. 
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5.6.2 Overview of findings 
In this chapter, the experience of the 172 households in the four villages was 
examined in terms of reported illnesses, access and use of OP treatment and 
admission, health utilization pattern and level of costs. These variables have been 
presented by districts, by villages and by wealth groups. 
A total of 103 illnesses in the previous two weeks and 38 people adm itted in the 
previous twelve months were reported by 92 households. The findings showed an 
inequity in self-reported illness and health service use by districts, villages and wealth 
groups (figure 5.5). The worse-off group and the worse setting showed higher rates of 
Illness in the previous two weeks. Regarding access and use of OP treatment, the most 
advantaged village (KK) had the higher rates of use of OP treatment. The worse-off 
group and the worse setting had lower rates of admission. The gap of inequality in 
admission was wider than those in self-reported illness and use of OP treatment. 
Many households (40% of total illness episodes) did not seek any treatment for their 
Illness. When they sought care for OP treatment, they firstly sought care from local 
facilities or private providers e.g. natural herbs, Seang-Pao, private practitioners and 
private drug stores, depending on provider availability in the village. Public health care 
providers, health centres and district hospitals, were not the preferred option for OP 
treatment for many reasons notably perception of severity of Illness, geographical 
barriers for a remote village, financial barriers and trust in providers. For 
hospitalization, public health care providers, especially health centres and district 
hospitals, were the most frequently used by the villagers. Nonetheless, the villagers 
were worried about provincial hospital admission because the household had to 
shoulder all financial costs including the referral cost. 
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Rates of self-reported illness 
120/0 ,-------------------------------------------------------~ 
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6% 
00/0 ...l-___ L.. __ 
Non-poor Poor 
district district 
Adv Mod Disadv Better- Middle Worst-
village village village off group off 
Rates of use of OP treatment 
80/0 ~---------------------------------------------------~ 
4% 
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Non-poor Poor 
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Adv Mod Disadv Better- Middle Worst-
village village village off group off 
Rates of use of admission 
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2% 
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Non-poor Poor 
district district 
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village village village off group off 
Mean of 9% 
Mean of 5.5% 
Mean of 3% 
Note: 
Adv .. advantage village (KK) 
Mod . moderate villages (KY &. SPX) 
Dlsadv ,. disadvantage village (TAL) 
Figure 5.5 Rates of illness, use of OP treatment and admission among districts, 
villages and wealth groups 
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Mean direct cost of OP treatment was 4.2 USD per episode and it was much smaller 
than costs related to hospitalization (46.3 USD per person admitted). The public 
providers were the most expensive option for both OP treatment (3.5 USD per visit) 
and for hospitalization (35.7 USD per admission). Among public providers, admission at 
a health centre was usually the cheapest (7.1 USD per visit), followed by district 
hospital (38.4 USD per visit) and then the provincial hospital (115.7 U SD per visit). All 
public provider costs were high compared to mean villagers' consumption (0.8 USD per 
person per day). For both OP treatment and hospitalization, villagers in the poor 
district faced higher mean costs than the non-poor district. Cost s of treatment also 
differed between wealth groups. For OP treatment, the middle group faced the highest 
mean costs but the worst-off and the better-off faced lower mean cost. For 
hospitalization, the poorest group faced the higher mean cost. 
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5.6.3 Discussion of findings 
With regard to the high rate of self-reported illness in TAL, it should be noted that the 
results from TAL might be influenced by seasonal variation because the interviews 
were conducted in the winter time, Dec OS-Jan 06. It was cold (around 10-15 degree 
Celsius) and windy. The researcher observed that the villagers wore unsuitable clothes, 
as some children were naked and some adults wore very light clothes. Most household 
members kept warm by sitting around the smoky fire on the ground besi de the house 
in the evening. This might have caused greater incidence of illness. Nevertheless, the 
level of reported illness might be less than it could be, due to the perception of the 
villagers of illness. For example children had cold symptoms such as runny noses, 
sneezing, coughing and crying but their parents perceived that these were not illness. 
These were the ordi nary features of children when the weather changed and then 
children would adjust. The fieldwork in the other three villages was conducted between 
the late winter and the summer and a situation si milar to TAL was not seen. 
The self-reported illness in the study was compared to national survey data in the Lao 
Expenditure and Consumption Survey III in 2003 (LECIII). This study found a higher 
annual per capita illness rate than the LECS III, at 9% in the previous two weeks 
suggesting a rate of 2.35 illnesses per person per year whereas the LECS III found a 
14% prevalence in the previous four weeks which equals 1.82 illnesses per person per 
year (laO PDR 2003). Various reasons could explain the differences. Firstly, the aims of 
the surveys and the questionnaires were different. The main purpose of the LECS III 
was to report on expenditure and consumption and the questionnaire consisted of 
several modules which required a longer interview period per household. In contrast, 
this study focused on the health module which made the questionnaire simpler than 
the LECS III. Secondly, the recall period might affect the prevalence result. A short 
recall period might enable the respondents to remember more accurately than a longer 
recall period. Duration of the interview and number of respondents in a household 
might also be factors - the respondents usually need time to think about the previous 
experience and, as observed during the fieldwork of the study, respondents in a 
household sometimes reminded each other of previous experience of Illness. The 
relatively high ill ness rate among the villagers in this study may also be explained by 
the rural setting since ill ness is possibly higher among people in the lowe r soclo-
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economic classes (Bowling 2002) and in rural households, as in Thailand 
(Tangcharoensathien et al. 2006). In relation to hospitalization rates, the study found a 
prevalence of hospitalization of 3.3% per year. Unfortunately, hospitalization was not 
reported in the LECIII so cannot be compared. 
The villagers' first choice was to seek care locally when they were ill. Herbs provided 
by a traditional healer or VHV were commonly used and they were cheap options since 
they involved no transportation costs. Private practitioners were also used, especially 
mobile practitioners in remote villages. Drug stores and private clinics were used by 
those who had easy access, from all wealth grou ps. 
The VHV was supposed to be linked to the health centre and the district health system 
In terms of supervision and support from the drug procurement system for the 
Revolving Drug Fund (RDF) at the village level. The role of the VHV and RDF is to 
support healthcare in the community, especially in remote areas where the drug store 
Is difficult to acces s. The VHV can contribute to the health service system not only by 
providing drugs to the villagers but a Iso other health services Including health 
education, disease prevention and health promotion for the community, birth/death 
records, and epidemic information. The latter has been done by volunteers for Avian 
Influenza surveillance in Thailand (SEARO 2007). It appeared that the VHV in these 
four villages functioned only in distribution of drugs, but not other functions in health 
development. The role of the VHV in drug distribution was still not fully successful. The 
VHV was used by villagers in only one out of four villages. Many factors influence the 
VHV's performance, for example in-kind incentives, acknowledgement and social 
standing and level of knowledge (SEARO 2007). Four VHVs were investigated in the 
study and it found that size of workload was one factor affecting the VHV's 
performance. The VHVs in KY and KK were responsible for more than one official task 
(deputy of village hea d plus VHV in KY and village head plus VHV in KK). Too much 
work at the same time was undermining the effectiveness of the VHV and RDF at 
village level. Even if the VHVs presented a proper knowledge and skill of their role, 
their services might be not popular due to the close proximity of the community to an 
area where varieties of health services were readily available (Kauffman and Myers 
1997). The villagers in KK village, which is located near to a market, preferred the drug 
stores near the village to the RDF because the drug store had more variety of drugs. 
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However, it was widely accepted by villagers that if the VHV was fully active, the VHV 
and RDF would be very useful for the community, especially in a remote area 
The private practitioners and the traditional healers who are expert in herbs were 
unregistered but they were popular choices of the villagers. It has been found also 
elsewhere, for example in rural Bangladesh, that people choose unqualified allopathic 
providers (untrained drug retailers/vendors) above formally trained practitioners or 
government health providers (Ahmed 2005). There were many possible factors that 
influenced the villagers' preference towards healers and unregistered private 
practitioners such as availability of healers in all four villages, trust in the private 
practitioner (in case of KY village) and convenience to reach them even in the remote 
area (mobile practitioner at TAL). An official registration of a provider was not of 
concern to villagers. They did not pay attention to whethe r the health facilities were 
officially registered or not. 
This study found tha t public health care providers had not been a popular choice for 
health care provision in the previous two weeks. They represented only 4% of total 
health service seeking activities. The LEeS III reported that, in the previous four 
weeks, only 10% of people with health problems had sought treatment from public 
health care facilities for a variety of reasons such as not considering the health 
problem serious, difficulty in accessing the facility, cost, quality of care and no 
possibility of cure (Lao PDR 2003). Geographical and financial problems were offiCially 
accepted as criteria to identify poor and non-poor settings in the National Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (NGPES) - (1) difficulty of travelling defined as over 6 
hours from the village to a hospital; (2) inability of household to cover medical costs 
(lao PDR 2004). Hence, geography and finance were considerable barriers to 
accessing health services In Lao PDR as a whole in addition to other factors e.g. 
perception of severity of illness and quality of care. The same reasons for unpopularity 
of public health providers, except quality of care, were found in this study. 
Although the public health providers were not the main choice for OP treatment, they 
were the most frequently used for admission. The better-off could access the public 
health providers more easily than the worst-off. The villagers in the better setting had 
higher rates of hospitalization than those in the worse setting. KK villagers had easy 
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access to hospital admission when they needed it, because they lived near a district 
hospital, whereas the patients in the other villages mostly had to consult more health 
care providers before they reached the district hospital admission. 
Cost of health services for OP and admission at public health providers were the most 
expensive compared to local facilities and private providers. Cost for OP service was 
smaller than for admission. These findings indicate that distance, inconvenience of 
transportation and costs of service were major barriers to access and use of public 
health services, especially for severe conditions. 
The findings of the study present some similarities and some differences with other 
studies in Lao PDR. There was a household survey with 2,985 randomly selected 
households in all eight districts throughout the Oudomxai province in 2003/2004 
(Dunlop et al. 2004). The survey (called 'the Oudomxai survey' hereafter) was 
conducted by the MOH and the Primary Health care Project and funded by the ADB. 
Oudomxai province consists of many poor villages and poor districts similar to SVK 
province. Another study was conducted in a total of 60 household of urban districts in 
three provinces and published in an international journal (Paphassarang et al. 2002). 
The findings of the thesis that people used public health provi ders less often was 
similar to the findings of the Oudomxai survey and the study by Paphassarang et al. 
The Oudomxai survey showed that government hospitals were used for only 8-10% of 
total reported illness episodes and health centres were used for 10-15% of total illness 
episodes. Paphassarang et al (2002) reported that people in urban areas utilized 
private providers as the first choice e.g. private pharmacies and clinics. In addition, 
treatment abroad (Thailand) was the preferred choice of the high socio-economic 
group. Dunlop et al. (2004) argued that low public use could partly be explained by the 
relatively high household expenditures occurred when a person sought care from 
government facilities which were the most expensive compared to other types of 
health services. As in this thesis, Dunlop et al (2004) reported that among the 
government facilities, health services at provinCial hospital was the most expensive, 
district hospital was cheaper than provincial hos pital and the health centre was the 
cheapest. However, the findings of the thesis on inequity in access to health care 
services across wealth groups were different to findings from the Oudomxai survey 
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which reported that the pattern of care seeking for the first source of care for villagers' 
illness was fairly similar across wealth deciles. The thesis supports the suggestion of 
Dunlop et al (2004) that further study is needed in order to answer why fees paid to 
public facilities were considerably higher compared to private and local facilities. 
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5.7 Concluding remarks 
Material in the previous chapter on the context of the villages such as economic 
circumstances of households, geography, availability of health facilities in the village 
and common practice on health care behaviour, provided a good background to 
support insights into health service utilization in this chapter. The creation of wealth 
groups enabled the study to measure inequality in access to and use of health services. 
This chapter has presented inequality in access and use of health services by 
geography (district and villa ge) and wealth groups. It has shown that economic 
deprivation and the disadvantaged condition of the community acted as deterrents to 
use of health services. Many villagers who reported illness did not seek health care but 
whether they got better or worse was unknown. For those who sought care, local 
facilities and private providers were the preferred chOices. The villagers perceived 
public health providers as a last resort. Many factors Influenced the villagers' decision 
on health seeking behaviour including financial factors. Cost was a main barrier of 
accessibility to health services, especially for hospitalization. Costs of treatment at any 
provider were high in relation to mean household consumption. Public health services 
were the most expensive among the health facilities. The villagers are likely to have 
faced difficulty in paying user fees at point of service, especially an expensive 
hospitalization at a public health provider. Illness cost might result in negative 
consequences to the households. The practical strategies that households used in 
reaction to illness costs and their consequences are investigated and shown in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COST BURDENS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the data of households in the four villages in order to identify the 
financial burden of health care use on household consumption including household 
catastrophic health expenditure, and coping strategies that households adopted to deal 
with the costs of illness. This chapter therefore considers demand-side behaviour and 
perspectives in order to address the objective 3 of the study (To assess illness cost 
burden to households including identifying catastrophic health expenditure of 
households and assess the strategies households use to cope with costs of illness with 
an emphasis on taking up the exemption mechanism). In the context of this study, 
exemption from payment of medical bills was treated as a coping strategy. Households' 
attitudes on user fees are presented in relation to their effect on exem ption awareness. 
This analysis provides the evidence for better understanding of dema nd-slde reactions 
to Illness and ability to cope with its financial consequences. A brief methodology is 
presented in the next section foil owed by the results .of the study. An overview and 
discussion of the methodology and findings are presented subsequently, at the end of 
the chapter. 
6.2 Methodology 
Data were obtained from both quantitative and qualitative methods: village census, 
key informant interviews, focus group discussions and household in-depth interviews. 
Brief explanations of the village census, the key Informant interviews and the focus 
group discussions have already been presented in the previous chapter. Hence, this 
section presents brief details of only the household in-depth interviews and approach 
of measuring household catastrophic health expenditure. 
Based on the data from the village census combined with that on wealth groups from 
FGDs, further households were purposively selected for in-depth in terview in order to 
obtain a mix of different wealth groups and experiences of illness (condltio.ns treated 
on an out-patient basis in the previous two weeks and admission and death in the 
151 
CHAPTER 6: COST BURDENS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES 
previous twe Ive months). There were a total of 29 hous eholds selected for in-depth 
interview in the four villages (8 in TAL and 7 in each of the other three villages). In-
depth interviews were conducted with an open-ended guide in order to ga in an in-
depth understanding of how and why the ho usehold reacted to illness and dealt with 
its fina ncial consequences. 
A crucial parameter in this chapter is health service cost burden as a proportion of 
household non-food consumption. As in other studies (Russell 2001 and Chuma et al. 
2007), the costs of all OP treatments over the previous 2 weeks, and the costs related 
to admissions over the previous 12 months, were estimated on a monthly basis. To 
measure household health expenditure, costs incurred for each household's OP 
treatment and admission were totalled to find a monthly cost and then expressed as a 
percentage of monthly household non-food consumption (Appendix III). Applying the 
threshold recommended by WHO (2005), when the cost burden was equal to or 
greater than 40% of monthly household non-food consumption, it was defined as a 
catastrophiC level of health expenditure. Costs of health services were obtained from 
the village census. Household non-food consumption was calculated using mu Itiple 
methods based on the Household Economy Approach or HEA (Seaman 2000) wh ich 
was explained earlier. Average consumption per equivalent person per day and profiles 
of food and non-food consum ption were calculated for each wealth grou p of every 
village. These figures were assigned to every household In a village according to the 
wealth group that the household belonged to. The household consumption of every 
household was estimated by the average household consumption per equivalent 
person per day multiplied by the number of equivalent members in a household. 
Analysis of quantitative data was done using SPSS® and Excel® and is presented 
using descriptive statistics. Analysis of qualitative data was manually done using a 
thematic content approach and is presented in descriptive narrative. 
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6.3 Cost burdens and catastrophic health expenditure 
From the village census, a total of 92 households (out of a total 172 hous eholds) 
reported illnesses in the previous two weeks and/or admissions in the previous twelve 
months. Costs of health services were incurred in 64 households. Costs of all OP 
treatments and admission in a household were calculated as the monthly household 
cost burden and are presented in table 6.1. The mean cost burden of the four villages 
was 51% of monthly household non-food consumption whereas the median cost 
burden was 10%. The majority faced a cost burden of about 10% but a minority faced 
a high cost burden at 51% which was identified as catastrophiC health expenditure. 
TAL had the highest median percentage, at 44% of monthly household non-food 
consumption. It meant that half of the households in TAL who reported illness which 
incurred cost and/or admission would likely face catastrophic health expenditure. The 
median cost burdens in the other thr~ villages were lower than the catastrophiC 
expenditure threshold (KY at 12%, SPX at 5% and KK at 4%). 
Table 6.1 Household cost burden by villages 
Monthly costs per household Phine district APT district Four 
as % of monthly non-food (Poor district) (Non-QQQr district) villages 
consumetion (1) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
HH reporting illness and/or 
admission with incurred cost, n 14 17 13 20 64 
• Mean 180% 23% 10% 12% 51% 
• Median 44% 12% 5% 4% 10% 
• Minimum 0.9% 2% 2% 0.7% 0.7% 
• Maximum 1695% 120% 25% 127% 1695% 
Source: Village census 
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The cost burdens to households differed considerably between wealth groups (table 
6.2). The middle and the worst-off group faced higher cost burdens than the better-off 
group. The mean cost burdens in the middle and worst-off group were higher than the 
catastrophic health expenditure threshold. 
Table 6.2 Household cost burden by wealth groups 
Monthly costs per household 
as % of monthly non-food 
Wealth groups 
consumption Better-off Middle Worst-off All 
HH reporting illness and/or 
admission with incurred cost, n 22 31 11 64 
• Mean 10% 81% 50% 51% 
• Median 6% 12% 18% 10% 
• Minimum 1% 0.7% 2% 1% 
• Maximum 79% 1695% 354% 1695% 
Source: Village census 
Table 6.3 shows the number of households with catastrophic health expenditure over 
the total number of households with health care costs. These figures are presented by 
villages and wealth groups. Overall, sixty four households (out of 172) faced costs for 
illness treatment and admission. Among them, 12 households faced catastrophic levels 
of health expenditure (based on the threshold of 40% of monthly non-food 
consumption) - 10 households due to the cost of OP treatment and two households 
due to the cost of admission. 
Table 6.3 Household catastrophic health expenditure by villages and wealth 
groups 
Wealth groups 
Better-off 
Middle 
Worst-off 
All groups 
Two villages in a district 
Source: Village census 
Phlne district 
(Poor district) 
(1) TAL (2) KY 
0/0 1/6 
5/10 2/8 
3/4 0/3 
8/14 3/17 
11/31 
APT district 
(Non-poor district) 
(3) SPX (4) KK 
0/7 0/9 
0/5 1/8 
0/1 0/3 
0/13 1/20 
1/33 
Four 
villages 
1/22 
8/31 
3/11 
12/64 
Note: Figures in the table show number of households with catastrophic health expenditure/the 
total number of households with health care costs. 
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Almost all of the households with catastrophic health expenditure (11 out of 12 
households) were in the Phine district (the poor district) and all of them were Lao 
Theung. It was clear that TAL households had the highest possibility of catastrophic 
health expenditure (57% or 8/14 households) while the other three villages had a 
lower possibility, especially the villages in APT district (the non-poor district). 
Across wealth groups and villages, the worst-off and middle groups in TAL were the 
most vulnerable to catastrophic health expenditure (75% or 3/4 households and 50% 
or 5/10 households, respectively). 
Across wealth groups, when households faced health care costs, there was a high 
possibility that this woul d be catastrophic for the worst-off and middle group at 27% 
(3/11 households) and 25% (8/31 households) respectively, while the better-off had a 
low chance at 5% (1/22 households). 
The quantitative data could present the numbers of household with catastrophic 
expenditure but it was not able to explain any consequence of high cost burden to the 
household. Qualitative data could complementary provide great better understanding 
on household catastrophic health ex penditure. Hence, the next section will provide 
overview of samples for household in-depth interviews which would be used to explain 
details and consequences of catastrophic expenditure la ter. 
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6.4 Illness pattern from household in-depth interviews 
This section presents information from in-depth interviews of sampled households in 
terms of their wealth group, condition of illness, health care costs burden, households 
with catastrophic levels of expenditure, and negative outcomes e.g. patient disability or 
death. 
In total, household in-depth interviews consisted of 8 better-off households, 15 middle 
households and 6 worst-off households (table 6.4). Most of the households (18 
households) had experienced only 1 episode of either illness or admission or death in a 
household whilst some of them (11 households) had experienced multiple conditions 
such as many illnesses or admissions in a household. Concerning experience of 
treatment seeking, four households (TAL 4, SPX 5, SPX 6 and KK 7) did not seek any 
treatment and all patients in these four households faced negative health outcomes: 
death or disability. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of information from in-depth interviews 
Wealth grouQ Conditions Treatment 
~ costs burden catas-tt:: tt:: 0 c: (% of HH trophic 0 ~ ~ '~ c: 'Bi Q) ~ non-food health Note on negative health Q) '5 5l 'E £ ~ '0 0 a. .c III consumption expend i- outcome (death or Q) ' ~ :: 0 EllS '0 Q) HHID [Xl III 0 in a month2 ture** disabili!l2 
TAL 0 6 2 9 1 2 2 4 
TAll / 1 1695% / 
TAL2 / 2 1 17% 
TAL3 / 1 0% A boy lost his fingers, 
TAL 4 / 1* 0% A girl had mental disability, 
TALS / 1 0% A baby died, 
TAL 6 / 1 57% / 
TAL 7 / 3 44% / 
TAL 8 / 1 1 354% / 
KY 3 3 1 5 0 3 2 3 
KY1 / 2 79% / 
KY2 / 1 6% 
KY3 / 1 22% 
KY4 / 1 1 47% / 
KY5 / 2 189% / 
KY6 / 1 34% 
KY7 / 1 18% 
SPX 2 3 2 2 1 8 3 0 
SPX 1 / 5 5% 
SPX 2 / 1 8% 
SPX 3 / 1 1 25% 
SPX4 / 1 13% 
SPX 5 / 1* 1 0% A girl had mental disability 
and a baby died. 
SPX 6 / 1* 0% A boy died. 
SPX 7 / 1 2% An elderly died. 
KK 3 3 1 1 0 9 2 1 
KK 1 / 2 9% 
KK 2 / 1 13% 
KK3 / 4 1 13% 
KK4 / 1 89% / 
KK 5 / 1 13% 
KK 6 / 1 23% 
KK 7 / 1* 0% A girl died, 
All 29 8 15 6 17 2 22 9 8 
HHs 
Source: Household in-depth interview 
Note: * No treatment for the patient and the patients died or were disabled. 
**Catastrophic health expenditure defined as equal to or greater than 40% of monthly 
household non-food consumption. 
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6.5 Level of catastrophic health expenditure and its consequences 
The household in-depth interviews revealed that the impa ct of catastrophic health 
expenditure on household livelihoods varied, depending on household capacity to 
absorb health expenditure - in turn linked to its asset base and number of members 
(the more adult members, the better it was able to manage risk). Finally, the status of 
the sick person also mattered - more serious consequences would result when the 
patient was the breadwinner rather than a dependant. 
As known from the village census, the level of catastrophic health expenditure vari ed 
greatly, from 43% to 354% and 1695% of monthly household non-food consumption. 
Even low levels of health expenditure could become cataS trophic, especially for the 
worst-off. For example, an amount of 1.65 USD for illness treatment generated 
catastrophic spending levels of 44% of household monthly n on-food consumption (Box 
6.1). 
The highest cost burden of OP treatment (1695%) occurred in the middle group and 
the highest cost burden of admission (354%) occurred in the worst-off group. These 
two households were in TAL and in both cases expenses were exacerbated by the Heet 
ceremony due to the sacrifice of a cow for a ritual offering. The catastrophic health 
expenditure level at 1695% did not affect the household consumption long term (Box 
6.2) whereas the high cost burden at 354% was harmful to the household. It squeezed 
the household from the worst-off group into an ultra poor category (family with many 
young children, non-permanent house, no assets and having debts) and then 
impoverishment (Box 6.3). 
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Box 6.1: Household TAL 7 
This household lived in the poor district and was far from public health care providers. 
It was classified as being in the worst-off in the village. The household had a total of 5 
members: a household head (a widow, aged 46),3 young sons (aged 12,8 and 7) and 
1 young girl (aged 9). The female household head was the only main worker in the 
household. The main occupation of the household was rice farming, exactly the same 
as other households, despite its lack of labour. 
The household reported 3 illnesses in the previous 2 weeks. The household head and 2 
children got fever. They took analgesic drugs which the household head bought from a 
drug store in a market and kept in-house. The symptoms of the household head and 
the eldest child got better but the symptoms of the second child continued. The 
household head sought care from a private practitioner who came to the village. The 
second child then recovered. The fees for the private practitioner were 1.5 USD. The 
household head had only 1 USD In hand at that time. She requested the private 
practitioner a delayed payment of 0.5 USD for duration of 10 days. She would repay 
later by seeking natural torch material from a tree In the forest and digging for sma II 
frogs. 
The costs of treatments for 3 illnesses were estimated at a total of 1.65 USD and 
accounted for 44% of monthly household non-food consumption - catastrophic health 
expenditure. 
Source: Household in-depth interview 
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Box 6.2: Household TALl 
This household was ranked as a 'middle group' in the remote village, TAL. The family 
consisted of six members (3 adults and 3 teenagers). The household head was the 
Sanadee, an executive of the local authority, who was a ritual leader. Most villagers, 
including the village head, respect the Sanadee. The house was built from permanent 
materials, wooden poles, walls and floors and corrugated i ron roof. The household 
head owned 1 Tak-tak, 2 bulls, 3 pigs, 2 ducks and 20 chickens. 
The household head's mother (aged 85) had been ill for the two weeks before the 
interview with symptoms such as a cough, fever, fatigue and pain in her joints. In 
responding to her ill ness, the household adopted three treatment actions; using a local 
herb, visiting a mobile private practitioner and conducting Heet. The traditional 
offerings of this household included edible and non-edible items: a cow, a chicken, rice 
liquor, stiCky rice, potato, banana, top parts of rattan, sugar cane, shrimps, shells, 
cash, an egg, a cup of uncooked rice, a piece of cloth, a ring, a comb and earrings. 
The last six items were placed in the house for three days while the others were 
cooked for food. The Heetwas arranged early in the morning. Most households in the 
village came to join the Heel. The family served the participants with sticky rice, many 
other dishes and rice liquor. 
The total health expenditure of the three actions accounted for 98.9 USD or 1695% of 
household monthly non -food consumption. The cost was particularly high because the 
Heetceremony involved the sacrifice of a cow (93 USD). Despite the high cost, the 
household paid willingly and the patient enjoyed having the celebration in her house. 
She was happy to see many relatives and neighbours com e to her house. 
The high cost burden had neither short nor long term effects on household 
consumption as it had a range of other assets for routine living e. g. adequate amount 
of rice for the whole year, poultry, livestock and a Tak-Tak. Significantly, the household 
still had the same labour nu mbers to generate its own products. The patient was a 
senior person and so not a main labourer in the household. 
Source: Household in-depth interview 
160 
CHAPTER 6: COST BURDENS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES 
Box 6.3: Household TAlS 
This was categorised as a 'worst-off' household and was located in a remote village, 
TAL village. It had eight members: a couple and their six young children (ages 7 
months - 11 years). The house was a semi-permanent structure, with poorly made 
wooden jOists, bamboo sheet walls and an unfinished roof over the porch. The 
household head did not own a Tak-Tak, but owned 2 small pigs and 2 chickens. 
In addition to rice farming, the household head (named BL hereafter) sometimes did 
daily labouring (wood s'awing) which provided an additional income. BL and his wife 
were only two main labourer of the household. 
The household reported 2 condit ions: 
1. An illness in the previous 2 weeks: The youngest child (aged 7 months) had 
diarrhoea for 3 days. BL's wife had given him natural herbs. 
2. An admission in the previous 12 months: BL had abdominal pain which was 
discovered to be a ruptured appendix during the previous month of the interview 
period. A total of 7 encounters were applied to try to relieve his symptoms. When he 
had occasional abdominal pain, Seang-Pao (including local herbs) of many healers in 
the village was the first choice. The following day a private practitioner gave him a 
treatment. Two days later, the Heetwas conducted for him. Despite an incomplete 
Heetprocess, BL was taken to the district hospital because of his worsening 
symptoms. Taking 8 hours to travel 67 kilometres, BL arrived and was admitted to the 
district hospital for 1 night and the n he was referred to the provincial hospital the 
next day. 
(Continued next page) 
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Box 6.3: Household TAL 8 (continued) 
The district hospital did not have an ambulance so the villagers had to shoulder 
transportation cost themselves. They hired a private car to take BL to the provincial 
hospital, taking around 7 hours to travel approximately 160 kilometres. BL had 
surgery and was admitted to the provincial hospital for a total of 10 days. BL was back 
to the district hospital for 5 days admission to recover. Thereafter, BL and his carers 
hired a Tak-Tak to the village. 
Financial costs by type of provider are shown below. 
1. Seang-Pao and herbs 
2. Private practitioner 
3. Heet 
4. DH (twice, 6 days) 
5. PH (10 days) 
Total costs 
User fees 
(USD) 
2.8 
8.9 
61.0 
12.0 
318.0 
402.7 
(87%) 
DH: district hospital; PH: provincial hospital. 
Transportation 
costs (USD) 
o 
o 
o 
13.0 
26.3 
39.3 
(8%) 
Uvlng costs 
(USD) 
o 
o 
o 
14.6 
7.0 
21.6 
(5%) 
Total 
(USD) 
2.8 
8.9 
61.0 
39.6 
351.3 
463.6 
(100%) 
Together these cost 463.6 USD or 354% of monthly household non-food consumption. 
To cope with this cost the household adopted multiple strategies: using their limited 
savings; sacrificing half a cow for Heet and selling half for cash; selling livestock; 
selling wooden poles prepared several months ago for a new house, borrowing money 
and getting support from relatives and neighbours. They even announced their need 
for help on the local radiO, h oping to get financial support from relatives In other 
villages. This high cost burden combined with the coping strategies and limitation of 
only two main labourers in the household led to household impoverishment. After the 
patient completed treatment, the family had neither poultry nor livestock left. On the 
other hand, he had debts from the hospital admission. 
~ .. When I was i/~ ... I lost opportunities to earn; normally I would go to the 
forest to hunt wild animals and sometimes did daily labouring. I dont know 
how long it will take to repay the debts - more than 100-200 USD ... perhaps 2-
3 years if I'm lucky ... If I had not been i/~ we would not have debts and would 
be able to construd a new permanent house ... ' 
Source: Household in-depth interview 
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6.6 Coping strategies 
As suggested by the above examples, when illness confronted the households, they 
had many approaches to deal with the problems. Those approaches used by the 
households were grouped into two main coping strategies; cost prevention strategies 
and cost management strategies, as in another study (Russell 2001). 
6.6.1 Cost prevention strategies 
From the village census, about 40% of the people reporting illness episodes adopted 
the cost prevention strategy of not seeking treatment, as presented earlier. This was 
largely among households from the better-off and worst-off groups. TAL, the remote 
village, showed a higher rate of not seeking treatment. 
From the 29 households with which in-depth interviews were conducted, four 
households reported not seeking care for the Illness of a household mem ber. These 
four households were spread over the poor and the non-poor districts - one was the 
middle group in TAL, two in SPX (one in the middle group and another In the worst-
off) and another was amongst the worst-off in KK (table 6.4). 'Lack of money/or 'being 
poor'were first cited as reasons for not seeking care. When probed with the question 
'suppose you had cash available at that moment, would you seek care or not?', all the 
four households still said they would not seek care and they explained their reasons. 
Two households stated that 'It was a simple symptom, not serious. 'One household 
gave a more surprising reason that 'It was at night and they did not dare to wake up 
health staff. 'Two households reported that there was 'no effective treatment available 
for the illness'and 'no hope~ Therefore, it appeared that lack of cash was not the most 
significant rea son for not seeking care. 
While cost prevention strategies sometimes were followed by recovery, at other times, 
they were not. In the four households which adopted the cost prevention strategy of 
not seeking care, all experienced health outcomes of death or disability. Boxes 6.4 and 
6.5 present examples. 
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Box 6.4: Household SPX 6 
This household was classified as worst-off. There were 5 household members: 2 adults 
(aged 45 and 40) and 3 children (aged 17, 12 and 11). 
The second child of the household (a boy, aged 13) had died in the previous twelve 
months. The boy got abdominal pain in the late afternoon. His symptoms worsened at 
9.00 pm and became very serious at 05.00 am the next day and finally the boy died 
around 05.00 am without any treatment. The parents thought that they would seek 
care for the boy in the early morning but he died at dawn. They gave their reasons for 
not seeking any treatment for the boy as follows: 
1. It was at night. They were not familiar with the health staff and were afraid to wake 
them for treatment at night. They would wait until morning. 
2. Perhaps, the boy might recover by himself. They didn't think that it was very 
serious. They took it lightly (Theou Bao). 
3. They did not have enough money to seek care from a public health care provider. 
They only had 10 USD in hand that night. They needed at least 20-30 USD to seek 
care at a health centre or 50 USD at a district hospital. 
4. They did not own a Tak-Tak and It was difficult to travel to seek care, especially at 
night. 
They had considered his illness to be minor but they had also not sought care for other 
reasons. If the above conditions had been satisfactory, they would have sought care. 
This household did not even tell the neighbours about the boy's condition that night. 
Nobody knew until the morning. The household head just informed his neighbour, the 
village head and the village authorities in the early morning that his son died. The 
household head said in a local dialect that 'If someone has blurred vision and/or a 
hearing impairment, it is difficult to go somewhere~ 
Source: Household in-depth interview 
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Box 6.5: Household TAL 4 
This household was ranked in the middle group in the viii age. There were 7 household 
members: two adults (aged 42 and 35) and five children (aged 16, 14, 10,9 and 7). In 
the two weeks before the interview, the second child (girl, aged 14) had had 
convulsions three times in one day. No treatment was given to her. She had been 
having convulsions since she was one year old. Several treatments were tried including 
traditional healing, natural herbs, private practitioners and drugs from a private clinic. 
In March 2005 she had a convulsion and put her left hand in a fire. Her family treated 
her burnt fingers themselves, by applying a mixture of toothpaste, antiseptic syrup, 
antiseptic powder and well water to the burn. Ultimately, she lost her fingers. At this 
moment, only the thumb of her left hand works. The girl usually had convulsions 3-4 
times a day, around 4-6 times a month in 2005. She was given neither medicine nor 
natural herbs. Her father stopped thinking he could treat his daughter's Illness In 2005 
for many reasons, particularly, lack of money and lack of knowledge of effective 
treatment. 
'It was too difficult and too expensive to get to a clinic or a hospital I could not 
afford medidne as well as the transportation costs. We needed at least 20-30 
USD to go to a hospital I donf think I could earn that much money. .. and even 
if I had money I donf know where to go for a good treatment Even in a 
better-off household, a boy has similar symptoms to my daughter and he's 
never recovered, how could my daughter recover?' 
Source: Household in-depth interview 
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6.6.2 Cost management strategies 
Even though households lacked cash in hand when they got ill, they preferred to seek 
care from whatever provider was available in the village so they could manage the cost 
later. Results from all the focus group discussions in the four villages clearly revealed 
that 'despite lacking cash; they would fight the illness~ They firmly pointed out that 
'they would not die without seeking any care~ They had several options for cost 
management strategies to deal with illness costs. 
In the village census, respondents were asked which mechanism they adopted to deal 
with total costs of treatment. Table 6.5 shows that since the cost of OP treatment was 
typically much less than admission, the management strategy for cost of OP service 
was less complicated than for admission. Analysis of the coping mechanisms by wealth 
groups did not show any significant difference from those analysed by village. 
Therefore the data on cost management strategies analysed by village are presented in 
this sub-section. 
There were a total of 58 times that coping mechanisms were adopted for 48 illness 
episodes with health care costs. The majority of illness episodes (81% or 39 out of a 
total of 48 episodes) were managed with a single coping mechanism. Only a few of 
them were managed with a com bination of coping mechanisms. The cost management 
strategy for admission was more complicated than for OP treatment due to the greater 
cost of admission. There were a total of 66 instances of adopting coping mechanisms 
for 38 people admitted. The majority of them (58% or 22 out of a total of 38 people 
admitted) were managed using a single coping mechanism. The rest were managed 
with a combination of coping mechanisms; 24% by two coping mechanisms and 19% 
by three - five coping mechanisms. 
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Table 6.5 Coping mechanisms to deal with cost of OP treatment and 
admission 
Phine district 
(Poor district) 
APT district 
(Non-poor district) Four 
villages (i) TAL (2) KY (3) SPX (4) KK 
Illness in the previous two weeks 
Number of illness episodes incurred 
costs 15 
_r1~.?I_Il.~Qg_p_~!:...~pl~Q.c!~_{Y~QL ____ . ____ ~ ,~ 
Coping mechanism used (n) 
• Use savings 13 
• Selling assets 2 
• Non-cash payment 4 
• Delay payment to provider 1 
• Borrowing 0 
.Th~1 w 
- "Number of coping-mechanisms per ----. 
episode 
• Single coping mechanism 10 
• Two coping mechanisms 5 
• Three coping mechanisms 0 
• To~1 15 
Admission in the previous twelve 
months 
Number of people admitted 2 
~~an _cost~ ~.son adm!tted J!:JSD _ .... _~~.?.,_~._ ... 
Coping mechanism used (n) 
• Use savings 1 
• Selling assets (livestock, rice, joist) 2 
• Borrowing 2 
• Non-cash payment 
• Getting support from neighbours 2 
• Government support 
_. __ !..Jo~_1 _ .. ____ . ____ ._ ..... _ ... _L _._. __ 
Number of coping mechanisms per 
person admitted 
• Single coping mechanism 
• Two coping mechanisms 
• Three coping mechanisms 1 
• Four coping mechanisms 1 
• Five coping mechanisms 
• To~1 2 
Source: Village census 
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17 5 
2.8 1.4 
15 4 
3 1 
o 0 
2 0 
1 0 
21 5 
14 5 
2 0 
1 0 
17 5 
7 16 
31. 7 ... _l~,_~. __ ... _ 
5 15 
4 3 
2 
6 
3 
20 _ ....... _ lJL ... ___ _ 
1 14 
3 2 
2 
1 
7 16 
11 48 
2.0 4.2 
11 43 (74%) 
o 6 (10%) 
1 5 (9%) 
o 3 (5%) 
o 1 (2%) 
12 58 (100%L 
10 39 (81%) 
1 8 (17%) 
o 1 (2%) 
11 48 (100%) 
13 38 
55.7 ._ . .1§._L . ____ ._ 
9 30 (450/0) 
7 16 (24%) 
4 8 (12%) 
6 (9%) 
5 (8%) 
1 1 (2%) 
21 __ .... _.§_6 _~!gg.~(01. 
7 22 (58%) 
4 9 (24%) 
2 3 (8%) 
3 (8%) 
1 (3%) 
13 38 (100%) 
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Using savings was the most common strategy for dealing with costs of both OP 
episodes and admission. Most households had some amount of cash in hand when 
they sought care. Only a few of them (5 out of 48 illness episodes and 7 out of 38 
people admitted) had no available cash at that moment. They normally adopted other 
coping mechanisms. 
Selling assets was also quite widely used by households. Poultry was normally sold to 
cope with costs of OP episodes. In case of admission, rna ny types of assets were sold, 
for example poultry, livestock, rice and timber joists which had been prepared for a 
new house. Data from FGDs and in-depth interviews revealed that assets were 
normally sold within the village in order to get a reasonable price. The respondents 
reported that this was a kind of social network th rough which they could help each 
other within the community. Nevertheless, one household head from the household in-
depth interview described his experience of getting a 10% lower price than expected 
when he had to sell a cow urgently to pay medical bills of his daughter. 
Non-cash payment was a strategy used to deal with cost of Illness, especially for 
traditional services which were not costly. Nonetheless, in one household in KK, the 
patient gave cash and 20 kg of rice to a private clinic as payment (Box 6.6). This 
resulted in the highest cost burden due to OP treatment in KK village, 36% of monthly 
household non-food consumption. 
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Box 6.6: Household KK 4 
This household had only two members: a household head (aged 63) and his wife 
(aged 56). This household was classified as a middle group in the village. 
The household reported one illness in the previous two weeks. The housewife had a 
skin rash on her waist. She tried three different types of care for her symptoms; 
Seang-Pao, herbs and a private clinic. She got free treatment at the point of service 
because she had a close relationship with the doctor. After recovering from her 
symptoms, a month later, she gave the doctor 5 USD and 20 kg of jasmine rice. The 
total value of the payment to the private clinic was 12.3 USD. 
The household was very concerned to repay the private clinic. They thought that even 
though they did not have cash in their pocket, they were able to get care from this 
private clinic. They were so eager to give something in return because the doctor was 
so kind to them. After repaying the doctor, they felt proud of themselves [they proudly 
smiled all the time when they told their story]. 
Source: Household in-depth interview 
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Borrowing was the third most frequently used strategy for admissions. Although the 
amount of borrowing was high (ranging from 10 to 347 USD), almost all respondents 
in village census said that there was no requirement for a credit guarantee and no 
interest paid. Respondents in only two households mentioned capacity to repay as an 
issue influencing access to credit. One said there was an impliCit guarantee of capacity 
to repay, indicated by having assets such as livestock. Another said the housewife had 
borrowed money from her parents and had given them a cow as a guarantee. If she 
could not find money, she would repay them with the cow. If she was able to earn 
money, she would repay with cash and get her cow back. Data from all FGDs backed 
up the idea that borrowing within the village for basic needs would not incur interest 
and no explicit guarantee of repayment was demanded, regardless of wealth group or 
status in the village. The focus groups explained that 'basic needs' means health, 
education and housing. According to the four villages' experiences, all of the 
borrowings were for health purposes, only one case for housing, which had suffered 
fire damage, and never for education. The focus groups further revealed that the 
borrowing for health was unlike the borrowing for doing business such as investment 
in rice fields or livestock which would incur interest. 
Getting cash and non-cash support from neighbours and relatives were incurred for 
cases of admission, but not OP treatment. One household had broadcast on local radio 
and hoped for financial support from relatives in other villages, as presented earlier in 
Box 6.3. It should be noted that psychological support from neighbours and relatives 
was very common for both OP episodes and admissions. For example many neighbours 
and relatives voluntarily came to see and stay with a patient in a patient's house or 
many villagers accompanied a patient to a provider even though they could not help. 
Support from government was reported by one household when a boy had been 
injured in an explosion in the forest near the rice field. When he received care In the 
provincial hospital, the unexploded ordnance (UXO) decontamination programme 
subsidized some of the treatment costs. 
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Delaying payments of user fees to providers such as a private practitioner, health 
centre or district hospital were commonly mentioned by households. Several 
households had experience of delayed payment but they had now paid. They did not 
want to· be recorded as delaying payment. The household perceived that they just 
prolonged a payment period for a while in order to have enough time to earn cash. 
They normally delayed for a short time, 4-5 days - just enough time to return to the 
village and sell their assets. They could eventually repay the providers and there was 
no interest charge. 
Data from household in-depth interviews showed that four households had had 
experience of delayed payment (three households at public providers and one 
household at a private practitioner) and none paid interest. Another two households 
did not have experience of delayed payment but thought it would not be difficult to be 
allowed to delay payment. 
'It is vety easy to ask the doctor (at health centre) for delayed payment He is 
velJl nice. He knows evelJl household in the village and vice versa. He never 
told me how long we had to repay. But we deliberately told him that we could 
repay within a week. In fact I could not keep my promise, so I went to tell him 
and asked for a longer period of delayed payment I just wanted to see him 
and inform him, not disappear quiet/y. He easily accepted without getting 
angry. , 
(A household in-depth interview, SPX 1; admission to a health centre) 
'The doctor was so kind to allow me (a patient) to go back home and find the 
money to repay him whenever I could have enough cash. It was our 
responsibility to repay him. He gave us treatment and the patient recovered 
because of his treatment so we had to pay him. Eventually, next time when we 
were sick we had to see him again. ' 
(A household in-depth interview KK 4; care at a private practitioner) 
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On the other hand, another five households were not positive about delayed payment 
at public providers (a district hospital and a provincial hospital). They thought it was 
very difficult to be allowed to delay payment unless the households had some capacity 
to repay, for example having a relationship with the health staff or having livestock at 
home. 
'We (a parent of a patient) must own livestock otherwise we would not have 
dared to ask the doctor to delay payment and he also would not accept my 
request How could we delay payment, if we did not have a relationship with 
the health staff or own livestock. ' 
(A household in-depth interview, KK 3: admission to a district hospital) 
'I (a relative of the patient) felt scared to talk to the health staff even when he 
asked me about the patient Whenever he came to see the patient, I just stood 
away from him. I did not mention delaying payment We were able to delay 
payment because the deputy viI/age head came with me and he talked to the 
health staff. If he had not come with us, I definitely would not have asked for 
delayed payment [The deputy of the village head said} It was difficult to be 
allowed to delay payment The health staff asked many questions until she felt 
comfortable about allowing us to delay payment, for example what was the 
relationship between the patient and me, whether the patient has other 
relatives, any livestock owned by the patient, how could you repay .... Oh! She 
asked until I felt tired. Sure, she must ask until she felt confident that we could 
repay. It was not such a bad situation because I could communicate with the 
health staff. can you imagine? How could the villagers understand what they 
should say or answer to the health staff?' 
(Household in-depth interview, TAL 8: admission to a provincial hospital) 
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Exemption was asked about as a coping strategy for dealing with OP treatment and 
admission. In the questionnaire of the village census, every adult was asked whether 
they had known about exemption or not. In addition to knowledge of-exemption, the 
households which had reported illness and had sought care from public providers were 
asked whether they had experience of asking for or receiving exemption from user fees 
from the hospital or not. Apart from the households of the village head and the VHV in 
SPX, no household in the four villages had heard of exemption at public health care 
providers. All households which had experience of seeking care from public providers 
never requested or received exemption for curative care from public providers. Details 
of households' perspective towards exemption are presented in the following sub-
section. 
6.7 Households' perception on user fees and exemptions 
This sub-section presents attitudes of households on paying use r fees and on 
exemption at public health providers. The study found that households have a strong 
position towards user fees which had a profound influence on exemptions. 
6.7.1 Households' perception on user fees 
All twelve focus groups (3 groups per village in the four villages) and twenty nine 
household in-depth interviews showed the same idea. All of them confirmed 
emphatically that a patient must pay user fees to public health providers. Their reasons 
can be classified as follow; 
• Public health care service belonged to the govemment The people had to pay for 
government services. The government had financial constra ints and the people 
must support the government. (3/12 FGDs and 2/29 household in-depth 
interviews). 
'Someone has to pay for treatment costs. Who would pay, if we did not pay? 
The govemment has no money to support it [exemptions}. I 
(FOG of the village com mittee in TAL) 
173 
CHAPTER 6: COST BURDENS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES 
• No money, no treatmentat all. A patient at least must pay for drugs. Nothing was 
free even a traditional spirit service, Seang-Pao. (6/12 FGDs and 9/29 household 
in-depth interviews). 
'We have to have money in hand before going to a hospital. If we have no 
money, we will be not able to get any treatment Patients have to pay user fees 
not only in public providers but also every type of provider. When we sought 
care from Seang-Pao, we also paid a healer. 
(FGD of the males in SPX) 
'We [households} had to buy drugs. How can we get free drugs? The patients 
have to pay, at least, for drugs so that drugs would be available for the next 
patient' 
(Household in-depth interview, TAL 6) 
• This was a business era. (3/12 FGDs) 
'During the war period, treatment was free for everybody. But now, 
everything has changed. This is the business era. Everything revolves around 
investment, selling and buying. Hospitals also have to invest They have to 
buy drugs from private companies; they do not get free drugs. 
(FGD of the village committee in SPX) 
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• It was shame or stigma if they did not have money to pay user fees to providers. 
(4/12 FGDs and 3/29 household in-depth interviews) One household in-depth 
interview (TAL 8) provided a bette r understanding of the stigma they suffered. It 
was caused in two ways: (1) health staff frequently asking for money and (2) 
asking for money in front of other people. No respondent mentioned rudeness from 
the health staff. 
'I [a patien~s relative] did not want to see a health staff member. He came to 
see the patient at the ward [of a provincial hospital] and he asked us ~ 
d2¥ about money to pay for treatment I felt extremely embarrassed because 
of the other persons around there. He spoke with his normal voice but 
everyone could clearly hear. There were so many people in the ward; other 
patients and their relatives. It seemed that everyone looked at us 
(interviewee and the patient) and they were waiting to hear the answer. I 
supposed that other people probably had more money than us. Ms. A 
[supposed name of another relative] Quickly disappeared from the ward if a 
health worker was coming. [Ms. A said] Why did I have to stay? I felt too 
ashamed to stay. , 
(Household in-depth interview, TAL 8) 
• It was an obligation of patients to pay user fees and it was dependent on 
household capability to deal with the payment. (4/12 FGDs and 8/29 household In-
depth interviews) 
'Both private clinics and public hospitals have user fees. Patients have to pay 
user fees otherwise they cannot go to see a doctor. .. We must seek money 
from whatever sources we can ... ' 
(FGD of the females in KK) 
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6.7.2 Households' perception on exemptions 
Every respondent in both qua ntitative and qualitative studies strongly confirmed that 
exemptions for general treatment of illness at public health providers were not 
possible. Patients had to pay user fees from their pocket. However, they knew that a 
child can get free immunization and a patient can get free treatment for some diseases 
which were particular events i.e., tuberculosis, leprosy, special operations for glaucoma 
and cleft palate. 
~ .. no exemption at all because drugs came from government budget. We must 
pay. Health staff would ask money before they provided drugs to a patient' 
(Household in-depth interview, TALS) 
'How come? If people did not have money, how people could receive health 
care. It was not possible that hospital will provide exemptions for the poor. ' 
(Household in-depth Interview, KK2) 
Qualitative information in SPX provided a better understanding from the people's 
perspective on why nobody had known about exemptions. Data came from an ad-hoc 
interview with the village head and the VHV in SPX who had known about the 
exemptions. They had been informed that exemptions was for 'Phu-Anathd (a 
destitute person), not for 'Phu-Thukyak'(a poor person). The village head had been 
given this information at a meeting at the district government when he first came to be 
the village head of SPX in 1997. The VHV had been informed when he was trained to 
be a health volunteer by the district health office in 2002. They said every participant 
of the same meeting had the same understanding. The VHV indicated that a trainer 
said there was a ceiling on the exemptions of 1 USD per visit; otherwise the village 
RDF might face financial problems. The village head and the VHV Interpreted that 
households in the village were poor but not destitute. That information led them to 
infer that no one in the village was eligible for exemptions at public providers and so 
they did not inform the village members about possible exemptions. The village head 
and the VHV were reminded about the exemptions for the destitute again by the 
District Health Office in 2003. This time they had informed the villagers in a meeting 
but it seemed that no one paid any attention to this issue. The VHV reported his 
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experience that he had never given exemptions to any villager since the RDF was 
available in the village in 16 August 2002. Likewise, no villager had asked for free 
medicine from him. Some villagers had postponed payment to him and all of them 
could repay anyway. The village head and the VHV further elucidated that the 
terminology of 'a poor person' and 'a destitute person' was introduced by the 
government staff. Both of them had to keep strictly to the definitions and nobody could 
change them except the government. The village head and the VHV could clearly 
define the difference between 'a poor person' and 'a destitute person', that a poor 
person has a better situation than a destitute one. 
• 'A poor person' means someone who has not enough money but still has 
relatives or assets such as a house, rice field, poultry, pigs or livestock. 
• 'A destitute person' means someone who has absolutely nothing i.e., no money, 
relative or asset. 
Additionally, all three focus group discussions in SPX had the same idea that 
households in the village were poor, not destitute. The FGD of village committees 
explained that there were many destitute people after the year of independence 
(1975). The last destitute person in this area had died two years ago. Presently, 
everyone in the village has at least one of three Items; house, kin and asset. 
Therefore, there is no destitute in the village and in the area. 
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6.8 Discussion 
6.8.1 Discussion of methodology 
Households for in-depth interview were purposively selected based on experience of 
illness or admission or death obtained from the village census and allocation to wealth 
group by the FGDs. The selected households were asked for their willingness to 
participate in the study and none of them declined. A schedule of in-depth interviews 
was arranged later through the village head or the local assistant. The schedule was 
publicly known by the villagers. Many neighbours came to observe the in-depth 
interview in the first few households beca use other selected households wanted to 
know beforehand what questions would be asked. When someone outside the selected 
household members was present at the in-depth interview, there were advantages and 
disadvantages. For some selected households, participation of other neighbours 
benefited the in-depth interview. For exam pie, the neighbours provided a friendlier 
environment, especially for respondents who were very shy. Frequently, the 
neighbours helped in verifying data for the household members, espeCially times and 
dates. Nevertheless, sometimes, the selected household members were reluctant to 
say Some feelings or personal reasons in front of their neighbours, for instance reason 
for not asking for a delayed payment. If the researcher discerned their reluctance, she 
skipped that question and then found out later e.g. asked the household members 
again later when their neighbours had left or obtained the information in other ways. 
For one household, a neighbour interfered in the interview. He answered the questions 
before the respondents and forced the respondents to quickly respond. He was gently 
requested by the researcher to stop getting involved in the interview by quietly 
thinking of his own answer which wou Id be the next in-depth interview. The village 
head stressed the request to him. 
In the village census, although the villagers adopted delayed payment as a coping 
strategy, they did not want it recorded as such if they had repaid already. It was rather 
referred to as another coping mechanism, such as earning money from e.g. selling 
assets and using savings. For example, a household head delayed payment to a private 
provider. At the interview date, he had repaid already by his saving which he earned 
from many activities e.g. fishing or fetching natural products. In this case, the coping 
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mechanism was recorded as using saving. Income diversification was not mentioned as 
a cost management strategy because it was perceived as consequences of needing to 
find the cost of the health care. Extra jobs were done in order to generate additional 
income for many purposes such as (1) to repay a borrowing or (2) to repay a delayed 
payment or (3) to buy poultry to replace the one which had been sold or (4) to replace 
savings which had been used. 
A threshold of catastrophic expenditure when health expenditure is equal to or greater 
than 10% of a household's income has been applied in many studies (Russell 2001i 
Russell and Gilson 2006; Chuma et al. 2007). A cut-off point of 40% or more of 
household non-food consumption which was proposed by WHO (2005) and used in 
other studies (Xu et al. 2007i Xu et al. 2003) was adopted in this study because it is 
more sensible for measuring a catastrophic level in a low-income setting which 
normally has a high share of food consumption. For example, in table 6.6, if the 
catastrophe threshold was based on 10% of household consumption, health 
expenditure of 10 units would cause catastrophe for all households regardless of the 
profile of food and non-food consumption. Health expenditure of less than 10 units 
would not lead to catastrophe for any household. If a cut-off point of 40% of non-food 
consumption is applied, the profile of food and non-food consumption is significant for 
whether or not expenditure is catastrophic. Health expenditure of 10 units could lead 
to catastrophe for households 1 - 5 (food consumption of 75% - 95%), but not for 
others. Health expenditure less than 10 units could result in catastrophe for 
households with food consumption greater than 75%. When food consumption equals 
75%, whether a cut-off point of 10% household consumption or 40% non-food 
consumption is employed, the judgement on catastrophic expenditure would be the 
same. 
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Table 6.6 Illustration of the sensitivity of catastrophic health expenditure to 
its definition 
Catastrophic level when health Health 
ex~enditure Is 10 units expenditure which 
leads to 
catastrophe, if 
Based on based on 40% of 
HH Household Food Non-food Based on HH non-food non-food 
no. consum~tion consumetion consum~tion consumQtlon consum~tion consum~tlon 
[A] [B] [C] [0] [E] - 10L[B] [F] - 10L[D] [G] - 40% x [0] 
1 100 95 5 10% 200% 2 
2 100 90 10 10% 100% 4 
3 100 85 15 10% 67% 6 
4 100 80 20 10% 50% 8 
5 100 75 25 10% 40% 10 
6 100 70 30 10% 33% 12 
7 100 65 35 10% 29% 14 
8 100 60 40 10% 25% 16 
9 100 55 45 10% 22% 18 
10 100 50 50 10% 20% 20 
11 100 45 55 10% 18% 22 
12 100 40 60 10% 17% 24 
The study found that non-food and food consumption of the four villages was 25% and 
75%, respectively, as presented earlier in table 4.5. Considered by wealth group and 
by village, the middle group and the worst-off group of the four villages had lower 
levels of consumption and a higher proportion of food consumption than the better-off. 
There is a limitation of the methodology for obtaining household consumption in this 
study. Mean figures obtained from three sampled households were applied to other 
households in the same wealth group of the vi llage. By doing this, every household of 
a wealth group had the same consumption per person per day and the same 
proportion of food and non-food consumption. So this was a rough approximation and 
would affect the accuracy of the numbers of households facing catastrophic 
expenditure. 
The measurement of catastrophic expenditure is inevitably crude and controversal. By 
applying a cut-off point of 40% non-food consumption, a total of 12 households had 
catastrophic expenditure. If a threshold of 10% of household consum ption is applied, it 
would capture a total of 8 households with catastrophic expenditure. Nonetheless, 
catastrophic payments do not reflect the severity of household financial hardship 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2003). Households facing catastrophic health expenditure 
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do not necessarily face impoverishment. It depends on the assets base, characteristics 
of each household member and other factors such as timing of health costs (Russell 
2004; Van Damme et al. 2004). But employing such a definition of catastrophic cost 
could indicate the magnitude of the cost problem. Qualitative methods in this study 
could then be used to explore its implications for household welfare in greater depth. 
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6.8.2 Overview of findings 
This chapter has presented the cost burden on households caused by paying for 
treatment, catastrophic health expenditure, coping strategies adopted by households 
to deal with costs of health services, and households' perception towards user fees and 
exemptions. A summary of main findings from the village census is shown in figure 
6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Summary of main findings from the household census 
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Catastrophic health expenditure 
10 hhs from OP treatment and 
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There were 64 households in total faced costs for OP treatment and admission. Among 
them, 12 households faced catastrophic levels of health expenditure (relative to the 
threshold of 40% of monthly household non-food consum ption). The level of 
catastrophic health expenditure had a wide magnitude, from 43% to 1695%. The 
remote village in the poor district (TAL), especially the middle and the worst-off group 
in the village, had the greatest suffering from catastrophic health expenditure 
compared to the other three villages. Catastrophic hea Ith expenditure could be caused 
by either small or large amounts of health expenditure. The impact of catastrophic 
health expenditure on household livelihoods differed from household to household and 
was associated with the capacity of the household to cope with the crisis e.g. asset 
base, profile of household members and status of the sick person in the household. For 
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example catastrophic health expenditure at 1695% of monthly household non-food 
consumption neither affected short nor long term household livelihood in one 
household because it owned many assets and the sick person who was elderly was not 
a main labourer of the household. 
When a household was faced with unexpected illness, cost prevention strategies by not 
seeking care and treatment cost management strategies were adopted. Not seeking 
care was the strategy used in many households, from the better-off to the worst-off. 
Unfortunately, four households who all adopted cost prevention of not seeking care 
encountered an unwanted health outcome of death or disability. 
The households had many mechanisms to deal with costs of treatment. Using savings 
and selling assets were commonly adopted by households. Selling poultry was normally 
used for dealing with costs of OP treatment while selling more val uable things such as 
cows, rice and timber joists were used for dealing with admission costs. Non-cash 
payment was used. Usually cash could be borrowed within the village with neithe r 
credit guarantee nor interest. Delayed payment of user fees to providers without 
interest was commonly practised. Nonetheless, there was an implicit credit guarantee, 
notably a close relationship with the lender or ownership of livestock which implied a 
capacity to repay cash borrowing and delayed payme nts. 
The villagers completely accepted the principle of user fees at public health care 
providers. They perceived that the patients had responsibility to pay user fees by 
whatever coping mechanisms they could possibly ma nage. Almost no villager knew 
about exemptions at public health providers. The few who knew understood that 
exemptions were for the destitute, not for the poor. They inferred that they were the 
poor and then not eligible for the exemptions. They also believed that exemptions 
were impossible. 
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6.S.3 Discussion of findings 
Health care cost burden 
The national survey of the LEe III did not provide analyzed data on health care cost 
burden to households so the study's findings on cost burden cannot be compared to 
the national figure. The Oudomxai survey did not present health care cost burden on 
households. Paphassarang et al (2002) reported that the high socio-economic group 
had a higher cost burden (2.0-6.5% of income per person per year) than the low 
socio-economic group (1.0-1.6% of income per person per year). This was in contrast 
with the findings of the thesis which found that the middle and the worst-off groups 
faced higher cost burdens. This was both because of their lower consumption as well 
as a higher proportion of food consumption than the better-off group, as shown in 
table 4.5. Among the four villages, TAL had the highest level of cost burden and the 
greatest number of households with catastrophic expenditure. There were many 
possible explanations. TAL had the highest proportion of food consumption (88% for 
middle group and 84% for the worst-off group) and its consumption was relatively low. 
Neither the national survey nor the studies in Lao PDR presented evidence on 
catastrophic levels for Lao households. The thesis produced new findings in Lao PDR 
on catastrophic health expenditure. The thesis found that catastrophic health 
expenditure was related to treatment choice. Seeking care from local facilities wa s 
normally chea p but, sometimes, it could be an expensive or even catastrophic expense 
if the villagers adopted the traditional practice of Heet This event was adopted only 
among the Lao Theung, not the Lao Lum. Two households in TAL and one household 
in KY village, all Lao Theung, applied it and the two households in TAL as a 
consequence were faced with catastrophic expenses (at 1695% and 354%) but not the 
one household in KY (34% of monthly household non-food consumption). This 
evidence suggests that different ethnic groups have different traditional beliefs and 
practices to relieve illness which might be sign lficant for health seeking patterns, health 
care costs and health outcomes. Within the three main ethnic groups In Lao, it Is 
commonly accepted that Lao Lum (low land) is the better-off group, Lao Theung (mid 
land) is the middle group and Lao Sung (high land) is the worst-off in terms of 
economiCS, access to infrastructure and access to social welfare and public health 
services. Lao Sung has traditional beliefs similar to or possibly more extreme than 
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those of Lao Theung. Taking together the traditional beliefs and more severe 
geographical barriers, it can be predicted that Lao Sung may have a traditional 
ceremony which incurs high costs similar to Heet 
Costs of health service at public providers were high, especially compared to the low 
consumption level of households. The findings from Household TAL 8 (Box 6.3) 
indicated that user fees at public providers (12 USD at the district hospital plus 318 
USO at the provincial hospital) caused catastrophic health expenditure to the 
household, especially expensive treatment at the provincial hospital. In this case, the 
household characteristics did not have good capacity to buffer health expenditure (this 
was a worst-off household) but main reasons for catastrophe expenses were treatment 
choices. The patient was in the remote area and he had limited choice of care. Several 
treatment options were applied includ ing Heet When he reached the public providers, 
his condition was worse - ruptured appendix - and he was referred to the provincial 
hospital. If the villagers were well educated that Heetcould not cure the disease, 
Heels expense would be saved. If he could reach the district hospital earlier with a 
less serious condition, he might have been cured at the district hospital with lower user 
fees and transportation costs than the provincial hospital. The household might have 
been able to avoid catastrophic expenses. 
The findings showed that low levels of treatment costs (1.65 USO) could cause 
catastrophic expenses to a household, as seen in cambodia (Van Oamme 2004). The 
thesis found in a household in-depth interview of TAL 7 (Box 6.1) that the illness cost 
was incurred by a simple treatment choice (a private practitioner) without 
transportation cost. Referring to an average cost of OP treatment as presented earlier; 
the level of 1.65 U SO was about an average OP treatment cost by private providers 
(1.7 USD per OP visit) and it was the cheapest amongst facilities. Hence, main reasons 
for catastrophic expenses for this household were not from the treatment chOice, but 
from the household characteristics themselves. This household was ranked by all three 
FGOs in the village as the worst-off household among the worst-off group in TAL. The 
household was selected for the consumption survey and its consumption was lower 
than the average of the worst-off group in TAL. This indicated that this hous ehold was 
extremely poor. When household members were III (even with a not serious condition) 
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and the household had to shoulder treatment costs, it was difficult to avoid 
catastrophic expenses. 
The thesis found that the cost burden differed considerably according to wealth grou p. 
The poorer the group, the higher the median cost burden. This is evident not only in 
Lao PDR but also in many other settings e.g. Vietnam (Sepehri et al. 2003) and Kenya 
(Chuma 2007). 
A case of death was selected for in-depth interview. The study focused on health 
expenditure, but not fu neral expenses but during the interview period, the respondents 
provided some information about the funeral event and expenses. Social status and 
age of the dead person were major factors influencing the funeral expense. The 
funeral of a baby or young person would be simple and less costly but the funeral of a 
person who had high social status (e.g. elderly, well-known person) would be 
expensive. The funeral expenditures were roughly estimated by far more expensive 
than health expenditure so possibly led to financial hardship for the household. 
Nevertheless, it was not the major concern of the study. 
g>ping strategies to deal with costs of illness 
Cost prevention by not seeking treatment was used In the Lao villages. Unfortunately, 
information from in-depth interviews suggested that four households who adopted not 
seeking care had resulted in the worst possible outcome such as disability or death. 
This can be counted as a 'catastrophic health outcome'to the household, especially for 
curable diseases, which is equally, or possibly more serious than catastrophic health 
expenditure. In other words, lack of access to adequate health services by households 
could lead to a catastrophiC health outcome and could have economic cons equences 
(Wagstaff 2007b). 
Costs of OP treatment were easier to manage than costs of admission. Using savings 
was typically adopted as a coping mechanism. Non-cash payment was also accepted in 
lao. Generally it involved giving assets such as rice as payment; no-one reported 
payment by casual labour which is accepted in other settings (Chuma 2007). The social 
network established within the village, used for selling assets and borrowing cash, was 
important in meeting health expenditure and has been identified elsewhere (Sauerborn 
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et al. 1996; Russell 2001; Chuma 2007). The strength of the village in Lao is that loans 
could be made without credit guarantees and without interest, as with the informal 
credit system in China (Wilkes et al. 1998). In contrast, borrowing in order to meet 
health care costs in other countries is considered as a commercial transaction and 
interest is charged, e.g. Vietnam (Sepehri et al. 2003), cambodia (Van Damme et al. 
2004) and formal credit in China (Wilkes et al. 1998). Delaying payment was commonly 
used in Lao and in other settings (Chum a 2007). In the Lao context, no credit 
guarantee or interest were required unlike in cambodia where the patient had to pay 
more for the same service when credit was given (Van Damme et al. 2004). 
The thesis found that no household experienced reducing basic needs e.g. 
consumption or schooling. It might be because the villagers normally consumed wild 
products which could be fetched in the forest. All children were in a primary school 
and they could attend the school with low cost or without cost. Teenagers who were in 
a secondary school or a university which might incur high expense to the household 
were not captured as samples in the study. 
The mechanisms adopted by the household were reactions to health care costs at that 
time. They could not reflect long term consequences nor was it possible to observe 
changes in livelihood. Nonetheless, information from in-depth interviews did 
demonstrate some impacts on the household, for example; a household had debts 
from admission or the household needed to earn cash in order to repay a delayed 
payment. 
Perception on exemptions 
The villagers perceived that money was necessary for seeking care and lack of money 
was not perceived as the main barrier to accessing health services. This Implied that 
they did not expect free care from the providers and were not aware of the 
exemptions at public providers. It indicated that exemption did not function well as 
indicated by Gilson et al (1995) and it was reported as the case in Lao PDR 
(Paphassarang et al. 2002) and in Vietnam (Sepehri et al. 2003). This study adds to 
evidence of why an exemption policy might be unsuccessful. Exemptions were not 
taken up in the Lao villages because the villagers lacked knowledge about exe mption 
and the villagers who knew were unaware of the entitlement to exemptions. The 
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villagers had clear definitions between the poor and the destitute and they got these 
concepts from government staff. These definitions affected the knowledge, attitude 
and practice of the villagers on exemptions. The villagers totally accepted that the 
destitute would get 'the money exemptions' (or waiving from paying user fees) but the 
poor would get 'the time exemptions' (or a delayed payment), not money. They did 
appreciate the time exemptions they got from the providers. They did prefer to 
preserve the money exemption for the destitute who rarely existed in this era. This 
emphasises that the households' perspective is a key factor in the successful 
implementation of an exemption policy, in addition to factors such as the policy itself, 
policy makers, providers (Gilson et al. 1995) and stigmatisation of the household 
(Gilson et al. 1998). 
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6.9 Concluding remarks 
A combination of multiple methods from quantitative and qualitative approaches i.e., a 
village census, a consumption survey, key informant interviews, focus group 
discussions including wealth ranking, household in-depth interviews complemented 
each other well and made it feasible to identify household catastrophic health 
expenditure and to gain in-depth understanding on the household impact of illness. 
Within the current context of the health delivery system, the villagers suffered from 
illness. Some of them were not able to access health services when needed and then 
faced a negative outcome of death or disability. The households were confronted with 
high cost burdens and some were catastrophic. Most catastrophic expenditure was 
concentrated in the poor district, especially in the most disadvantaged village and the 
middle and the worst-off group. The poorer households were more vulnerable to 
catastrophic health expenditure due to a low level of cons umptlon and a very high 
proportion on food. Catastrophic health expenditure could be caused by many types of 
services, for instance, a small amount of service costs at a private provider, an 
expensive Heet, and a costly service at public providers, particularly a provincial 
hospital. Expenditure defined as catastrophic might not always result in negative 
consequences to the households. 
The households dealt the cost of health services themselves drawing on a strong social 
network in the village. The villagers were not aware of the exemptions. On the other 
hand, they strongly accepted a concept of paying user fees at point of services. Lack of 
knowledge on exemption, misunderstanding on entitlement and lack of awareness of 
the exemptions were main factors from the households' perspective which Inhibited the 
success of exemption policy implementation. A delicate issue on the definition of who 
was entitled to exemptions was found from the households' perspective. 
This household information demonstrates that the exemption policy was not effectively 
implemented at all. The user fees at public health providers caused household 
catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment for some. The current health 
delivery system did not enable the villagers to get proper access to health services 
when needed, in particular to public health providers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
USER FEE AND EXEMPTION POLICY IMPLEMENTAnON 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the implementation of the national policy on user fees and 
exemptions (known as Decree 52 PM) from the viewpoint of policy makers and 
providers at all levels of the country (centra I hospitals in Vie ntiane capital, a provincial 
hospital, district hospitals and health centres) using both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. The chapter mainly responds to objectives 4 and 5 (to assess public 
health care providers' behaviour and attitudes on exemption mechanisms and to assess 
the perceptions and preferences of national policy makers on fee exemptions policy 
and implementation). A short methodology Is presented In the next section followed by 
the results, which form the main section of the chapter. The results section Is divided 
into two sub-sections. The first is user fees and exemptions policy in Lao PDR which 
demonstrates the context of user fees before the launching of the policy in 1995 and 
the content of the policy. The second is the Implementation of the policy which covers 
the process of implementation and routine practices of providers. The attitudes of 
policy makers and providers towards user fees and exemptions are presented. 
Discussion of methodology, an overview of the findings, discussion of findings and 
concluding remarks are presented subsequently, in the last part of the chapter. 
7.2 Methodology 
Data were obtained from policy makers and public health care providers using both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
Key informant interviews with a semi-structured questionnaire were used to obtain 
data from selected policy makers. A total of 22 policy makers (PMK1- PMK22) were 
interviewed; 15 in the Ministry of Health, 3 in the Ministry of Finance, 2 in the School 
of Public Health, 1 in the Poverty Reduction Fund and 1 independent consu ltant for 
WHO in Lao PDR (table 7.1). 
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Time constraint, budget Ii mitation and safety of travelling were considered in ma king 
the selection of sampled providers. A total of 15 health facilities (PVDl - PVD15) in 
both Vientiane Capital (VTE Capital) and Savannakhet (SVK) Province were chosen for 
interview. These comprised 5 facilities at provincial level, 7 facilities at district level and 
3 groups of facilities at village level (table 7.1). Each provider was visited and then 
health staff were interviewed using a semi-structured questionnaire, except head of 
some health centres who were interviewed at the district hospitals. In addition, the 
financial report of each interviewed provider was requested. The financial report of 
SVK Provincial Health Office was very usefuJ as it presented data of all 14 hospitals in 
SVK province (all 14 district hospitals and SVK provincial hospital). 
Table 7.1 Code and summary data of policy makers and providers including 
methods used 
Code Organization 
Policy makers 
PMKl - PMK15 Ministry of Health 
--P'M-Ki'6"'::PMK17" School of Public Health 
PMK18 - PMK20 Ministry of Finance 
_ ... ~t1..K~L .. - .. --.----.. Poverty Reduction Fund 
Independent consultant of 
PMK22 WHO, Lao PDR 
Providers 
PVDl - PVD3 Provincial level 
....!P"":'V':;D=-4 ~~-- Provincial level 
PVD5 Provincial level --!...,;~----
District Hospital in poor 
_ . p.Y..P.~..::_p.y.P~ . __ ...... districts 
District Hospital in non-
PVD9 - PVD12 poor districts 
4 Health Centres in a poor 
PVD13 district .-!...!~::....- -- 3 Health Centres in a non-
_pVDl4._._. __ ._._. poor district 
7 Health Centres in 
Place Method 
Quantitative 
VTE SVK (financial Qualitative 
Capital Province report) (Interview) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
--------_._._._----'---
---.-.-... -----.------7---
/ 
/ 
I 
I 
._ ..... __ .1 _._ .... _... .. ... __ .... .L. . ___ L _ 
---1.. / / 
_ L . ____ I __ ___ -'/'---_ 
I 
PVD15 another non-poor district / / I 
Note: * means financial report in a format of the SVK Provincial Hea Ith Office 
presenting data of all hospitals in SVK (a provincial hospital and 14 district hospitals) 
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7.3 The context and content of user fee and exemption policy in Lao PDR 
7.3.1 The context of systems of user fees in Lao PDR before 1995 
The history of the user fee system in Lao PDR can be divided into three periods. Firstly, 
between 1975 and 1986, after the liberation of the country on 2nd December 1975, the 
government reunified the nation under one party and management systems were 
centralized. Health care services were provided free of charge. Drugs and medical 
supplies were supported by socialist countries, in particular the former USSR, Vietnam 
and China. Some hospitals got sufficient (or more than enough in some areas) support 
for hospital services while others did not. 
:4t that time, we got an ambulance from the former USSR and a lot of medidnes 
from China, the former USSR and Vietn;Jm. We wefCI frightened by the many large 
packs of medicines ... thefCI were too much. We wefCI not able to use them all. ' 
(PVD6) 
' ... support was not adequate. SofTJe patients had to buy drugs at drug StofCIS 
outside the hospital when those items wefCI not available in the hospital. '(PVDS) 
Secondly, since 1986, the government adopted a policy of the New Economic 
Mechanism. It moved economic activity away from a central command system towards 
a market-based approach. The private sector was allowed to have an active role in the 
socio-economic development of the country. There was a paradigm shift from a 
subsistence economy to a government-regulated market economy. In the meantime, 
the provinces became Increasingly responsible for raising revenue for the various 
services they prOVided, such as health and schooling (Evans 2002). As a by-product of 
economic reform, the Ministry of Health endorsed the National Drug Policy in March 
1993 (Paphassarang et al. 1995). The context of the new government direction on the 
market economy and diminishing assistance from comrade countries resulted in 
insufficient drug supplies and government budget constraints. 
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'Between 1985 and 1995, drugs from donations and government could only cover 
3-4 months a year and, the rest of the time, patients had to buy drugs outside the 
hospital. '(PVD1). 
subsequently, the concept of a cost-recovery system in terms of a 'Revolving Drug 
Fund' (RDF) was adopted. It was influenced by international contexts such as Health 
for All, the Bamako initiative, as well as other support e.g., financial support in 1994 
from the Nippon Foundation (known as Sasakawa) through UNICEF Lao PDR and 
technical support from an independent consultan t of WHO Lao PDR (PMK22). Many 
policy makers and providers considered that the RDF was the first step towards 
establishing a cost-recovery system in the Lao health system. The RDF had shifted the 
practice of buying drugs from outside the hospital to inside the hospital and had 
benefits for patients and public health facilities: patients could conveniently buy drugs 
while public health facilities earned money and had reduced financial constraints. The 
RDFs were established in public facilities at different starting points from facility to 
facility. 
'Drugs were inadequate especially IV infusion. Patients had to buy outside the 
hospital. It was a vel}' difficult situation in particular at night So we had initially 
created a 'drug fund' in the hospital in 1990 by collecting money from health staff. 
It was set up by us according to our own ability. We got an idea from tour studies 
in Vientiane Capital and Thailand. It was like a cooperative system. '(PVD9) 
'Patients started paying for drugs in the hospital around 1987-1988. We got some 
amount of financial support from 'Primary Health Care Project' and we borrowed 
30 USD (or 300,000 kip) from the District Bank in order to establish a 'Revolving 
Drug Fund' for the hospital and 4 health centres. '(PVD11) 
Nevertheless, almost all providers complained about the negative effects of economic 
reform which promoted the self-reliance system. Public health facilities were forced to 
rely on their own financial management capacities and had to solve difficulties 
themselves while government ensured staff salaries. 
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'We got a lot of complaints from patients. We explained to them, everyday, that 
the RDF was not 'selling drugs~ Unlike selling-buying in the market, it was a public 
service and was not profitable. Its main purpose was for 'replenishment~ Patients 
paid for drugs and then the next patient could have drugs as well. We had to think 
of how to explain this to the patients ourselves: no-one helped us~ (PVD10) 
Even though the government had a policy direction of providing free care to patients 
during 1986-1995, patients still had to contribute to the health system in at least one 
of the following ways; (1) buying drugs outside public facilities, (2) paying user fees for 
drugs in public facilities through a RDF, (3) providing a non-cas h contribution, e.g. 
villagers gave 21 kg of rice every month to the health staff instead of salary paid by 
the government (PMK3) and sometimes villagers contributed timber and labour for 
constructing public health facilities (6 PMK and 1 PVD). This led to an easy acceptance 
of Decree 52 PM in 1995. When it was endorsed and had been Implemented, nobody 
in the health sector spoke explicitly against the policy. 
194 
CHAPTER 7 USER FEE AND EXEMPTION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
7.3.2 The content of the user fee and exemption policy (Decree 52 PM) 
The national policy on user fees and exemptions was officially endorsed on 26 June 
1995 by the Prime Minister (Lao PDR 1995). It has been widely known as Decree 52 
PM, indicating its place in the sequence of officially endorsed decrees in Lao PDR. 
Decree 52 PM was published in Lao (Appendix IV), but not in English. An unofficial 
English translation has been done by the researcher for the purpose of this study only 
(Appendix V). 
No section in the decree described its overall objective and the specific purpose of 
raising user fees in public health care facilities. No definition of user fees was provided. 
Some items of service and levels of provider were specifically liable for charges. 
Guidelines for using revenue generated from user fees were briefly described. The 
policy recognized that some groups should be exempted from paying user fees 
(government employees' spouse & children, pensioners, students, monks and the poor 
or the low income groups). However, neither eligibility criteria nor guidelines for 
identifying the poor or the low income groups were indicated, just an attestation 
affirmed by an authorized person. Facilities that had provided exemptions would 
receive subsidization by the government. Details are shown in table 7.2. 
Apart from Decree 52 PM, the Ministry of Health launched an instruction for 
implementation of the policy which is Instruction 2635 MOH, approved by the Ministry 
of Health on 12 December 1995 (MOH 1995). Document review reveals that the 
contents of Instruction 2635 MOH almost exactly repeated Decree 52 PM. There were 
no further indications of the criteria to be used for identifying the poor. 
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Table 7.2 Main contents of Decree 52 PM 
Topic Contents of Decree 52 PM 
Objective of the decree Not specified 
--Deftnition-··ofuserfee--·-·_·- Not defined 
Promulgation of the 
policy 
Article 15: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
were responsible for promulgation of this policy and distributing direction 
on implementation to health facilities, Provincial Health Office, Department 
of Labour and Social Welfare at Provincial level and grassroots. 
------~--~~~--Items of services liable Article 6: There were seven items In central hospitals, provincial hospitals 
for charges and district hospitals [1. medical records and other documents, 2. supplies, 
3. laboratory, radiology and other diagnostics, 4. medicine,S. medical 
appliances, 6. curative cost (surgery, rehabilitation, acupuncture), 7. room 
and board] 
Article 8: user charges at health centre exclude charges for diagnostics and 
admission. Only a charge for medicine is permitted 
- Th--e--us-e- o--=f=--r-ev- e-n-u-e---- Article 14. 20% of the revenue from items 3 and 6 shall be remitted to 
generated from user general revenue of the government. The rest of the revenue can be used 
fees by hospitals at their discretion, and if the revenue Is Inadequate, the 
Exemptions from 
paying user fees 
Who has to pay user 
government will subsidize accordingly. 
Article 1: Government employees and pensioners are entitled to free care. 
Hospitals are reimbursed by the Social Security Department, Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare (MOLSW) on a fee for service basis. 
Article 2: Government employees' spouses and children are entitled to free 
care. 
Article 3: Students, monks and the poor or the low Income groups are 
exempt from user fees. 
Article 4. Citizens who are not covered by Article 1, 2 or 3, must pay in full 
fees themselves. 
- Exemption-Stor the--- Article 10. For a low income person, the hospital can accept affirmation by 
poor: how to identify MOLSW, Social Welfare Provincial Office or the village head. 
the poor 
Subsidization for the 
exemptions 
Article 13: The Ministry of Finance will allocate budget to subsidize 
hospitals who give free care to government employees' spouses and 
children (Article 2) and students, monks and the poor (Article 3). The 
Ministry of Health will propose the annual budget to the Ministry of 
Finance. 
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7.4 The user fee and exemption policy (Decree 52 PM) in practice 
7.4.1 Promulgation of Decree 52 PM 
Five policy makers in MOH (PMK1, 2, 7, 12 and 13) who were directly involved in the 
policy formulation and implementation in 1995 described the promulgation process. 
The Decree 52 PM document was introduced to representatives of Provincial Health 
Offices throughout the country ina meeting at VTE capital. This was a regular meeting 
of the Provincial Health Officers and Decree 52 PM was an additional agenda item, not 
the main focus of the meeting. There was no particular meeting or specific channel or 
specific budget su pport for the promulgation of Decree 52 PM, which was common for 
any decree. Generally, the most relevant ministry to the Decree would promulgate by 
distributing (verbally and/or document) to provincial levels and then further expanding 
to district levels and then spreading out to village levels and finally to people. 
The question of how the facilities got to know about Decree 52 PM was asked to all 
persons who held high position in public health facilities at provincial and district levels. 
All of them had been working in public health facilities since before 1995. All 
interviewees confirmed that neither training nor a particular meeting had been 
arranged for promulgating the policy. They all had heard about Decree 52 and received 
the document at a meeting at the provincial level, except interviewees of one district 
hospital (PVD7) who had heard about the decree but had never seen the document. 
Both of them said the director of the district health office might have the document. 
This coincided with the PVDll view that only the most senior person in the health 
facility would see the document. Many practitioners might know the words 'Siakail and 
'Sor Siakailln Lao or 'user charge' and 'exemptions' but would not understand the 
details. The majority of interviewees at district level said that they could receive 
information about Decree 52 from two channels; the provincial hea Ith office and the 
local governors. Interviewees were not asked about Instruction 2635. Interviewees 
from two facilities (PVD2 and PVD5) spontaneously mentioned it. They complained that 
they had had to find this instruction themselves and it was no clearer than Decree 52. 
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All interviewees at district level, except PVD7, had promulgated the policy by 
intermittently informing health centres, VHV and/or village heads. However, most of 
the interviewees thought that the audiences might not unders tand for a number of 
reasons such as: there were too many issues to talk about ina meeting and Decree 52 
PM might be not a major concern from the village heads' point of view. However, staff 
of one district hospital believed that people understood more or less because some 
patients had requested exemptions from the hospital by showing attestation affirmed 
by the village head. 
'We informed village heads but only from a quick reading of headings and main 
topiCS, not in detail because there were too many urgent issues for one meeting. 
In addition, village heads would focus on the high priority issues related to their 
routine life. We could not guarantee that the village heads would inform villagers. 
Even if the village heads had informed their members, I was not sure that the 
villagers would understand it Some health staff still had not known about it or 
understood it until today. '(PVD6) 
The same question of knowing about Decree 52 PM was put to the head of 14 health 
centres (PVD13, 14 and 15). About half of them had been working in public health 
facilities since before 1995. All of them had heard about user fees and exemptions but 
had never seen the document of the decree and did not know any details about it, 
except one of them who had worked in the district health office before moving to the 
health centre. He understood and could explain the main content of the decree. 
Furthermore, all of them said they had not informed village heads or villagers about 
the exemptions policy. 
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7.4.2 Expectation and implementation of Decree 52 PM 
All policy makers in MOH and providers perceived that Decree 52 was a legal 
framework on user fees functioning in public health facilities in particular on the 
implementation of the RDF. They had foreseen that Decree 52 PM would facilitate 
provision of health services by public health providers. 
'The most important aspect of the decree was that public hospitals could maintain 
and extend public services. It would yield positive results for the bottom level and 
central levels. '(PMK5). 
It was practical and useful for the RDF. It was like a guarantee to the private drug 
companies when we signed contract with them in order to receive drugs into RDF 
stock and pay them later. '(PVD2) 
Policy makers in MOH were concerned about problems of Implementation at health 
facilities. They expected that each facility would be self-reliant or 'Khum Ton-Eang'ln 
Lao. At the same time, providers at provincial and district levels also believed that they 
had to be self-reliant. Importantly, they perceived self-reliance was necessary not only 
for the implementation of Decree 52 PM but also for all other Issues e.g., hospital 
administration and financial management, which will be discussed In a later section. All 
of them said they had had to interpret, implement and monitor the decree and solve all 
problems themselves. 
'We had to carry it out according to our own perception and understanding 
without any darification or explanation from anyone. '(PVD6) 
'We had neither guidance nor training; we had to solve problems ourselves. We 
listened to complaints (rom patients and tried to find solutions every three 
months. '(PVD10) 
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7.4.3 Fee schedule 
It was clearly indicated in the decree that user fees would be charged for seven items 
of services in hospitals but only charges for medicines were permitted in health 
centres. However, neither a standard fee structure nor any guideline for setting up or 
updating fees was included even in Instruction 2635 MOH, except that for medicines 
by the RDF rule - mark up at 25% of the buying price at all levels. Respondents in 
health facilities (PVD 2-3, 5-12) consistently provided practical features of fees as 
follows; 
• All interviewees perceived that 'the fee schedule was not universal and there 
was no standard fee level'. It depended on the individual hospital. 
• Fees were set by staff who were directly involved in that service, e.g. a 
laboratory department would be in charge of setting fees for laboratory tests. 
• Fee levels had been influenced by many factors including: cost of Ingredients, 
transportation costs, inflation rate (which had an indirect effect on Ingredient 
costs and transportation costs) and acceptability to people. BaSically, every 
hospital com pared its own fees to other hospitals both at the same level and 
higher levels. 
• There was no regular timetable for updating fees. It depended very much on 
the economic situation and the feasibility of implementation. 
• According to government regulation, any fee schedule needed approval by a 
local governor before implementation. In practice, the local government rarely 
intervened on the fee level or made an objection to the fee level proposed by 
the hospital. 
• In some cases, hospitals made an adjustment after implementation of the fee 
level due to a long list of grievances by patients and/or staff, for example: 
'The charge for admission was set at 0.8 USD (or 8,000 kip) per night in 2005 
when we operated an in-patient ward in a new building. We never charged 
for an admission before because we had very old facilities (in-patient ward in 
an old wooden building). Many people could not accept the fee rate: there 
were a lot of complaints to our staff and then two or three months later we 
reduced the fee to 0.5 USD (or 5,000 kip) per night '(PVD9) 
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The practice described above resulted in a wide ra nge of fee levels for the same 
service among the same level of health facilities as shown in table 7.3 and table 7.4. 
Table 7.3 Fee schedules of seven district hospitals in SVK Province 
PVD6 PVD7 PVD8 PVD9 PVD10 PVDll 
OP registration 0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 
IP Nursing document 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Drug mark up 20% 15-20% 30% 25% 20% 20-25% 
Malaria film 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Complete blood 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.5 
count 
Blood grouping 0.5 NA 0.4 0.7 0.35 0.5 
Stool exam (KOPA) 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 
x-ray NA NA Small 2.5 NA 3 2.0-2.5 
large 3.0 
Ultra-sonogram 3.2 NA 3 2.5 NA 2 
IP admission-normal 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 
bed 
IP admission-Special 2.5 NA 1 4 NA 0.7-1.0 
room 
ANC per visit 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.8 
EPI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Data as of June 2006 
Currency In USD (1 USD approximately 10,000 Kip) 
NA means the service Is not available In the health faCility. 
Table 7.4 Fee schedules of nine health centres In SVK Province 
Health centre (HC) HCl HC2 HC3 HC4 HC5 HC6 HC7 HC8 
OP registration 0 0 0.2** 0 0 0 0 0 
IP Nursing 0.3 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
document 
Drug 20% 25-30%* 30% 20% 30% 20% 30% 30% 
Malaria film 0.5 0.5 0.15 0 NA NA NA NA 
Stool exam (KOPA) 0.5 0.5 0.15 NA NA NA NA NA 
Normal bed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ANC 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0 
EPI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Data as of June 2006 
Currency in USD (1 USD approximately 10,000 Kip) 
NA means the service Is not available In the health faCility. 
PVD12 
0 
0.5 
25% 
0.5 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
NA 
NA 
0 
NA 
0.7 
0 
HC9 
0 
NA 
30% 
NA 
NA 
0 
0.1 
0 
HCl and HC2 were In Phine DIstrict (the poor district) and HC3-HC9 were In APT district 
(the non-poor district). 
* Drug prices In HC2 were charged at a higher margin than HCl In the same district 
because It was for salary of two health volunteers In the health centre. 
** OP registration was charged to patients outside the catchment area of health 
centre. 
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7.4.4 Role and profile of revenue generated from user fees In providers 
Secondary financial data from all hospitals in SVK Province (1 provincial hospital and 14 
district hospitals) were retrieved from the Financial Department of SVK Provincial 
Health Office (PVD4). Evidence showed that revenues generated from user fees were a 
major source of income in the provinCial hospital at an average of 65% of total hospital 
revenues during the fiscal years 2001-2005 (table 7.5) and about one third of total 
revenues in all 14 district hospitals during the fiscal years 2001-2005 (table 7.6). 
Table 7.5 Revenue of SVK Provincial Hospital by sources of revenue 
Fiscal year 
Revenue sources 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001-05 
1. Government budget 28% 26% 24% 26% 28% 26% 
2. Generated from 
user fees 65% 59% 72% 60% 68% 65% 
3. Donors 7% 15% 5% 15% 4% 9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
USD 301(445 458(997 560(727 672(185 586(659 2(5801014 
According to sub-analysis by poor and non-poor districts (table 7.6), on average per 
hospital, a district hospital in the non-poor districts not only got higher total 
government subsidy but also had more capacity to raise user fees than those in the 
poor districts. The district hospitals in poor districts had a lower proportion of revenue 
from user fees (16% of total revenue) than those in non-poor districts (34%). 
Furthermore, the proportion of user fees to total hospital revenue in provincial and 
district hospitals was more or less stable during the five year period. 
Using population as of September 2005, the government subsidized the district 
hospitals in the poor districts (0.66 USD per person per year) slightly more than those 
in the non-poor districts (0.55 USD per person per year). However, this higher 
government subsidy at 0.10 USD per person in 2005 could not compens ate for a lower 
capacity to raise fees per person in the poor district. The poor district hospitals still had 
lower revenue at 0.74 USD per person In 2005 than those In the non-poor at 0.77 USD 
per person in 2005. 
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Table 7.6 Revenue of district hospitals in SVK Province by sources of 
revenue 
Fiscal ~ear 
Revenue sources 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001-05 
All 14 district hospitals 
1. Government budget 64% 69% 66% 70% 75% 69% 
2. Generated from user fees 36% 31% 34% 30% 25% 31% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total amount {million UsD} 0.2579 0.3343 0.4038 0.4568 0.5479 2.0007 
District hospitals in poor 
districts (4 district hospitals) 
1. Government budget 87% 82% 77% 86% 89% 84% 
2. Generated from user fees 13% 18% 23% 14% 11% 16% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total amount (million UsD) 0.0425 0.0672 0.0779 0.0793 0.1063 0.3731 
Mean per poor district 
hospital 
• government budget per 
hospital (million US D) 0.0092 0.0137 0.0151 0.0169 0.0237 0.0786 
• User fees per hospital 
(million USD) 
.-.. 
_ .. QJ>.Q 14. .... _~Q931 .... _ 0. 0944 0.0029 0.0028 0.0146 
Mean per capita in 2005 
• government budget per 
person (USD) 0.66 
• User fees ~er ~erson (USD} 0.08 
District hospitals in non-poor 
districts (10 district hospitals) 
1. Government budget 60% 66% 63% 66% 71% 66% 
2. Generated from user fees 40% 34% 37% 34% 29% 34% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Tgtal ~l!1ounJ (mWlolLlJSD) _____ 0.2154 0.2671 0.3259 0.3775 0.4417 1.6276 
Mean per non-poor district 
hospital 
• government budget per 
0.0176 hospital (million US D) 0.0128 0.0206 0.0250 0.0314 0.1075 
• User fees per hospital 
(!l1illion US D) __ 0.Q087. ._0.0091._9·0PO .. _ .. 0...:.QJ27 ... _ 0.0127 __ 0.055~_. 
Mean per capita in 2005 
• government budget per 
person (USD) 0.55 
• User fees Qer Qerson (USD} 0.22 
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The same data set showed that, in the fiscal year 2005, revenue from medicines was 
the major part of revenue generated from user fees in both provi ncial hospital (36% of 
total revenue from user fees) and particularly district hospitals (82%) in SVK Province 
(figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1 Profile of revenue from user fees in provincial and 14 district 
hospitals, SVK Province, fiscal year 2005 
Profile of revenue from user fees of 
Provincial Hospital, Savannakhet Province, 
fiscal year 2005 
Treatment 
se rvices, 
32% 
Medical 
supplie s, 
20% 
Pat ie nt 
n, 
Medicines, 
36% 
Profile of revenue from user fees of aU 14 
District Hospitals, Savannakhet Province, 
fiscal year 2005 
Othe rs, 4% 
Treatment 
se rvices, 1% 
Room and 
board, 2% 
Patie nt 
registration, 
6% 
Medical 
supplies, 5% 
Medic ines, 
82% 
However, this secondary data needs to be used cautiously. Interviews of providers 
revealed that one district hospital kept three sets of the financial reports particularly 
concerned with revenue from user fees: one was for submitting to the local governor 
(showing only 8 items of user fees for calculating the obligatory remittan ce), one was 
for sending to the PHD (showing only items specified in a designed template) and one 
was for internal hospital use. Another main concern was the accuracy of the data, Staff 
of one district hospital said they did not have a copy of the financial report. 
Sometimes, they just provided financial figures by phone when the PHD needed it (see 
detail on reporting system). Quantifying the magnitude of data error needed intricate 
and subtle approaches which had not been planned in this study. 
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7.4.5 Use of revenue generated from user fees 
According to the Article 14 of Decree 52 PM, twenty per cent of the revenue from user 
fees for laboratory, radiology & other diagnosis and curative services must be remitted 
to the general revenue of the government and the rest of the revenue can be used by 
hospitals at their discretion, and if the revenue is inadequate, the government will 
subsidize as necessary. Revenue from user fees would be divided into two pots. Firstly, 
there was to be a remittance to the local governor (known as 'Panta Ngobpaman'in 
Lao or called 'obligatory remittance' in this study). Secondly, there was to be a fund 
retained in the hospital for its own expenditure. 
A) Obligatory rem ittance 
Different interpretations 
Even though the decree clearly Indicated the policy on obligatory remittances (20% of 
revenue from laboratory, radiology & other diagnosis and curative services), each 
policy maker and provider had his own interpretations which were dissimilar. It Is 
important to mention here that, according to the Decree, there was no definition of 
'user fee' or 'Ray Rub Vichakatf in Lao. Each policy maker and provider had a different 
understanding and interpretation of Ray Rub Vichakan which led to different 
interpretations of obligatory remittances. Two main interpretations of Ray Rub 
Vichakan were identified. One induded all revenue generated from services related to 
patients (including RDF) and non-patients e.g. rent of a meeting room (PVD8), while 
the other excluded non-patient related services e.g. rent for motorcycle park (PVD5). 
Interpretations of the boundaries of RDF were also different. Small-sized district 
hospitals (PVD6, 7 and 10) interpreted RDF to include medicine and all reagents for 
laboratory and x-ray services whereas some large-sized district hospitals (PVD8, 9 and 
11) and hospitals at provincial level (PVD2, 3 and 5) assumed that RDF was for 
medicines only and reagents for laboratory and radiology were separately managed. 
This very much depended on the size of the hospital and the complexity of hospital 
management. Because of different definitions of Ray Rub Vichakan, three policy 
makers (PMK2, 13 and 18) explained that hospitals had to remit 20% of revenue 
generated from all sources of Ray Rub Vichakan, including RDF to the government 
whereas three other policy makers (PMK1, 8 and 11) understood that revenue from 
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RDF need not be remitted to local government and that all revenue from RDF could be 
retained by the hospital. In addition, one policy maker (PMK2) strongly disagreed with 
the notion of 20% of the revenue. He argued that it should be 20% of the profit of the 
revenue generated from user fees. 
Diversity of practice on obligatory remittance 
The different interpretations of Ray Rub Vichakan and boundaries of RDF as mentioned 
above, together with differences in the financial arrangements established by each 
local governor, resulted in considerable variation in the practice of diverting revenue 
from user fees to local coffers. Secondary data from two hospitals at provincial level 
(PVD2 and 5) and 11 district hospitals (excluding incomplete data from 3 district 
hospitals) showed that obligatory remittances were, on average, 1-5% of the total 
revenue from user fees including the RDF, during the fiscal years 2001-2005 (table 
7.7). District hospitals had twice as high a rate of obligatory remittances as hospitals at 
provincial level. Excluding revenue from the RDF from the calculation, obligatory 
remittance of 11 district hospitals wa s about 25% of the total user fee revenue from 
other services. 
Based on interviews at two hospitals at provincial level and seven district hospitals, 
three features of obligatory remittances among these hospitals were identified. Firstly, 
the two provincial hospitals had to remit 20% of revenue generated from 3 speciRed 
Items negotiated with the provincial governor (detail in table 7.7). Secondly, one 
district hospital had to remit 20% of proRt of all revenue generated from 8 items 
approved by the local governor. However, the target amount of obligatory remittances 
had been set for the hospital at the beginning of the fiscal year. Thirdly, six district 
hospitals had to remit a Rxed amount from the user fee revenue which had been 
assigned by the local governors at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
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Table 7.7 Obligatory remittances compared to total user fee revenues in the 
hospital and features of obligatory remittances 
Secondary data from flnandal report Interview data on features of 
obligatory remittance In the FY 2005 
Mean (samples: two hospitals at provincial 
Code 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001-05 level and seven district hospitals) 
PVD2 2.1 % 2.0% 1.4% 1.0% NA 1.2% 20% of ~ from 3 Items 
(19.4) (24.1) (34.2) (33.8) (27.9) (registration, room & board and 
health check-up) 
PVD5 2.3% 2.2% 1.8% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 20% of ~ from 3 Items 
(4.4) (5.9) (7.4) (9.1) (9.1) (7.2) (ultrasound, echocardlogram and 
room & board) 
11 DH 2.3% 4.5% 5.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% One DH: 20% of J2CQflt from 8 Items 
(1.4) (4.7) (7.8) (6.4) (6.4) (5.3) (medicines, laboratory, x-ray, 
ultrasound, registration, 
rehabilitation, dental services and 
oxygen) 
Six DH: a fixed amount at the 
beginning of the year 
Note: Figure in brackets shows amount of obligatory remittances in 1,000 USD. 
All seven district hospitals consistently gave the same information on their practices. 
The district governor had been allocated a target of total obligatory remittances by the 
provincial governor and then the district governor assigned a target to each sector in 
the district according to its earning capacity. The target was agreed at a meeting of all 
sectors with the district governor at the beginning of the fiscal year. The target was 
negotiated during the meeting and could be adjusted during the year. 
Pragmatically, the district hospitals used whatever sources of cash they had available 
in the hospital to remit to the district governors when they reached the deadline. It 
could be cash from either user fee revenue including RDF or gover nment budget that 
the hospital received through the district governors. 
'The hospital received a govemment budget for administration of about 12 million 
kip from the district govemor but 3-4 days later we gave 9 million kip back to the 
district govemor. '(PVD6), 
8 A hospital received the government budget through the local governor with two main separate 
Items. One was for salary and other benefits for hospital staff which was based on number and 
position of health staff In the budget plan. Another was for hospital administration e.g., 
electricity, water supply, gasoline, stationery costs etc. Some of It had been allocated from the 
government through the local government and some of It relied on the financial capacity of the 
local government. If so, how much the hospital would receive entirely depended on the final 
decision at the local level. Hospitals might or might not receive payment as Indicated In the 
budget plan. 
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'We told the district governor to deduct the government budget from an allocation 
for hospital administration, and send us the balance. Sometimes the budget was 
not enough and we had to pay costs from whatever monies we could find. ' 
(PVD8), 
'We used all types of cash we had The district governor was not concerned about 
the source of money. '(PVD9) 
From the experience of seven district hospitals during the last three years (the fiscal 
years 2003-2005) shown in table 7.8, four district hospitals had reached or nearly 
reached the target of the obligatory remittance. One could only reach ha If of the 
target. One could remit 15% over the target. One had experience of both success and 
failure to reach the target. Neither of those who failed to reach the target had 
experienced a negative impact from the district governor to the hospital, though 
several providers thought failure might lead to delayed payment of the government 
budget. In fact on the contrary, one provider had had good experience of re-
distribution of resources among sectors, which had high and low capacity to charge the 
user fees, in the district. Interestingly, two district hospitals had received appreciation 
certificates issued by the district governors wh en they exceeded the target. One had 
received a cash bonus regardless of target achievement. This was because the whole 
district had contributed beyond the target of the province so had received a bonus 
from the province. The director of the hospital said this system was applied to all 
levels; national, provincial and district levels. 
208 
CHAPTER 7 USER FEE AND EXEMPTION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Table 7.8 Achievement of remitting the obligatory remittance and attitude of 
hospital staff 
Experiences in the FY 
2003-2005 
PVD6 2003-2005: reach the 
target 
---_ .. - -.-. -_. -_. --
Implication in the FY 2003-
2005 
Nothing 
PVD7 2003-2005: reach the Nothing 
. __ ....... _ .._ ....... _ ...... _._ ... _ .. ~9.Eg~L ...... _ ...... _ .. ____ ._ ... _ ... _._._ .. _ 
............ M. • ... "" •••• 
PVD8 
PVD9 
2003-2005: under the 
target (by half) 
No criticism from the 
district governor and 
colleagues in the meeting 
and no negative 
implication, in contrast 
hospital got more 
administration budget. The 
district government re-
allocated money among 
rich and poor sectors In the 
district. 
'2003~2005:- reachthe -_.- Nothing 
target 
.-_ ... -.. __ ... _._ ......... _, .. __ . .,,, ... _ ..... _." ..... - -_._- - _ ... -
--PVDi6---"'--'--2003-=2-00S: reach the Nothing 
Attitude on what impact 
if the target could not be 
reached 
1. Verbal criticism in the 
meeting 
2. Delay In paying 
government budget of 
. salary and administration . 
No significant Impact 
No significant Impact, 
just questions in the 
meeting 
1. Delay In paying 
government budget, In 
particular for 
administration 
No significant impact 
._ target _____ _ 
- P-V-D-1-1-- 2003-2005: over the Received appreciation No Significant Impact 
PVD12 
target (by 15%) certificate from the district 
government 
. 2003;ioos:under the- - 2005: Received bonus In No significant Impact 
target (by half) cash because the district 
could contribute over the 
target to the province 
2004: over the target 2004: Received three 
(by 13%) things in return; (1) bonus 
in cash about 12% of the 
target (2) applause in the 
meeting (3) appreciation 
certificate from the district 
governor 
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Attitudes of providers towards remitting obligatorv remittance and its future 
Based on interviews, all policy makers and providers at provincial and district levels 
expressed strong views on the obligation of the people to the government. They 
believed that every individual person and organization who earns income must pay a 
part of their revenue to the government treasury like tax. It was very common to hear 
from interviewees that 'everyone who has income must remit to the government. It is 
the policy of the government 'Staff of the financial department of one district hospital 
gave a clear explanation that 'This obligatory remittance was to help the district 
governor. We (organization) like others who earn more should pay more tax in order to 
help each other to construct the country. It is our duty to remit to the government 
whatever amount of money we have. '(PVDll) 
All interviewees in each sampled hospital in SVK Province (1 provincial hospital and 7 
district hospitals), except one district hospital, said that In theory they disagree with a 
concept of obligatory remittance All of them were asked on willi ngness to continue it In 
practice. The majority (5/8 hospitals) said that, in practice, they would prefer to 
continue the obligatory remittance. They were concerned about the limitations of 
government revenue, and conformity among all sectors in the district. In addition, 
some suggested remitting a percentage, not a fixed amount at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. A minority of them (3/8 hospitals) would prefer not to continue the 
obligatory remittance due to the financial constraints of the hospital. Their opinions 
and suggestions are displayed in table 7.9 below. 
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Table 7.9 Quotations from providers in SVK Province according to obligatory 
remittance in the future 
Opinion 
Preferred 
to continue 
the 
obligatory 
remittance 
Did not 
prefer to 
continue 
the 
obligatory 
remittance 
Hospitals Quotation 
PVD6 'To continue remitting but as much as we can: other organizations 
(poor DH) which had less revenue still had to remit so we must remit our 
_._. _____ J.~velJ..l!§...J!~ we/~_~. __ .... __ ... _. ___ . ___ . __ ... ___ ._ . ___ ... _____ ... _ 
PVD7 'All sectors had to remit. We also would like to remit to the district 
(poor DH) governor as much as we could. If we could not reach the targeli 
__ . . ..__ ....... ____ ... ___ J:Y~_i.'!s..L£llf!l.!./!LeQ th.em .. :.. __ . __ . __ . __ . __ ... ____ .. __ ._ .. _._ .. _ .. _______ .___ ._ ._._. ___ .. _. 
PVD8 'Concerning the reality of the hospital situation, it would be 
(poor DH) practical to remit revenue to around 10-20% of profit from 
treatment services, excluding RDF otherwise the hospital could not 
survive. If we abolish an obligatory remittance, the government 
could not survive. ' 
PVD9 
(non-poor 
DH) 
'Obligatory remittance is a responsibility to the country. We would 
prefer to remit revenue as a percentage, not a fixed amount It 
should be 3% of revenue from laboratory and ultrasound only, and 
exclude RDF and other revenues. ' PVD12--··--··----- 'fiaveioremTi even'a -ti;wamouni.· Others-joihersectors In the- -" 
(non-poor district] had to remit It could not be waived for some and not 
DH) others otherwise it would not be fair and might distort a universal 
system of the country. , 
PVDS 'Currently, the hospital has been facing serious budget constraints. 
(PH) We owed private drug companies about 500 million kip. The 
_. __ ._._._ ... __ . __ .. ________ gqL!.erfJ.,!!~nLs.l!9.j!/if..llf:'!R. £!.5.L .. IJ.E.t t.q. /~yy ,!!o,!_e.Y (Pm.. .'!s:.:_ _._ ..... 
PVD10 'This amount that we had to remit to the district governor should 
(non-poor be retained in the hospital for our own use. It was not even 
DH) enough for the administration of the hospital and it would only 
represent a tiny proportion of the district governor's Income 
PVDll 
(non-poor 
DH) 
___ ~().!!JRiJLf!!l..J!l otfter_ se~.tQ!'§.: _ .. _ .._ ... _ _ .. _._ .. _ _..__ __ .. _ ___ _ _ _. 
'Reality, we should not remit revenue from the hospital to the 
government People come to see a doctor when they get sick: they 
do not come for business or trading purposes like in a market. 
Patients have to sacrifice their household money for treatment 
The government should levy high tax from the entertainment 
sector e.q., restaurants, bars, pubs. ' 
Note: PH stands for provincial hospital 
Poor DH stands for district hospital in po or district. 
Non-poor DH stands for district hospital in non -poor district. 
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Magnitude of obligatory remittance compared to total revenue of the government 
Secondary data from the Department of State Treasury Protection, Ministry of Fina nce 
illustrates that obligatory remittances raised from fees by the Ministry of Health 
(including from public health facilities (user fees in hospitals) and non-public health 
facilities (fees from drug stores and private clinic» was a small part of total 
administration fees of the country in the FY 2005 and 2006. Two major sources of 
Administration Fees (or obligatory remittance) throughout the country in the FY2005 
were from Ministry of Communications, Transports, Posts and Construction (66.7% of 
total administration fees) and National University (19.7%). Another three sectors 
contributed around 10% of total administration fees including Ministry of Health 
(3.5%), Ministry of Education (3.2%) and Ministry of SCience, Technology and 
Environment (3.2%). The other ten sectors contributed less than 4% of total 
administration fees. 
Another set of secondary data were retrieved from the Official Gazette of Lao PDR. It 
showed that the government had major revenue from three main sources: tax, 
customs and state owned asset management. It clearly highlight ed that the 
administration fees (or obligatory remittances) were a tiny part of the total revenue of 
the government at around 1% over the five year period (the FY 2001 - 2005). 
calculating the evidence in the FY 2005, obligatory remittances raised from the 
Ministry of Health was only 0.04% of the total revenue of the government. 
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B) Use of the retained revenye in the hospital 
Decree 52 PM indicated that apart from obligatory remittances, the rest of the user fee 
revenue can be retained and used by the hospital at their discreti on, and if the revenue 
is inadequate, the government will subsidize them. Secondary data obtained from SVK 
Provincial Health Office (PVD4) was used again. There were some data missing from 
three district hospitals and they were excluded from the analysis. In total, secondary 
data of one provincial hospital and 11 district hospitals were analyzed. Interestingly, 
obligatory remittances and exemptions were recorded as items of expenditure from 
user fee revenue but these two items were a small proportion of the total expense. 
Details of the exemptions will be given in the next section. It was clear that the major 
part of the user fee revenue during the fiscal years 2001-2005 was spent on 
replenishing medicines in the RDF at both provincial and district hospitals (50% and 
68% of total expense from user fee revenue, accordingly). The second largest Item 
was 'other purposes'. Interview data revealed that 'other' meant hospital administrative 
costs which were beyond the capacity of the government budget. The third largest 
item was replenishing medical su pplies or reagents for laboratory and x-ray 
departments. Details are shown in table 7.10. 
'Last year, the actual administrative cost was 20 million kip (mostly for electriCity 
and piped water bills) but the government could subsidize only 2 million kip and 
the rest was paid by user fee revenue. We also used it for the maintenance of 
equipment e.g. computers and cars. Another major item was salary for some staff, 
mostly nurses, who did not receive a salary from the government They were 
waiting for an official position as government employees. The hospital desperately 
needed more nurses but the government did not have positions for them. '(PVDS) 
'Most of the costs were electricity bills for which we got less subsidization from the 
government budget. Last year, we decided to subsidize house rental for our staff 
and we also used this money. '(PVD9) 
'We used it for things which we could not get from the government budget such 
as buying new computers and a laptop which you see here. We could not expect 
to get them from the government budget. '(PVDll) 
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Table 7.10 Expenses from user fee revenue of one provincial hospital and 11 
district hospitals, SVK Province during the fiscal years 2001-2005 
Mean 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001-2005 
A provincial hospital 
Replenishing medicines 42% 43% 58% 53% 53% 50% 
Replenishing medical 
Supplies 23% 21% 14% 7% 7% 14% 
Exemptions 4% 2% 3% 6% 6% 4% 
Obligation Remittance 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Others 29% 32% 24% 32% 32% 30% 
Total amount (million USD) 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.32 
11 DIstrict hospitals 
Replenishing medicines 68% 70% 75% 63% 63% 68% 
Replenishing medical 
Supplies 7% 4% 5% 7% 7% 6% 
exemptions 4% 8% 3% 3% 3% 4% 
Obligation Remittance 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 
Others 18% 14% 13% 22% 22% 18% 
Total amount (million USDl 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 
Source of data: Financial Department of SVK Provincial Health Office 
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7.4.6 Exemptions from paying user fees 
Regarding Decree S2 PM, government employees plus their dependents (spouse and 
children) and pensioners were entitled to free care, which meant they had to pay 
themselves first and subsequently be reimbursed from 'the Government Employee 
Scheme'. It was a contributory scheme of 6% of government employees' salary 
covering S benefits (health, maternity, disability, pension and death) (Lao PDR 1993). 
Decree S2 PM aims to ensure that students, monks and the poor or the low income 
groups would be exempted from paying user fees. The procedure indicated that the 
status of 'low income' or 'the poor' could be verified by an attestation affirmed by the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MOLSW), Social Welfare Office at provincial or 
district level or the village head. The policy was also designed to subsidize hospitals 
which provided free care to low income people by stating that the Ministry of Health 
shall propose its annual budget to the Ministry of Finance. It meant that subsidizing for 
the poor, students and monks would be financed through the general tax system of 
the government. 
On the basis of Decree S2 PM, many groups of people were entitled to get exemptions 
from paying user fees at public health facilities. However, this study only focused on 
the poor or the low income people. This section presents four key issues regarding the 
exemptions. Firstly, data on exemptions in the financial report as shown in table 7.10 
above indicate that providers had given some exemptions to patients. It needed to be 
shown whether the poor got the benefit or not and if they did, how much. Qualitative 
data were used to reveal the details behind these exemptions figures. Secondly, 
common practices of providers were identified to show how providers coped with 
exempting the poor while dealing with serious budget constraints. Thirdly, attitudes of 
providers and policy makers towards exempting the poor are presented. The final Issue 
presents attitudes of providers and policy makers towards subsidization from the 
government budget for exemptions. 
A) Exemptions data 
Referring to table 7.10 above, the provincial hospital and 11 district hospitals had 
provided exemptions or 'Nayobuy to patients at 4% of total expenditure paid from 
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user fee revenue during the fiscal years 2001-2005. The total amount of exemptions 
accounted for 66,400 USD in the provincial hospital and 17,000 USD in 11 district 
hospitals in a 5 year period. However, no more detail could be found i.e. , how many 
patients, which groups (government employees, penSioners, students, monks or the 
poor), for which items of user fees (e.g., medicine, laboratory, x-ray, registration or 
room & board) and for what types of services (OP or IP). Therefore, this quantitative 
data could inform only the magnitude of total exemptions in the hospital but it could 
not specify beneficiaries from this exemptions. It could not show that th e poor 
benefited from exemptions. 
Interviews with providers, including secondary data on exemptions in the fiscal year 
2005, provided very important information which showed the complexity of figures in 
the item called 'exemptions' or 'Nayobuy in the financial report from the financial 
department of SVK Provincial Health Office (PVD4). Mostly, figures of exemptions 
recorded in the report of SVK Provincial Health Office were not the same as the figures 
at hospital level. The magnitude of difference between these two data sets was very 
wide ranging; two hospitals showed a difference of less than 10%, two hospitals 
showed a difference of more than 10% and three hospitals showed totally opposing 
data (table 7.11). Interview data could explain some these differences i.e., 
'The figure we gave to the PHO was an earmarked amount of the RDF that could 
pay for exemptions plus value of medicines when health staff were carrying out 
the outreach programme. These medicines were for both people and health staff 
themselves. '(PVD7), \ 
'It consisted of three parts. One was bad debts from the previous year which was 
approximately 2 million kip. The second was laboratory, ultrasound, registration 
and room & board costs which are provided free of charge to our staff. The final 
part was exemptions for the patients. However, it could not identify which patients 
(poor or non-poor) had received exemptions. '(PVDll) 
'Normally, in our report exemptions were divided into eight sub-items; the poor, 
monks, penSioners, oxygen, transport, laboratory mainly for our staff and their 
dependents, voluntary contribution to the meeting of the district and others. For 
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example, last year fees for laboratory selVices for the staff was 1,099,000 kip, 
exemptions for monks was 97,500 kip, money transferred from the hospital to 
RDF was 1,616,000 kip and we also added 5 million kip we got from the district 
governor [cash bonus due to the district achieving the target for the obligatory 
remittance as mentioned above] into this item. '(PVD12) 
The items different hospitals included in 'exemptions' varied considerably from hospital 
to hospital. Whenever unpaid user fees or debt lists were written off (normally on a 
yearly basis); it would be put into 'exemptions' item. Therefore, the figures of 'the 
exemptions' given by some hospitals did not represent actual exemptions for the 
patient, but included bad debts. In addition, the data recording systems of all the 
hospitals could not distinguish betwee n exemptions for government employees and 
general patients. 
Table 7.11 Difference of exemptions figure between PHO financial report 
and report at hospital level 
Exemptions In the fiscal year 2005 (USD) 
Data from financial 
report of Provincial 
Health Office 
Hospital [a] 
PVD5 22,170 
PVD6 325 
PVD7 300 
PVD8 0 
PVD9 104 
PVD10 0 
PVDll 514 
PVD12 300 
Data at hospital level 
[b] 
21,473 
NA 
o 
471 
109 
513 
434 
772 
Note: NA: report not available in hospital. 
DIV/O: could not be calculated. 
Difference 
[a]-[b] 
698 
300 
-471 
-5 
-513 
80 
-472 
[a]/[b] 
1.03 
NA 
DIV/O 
0.00 
0.95 
0.00 
1.18 
0.39 
Fortunately, the other two hospitals at provincial level (PVD2 and PVD3) had good data 
bases on exemptions. This was because they were large sized hospitals and the 
exemptions amount per year was quite large e.g., In the fiscal year 2005, 84,000 USD 
in PVD2 and 43,000 USD in PVD3. They had their own report format and style. Figure 
7.2 (a) and (b) demonstrates that government employees (in particular hospital staff) 
were the group who benefited most from exemptions (although they are entitled to be 
reimbursed for user fees -from the Government Employee Scheme). Other people got 
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benefit from exemptions in the region of 23-33% of the total exemptions amount in 
PVD2 during the fiscal years 2002-2005 and 12-17% in PVD3 during the same period. 
However, the same problem occurred: the data could not be quantified as 'do the poor 
benefit or not' and 'if yes the poor benefit, how much do they get'. It could only be 
concluded that the poor might get an exemption at a lower level than government 
employees who had better socio-economic status. The interview data in the next 
section will give a better understanding of why the poor get less exemption. 
Figure 7.2 Exemptions provided to different group of patients during the 
fiscal years 2002-2005 
Figure 7.2 (a) PVD2 
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B) providers' practjces on exemoting the poor 
PVD7 and PVD15 (consisting of seven health centres) indicated that they had not 
provided any exemptions to any patients during the previous fiscal year (2005). Other 
providers gave similar inform ation, that provision of exem ptions to the poor wa s very 
small. All providers had a common pattern of practice that, initially, health staff would 
apply a strategy of 'PukRadom'to all patients. It meant that health staff powerfully 
persuaded patients to pay user fees whether or not patients had an attestation 
affirmed by the village head. 
~ .. after establishing, if patients could pay, we urged them to pay'(PVD8) 
'Although they had attestations, we would convince them to pay. The user fees 
were not much. We said, could you pay as much as you have? '(PVD12) 
' ... oh! we try very hard to convince them, with every way we can. We did 
'pukradom' and we gave them reasons such as everybody needed free service, 
otherwise how could the hospital survive, how was the next patient to be 
treated? '(PVD3). 
Apart from that health staff also observed the characteristics, clothes and expression of 
patients and their relatives as well as enquiring about their assets such as livestock or 
other relatives. Two common options could be offered to patients: one was to delay 
payment to the provider and another was to reduce the quantity of medicine to be 
equal to the amount of money in the patients' pocket at the point of service and 
request the patient to buy the rest later either from the hospital or a private drug 
store. The former option was extremely popular in practice while the latter option was 
rarely applied. 
A delay in payment to providers at provincial level was mostly offered to patients who 
were admitted to hospital, rarely for out-patients. Delayed payment at district and 
village level would mostly be provided to patients familiar to health staff and then the 
health staff could ask for re-payment. All the interviewed health centres and district 
hospitals had similar experiences that the majority of patients could pay at the point of 
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service, a few patients delayed payment and fewer still received exemptions. For 
patients with delayed payment, most of them could repay the providers anyway. 
Providers had experience of few bad debts compared to total debts. 
'Mostly we were repaid by patients, around 80-90% of the total debt Only a tiny 
part was bad debt If we were not familiar with them (patients), there was more 
likely to be bad debt '(PVD6) 
'For patients who delayed payment, usually they could repay within 2-3 months 
and we got almost 100%. They repaid when they came to the hospital next time. 
Or when we went to the village for child immunization, we asked them to repay. ' 
(PVD7), 
'Almost all the debt could be repaid. This was because we knew the patients and 
could ask for repayment We sent a list of them to the village head. '(PVD8) 
C) Attitudes towards exemptions 
All the interviewed providers (both in SVK Province and Vientiane capital) had the 
same perception that patients had brought money to pay user fees at the point of 
service. 
'They intentionally came to the hospita~ they had obtained money already. , 
(PVDll) 
'Almost all of them had had cash in their pocket before coming to the hospital' 
(PVD8), 
'Almost all patients had money even monks and students. If monks and 
students could pay, they paid. '(PVD3) 
It was learnt from the households' perception tha t exemptions were for 'the destitute', 
but not for 'the poor'. The definition of who was entitled to exemptions was asked from 
the providers and policy makers. All the interviewed providers In SVK Province had the 
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same perception as that of the households. They perceived that patients were poor, 
not destitute. The poor still had money to some extent unlike the destitute who had 
nothing; neither assets nor relatives. Exemptions were for 'the destitute' and delaying 
payment was for 'the poor'. 
'We offered to let them delay payment because they were not destitute. They 
had no cash but they had assets and would be able raise cash if they were 
given time. '(PVD6) 
'cash-exemptions was for the destitute; time-exemptions was for the poor' 
(PVD14). 
'Exemptions were for the destitute person who was ultra-poor and suffering 
badly; it was not for the poor who still had something, even if their life was 
hard, and the poor would be allowed to delay payment '(PVD8). 
However, seven policy makers who were asked about 'the destitute' and 'the poor' and 
providers in Vientiane capital believed that 'the destitute' was similar to 'the poo r' and 
they could be used interchangeably. 'The destitute' was just a technical term and more 
likely to be used by a highly educated person whereas 'the poor' was commonly used 
by all. 
Another key concern of policy makers and providers was that there were no clear 
criteria to identify the low income person. Some of them did not trust in an attestation 
issued from a village head. As a result, providers felt reluctant to exempt. 
~ .. attestation from the village head, it could not guarantee the truth whether 
they were really poor or if they were familiar with the village head '(PVD10) 
'No one could know who was poor. The govemment also did not prove who 
was poor. They just knew how many poor there were. '(PVDll) 
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P) Subsidization for exemptions 
All the interviewed hospitals at provincial and district levels complained that the 
hospital did not receive financial support for the exemptions and at the same time the 
hospital had budg et constraints. 
'If we strictly followed Decree 52 PM (automatically gave exemptions to monks 
and students), how could we remit the obligatory remittance to the district 
governor?'(PVD8) 
'We needed to earn money for the administrative costs of the hospital as well 
as the obligatory remittance. If someone could adequately support us, we 
would like to not charge patients. '(PVD10) 
'Having a framework to practise exemptions but no budget support .. how we 
could do it? We also had to financially survive by ourselves'(PVD7) 
Meanwhile, policy makers understood the real situation that the hospitals had been 
confronting. In practice, there was no specific government budget item for subsidizing 
the exemptions. The Ministry of Health never requested budget for exemptions from 
the Ministry of Finance. It was because of limitations in developing a rigorous budget 
plan. 
'Never set a budget plan for exemptions because there are no clear cut criteria 
for identifying the poor. It is difficult to defend the budget from MOF and the 
National Assembly. If we had a detailed plan and criteria who are the poor we 
could know how many poor there are. It is possible to get a budget depending 
on (1) the fiscal capacity of government and (2) the proposal of the MOH which 
must be valid, reliable and robust. '(PMK4). 
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7.4.7 Monitoring and reporting system 
There was no official monitoring system on user fees and exemptions from a central 
organization. One reason was the decentralized management system. The MOH did not 
have direct authorization to command a monitoring system including data collection. 
'It was difficult to gather data from district and provincial hospitals because 
they directly reported to the local governor. The MOH only monitored the 
central hospitals in VTE capita/. '(PMK4 who was directly in charge of planning 
and budgeting of M OH). 
The interview with PVD4, the head of the financial department of SVK Provincial Health 
Office (PHO) revealed that, in theory, every hospital should submit a financial report to 
the PHO on a quarterly and yearly basis on user fees and exemptions. In practice, 
submission of financial reports from the hospitals was erratic and the quality of the 
report was not good. There was a great variation in the management of financial 
reports on user fees and exemptions among hospitals. Two main variations were a 
template of the reports and the way of producing and keeping the reports. Regarding a 
template, although the PHO had circulated a template of the report on user fees and 
exemptions to all hospitals, in practice, some hospitals used the template but others 
did not. Reports of user fees and exemptions from central hospitals (PVD2 and PVD3) 
had more details than provincial and district hospitals. Central hospitals had created 
their own style of reporting because of the huge amount of user fees and exemptions. 
In contrast, the report of the government budget was found to be in a consistent 
template with regular submission of quarterly and annual reports for all hospital levels; 
central, provincial and district. 
In terms of producing and keeping the reports, some hospitals had poor management 
but some (1 provincial hospital and 2/7 district hospitals) had very well organized filing 
system for the reports. 
All the interviewed hospitals perceived that financial reporting requirements on user 
fees and exemptions caused a massive amount of paper work for the hospital. None of 
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them, except PVD8, saw any benefit to the reports. On the other hand, one district 
hospital (PVDll) expressed that the reports might have a negative effect on the 
hospitals regarding the percentage of obligatory remittance from user fees. 
~ . .it was just a report. It never had had any impact on us as we never received 
any subsidization even though we paid for the poor. '(PVD10) 
'How much we paid for the exemptions is our own responsibility. It doesn't matter 
how much we reported as we never got any subsidy. And we know that 
govemment has not enough money. '(PVDS) 
Another district hospital (PVD8) had recently implemented a new project similar to the 
Equity Fund supported by the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC). The observation 
and the interviews indicated that the health staff of PVD8 had enthusiastically 
developed a systematic financial reporting system in order to reimburse exemptions 
from the BeT project. 
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7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Discussion of methodology 
policy makers 
At the beginning of the fieldwork, some current policy makers in the Ministry of Hea Ith 
were purposively selected. Each interviewee was asked at the end of the interview 
process to recommend other current or ex-policy makers who were heavily involved in 
the user fee and exemption policy. Finally, a total of 22 policy makers were interviewed 
by the research team. This technique to obtain sampled interviewees has advantages 
and disadvantages. It was an effective technique to ensure that the most relevant 
policy makers were not missed. The most relevant policy makers were repeatedly 
mentioned by many respondents. It also provided an Indicator of potential interviewees 
in the study. The research team verified with the respondents whether the study had 
covered all relevant interviewees. However, this technique was based on the personal 
relationship between the initial res pondent and another nominated person and could 
cause problems of selection bias. The study therefore prevented selection bias by 
verifying the list of interviewees with many other interviewees. Since Lao POR is a 
compact society, especially in the health sector, it was possible to verify the coverage 
of all relevant policy makers. 
Public health care providers 
Although the number of sampled public providers was limited, a total of 29 settings in 
SVK Province and VTE capital, they consisted of all levels of public health facilities in 
Lao POR, namely health centre, district hospital, provincial hospital and central 
hospital. Health centres and district hospitals were in both poor and non -poor districts. 
Obtaining information on public health providers benefited from synergies between 
quantitative and qualitative methods. For each provider, the fieldwork started with 
quantitative followed by qualitative research. Requesting financial reports from the 
most recent fiscal year of each health facility was an effective approach as it did not 
require any effort from either the providers or the researcher. Every provider had 
already produced the report. In cases where the hospital had produced a 
comprehensive report like a hospital annual report, the providers were keen to discuss 
it. This helped establish familiarity with the respondents before conducting the 
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interviews. The reports also provided an overview of the provider and some useful data 
for the interviews such as the history of the hospital, a list of the directors, mission and 
vision of the hospital, human and financial resources and output of the hospital. Some 
reports presented an analysis of user fees and exemptions, constraints on the 
implementation of exemptions and the way forward to overcome those constraints. 
Since the figures in financial reports normally fail to inform all dimensions of the data 
or rationale, qualitative data can fill this gap. It was also a good approach for cross 
checking the validity and reliability of information between the two sources. 
There might have been problems of respondent bias during the fieldwork with publ ic 
providers in SVK Province because the RA was a member of the health staff in SVK 
provincial health office. The same problem happened in VTE capital because the 
research team consisted of health staff of the National Institute of Public Health 
(NIOPH). The respondents perceived the research team to be high level professional 
health staff and might have been more likely to intensify their problems, especially 
insufficiency of hospital revenue to cover expenditures and financial burden due to 
exemptions. However, these could be cross-checked with the secondary data. It was 
apparent that potential bias of the respondents had no effect on financial information. 
The findings from the interviews were used to explain the secondary data, and to 
assess customa ry practice a nd attitudes of the providers. 
226 
CHAPTER 7 USER FEE AND EXEMPTION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
7.5.2 Overview of findings 
The national policy on user fees and exemptions was legally endorsed on 26 June 1995 
(known as Decree 52 PM). However, a cost-recovery system, in particular the 
Revolving Drug Fund (RDF), had been implemented in the Lao health system before 
the establishing of the policy. 
Decree 52 PM had clearly highlighted topics about user fees as well as exemptions to 
many groups of people including the poor or the low income group (prime concern of 
this study) using an attestation affirmed by government offices or village heads but did 
not mention the criteria for identifying the poor. The policy had spelled out an intention 
to subsidize the providers who provided exemptions. 
The policy had been promulgated from national level to providers and village levels 
through routine chann els. Some health staff did not clearly understand the policy even 
now. The user fee revenue was Significant for public providers especially for provincial 
hospitals (two thirds of the total hospital revenues) and district hospitals (one third of 
the total hospital revenue). Providers mainly spent it for replenishing medicines in the 
RDF, reagents for diagnostic tools and other necessities beyond the government 
budget capacity, for insta nce buying computers, maintenance of equipment and 
incentives for hospital staff. A small part of user fee revenue (1-5% of the total 
revenue from user fees) was remitted to local coffers which was called 'obligatory 
remittances' with a very different practice among hospitals. In practice, providers 
remitted 'obligatory remittance' to local governors from whatever source of money 
hospitals could find. 
The study focused on exemptions for only the poor or the low income group. 
Exemptions shown in the financial reports were a small portion (4% of the total 
expenditure from user fee revenue). Government employees especially hospital staff 
got most benefit from exemptions while other people got less benefit. The existing 
financial report template was unable to display whether the poor got exemptions or 
not. It is believed that the poor rarely got exemptions as long as health staff preferred 
to 'Pukradom'or strongly convince all patients to pay user fees even if patients had an 
attestation from village heads. It was very popular in all providers that the payment to 
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providers could be delayed when patients had inadequate cash at point of service. 
Most providers could get repayment because they allowed delayed payment to patients 
whom they were familiar with and could as k for repayment. Providers in SVK Province 
perceived that exemptions was for 'the destitute' (who had neither assets nor 
relatives), not for 'the poor' (who still had either assets or relatives). The providers had 
covered the cost of exemptions by their own revenue; no government budget subsi dy 
for exemptions was given to hospitals. There was a great variation in the template of 
reports of user fees and exemptions, unlike reports of the government budget which 
had a single template with quarterly and annually submissions. Each hospital had its 
own understanding and modification of reporting user fees and exemptions which led 
to inaccurate figures of exemptions to the patients. 
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7.5.3 Discussion of findings 
Lao PDR gained independence in 1975 and adopted a New Economy Approach and 
decentralization in 1986. User fees in the Lao health system have officially been in 
operation nationwide since 1995 but, in fact, a cost recovery system was developed 
locally before 1995 across the country, with little or no direction from the centre. This 
was similar to cambodia and Uganda where the user fees system emerged during a 
period of conflict and weak central government (Russell et al. 1997). It created a 
diversity of fee practices among health service facilities and among districts. Unlike 
Zambia, a country with a more planned process of decentralization, districts had a 
greater role than the state in setting fees and using revenue. In contrast In Thailand, 
where the government was more centralized, the national policy on user fees was well 
developed a nd each province functioned under a central policy framework. 
Although the objective of the user fees system was not explicitly stated in Decree 52 
PM, it was commonly mentioned by the respondents that, because of diminishing of 
support and government budget constraints, it was designed to generate revenue in 
public health care facilities. The other three goals of user fees; (1) to Improve 
efficiency of the health system, (2) to Improve quality of he alth services and (3) to 
promote equity of access to health care services, were never stated as the policy goals 
and hardly mentioned by the interviewees. Some interviewees mentioned Improvl ng 
availability of medicines in hospitals. This implied that the objective of user fees was a 
narrow emphasis by the policy makers and providers on raising revenue for the health 
system, in particular in light of the difficult economic conditions of the country. This 
might have resulted from lack of awareness on the part of some policy makers of the 
need for the policy to promote access for the poor and to Improve quality of care. 
In principle, health financing inequity due to geographic and economic cond Itlons could 
be addressed by pooling a proportion of revenue from user fees at district, provincial 
or central level (within the Ministry of Health) and then redistributing pooled money to 
poorer areas where there was less capacity to raise fee revenue. However, Decree 52 
PM did not have a n objective to improve financial equity at an y level - within dl strict, 
province or across the country. Each local provider benefited directly from collected 
user fees because almost all the fee revenue could be kept and used at local level. This 
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procedure exacerbated existing financing inequities between district hospitals in the 
poor and non-poor districts as health care providers in wealthier areas could generate 
greater resources. The fee revenue that the district hospital in the poor district could 
generate was lower (at 0.08 USO per person in 2005) than the non-poor district (at 
0.22 USO per person in 2005). The government subsidized a slightly higher budget per 
capita for the poor district hospital. However, it still could not achieve financial health 
equity among everybody in the poor and non-poor districts (revenue from government 
budget plus user fees at 0.74 USO per capita in the poor district hospitals and 0.77 
USO per capita in the non-poor district hospitals in 2005). Arrangements for local 
retention of fee revenues in Lao POR yielded benefits to local providers. This was 
unlike the situation in some countries where all fee revenues reverted to the central 
Ministry of Finance so health facilities, and the health sector as a whole, did not benefit 
from collecting user fees and the health facilities, therefore, had no Incentive to collect 
user fees (Russell et al. 1997). 
In Lao POR, the total fee revenue of each district and provincial hospital wa s split 
between the local treasury (called obligatory remittances) and the collecting facility 
(called fee revenue retention). The health centre could retain 100% of the fee revenue 
and use it at the collecting health centre. The study found that practices of obligatory 
remittances and fee revenue retention widely differed among the sampled district and 
provincial hospitals in SVK province and VTE capital. The Interviewed providers and the 
participants of the two one-day workshops echoed that these practices varied greatly 
not only in SVK provi nce and VTE capital but also across the country. 
Although the obligatory remittances were around 1-5% of the total fee revenues, 
which was minor compared to fee retention at local facilities, the interviewed providers 
had different preferences as to whether obligatory remittances to the local coffers 
should be conti nued or not. The SVK provincial hos pita I and 2 non-poor district 
hospitals preferred to stop obligatory remittances but 3 poor and 2 non-poor district 
hospitals) preferred to continue. The issue in terms of obligatory remittances practice 
was the providers' belief that It was a duty of the organization to support the 
government regardless of the economic status of the hospital. It was comparable to 
the villagers' belief that it was a duty of the patient to pay user fees to public health 
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providers. This evidence reflects the willingness of the Lao community to comply with 
government regulation. 
Each health facility could plan its own use of retained fees. The local health facilities 
had responsibility for making decisions on fee revenue. The policy makers at central 
and provincial levels did not provide financial management skills, systems or 
procedures for effective use of fee revenues to the local providers. The national policy 
did not have a policy framework or guidelines on the effective use of such revenue to 
facilitate its use for preventive and promotlona I activities or cost-effective inte rventions 
which could have a positive impa ct on the poor. 
Practice for reporting systems of revenue and expenditure of user fees greatly differed 
among health providers. The national policy design did not present any systematic 
evaluation of user fee policy impact. It was questionable whether the implementation 
of user fees policy in the Lao health system had contributed to health service 
improvements at the community level and for the health system as a whole. 
According to Decree 52 PM, user fee exemptions for services essential to public health 
have not been recognized in the Lao health system. In practice, a few essential 
services were provided free of charge e.g. child immunization and treatment for TB, 
leprosy and AIDS patients. Basic services for pregnancy like ANC (antenatal care) were 
overlooked by policy makers. Pregnant women had to pay user fees for each ANC visit 
and even for a book to record pregnancy progress. 
The Lao government, in principle, recognized the need to exempt those unable to pay 
user fees to public health providers. Decree 52 PM advocated exemptions applying 
characteristic targeting (civil servants and their family, students, monks) and direct 
targeting (the poor or low income group). Neither geographical targeting nor ethnic 
targeting of exemptions were applied in Decree 52 PM, even though it has been 
commonly accepted throughout the country for many years (before 1995) that Lao 
Sung (high land) was the most disadvantaged group, while Lao Theung (mid land) was 
less disadvantaged than Lao Sung and Lao Lum (low land) was the least 
disadvantaged group of all. The terms of Decree 52 PM have made it impossible to 
ensure exemptions for women's and children's health services, despite the challenge of 
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achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for child mortality reduction and 
improved maternal health. 
Decree 52 PM clearly advocated that civil servants and their family and the poor or the 
low income group were protected from paying user fees from their own pockets. In 
practice, Lao PDR showed a similar pattern of exemption to other countries studied by 
Creese and Kutzin (1995) and Russell et al. (1997). Fee exemption systems actually 
worked against equity goals - exemptions were provided to civil servants, in particular 
to health workers in the hospitals but the poor were urged to pay user fees. 
In terms of exempting the poor, Decree 52 PM did not Indicate clear eligibility criteria 
or guidelines on identifying the poor or low income group. The policy makers gave 
significant power to the village head by issuing tem porary attestation of the poor on 
the understanding that the village head was familiar with the viii agers. Many 
interviewed hospitals thought that this increased the subjectivity and InconSistency of 
exemption implementation across the community and it created distrust between the 
provider and the patient. The study found that the providers scrutinized the poor with 
their own judgment even if the poor had attestation. It meant that, In practice, the 
poor were entitled to exemption but the public health care providers had a powerful 
final say in whether they would provide exemption to the poor or not. 
In addition, the central Ministry of Health was not concerned about the amount of 
money public providers were spending on exemptions. The policy makers at central 
level transferred financial responsibility to the local health providers whilst user fees 
were important revenue for the local providers. This resulted in reluctance on the part 
of the health workers to provide exemption to the poor and th ey urged the poor to pay 
user fees. 
A policy of user fee and exemption for the poor were endorsed in the same national 
decree, Decree 52 PM. However, all villagers clearly understood and strongly accepted 
the concept of paying user fees to public health providers but almost no villagers had 
known about the policy of exempting the poor. This indicated that all levels of policy 
makers and public health providers deliberately promoted user fee policy to the 
villagers and at the same time had no intention of promoting the policy of exemption 
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to the villagers. When the public health providers explained the exemption policy to the 
villagers they established their own criteria for granting exem ption - the exemptions 
were for 'the destitute'. This specific criterion was conveyed to the village head and the 
VHV and understood by households. This resulted in, at local leve I, a limited num ber of 
eligible people for the exemptions. However, the policy makers understood differently 
- the poor and the destitute meant the same and could be used interchangeably which 
meant that the poor/the destitute were entitled to exemptions. 
Based on this evidence and attitudes of providers, the interpretation of the research is 
that the actions of not promoting the exemption policy and setting restrictive criteria 
for granting exemptions were strategies of the local public health providers to keep the 
amounts of exemption as low as possible. Reasons for this included the majority of 
people in the comm unity were poor, there was no govern me nt budget to support the 
exemptions, the providers had financial Incentives to save fee revenue as much as 
poSSible, and the providers had an incentive to provide exemptions to civil servants, in 
particular health staff. 
The findings showed that the Ministry of Health did not have clear practical guidelines 
on user fees and exemptions, never requested a budget for subsidizing providers to 
exempt the poor, never supervised local providers and did not have a monitoring and 
evaluation system on exemptions. This evidence demonstrated that the Ministry of 
Health lacked capacity to translate exemption policy into practice - It did not have the 
administrative and financial capacity to implement the exemption policy. 
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7.6 Concluding remarks 
In terms of policy itself, Decree 52 PM was not designed to provide any benefit to the 
poor or to improve the health system as a whole. The policy makers lacked both 
technical and financial capacity to tran slate policy into practice. With limited support 
from the government budget, the public health providers had economic ince ntives to 
collect fee revenue but no motivation to grant exemptions to the poor. 
The circumstances of the user fees policy design and implementation led to limited 
success - only the objective of raising revenue for the collecting health facilities had 
been accomplished. 
The findings from this chapter together with the previous chapter clearly Indicate that 
the exemption policy was ineffectively implemented. The policy was not able to protect 
the poor from payi ng user fees at public health providers which led some households 
to experience catastrophic health expenditure and some of these were impoverished. 
Based on the evidence, lessons on improving the exemption policy can be identified. 
The policy itself ought to be comprehensible. In order to protect the poor, the policy 
objectives could be explicitly specified in terms of protecting the poor from 
impoverish ment due to health ex penditure and promoting equity between th e poor and 
non-poor groups. The target groups of the policy must be clearly indicated. In 
resource-poor settings where the majority of people are poor, there must be several 
groups of the needy. Priority setting can be applied to prioritize limited resource to the 
most needy or seek more funding support from various possible sources to meet 
budget requirements. Overall domestic and international contexts must be taken into 
account, for example the policy direction of the poverty eradication project for the 
entire country and the MDGs. This will not only avoid duplication among several 
projects but also maximize the benefits of different projects being run either by groups 
of people, areas or interventions. The best approach is that the policy is able to serve 
both domestic and international purposes. Nevertheless, if this is not possible, it is 
important that the main concerns of the country are prioritized. 
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Success of policy implementation requires adequate qualified health workers and 
sufficient resources. Comprehensive and practical procedures will facilitate the 
implementation process. Lao experience shows that even in difficult circumstances 
(limited human and financial resources), the public health care facilities achieved some 
policy success e.g. child immunization coverage in SPX village (chapter 4). Another 
advantage in the Lao context was that the health facilities and villagers were more 
likely to act in accordance with government regulation. 
It can be concluded that in order to achieve better protectio n of the poor from health 
expenditure in Lao POR, policy design is the most critical point. Experience of the 
implementation of the user fee and exemption policy has identified weaknesses and 
they can be prevented. The strength of the existing health delivery system and 
advantages of a strong social network in the community could be employed in order to 
accelerate the accomplishment of the policy goals. 
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CHAPTER 8 
IMPROVING HEALTH FINANCIAL PROTECTION OF THE POOR 
8.1 Introduction 
User fees have been implemented in the Lao health system for many years. The 
government had the intentio n to protect the poor or the low income group from paying 
user fees at public health providers by issuing the national policy on user fees and 
exemption, through the edict known as Decree 52 PM, since 26 June 1995. 
The main findings from the household side clearly highlighted that some households 
were faced with catastrophic hea Ith expenditure and, subsequently, had negative 
consequences from health expenditure. They managed financial crisis themselves with 
many coping mechanisms which mainly drew on the social network within the villag e. 
The households believed that exemption was impossible. Almost no villager had known 
about exemptions. The few who knew understood that exemption was for the 
destitute, not for the poor. They inferred that they were the poor and not eligible for 
the exemption. 
Apart from the households' perspective, the obstacles of exemptions Implementation 
from providers' and policy makers' perspectives were found. The public health facilities 
faced budget constraints and they mainly relied on user fee revenues. Small amounts 
of fee revenue were used for exemptions from which the poor got less benefit but 
government employees, especially hospital staff, got most benefit. The government did 
not have a specific budget line to subsidize providers who had given exemptions to 
patients. At national level, there was a lack of guidelines for exemption 
implementation, in particular on the procedure of identifying the poor. This led to 
different understanding of who was eligible to exemptions between the policy makers 
and providers/households. 
The analysiS found that the national policy on exemption (Decree 52 PM) did not 
provide benefit to the poor or the low income group. In the meantime, households 
were faced with paying us er fees at public health providers which could result in 
household catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment. Therefore, there is an 
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urgent need for the government to improve the design and implementation of 
exemptions or reform the policy on subsidizing health care for the poor. 
This chapter aims to respond to the last objective of the study (objective 6: To analyse 
the financial implications of alternative protection mechanisms and to identify policy 
implications for pro-poor financing and provide policy recommendations on improved 
ways of protecting the poor). It brings together knowledge from literature reviews, 
evidence from the household study and information on the current situation in Lao PDR 
to structure a modelling exercise to explore the financial feasibility of funding 
protection for the poor. Simple financial modelling is used to identify a preferred 
financing model and its im plications. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the methods used to propose 
financing model options and to estimate their financial implications. Section 3 presents 
a framework for the analysis in this chapter. Section 4 provides main findings from the 
analysis of each element which are used as input for constructing possible financing 
models. The preferred financing model and its possible implications are presented at 
the end of the section. An overview of the analysis, discussion and concluding remarks 
are at the end of the chapter. 
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8.2 Methodology 
In order to achieve the aims of the chapter, several sources of data were employed for 
the analysis as follows; 
• Document review on the most recent government regulation and law related to 
health insurance in Lao PDR 
• Statistical reports e.g. Lao Official Gazettes for revenue and expenditure of the 
government, National Health Account from WHO website, services reports of 
the hospitals in SVK province. This information was analysed to input Into the 
policy options and analyse their Implications. 
• Findings from FGDs of the two villages in the non-poor district on issues of 
better protecting the poor and features of housholds' contribution. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, guidelines for discussion on these 
issues were developed during the fieldwork in the non-poor district (after 
finishing the fieldwork of the two villages in the poor district). So these 
questions were discussed only in the two villages of the non-poor district. It 
was not feasible to go back to the two villages of the poor district and re-start 
FOGs again. 
• Results of two one-day workshops involving policy makers and providers in VTE 
capital were also used. 
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8.3 Framework for the analysis 
In order to recommend options for health financial protection to the poor, firstly, It is 
necessary to draw an outline for the analysis to cover all key elements of health 
financing. Many frameworks in health care reform arena have been presented by many 
experts. One framework originally established by Reinhardt in 1989 which was 
suggested as the simplest framework (Mills 2000) was adopted in this study. The 
framework is adequate for analysis in this chapter. The framework presents four key 
actors namely (A) the population who pay for and get health services, (B) the financial 
intermediaries or purchasers who collect funds and pay providers, (C) the providers 
who deliver health services to the patients and at the same time get financial support 
from the purchasers and/or the patients and (D) the government who regulates the 
system (figure 8.1). 
Figure 8.1 Four key actors and functions of health system 
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Source: modified from Reinhardt 1989 cited In Mills 2000 
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The framework provides an overall basis for consideration of the financing model. 
Together with the objectives of the chapter, the structure of the analysis is set in 
subsequent sections as follows: 
• Current context of health insurance schemes in Lao PDR: It is important to 
understand the recent direction of health financing in the Lao health system in 
order to provide reasonable policy options. 
• Who is 'the poor? It is a vital question to be answered in order to estimate the 
numbers of target population to be used to calculate the financial requirement. 
• Provider payment method. The provider payment method is a determinant of 
the financial implications in the models. Different provider payment methods 
result in different financial implications. It is essential to decide which method 
will be applied. 
• financial requirement to serve the poor. Total financial requirement is 
estimated and compared to the budget of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in order to see the magnitude of total financial 
requirement. 
• Possible financing sources to support the poor. Several financing sources; 
namely government budget, household contribution and grants, are analysed 
for their potential to support the poor. At the end of this sub-section a possible 
financing model is recommended. 
• Protecting the less-poor. The analysis found a good opportunity to expand 
health financial risk protection for not only the poor but also the less-poor. 
• Health financial protection for all. A financing model to protect the poor and 
less-poor, and incorporating two current schemes (for government employees 
and private workers) is developed in order to summarize the whole picture for 
all Laotians. 
• Prerequisite for the development and implementation of the financing model. 
The analysis in this chapter explores the financial feasibility of financial 
protection for the poor. This analysiS has to make a number of assumptions 
with respect to other conditions and constraints which need to be tolerably 
supportive, despite the complex context identified in the earlier chapters. 
Therefore, this last section will clarify assumptions on conditions and 
constraints which are prerequisites for effective financial policy implementation. 
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It also discusses the way forward on the testing of the financing model and 
further development of financing policy. 
8.4 The analysis 
8.4.1 Current context of health insurance scheme In Lao PDR 
The study recognizes the government's intention to protect the poor as stipulated in 
the most recent law, namely Curative Law endorsed on 9 November 2005 and signed 
by the President. The law clearly highlig hts that the objective is to assure that all 
family members and communities would generally and equitably receive quality health 
services. A total of six health insurance funds are explicitly stated in the article 45-50 
which cover different groups of Lao people and have different sources of finance (table 
8.1). 
As of 2006, three public health insurance schemes have operated in Lao PDR; 
Government Employee Scheme (GES), Social Health Insurance Scheme (SHI) and 
Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI). GESis a compulsory contributory scheme 
with contributors contributing 6% of their salary which is automa tically transferred to 
the fund every month. The scheme provides health benefits to the contributors and 
their spouse and dependants which are estimated at 786,800 persons 9 • SHlis a 
compulsory contributory scheme which is funded by employees and employers' 
contribution at 4.5% and 5% of employees' salary, respectively. The scheme provides 
health benefits to contributors and spouse and dependants. Even though it is a 
compulsory scheme, its coverage is still low. The total beneficiaries in July 2006 were 
56,211 persons10 compared to the total estimation of 141,272 private employees and 
state owned enterprise employeesll • It is hope that the scheme will be extended to 
cover all potential contributors. The majority of the Lao population (more than 70%) 
9 Estimated at 14% of total 5.62 million population: Consultant report 14-18 February 2005. 
10 Avlva Ron September 2006. Consultant paper: ILO/ISSA/AIM study on linkages between 
statutory social security scheme and community based SOCial protection mechanisms to extend 
coverage, Case study on Lao PDR. 
11 b!tp:llwww.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkoklindexlaOSOClal.htm# ftnref3 
Estimate based on figures contained In the 2005 population census - 121,786 private 
employees and 19,486 state owned enterprise employees. Total = 141,272 workers (search on 
29 June 2007) 
241 
CHAPTER 8: IMPROVING HEALTH FINANCIAL PROTEcnON OF THE POOR 
works in the informal labour sector and therefore they are excluded from the two 
formal schemes above. CBHlo is a voluntary contributory scheme which covers all 
family mem bers. It was set up in 2002 as a pilot project in some villages of three 
districts. By July 2006, five local settl ngs were operational in rural a nd semi-urban 
areas which covered only 18,829 beneficiaries. With the nature of a voluntary scheme, 
especially given monthly payment of the premium, it is quite risky for CBHI in terms of 
risk pooling and financial sustainability. A private insurance fund is indicated in the 
Curative Law, article 49, and in practice there is one profit insurance company in Lao 
PDR. This study will not discuss private health insurance because providing free health 
care to the poor is not its concern. 
'The Curative Law' declares an intention to protect the poor using' the Social Welfare 
Fund. Nevertheless, statements in the law are similar to 'the Decree 52 PM' for 
example "the poor or the low income group who has attestation from head of the 
community would be exempted from paying user fees by their own pocket but 'the 
Social Welfare Fund' wou Id pay Instead according to the regulation". But, in practice, 
by the end of the fieldwork, no action on the implementation of the Curative Law had 
been taken. Table 8.1 summarized health insurance funds according to 'the Curative 
Law' with current beneficiaries in each fund. It clearly shows that, currently, few Lao 
people are entitled to financial health risk protection and the majority of Lao people, 
including the poor, are not protected. 
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Table 8.1 Health insurance funds in Lao PDR according to 'the Curative Law' 
Curative Health Insurance Entitled people Possible Current Covered 
Law scheme sources of covered people as 
finance population % of total 
indicated in (As of July population 
the Curative 2006) 
Law 
Article 47 Government Government Mandatory 786,800 14.0% 
Employee Employees, contribution 
Scheme (GES) spouse and from 
dependants government 
emplQlees 
,-, .. _-, 
Article 48 Social Security Employees in Mandatory 56,211 1.0% 
Scheme (SSS) private sector, contribution 
spouse and from 
dependants employers 
and 
em 10 ees 
Article 46 Community Families who pay Voluntary 18,829 0.3% 
Based Health contribution to contribution 
CBHI from 
households 
Article 49 Private insurance Those who can Voluntary NA NA 
Qa~ Qremium contribution 
Article 50 Social Welfare The poor or low Contribution 
income group from 
govern ment, 
individual, 
community, 
domestic and 
International 
--2I9anlzations 
Article 51 No insurance: The rest of the Household out 4,758,160 84.7% 
pay by out-of- population of pocket 
Qocket 
Total poQulation 5,620,000 100% 
8.4.2 Who is the poor? 
The main objective of this sub-section is to suggest possible options for how best to 
target support to 'the poor'. The most important element for protecting the poor is to 
identify who is 'the poor'. In this study, 'the poor' is defined as the worst-off 
households or the needy in terms of financial risk protection. Unit of analysis is the 
household, not individual person, for two reasons. Firstly, because of the economy of 
the majority in Lao PDR; about 80% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. 
Chapter 4 showed that all 172 sa mpled households had the same occupation, rice 
farming, where everyone in the household contributed their labour even children, 
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woman and elderly. All household members would share the same basket of income or 
consumption. Secondly, the other three health insurance schemes cover contributors 
and their family. So it was justified to consider the household as the unit of analysis. 
Referring to the targeting literature (Newbrander et al. 2000), direct targeting and 
characteristic targeting by geography will be used to analyse possible options to 
identify 'the poor'. 
Characteristic targeting by age group 
Characteristic targeting by age group (elderly and children) is unlikely to be feasible or 
appropriate. It will have problems of leakage and under-coverage, covering some 
elderly and children who are not poor, and excluding some poor who are adults. 
Administrative problems are a major obstacle. At this time, birth registration has not 
been implemented and house registration and identity card have just been 
implemented in some provinces in the year 2005. They are still incomplete throughout 
the country. Furthermore, age information filled in the house registration was from 
rough guesses. 
Characteristic targeting bv geography 
According to the Lao National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strate gy - NGPES (Lao 
2004), a total of 142 districts throughout the country have been classified into three 
main groups; 47 poor districts as priority for poverty eradication, 25 poor districts but 
not the priority an d 70 non-poor districts. This is the easiest approach; no need for 
additional efforts or administrative cost to identify the poor district. In addition, the list 
of these 47 poor districts is acceptable from various organizations and people 
throughout the country, especially the policy makers and politicians. 
Nevertheless, the concern is two main weaknesses - 'leakage' and 'under-coverage'. 
There is leakage to non-poor households in the 47 poor districts particularly in urban 
areas, for instance shopkeepers in a market. Concurrently, the poor households in 
other districts, outside the 47 poor districts, may be as poor as those in the 47 poor 
districts and they are still confronted with financial risk. Another concern is that it is not 
guaranteed how often the NGPES will update the list of the 47 poor districts and/or 
revise criteria for identifying the poor households, villages and districts. The NGPES has 
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identified poor districts using criteria related to poor villages, local school, dispensary 
or pharmacy, access road and safe water. It may not be completely accurate. For 
example Vilabouli District in SVK Province has had a vast investment in gold mining by 
an Australian company who began successful production of gold and copper at the end 
of 2002. This huge project has lead to massive income for the Lao government and, 
local employment, and health care services provided by I ndependent hospital of the 
mining company. It can be argued that this district should be not In the list of poor 
districts but it is still there. It is possible that the list of poor districts might be subject 
to political favouritism and might be manipulated. For the reasons above, selection of 
all people in the 47 poor districts would not satisfactorily target the poor. 
Direct targeting (Ootion A) 
In order to prevent the problem of leakage and under-coverage, direct targeting to 
identify the poor households throughout the country is cons idered. Direct targeting or 
means testing requires information which may be time-consuming and costly. Direct 
targeting applying wealth ranking by the village committee members is possible, as 
demonstrated in the study villages. The poorest or the worst-off classified by villagers 
would not be greater than one third of the total population in the comm unity which 
matches the official figure of 32.7% poverty incidence in Lao PDR in 2003. In addition, 
at the beginning of the fieldwork (7th November 2005), the researcher interviewed a 
high level person of the Planning and Cooperation Department, SVK Provincial Office 
and found the official practice of identifying poor households as follows. In actual 
practice, the village head of each village provided information on how many 
households and specified which house holds in the village were the poorest to the staff 
of the local governor. This means that poverty incidence relied on the village head. 
After that the staff visited each poorest household specified by the village head in 
order to assess the poverty profile of the household according to the five criterion set 
in NGPES (lack of rice - less than 16 kg/person/month, lack of clothes, lack of shelter, 
insufficient income to cover the cost of medical treatment and child schooling costs). 
Thus current practice is a Iready based on village level information and investigation. 
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Geographical targeting combined with direct targeting (Option B) 
Another approach is a combination betwee n characteristic targeting by geography and 
direct targeting. The 47 poor districts are chosen and then the worst-off households 
are identified applying wealth ranking by the village commi ttee members. 
Two approaches are subsequently taken into account in the analysis - the direct 
targeting (Option A) and geographical targeting combined with direct targeting (Option 
B). Table 8.2 presents advantages, disadvantages and estimated beneficiaries of each 
approach of targeting incl uding the status quo. 
Table 8.2 Scenario of who will be identified as 'the poor' 
Option 
Status quo 
Option A 
Option B 
Not 
considered 
in the 
analysiS 
Not 
considered 
in the 
analysis 
Targeting 
Using 
attestation by 
village head 
Direct 
targeting 
Geographical 
and direct 
targeting 
Characteristic 
targeting by 
geography 
Characteristic 
targeting by 
age group 
Beneficiary 
(~eo~lel 
(very few) 
The poor throughout 
the country, about 
32.7% of total 
population 
!. 83Z,140}_' __ 
The worst-off 
households in the 47 
poor district 
(349,176) ., 
Total population In 
the 47 poor districts 
identified by NGPES 
Elderly and children 
Pro 
Cover the poor 
throughout the 
country 
This group Is the 
neediest. 
Easiest approach, 
refer to NGPES, and 
then no cost for 
Identifying the poor 
Registration 
problems 
Con 
The poor suffers 
Need efforts for 
Identifying process 
In all 142 districts 
throughout the 
country 
Need efforts for 
Identifying process 
In 47 districts, 
under-coverage of 
the worst-off 
households In non-
poor districts 
Ineffectiveness -
leakage to the non-
poor households In 
47 district and 
under-coverage of 
the poor 
households In non-
poor districts 
Leakage to non-
poor elderly and 
children and under-
coverage to adult 
who are poor 
Notes * Estimate from 5.62 million people x 32.7% poverty Incidence = 1,837,740 persons 
" Estimate the poor is about 30% of total population In 47 poor districts (1.16 min x 
0.30 = 349,176). 
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8.4.3 Provider payment method 
All three public health insurance schemes (i.e. GES, SHI and CBHI in section 8.4.1) 
have adopted the same provider payment method - a contract model with capitation, 
though capitation rates were different by scheme. GES is shifting from fee for service 
reimbursement to capitation, with a capitation rate of 65,000 kip or approximately 6.5 
USD per beneficiary per year. SHI's capitation rate is the same as GES. The CBHI 
capitation rate is 45,000 kip or approximately 4.5 USD per benefiCiary per year which is 
less than those in GES and SHI. 
In accordance with the existing three public health insurance schemes, it is justified to 
apply the same provider payment method - a contractual model with capitation, to pay 
providers who provide health services to the poor. Therefore, a capitation rate will be 
used to estimate the total financial requirement for protecting the poor in the next 
section. The capitation rate will co ver both out-patient and in-patient services, since, as 
found in the previous chapter, catastrophic health expenditure resulted from both OP 
treatment cost and admission cost. 
Even though a contractual model with capitation has limitations and is not a perfect 
provider payment method (Jegers et al 2002), it is not rationa Ie to propose a different 
method for supply side financing (e.g. fee for service, DRG - Diagnostic Related Group, 
or case based payment) from that already in existence. 
8.4.4 Financial requirements to serve the poor 
Currently, there are two capitation rates; 6.5 and 4.5 USD per beneficiary per year for 
the three public insurance schemes. Given the restriction of the government budget as 
well as other country priorities, a capitation rate at 4.5 USD per person per year is 
used and it should be acceptable to providers when compared to the current financing 
situation of the hospital - less than 1 USD per capita per year from both the 
government budget and the fee revenue as reported in table 7.6. Any new scheme 
would incur administrative cost e.g. training, promoting and im plementing including 
identifying the poor. In this study, the administrative cost was simply assumed to be 
10% of the health care costs. 
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It is assumed that health services delivered to the poor are from the existing health 
care infrastructure and human resources, ie no new investment. The estimation of 
financial requirement was based on the additional cost incurred by the poor in getting 
free care at public health facilities and administrative cost. Apart from the regular MOH 
subsidy to public providers, the additional financial requirement for serving the poor in 
option A would be 9.1 million USD per year. Option B would cost less at 1.7 million 
USD (table 8.3). In 2005, MOH received support at 5.4% of the government budget 
(Ministry of Finance 2006). When combined with the support for the poor, the MOH 
budget becomes 6.9% and 5.69% of the government budget for option A and B, 
respectively. 
Table 8.3 Financial requirements to serve the poor 
Beneflclary (people) 
Health care cost (million UsO) 
Administrative cost (million UsO) 
Total resources requirement (million US D) 
• as % of MOHP budget In 2005* 
• as % of government budget 2005* 
• as % of GOP In 2005* 
Note * Data from Lao OffiCial Gazette 2006. 
Option A: 
The poor throughout 
the country (about 
32.7% of the total 
population ) 
1,837,740 
8.3 
0.83 
9.1 
28% 
1.5% 
0.32% 
8.4.5 Financing sources to support the poor 
Option B: 
The worst-off In the 47 
poor districts 
349,176 
1.6 
0.16 
1.7 
5% 
0.29% 
0.06% 
In this section, three potential fina ncing sources (namely government budget, 
household contribution and grants or loans) to support the poor are analysed. 
yovernment budget 
During fiscal year 2001-2005, the three main sources of government revenues were 
from tax, customs and state owned asset management revenue (Ministry of Finance 
2006). Even though tax revenue is the largest proportion of the government revenue, 
it was only 7% of GOP in the fiscal year 2001 and decreased to 5% in 2005. The major 
spending from government budget was for capital investment, nearly half of total 
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government expenditure. In addition, government had to pay for debt servicing at 
about 14% of total expenditure in 2005 (Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4 Revenue and expenditure of the Lao government in fiscal year 
2001 - 2005 
Fiscal year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Po ulation~{p'ersons _. ___ ~.103 680 _~ 531L110 _5,660,~7~ 5,791,695 
GDP in real term1 
_J.mi!.ll(:m ~ipl __ .. _ ... _.. .. _. _.-l~ 7Q~,.QQ!_.J.§,39Q,OOO __ 20,307,OOO .. -11&?l,OOQ_ 28,970,.093_. 
Exchange rate1 
_(~jp'. p'er. .. ~.?PL -.. -....-.. ---._.§,.2~~-._ .. _tq,()_~6 __._... ~.9.15.§.9 ~9..,!L ...... _._._?§ .. _ .._ ... _. __ J.9,?~§_. 
GDP (million USD) 1,754 1,829 1,921 2,326 2,652 
GDP (USD per capita) 325 331 339 402 473 
Total Government 
Revenue 2 
__ (m!lt~I)-,=-,-~!n.-_-. __ .. __ .. _____ 24l... __ _ 1~6_ .. __ _ .2~? ..... _._ ..  _ .. _~Z~ .. ____ 3·HL 
Rl. Tax revenue 50% 34% 38% 37% 41 % 
~B2~·"~I!~tQrri~r~y_~n.:~e .... = .... =~=j,~~iL .. =~=24°(o ... =_ .. ~po/9 .~~-=._JJ~(9_==-~32% : 
R3. State owned asset 
_~~g~mentrevenue 
R4.0thers* 
Gov't revenue 
14% 
23% 
16% 
25% 
16% 
20% 
18% 
14% 
23% 
5% 
(USD per person) 45 44 42 48 61 
Total Gov't 
Expenditure 2 
million USD 396 358 417 394 567 
El. Labour r~lat~d _. _._. __ . ___ 19% ___ .. ...13% ._ .. _ ... ~}o/2..._. __ .. _. ___ .. )9°~ .. ___ --.-lQ% . 
~-E2'~"-program ·Q~.a.ting__ _. _ 9% __ ._~% . ___ ..J)_~/o 10%_. 9% 
.. J:_~! .-~Qi.t9.] .. ll}y.~~~!!lg,Q.L ........ - .-.. _ 58%_._ .. ....i4% .. __ .. 57°(2.... ___ . ____ 1J.~~____ 46°(q __ 
_ ..E4 . .Qi!.\J~ervldng--.----.--.-.-J. 4% . ___ .-15% .. _ .. _ 11 o/iL._. ___ ~~~ __ ~.4<yo _ 
Gov't expenditure 
(USD per person) 73 65 74 68 101 
Gov't budget balance 
(USD per person) -28 -21 -32 -20 -40 
Source: 1 Data retrieved from WHO Lao NHA website http://www.who,lntlnha/countrv/LAO,xls 
on 10 September 2007, 
2 Data from Lao PDR Official Gazette 2002-2006 
* Others refer to land management, capital, electricity and timber royalties 
** Data in 2005 was planned figures but data in 2001-2004 were actual figures. 
Figure 8.2 clearly highlights that govern ment expenditure h as exceeded revenue 
during 2001 -2005. The negative balance budget was around 5-9% of GOP in 2001-
2005 which wa s estimated to be 28 U SO per capita in fiscal year 2001 and it increased 
to 40 USO per capita in fiscal year 2005 (Table 8.4). Main sources for the negative 
balance budget were from loans at around 181 million USD in 2005 which accounted 
for 7% of GOP or 53% of government revenue in 2005. 
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Figure 8.2 Some indicators on government budget in fiscal year 2001-2005 
%GDP 
25% 
20% 
15% 
• • • • • 10% -
5% - +-----. • • • 
---Govt reve nu~ 
--4- Govt expenditure 
-x- Budget balance 
--Tax revenue 
--
0% ----------------------------------------
x _____ x ____ x _____ x----x -5% -
-10% -
-15% -L-___________ ____ ---' 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Source: Analysis from data in the Official Gazette, Lao POR 2002-2006 
There are two possible approaches to increase the government budget to health care 
for the poor; raise more revenue and reprioritize expenditure. Currently, Lao has a low 
tax burden, 5% of GOP in 2005, com pared to its neighbours - Cambodia, China, 
Thailand and Vietnam at 8%, 15.1%. 15.9% and 13.6% of GDP respectively (Kane, 
Holmes, O'Grady 2006). Heller (2006) suggested that an obvious option for low income 
countries is to raise the tax share to at least 15% of GOP. Regarding government 
expenditure, in 2003 the Lao health sector received only 6.2 % of total government 
expenditure which is low com pared to Cambodia, China and Thailand at 11.8%, 9.7% 
and 13.6% respectively but similar to Vietnam at 5.6% (WHO 2006). In the Abuja 
declaration in 2001, African governments committed to increasing support to the public 
health sector to at least 15% of the government budget (WHO 2000). Therefore, it is 
in theory possible to raise more tax revenue and negotiate to have more government 
subsidy to the health sector. 
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Household contribution 
As reported in chapter 6, villagers believed that a contribution to government service 
or to a public health facility was necessary. The contribution could be (1) pre-payment 
(as premium per year), (2) paying user fee at the point of service (existing situation) 
and (3) a combination of pre-payment and paying less at the point of service. The 
FGDs gave relevant information on contributions from households as follows; 
• If it was a government regulation for everybody to pay an annual premium, 
they would accept it easily and they were ready to comply. But if it was not a 
government regulation i.e. a voluntary contribution, some would not pay the 
premium. 
'[one FGD member] It is like farm land tax we have to pay regularly. It 
should not be a problem for 'health tax~ The village head has a 
responsibility to collect 'land tax' and remit money to the district 
treasury. It should be similar. ... [another FGD member] However, if it is 
not an obligation to do, I would not like to pay. I am healthy and then I 
will not pay. But I will pay for my wife who often has symptoms. 
(FGD of the males In SPX) 
• All FGDs agreed that an entitled unit must be a 'household', not 'individual'. The 
premium should cover health services for all members In a household. 
• All groups were concerned that the rate of premium must be affordable. They 
also said that 5000 kip or 0.5 USD per person per year was too small but the 
amount of 50,000 kip or 5 USD per person per year was too expensive. They 
preferred 20,000 kip or 2 USD per person per year. 
• There were two different opinions on differential charges. For each FGD, 
around half of members preferred an equal premium rate for every household 
regardless of economic status because they believed in universality (called 
Akkapa): everyone must do a similar thing, not differ from others. The other 
half believed that the better-off should pay more and the worse-off should pay 
less. 
• The most important was 'the health card' (either a household card or an 
individual card) received after paying the premium. The card was evidence that 
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they had contributed to the health facility which made them more confident to 
go to see a doctor. 
• Apart from pre-payment, paying a certain amount at the point of service was 
also acceptable from FGDs' perspective. 
'I expect that a doctor would be glad to receive cash from a patient 
when he gave treatment Moreover, he can have more cash to operate 
a hospital for us. It would be excellent if we pay premium and after that 
we pay a small certain amount to hospital whenever we go to seek 
service. I like it Currently, I never know before how much hospital will 
charge me which make me worry with unpredictable amount, especially 
a big bill in a provincial hospital, ' 
(FGD of the females in KK) 
According to these reasons, two main points were concluded. Firstly, there is room to 
improve health financial risk protection not only to the poor but also to everyone in the 
community by a mandatory contribution system endorsed by government regulation. 
Secondly, contributions from households can be possible in two forms - mandatory 
premium per year and paying user fees at point of service on the basis of a fixed 
amount. Collecting a pre-payment premium was feasible using an existing process of 
collecting tax in the village. Lao culture and belief is conducive to paying som ething for 
services received, and there never seems to have been resistance to pay user fees at 
point of service. There is no harm to keeping small certain user fees at point of service 
which every one can afford even the poor. 
~rant and loan 
In the two one-day workshops in Vientiane capital, the participants who were policy 
makers, providers and village heads all had the same opinion. They understood the 
government budget constraint but they did not agree with loans for protecting the 
poor from health catastrophic expenditure. They would be happy if the government got 
support from grants either from domestic or international organizations. But financial 
sustainability should be taken into account. Note that from the workshop, all 
participants supported the idea of contributions from the comm unity and government 
budget if the government can afford this. 
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To sum up, for protecting the poor, it appears justified that the government should 
take care of the poor and the most feasible financial source is from tax. An insurance 
contribution from the poor households is not rational and im possible. It is assumed 
here that the MOH takes financing option A (the poor throughout the country, 1.8 
million people) as an ultimate target with a tax-financed budget. In case that the 
government has severe restriction of the budget, the MOH could immediately 
implement financing option B (the poor in the 47 poor districts, 0.35 million people) 
with a tax-financed budget and at the same time the MOH could seek grants to expand 
to financing option A. However, the government must have a long term plan to 
guarantee financial sustainability. The government is hoping that the poverty reduction 
project will reduce the number of the poor. 
The households had a strong belief In paying user fees at point of service and would 
cope with a low payme nt. It is unnecessary to completely abolish user fees from the 
Lao health system. A co-payment with a small amount of fees which the poor can 
afford is assumed for both financing options. 
8.4.6 Protecting the less-poor 
The main findings in chapter 6 showed that not only the wors t-off households but also 
the middle groups made up the majority of households who faced catastrophiC health 
expenditure. The better-off also had a possibility of catastrophe due to illness costs. 
Therefore, it can be justified to develop health financial risk protection for the less-
poor. The CBHI (Community Based Health Insurance) provides health financial 
protection to a member who pays a premium. This scheme is a voluntary scheme 
based on a monthly membership. 
As mentioned earlier, the villagers in the study villages had a positive perspective on 
contributions involving paying a premium and co-payment. The households and public 
health providers normally followed government regulations. Therefore, protecting the 
less-poor appears acceptable and possible by introducing a mandatory contributory 
health insurance scheme. In order to fit with the existing system, CBHI is the most 
suitable option by shifting from a voluntary to a mandatory contributory scheme and 
changing the monthly membership to an annual membership. This can reduce the 
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administrative cost of collecting the premium and improve the financial sustainability of 
the CBHI. The new CBHI would cover all people who are not the worst-off and who are 
not covered by GES and SHI. The annual premium can be collected using the simple 
existing system - the village head collects the premium along with annual tax and 
remits the premium to the district hospital of that area. 
8.4.7 Health financial risk protection for all 
Based on the above proposed elements, all Laotians would be protected from health 
financial risk through four schemes (figure 8.3). The GES and SHI remain the same. 
The CBHI covers less-poor people which are the largest group, 52% of total 
population. The poor at 33% of total population would be subsidized by the 
government through a tax financed programme for the poor. 
Figure 8.3 Model of health financial risk protection for the entire population 
of Lao PDR 
Mandato 
Govt workers 14%, 
GES 
(MOSWL) 
Less-poor 52%, 
CBHI 
(MOH) 
The poor 33%, 
Tax-financed program 
(MOH) 
Capitation 6.5 USD/caplta 
Capitation 6.5 USD/capita 
Capitation 4.5 USD/caplta 
Capitation 4.5 USD/caplta 
_-L-!-----..!...~--, co-payment,....r::::====;=]l +-- _____ .....J 
People Providers 
L_-------' services 
MOLSW: Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
550: Social Security Organization 
MOH: Ministry of Health 
GES: -Government Employee Scheme 
SHI: Social Health Insurance 
CBHI: Community Based Health Insurance 
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.. 
Govt: government 
emp'er: employer 
emp'ee: employee 
Data In the circle show group of beneficiary, 
benefiCiary as % of total population, name of 
the scheme and the financial Intermediary. 
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8.4.8 Prerequisites for the further development and Implementation of the 
proposed financing model 
The model of health financial risk protection proposed through the analysis in this 
chapter was mainly tested against criteria of financial feasibility. The financing model 
assumed the existence of a health delivery system which enables people to access and 
use services. The financing model thus has three prerequisites; (1) on the demand 
side, that households can reasonably recognize their health problem and can reach and 
use public health services, (2) on the supply side, that there is extensive geographical 
coverage of public health care providers and that they are functioning - able to provide 
decent quality of care to patients and (3) with respect to third parties, that there is an 
organization for collecting, pooling finance, and purchasing services, that can 
successfully provide health financial risk protection for the poor and the less-poor. 
These three pre-requisites are in this section tested against the realities found in the 
four villages, their districts, a nd in the interviews at provincial and national levels. 
Demand side: recognition of need for and access to and use of pyblic health services. 
Although the demand response was assumed to be positive for the financing model, 
many problems on the demand side are likely. The findings on the health seeking 
pattern of the villagers showed that the villagers did not always recognise health need, 
nor were always able to access and use public health services, for several reasons. 
These reasons included lack of knowledge of health problems, poor attitudes of public 
health care providers (poor quality of care and behaviour of health staff), difficulty in 
accessing public health care providers, and availability of other choices of treatment. It 
should be borne in mind that free health services, sometimes, were not successful in 
encouraging villagers to access and use public health services such as free child 
immunization. Therefore, further in-depth investigation from the demand side of what 
factors can lead to success in increasing access and use of public health services 
(separately for health promotion, disease prevention and curative services) is strongly 
recommended. In addition, for imm ediate action, improvement of households' 
knowledge and attitudes on health would be a good strategy. 
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Sypply side: implications for health care services 
Once people are protected from full or partial fees at point of service, people will 
probably access public health care providers more often than when they are exposed 
to full fees. The financing models for protecting the poor and less-poor would increase 
the workloads of public health care providers, especially for curative care (out-patient, 
OP, and in-patient, IP, services). The analysis of service output of district hospitals and 
the provincial hospital in SVK Province showed that the providers had not much 
workload - an average of about 20 OP visits per day per district hospital and about 2 
IP cases per day per district hospital in 2004 (table 8.5). The SVK provincial hospital 
served 132 OP visits per day and 24 IP cases per day. The providers possibly have 
potential to increase health care services to the poor and less-poor. However, this is 
within the limitations of geographical access which were shown earlier. Issues of 
quality of care and capacity of the existing delivery system (both competency and 
responsiveness of health staff, and availability of medical device and equipment) were 
not captured in this study. So, further work is needed to assess the geographical 
coverage of the current health delivery system and its capacity to provide decent 
quality of services to the poor and the less-poor. Skilled staffs are required not only for 
curative services to households but also for improving health education, health 
promotion and disease prevention program meso 
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Table 8.5 Average OP and IP services of hospital in SVK Province, 2001-04 
SVK 4 Poor 10 Non-poor 
provincial district district 
hospital hospitals hospitals 
Bed (as of 2005) 160 65* 170** 
Average OP visits per hospital per day 
• 2001 
• 2002 
• 2003 
• 2004 
Average number of patient discharged per 
hospital per day 
• 2001 
• 2002 
• 2003 
• 2004 
Average length of stay (days per patient) 
• 2001 
• 2002 
• 2003 
• 2004 
Average occupancy rate per hospital 
128 
126 
132 
132 
33 
38 
52 
49 
2.7 
2.7 
2.3 
1.9 
• 2001 56% 
• 2002 64% 
• WOO n% 
• 2004 58% 
Source: Report of SVK Provincial Health Office 2001-2004 
Note: * Number of total beds for 4 poor district hospitals 
15 
14 
14 
16 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3.2 
3.1 
3.3 
3.2 
56% 
39% 
46% 
43% 
** Number of total beds for 10 non-poor district hospitals 
Third Darty for scheme management 
14 
16 
17 
15 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3.2 
3.2 
3.3 
3.0 
37% 
43% 
60% 
43% 
The financing model would require a third party who would manage the scheme for 
the poor and the less-poor. Currently, the MOH is responsible for coordination of CBHI 
which covers less than .20,000 members. The existing CBHI unit is in the MOH. The 
lessons learnt and human capacity of CBHI could be harvested to initiate protection of 
the poor and expansion to the less-poor. There is no need to invest in a new 
coordination unit outside the MOH. For the simplest pathway, the MOH needs to put in 
place a management system for the two new schemes. Since the management system 
of protecting the poor and the less-poor are linked together, it is practical to implement 
the financing model in a village by one organization - the MOH. The village committees 
would be supervised for the wealth ranking to identify the worst-off and then the 
worst-off would be registered. The remaining households in the village who are not 
members of GES or SHI would be registered in the CBHI. 
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The scheme could operate locally through a unit in each provincial/di strict 
administration e. g. collecting the premium, registering membership, issuing the card, 
paying money to providers, and dealing with day-to-day problems at local level. Based 
on observation at the national level, health staff at the MOH had very good knowledge 
on health care financing, especially CBHI. They were skilful on CBHI management at a 
pilot scale. They could provide supervision to the local level. At the provincial level, 
unfortunately, CBHI was not piloted in SVK Province, so the capacity of health staff to 
manage CBHI could not be directly observed. However, health staff at SVK Provincial 
Health Office who were dealing with a pilot project of Health Equity Fund were 
competent. Furthermore, it was apparent that health staff at local level (at both 
districts) had sufficient knowledge on health financing and health insurance. 
Model testing and fyrther development 
Ideally, any financing model should be developed through a partie ipatory process 
among key partners, especially policy makers. The most plausible model then should 
be practically tested in real life conditions or piloted on a small scale to find out if it 
would be successful and what the determinants of success are. Based on feed back 
from the pilot project, the model would be further developed to best suit it for effective 
implementation. None of this was possible within the scope of this study, so it remains 
a desk based modelling exercise. 
However, the financing model can be assessed in relation to the actual conditions of 
the four sampled villages. Based on evidence from previous chapters, the relevance of 
the financing model is as follows; 
• The model is not practical for TAL because of geographical barriers as well as 
the health seeking behaviour of TAL villagers. Primarily, the condition of the 
health delivery system must be improved for TAL before the financing model 
becomes relevant. 
• The model might work for KY. The villagers of KY could easily access public 
health care providers but they preferred private to public providers (see chapter 
5). At the same time, the evidence on immunization coverage (figure 4.5 of 
chapter 4) showed that the public health care provider (the nearest health 
centre of KY) did not well perform on providing services to patients. Although 
geographical access was supportive for the financing model, other factors in 
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relation to health seeking behaviour must be comprehensively investigated and 
improved e.g. trust in public health care providers, quality of care and the 
capacity of public health care providers. 
• The model is feasible for the two villages in APT district (namely SPX and KK). 
Conditions of SPX and KK were very supportive for the implementation of this 
financing model. The health delivery system had extensive geographical 
coverage in these areas and health staff performed well in terms of 
immunization coverage (figure 4.5 of chapter 4). From the observation of the 
researcher, health staffs in SPX and KK areas were competent and had good 
attitudes on providing health services to patients. The health seeking behaviour 
of SPX and KK villagers also were supportive for the Implementation of the 
financing model. 
Therefore, suggestions can be made for further work. First, the financing model should 
be piloted extensively in order to investigate feasibility and acceptability to the 
community (households and local public providers) including the factors that would 
need to be considered in developing an effective financing model. Second, the model 
should be further adjusted according to realities from the pilot project. Third, the 
model should be developed into a financing model for the national level with a process 
of multi-stakeholder consultation. Fourth, prerequisite conditions of the health delivery 
system must be achieved before the implementation of the suggested model. 
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8.5 Overview of the analysis 
Based on the findings of the study and given the current context in Lao POR, the 
analysis has suggested financing models for protecting the poor from health financial 
risk. Two models were set from different poverty assessments. Option A, direct 
targeting, was suggested by using wealth ranking by village committee members and 
would result in approximately 1.8 million people throughout the country receiving 
protection. In Option B, wealth ranking would be employed in the 47 poor districts and 
would result in protection of 0.3 million people. A contract model with capitation was 
suggested as a payment method to providers to conform with that of the three existing 
public health insurance schemes. Total resource requirement was estimated applying a 
capitation rate of 4.5 USO per capita per year plus 10% for administrative cost. Option 
A required additional resources of 9.1 million USO or 28% of the MOH budget while 
option B required less - 1.7 million USO or S% of the MOH budget. It Is possible that 
the government could subsidize the 0.3 million poor people (option B) with a tax-
financed budget and then expand to 1.8 million poor people (option A) with temporary 
support from grants and the government budget phased in in the long run. 
In addition to the poor, it is possible to protect the less-poor with a contributory 
scheme by transforming the current CBHI Into a compulsory scheme. The premium 
could be annually collected from the households who are not the poor, GES members 
and SHI members using the existing system of tax collecting by the village head. 
Attitudes of households suggested that it is worth having co-paym ent at point of 
service for both the new scheme for the poor and for the less-poor. The MOH was 
suggested to be the organization to manage these new schemes. Under these 
proposals, the Lao POR would achieve health financial risk protection for its entire 
people. Nevertheless, based on the village study, it was apparent that the existing 
health system was not fully supportive for the financing model. It is necessary that 
prerequisite conditions (on both demand and supply sides) must be achieved for the 
implementation of the finanCing model to be feasible and appropriate. 
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8.6 Discussion 
The financing model 
The study has explored financing model options for protecting the poor and less-poor. 
The suggested national model impli es that almost all user fees at point of services 
would be transformed to a prepayment system for treatment at public health 
providers. A small amount of co-payment would be kept at point of service. The 
suggested national financing model would thus result in user fees at point of services 
mainly being removed from public health providers. This essentially requires 
stewardship at all levels of key stakeholders; national, provincial, district and village 
levels. Gilson and McIntyre (2005) suggested that before fees can be removed, the 
health care budgets must be sufficiently Increased in order to protect quality of care in 
the face of increased workloads. After the abolition of fees in Uganda, it was found 
that utilization of public providers increased largely among the poor, but with no clear 
change among the non-poor (Xu et al 2005). Although the poor could access free care, 
surprisingly, the incidence of catastrophic expenditure am ong the poor did not fall (Xu 
et al 2005). This was because of frequent unavailability of drugs at public providers 
and households had to pay for medicines outside public providers. 
In order to achieve the policy objectives, seven practical strategies were recommended 
for managing fee removal (Gilson and Mdntyte 2005). These strategies are used here, 
drawing on the evidence from the study, as a framework for discussing the feasibility 
of the proposed financing model at national level (table 8.6). 
It is apparent that many issues need high attention from the government e.g. the rapid 
development of the CBHI office in the MOH, promulgation process, public information 
campaign, medicine management system, improving of phys ical access, and 
monitoring system. Some current conditions in Lao PDR would benefit policy 
implementation. For exam pie, local funds already exist in every hospital. 
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Table 8.6 Practical strategies for managing fee removal 
Practical strategies for managing fee removal * 
(1) set a specific unit for coordinating 
(2) dialogue clearly on policy goals with health 
workers 
Situation In Lao PDR ** 
(1) The study suggested that MOH takes this 
role because of experiences of CBHI. 
Nevertheless, a rapid Improvement of the 
CBHI office in the MOH is need~e~dC!... ___ _ 
(2) Promulgation of Decree 52 and any decree 
was very weak. The government needs to put 
in more effort. 
(3) establish local funds to support the activities (3)The 'current system ofdecentrallzatlo'il-"-' 
could enable local funds. The loca l levels have 
__ -----;-::--:-~--:-:--------' tj1eir __ owD_J1§!E .!:?Jjl!Y"to malJ.,!g~ th~ fUDd~: .. __ , _. 
(4) promote public information (4) The experience of Decree 52 showed 
Ineffective public Information and thus led to 
mis-understanding of entitlement to 
exemptions. The government must give high 
_, _  '"'''______'"'' ___ ,,____ ' ________ ' ______________________ '""_,_'", __ att;~ntL911JQ...Q..Llbl Ic ..Qr9..!!lQtion carm>_a iQQ! _____ .. 
(5) ensure adequate medicines and medical (5) The experience of RDF at village level 
supplies to deal with increased utilisation showed poor medicine management. This 
might need more training, supervision and 
_____ --;-----;----;-------;---;----.;:;::-:-::-:--.-___ -" evaluatloQ. otRD~J!l9nCl.gementat ~,~~!s!- _. 
(6) to improve physical access to health services (6) This could be newly established (e.g. 
through 'close to client' services home based treatment programme through 
mobile health workers) or strengthen current 
means (e.g. through VHV, TBA). Importantly, 
the conditions from both demand and supply 
sides must be comprehensively assessed in 
order to Improve access and use of public 
health services. 
(7) establish monitoring systems for useful 
information 
(7) The monitoring system of the government 
budget Is more effective than for user fee 
revenue. A system similar to that of the 
government budget could be applied. 
Source: * Modified from Gilson and McIntyre (2005) 
** Assessment by the researcher 
The study suggests that the MOH and a unit in each provincial/district administration 
should take responsibility for managing the two new schemes. It did not promote the 
idea of the purchaser-provider split by setting up a new organization. In practice, it is 
far from clear that the experiences of SHI purchasers which applied a purchaser and 
provider split suggest that they performed effectively (Wagstaff 2007c). At the same 
time, however, a government organization does not guarantee successful 
implementation. It is hoped tha t the MOH would operate responsibly and be more 
accountable because the schemes would be dominated by the mandatory contributory 
scheme of the less-poor (52% of the total population) plus the tax-financed 
programme for the poor (33% of the total population). 
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Finance 
The study suggested a tax-financed programme for the poor and a mandatory 
contribution for the less-poor. The financial estimations for the poor were calculated 
from a capitation of 4.5 USD per person per year. In fact, there are two capitation 
rates - 4.5 and 6.5 USD per capita per year, among public health insurance schemes in 
Lao PDR. From an equity perspective, different capitation rates should be monitored 
for their quality of care implications for different groups of insurance members. In 
future, the capitation may need harmonization. Co-payment would be newly applied to 
the poor and the less-poor schemes. It should be monitored in order to ensure that it 
will not be a barrier of access to and use of health services. 
In terms of the financial implications of the financing model, the a nalysls of financial 
requirements was based on an assumption that there would be no new investments in 
health care infrastructures and human resources. It was assumed that patients could 
practically access and use public health facilities. However, the study found that some 
households had problems of geographical access, especially in the poor district, and 
then suffered from death or disability. It is assumed that the infrastructure of health 
provision would be expanded according to the master plan of the MOH in 2005 and 
NGPES 2005. 
wealth ranking 
The analysiS suggested approaches for identifying the poor using (1) direct targeting 
by wealth ranking in the village and (2) geographical targeting of the 47 poor districts 
combined with the wealth ranking. The study found a possibility of conducting a wealth 
ranking by village members in the 4 villages studied, and acceptability of two schemes 
(the poor and the less-poor) in 2 villages. However, the sample size was tiny compared 
to the total of 3,649 villages in 47 poor districts. Expanding the study to a larger 
sample size is needed to assure the efficacy of wealth ranking and acceptabi lity to 
villagers of two schemes within villages. Testing of wealth ranking and PCA analysis on 
assets of households is required to be more confident that wealth ranking can 
differentiate the worst-off from the better-off. 
It was proposed that wealth ranking could be done by village committee members, not 
by an individual person (the village head), in order to ensure accountability of the 
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wealth ranking process, to encourage community participation and to gain acceptabilit y 
of the villagers. Nevertheless, experience of direct targeting in other countries, e.g. 
Thailand where income assessment was used to issue low income cards to the poor, 
showed that there was under-coverage and leakage (Gilson et al. 1998). It was 
mentioned that the effectiveness of income assessment was Influenced by many 
factors i.e. the political context, actors, design and implementation strategy. Hence, 
the process of wealth ranking would need huge effort to guarantee its success and 
effectiveness. It requires clear procedure, training and coaching on implementation. 
Good practice guidelines would inhibit personal bias. The process could cooperate with 
the Poverty Reduction Fund which had experience of identifying poor districts in 
NPEGS. 
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8.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided suggestions on a financing model which could improve 
health financial risk protection of not only the poor but also the less-poor, a group 
beyond the initial objectives of the study. The main findings and lessons learnt in the 
empirical study were used to develop a suggested financing model, for example; 
justification for providi ng both OP and IP services in the benefit package due to 
household catastrophic expenditure from a small amount of health care cost, and 
argument for expanding financial protection to the less-poor because of catastrophic 
expenditure in better-off households. The analysis of financial implications mainly 
relied on the current situation in Lao PDR in order to suggest the most feasible options 
based primarily on financial feasibility. 
The study suggested that the MOH should aim to protect the worst-off households 
throughout the country with subs idization from the government budget, a nd the less-
poor by household contribution. Wealth ranking by the villagers was suggested as a 
tool for identifying the worst-off households. Many characteristics of the current CBHI 
were employed e.g. a contractual model with capitation rate of 4.5 USD per capita per 
year and the CBHI unit in the M OH to manage the new two schemes. 
However, the suggested financing model is based on (1) only a small sample of 
households and public providers and (2) assuming a reasonably supportive health 
delivery system. Therefore, it Is necessary to study fu rther both households and 
providers with a larger sample size in order to assure feasibility and acceptability of the 
financing model. The process of constructing the finanCing model at the national level 
should involve all key actors in financial health protection, for instance the Ministry of 
Finance, the MOH, the CBHI unit, public providers and donors. Prerequisite conditions 
of the health delivery system are required prior to implementation of a model for 
financial protection of the poor and the less-poor. 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
The study aims to contribute to health financing policy on financial protection of the 
poor by improving unders tanding of health care utilization determinants and the 
success of mechanisms for protecting the poor; evaluating government policy and 
practice on fee exemption of the poor; and identifying ways of better protecting the 
poor. The conceptual framework of the study was developed by integrating five main 
concepts. Determinants of supply and demand of health services were adopted as a 
means of assessing responses and perceptions towards exemption policy from three 
main stakeholders in the health care financing system; policy makers, public providers 
and households. Concepts of health care seeking behaviour based on the Andersen 
Model were used to explain hea Ith service utilization of households. Categories of 
coping strategies were adopted to understand how, in practice, households deal with 
cost of illness. Concepts of exemptions under the user fee system and performance of 
protection mechanisms were applied to assess the implementation of the exemption 
policy. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were employed for data collection 
from the various stakeholders from national level to community level. 
This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used In the 
study. It also summarizes and discusses the findings of the study and the suggested 
financing model for protecting the poor and the less-poor. 
9.2 Methodological issues 
Several quantitative and qualitative a pproaches were used in this study in order to 
respond to all the objectives and indicators. Village census, consumption survey, focus 
group discussion, in-depth interview, key informant interview, document review and 
secondary data collection were chosen to complement each other. Strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach will be discussed and followed by broader 
methodological issues relating to the study. 
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9.2.1 Quantitative methods 
Village census 
A village census was conducted in all four sampled villages. Household interviews using 
a structured questionnaire were carried out in every household. This was possible 
because the number of households in each village was not large (ranging between 34 
and 62 households in each village). The village census has several major strengths. In 
general, survey data provide a good overview of households in a community. The 
village census has advantages over a sample survey because it provides a snapshot of 
the whole village, not just the sampled households. The village census was extremely 
useful for the study for the following reasons. 
• The village census provided an equal opportunity for every household to 
participate in the study. The villagers were very sensitive about having a 
chance to participate in the study. A limitation of a sampled household survey 
and qualitative methods is that they are not able to incl ude every household in 
the study. 
• It was a highly successful strategy for building rapport with the villagers. 
• During the village census, interviews were conducted with every household, in 
the house itself. It was a good opportunity to meet every household head and 
observe the status of every household before conducting wealth ranking. 
• Information on the a ssets of each household was useful to compute the asset 
index score in order to fi nd the correlation with wealth ranki ng by FGDs. 
• The village census illustrated the whole picture of the village which prevented 
bias in selecting sample households for the household survey. 
The village census was successful, with 100% participation and enthusiastic 
cooperation from every household. Almost all household members were present and 
gave individual information. This was because the village head had informed 
households in advance to stay at home. It should be noted that the fieldwork was 
conducted during the dry season when the villagers stay in the village. During the rainy 
season they stay in their farmhouses and it would have been extremely difficult to 
conduct a village census or household survey. However, conducting a village census 
requires huge time and labour resources so it could be conducted only in a Ii mited 
numbers of villages. The small number of sampled villages was one limitation of the 
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study. This inevitably limited the number of villagers who had experience of accessing 
health services, especially admission. 
Health care utilization and cost of treatment 
As mentioned earlier in the methodology chapter, four villages were chosen from two 
districts which were selected because they had a relatively high utilization rate at the 
district hospital. This could have led to bias towards high accessibility to public health 
services, and potentially a high cost burden of health expenditure to ho usehold 
consumption. However, it was not intended that the study should estimate the overall 
utilization and cost burden of the entire population. The study was aimed at gaining 
better understanding of how households reacted to illness. 
The study focused on the direct costs of illness but did not consider indirect costs e.g. 
production loss caused by illness. Indirect costs can exceed direct costs 
(Koopmanschap and Rutten 1994) and this was the case in Lao PDR (Dunlop et al 
2004). Sauerborn et al (1995) studied rural Burkina Faso and found that Indirect costs 
were the largest component of total costs of Illness. Indirect costs can lead to 
significant economic consequences for households, especially when a breadwinner is ill 
or a household member is very sick and requires long-term care such as for malaria, 
TB and HIV/AID patients (Russell 2004). Indirect costs when combined with direct 
costs of illness can push a household into poverty or into deeper poverty (McIntyre et 
al.2006). 
Not capturing the indirect costs of illness was a weakness of the study and it meant 
the capacity of the study was limited to understanding only the impact of direct costs 
of illness to households and subsequent household responses. Nevertheless, measuring 
indirect costs of illness is not easy and has methodological challenges both in the 
operational definition of indirect costs and quantifying them in monetary terms (Russell 
2004, McIntyre et al. 2006). Therefore, this is one of the suggestions for further 
research . 
.!:I9usehold economic status 
One of the greatest problems in the quantitative approach was measuring household 
economiC status. Classifying non-poor and poor households by quantifying income, 
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expenditure or consu mption in every household during the village census is time-
consuming and requires many resources. Even if it is the gold standard when done 
very well, the study could not afford the associated costs. Therefore, wealth ranking by 
FGDs was applied in the study. 
Household consum ption was then measured in sampled households in each wealth 
group. Neither household income nor expenditure was used due to various limitations. 
Generally, there was likely to be under-reporting of income and over-reporting of 
expenditure. According to the ILO definition, household expenditure is the sum of 
household consumption expenditure and non-consumption expenditure e.g. 
compulsory transfers to governments (direct taxes, for example), social security 
contributions (International Labour Office 2003). Asking about taxes paid by 
households might lead to less cooperation and create difficulties for the study. 
Measurement of household consumption is considered by the World Bank's poverty 
specialists to provide a far better indicator of living standards than Income data 
(Wagstaff 2000). In addition, in the context of the study, household consumption was 
more appropriate because villagers were engaged in the agricultural sector and lived in 
a subsistence economy. All villagers reserved their own rice products for In-house 
consumption before trading the surplus. They normally sought food from natural 
resources. It was less complicated to quantify the value of goods and services the 
household consumed by using prices from the nearest market. 
secondarv data collection 
Collecting financial information on health care providers and the governmentfrom 
secondary sources is the most effective approach as the reports have already been 
produced. However, weaknesses were identified. The validity and reliability of 
secondary data were doubtful. The figures might be misleading If the Interpretation 
was made without caution or tru e understanding of their meaning. This study tried to 
reduce this problem by two approaches; (1) requesting official reports which had 
previously been approved by the organization a uthorities and (2) triangulating the data 
with other sources e.g. key informant interviews or requesting an explanation about 
the figures in the report from staff who had produced It. 
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9.2.2 Qualitative methods 
Three qualitative methods were employed. Focus group discussion, key informant 
interview and household in-depth interview were used for collecting data from 
households. Key informant interviews were used in the public health facilities and with 
the policy makers. 
The qualitative approaches provided in-depth information for better understanding of 
particular topiCS, for example explanations of the consequences of catastrophic health 
expenditure on the household economy or how and why the MOH did or did not 
support the providers who granted exemptions to the poor. Qualitative methods were 
used with the a im of answering questions of how and why wh ich could not be 
answered by a quantita tive method. 
Sample sizes for the qualitative approaches were small. They were not intended to be 
statistically representative but aimed to strengthen understanding of in-depth 
information. The sample size was of less concern than the thinking generated for 
particular topiCS. One possible action to support an In-depth understanding from 
qualitative approaches was to cover every level of involved partners and to sample as 
many individuals as possible. Regarding policy makers' perspectives, the informants 
were purposively selected to cover a great number of informants with different 
positions from the top of the MOH to the policy makers at provincial level, and covered 
ex- and current policy makers. Regarding public providers' perspective, every level of 
health facility was selected from central hospital, provincial hospital, district hospital 
and health centre. District hospitals we re chosen from the poor and the non-poor 
districts. Regarding households' perspective, in each village, key informants were the 
most knowledgeable members of the village committees. FGDs were conducted in 
three different groups of people (village comm ittees, males and females) varying from 
young to elderly. House holds for in-depth interview were purposively selected to be 
typical of a range of illness experiences (OP and IP) and death and three wealth 
groups (the better-off, middle and the worst-off). 
The study employed many qualitative methods and each method covered a number of 
samples. These enabled the study to cross-check the validity and reliability of 
270 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
information. For example, key informant interviews of village committee members in a 
village usually covered about 6-11 members and they reminded each other of events 
and verified each other's answers. Information on wealth ranking of one FGD was 
verified by the results of other FGDs. Perceptions of villagers on user fees and 
exemptions were collected by FGDs in general and household in-depth interviews on a 
particular experience of illness in the household. Then perception of households 
towards user fees and exemption from FGDs and household in-depth interview 
supplemented each other and were triangulated. 
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9.2.3 Broader methodological Issues 
The strength of this study was its design to cover three main stakeholders; policy 
makers, public providers and households from the national level to community level. 
However, the sample size of households was small (172 households of only four 
villages) and located only in the 'rural without road' area. Owing to resource and time 
limitations, it was not possible to cover all three areas of Lao PDR; urban, rural with 
road and rural without road. Limiting the study on the household perspective to only 
four villages of two districts in one province made it possible to go into some depth in 
understanding of household experiences relating to access to health services and 
health financial protection e.g. the importance of the community network to support 
the poor, the impact of catastrophic health expe nditure on the household economy and 
reasons why people did not take up exemptions. 
After completion of the fieldwork, the findings were presented at two one-day 
workshops in Vientiane capital, Lao POR on 17-18 July 2006 to share and verify the 
preliminary results with policy makers, public health providers and heads of the four 
villages. All participants accepted the findings. Judging that Savannakhet Province has 
a stronger health delivery system and is of highe r economic status than other 
provinces in Lao POR, they felt that among both households and public providers, 
exemption practice would be greater than in other poorer provinces. 
Based on the Household Economic Approach (Seaman 2000), this study designed a 
specific approach, using multiple methods, to measure household consumption, a 
crucial parameter for measuring catastrophiC health expenditure. These multiple 
methods were practical and effective. 
The study design, which combined qualitative and quantitative methods, facilitated 
both measurement of the magnitude of expenditure and in-depth understanding of 
how these expenditures came about and influenced household economic status, as in 
the study by Russell and Gilson (2006). Employing a combination of several methods 
enabled the study to cross-check the findings from one method with another. Results 
from different methods also supported the conSistency of results obtained by other 
methods and supplemented each other. For example, the village census presented the 
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number of households which did not access or use health services when ill whereas the 
household in-depth interview explained the negative outcomes (death or disability) the 
households experienced due to the inaccessibility of public health services. 
Wealth ran king by FGDs can practically represent the wealth status of households and 
can be used to exam ine equity in the health system. This study found inequities am ong 
wealth groups in reported illness, use of health services, and cost burdens. However, 
almost all studies of equity in the health system divide households Into different wealth 
groups or socio-economic groups using quantitative data (O'Donnell et al. 2005; Van 
Doorslaer et al. 2005; Limwattananon et al. 2005; Sepehri et al 2005; Thi Thuan et al. 
2006; Chuma 2007) 
The study had the flexibility of modifying tools during the fieldwork in order to allow 
questions that were better suited to the real situation. The results from the first and 
second villages showed that villagers had never known about exemptions from public 
health care providers so had no experience of asking for them. Questions in FGDs for 
the third and fourth villages were changed from a process of asking for exemptions to 
asking about the way of protecting the poor an d less-poor. The study then learnt 
villagers' perceptions about voluntary versus compulsory health financial protection, 
their willingness to pay the premium and co-payment. This information was relevant 
and useful for the alternative ways to protect the poor and the less-poor from illness 
costs. 
Using a variety of approaches from quantitative and qualitative methods for every level 
of data sources (national to comm unity level) also facilitated greater in-depth 
investigation of the problem. The study found that three main stakeholders had a 
different interpretation of 'the poor' who would be entitled to exemptions. The village 
census showed that no villagers had known about exemption policy except one village 
head and VHV. Interviews illustrated that the village head and VHV had been trained 
to understand that exemptions were for 'the destitute', not for 'the poor' and they now 
firmly believed this. FGDs revealed that the villagers interpreted that they were 'the 
poor', not 'the destitute' and were therefore not eligible for exemptions. Interviews 
with the providers in SVK demonstrated that they had the same Idea as the villagers. 
The SVK providers explained that they had limited resources so they must limit the 
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amount of exemptions by restricting the number of eligible people. However, 
interviews with the policy makers found that they thought 'the poor' and 'the destitute' 
had the same meaning. All the information above, obtained by several methods, 
provided a better understanding on this particul ar issue of exemptions which might not 
have been possible to capture by one method. 
The study design allowed information to be presented on short-term cause and effect, 
but not for long-te rm cause and effect. The village census collected cross-sectional 
data of household experiences on illness in the previous two weeks and hospital 
admission in the previous twelve months. Household in-depth interviews were 
conducted at one-off visits, not longitudinal interviews. They, therefore, were not able 
to capture multiple illnesses over time such as treatment for chronic diseases in a 
household, and it was not possible to assess the long-term consequences of health 
care costs on household livelihood. Although the study design presents a static picture 
of the impact of health care costs on the household economy, interviews of households 
at least provided some sense of change over time. For example, a household head sold 
a cow when his daughter was admitted to hospital in the previous twelve months but 
at the time of the interview, he had earned money and now owned a new cow. Thuan 
et al. (2006) indicate that, in developing countries, ca~strophlc health expenditure Is 
usually the result of a 'series of events' which relate to every-day Illnesses rather than 
one single spectacular event e.g. an injury. In addition, Russell and Gilson (2006) 
emphasize the importance of longitudinal study research in order to explain the 
relationship between illness cost and livelihood change ove r time. They indicate that 
the consequences of illness on household impoverishment and livelihood depend 
greatly on the severity, frequency and duration of the illness. 
The researcher has a background close to Lao culture as she graduated from a 
University in the North east of Thailand and worked in that area for many years. As 
stated earlier, she has previous experience of conducting studies in the Lao health 
system. She understands specific cultural aspects, for example the hierarchical 
structure of Lao society. The fieldwork was carefully organized according to the formal 
and informal recommendations of Lao partners, especially recognized people. Those 
recommendations involved not only the study protocol (e.g. who should be met first, in 
what way and how) but also involving the liv ing style of the researcher (e.g. clothes, 
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hair style, eating habits, participating in social events in Lao, etc.). These could enable 
an effective relationship amongst the researcher, RA, local administrator (LA) and 
respondents. All respondents had willingness to participate in the study - there was no 
refusal from any respondent. Respondents actively Involved themselves in the study 
and also recommended the researcher to other key informants. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned before, the researcher and RA and Lao counterparts held 
positions of government officers in the public health system of Thailand and Lao PDR, 
respectively. Every respondent was told this before the interviews. The respondents 
possibly exaggerated their poor situation. However, this information could be 
triangulated with solid evidence. experiences and perceptions of the respondents on 
exemption policy implementation could be cross-checked by many means e.g. checking 
among the participants during interviews, cross-checking within the research team, 
and triangulation of data a cross participants and reconfirmed with other participants. 
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9.3 Overview of findings 
The overall main findings of chapter 4-8 are summarized in this section, starting with 
households' experiences of service utilization and financial implications of Illness costs. 
These experiences reflect the ineffectiveness of the exemption policy implementation 
on financial protection for the poor. The second sub-section explains the exemption 
policy implementation and providers' responses which could mirror the factors that 
inhibited successful policy implementation. The last sub-section presents the suggested 
financing model for improving financial protection for the poor and the less-poor. 
9.3.1 Health service utilization and financial Implication for households 
The four sampled villages were located in a rural area of SVK province. The villagers 
had difficult living conditions - a consumption level of less than 1 USD per person per 
day, hunger, poor infrastructure and poor hygiene and sanitation. 
When the villagers were ill, many of them did not seek any .health services. When they 
sought care, they preferred to use the local facilities. Public health services were not 
the preferred choice for OP treatment, but were popular for admission. Treatment 
seeking behaviour was determined by many factors I.e. values concerning III ness, 
attitude towards health services, cultural beliefs, physical access to health services and 
financial capacity of households. Service cost at public providers was more expensive 
than at the local and private providers. The villagers dealt with cost of health services 
themselves using many coping mechanisms within the community e.g. using savings, 
selling assets, borrowing, delaying payment at providers and getting support. Some 
households could cope with treatment costs. However, some could not and faced 
catastrophic expenditure an d were then Impoverished. 
In terms of equity, there were differences in levels of reported illnesses, service 
utilization of all provider types and catastrophic expenditure by wealth group and by 
area of residence. The villagers in the worst-off group and those in the worst setting 
reported higher rates of illness. It seemed that the villagers in the worst-off group and 
those residing in the poor district had more frequent OP visits. In contrast, the worst-
off group and the villagers residing in the worst setting had less probability of 
276 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
admission. catastrophic expenditure could happen across all wealth groups and area of 
residence, but it was more concentrated in the remote village, especially the worst-off 
and middle groups. 
The national policy on user fees and exemptions at public providers (Decree 52 PM) 
was officially implemented in 1995. The villagers firmly accepted paying user fees to 
the public providers. However, almost none of them were aware of the exemptions and 
those who were aware, believing themselves to be 'poor' and not 'destitute,' thought 
they were not eligible for exemption. 
9.3.2 The exemption policy implementation and providers' responses 
The content of Decree 52 PM itself was unclear, for example, there was no stated 
objective of introducing user fees. The policy was not successfully promu Igated. Many 
health staff did not clearly understand the exemption policy. The main issue was that 
fee revenues were a major part of hospital finance. Some of the fee revenues had to 
be remitted to the local governor. In the case of exemptions, the hospitals had to 
finance them from the fee revenue, without subsidization from the government 
budget. The MOH never submitted a budget plan for the exemption to the government 
due to lack of the clear criteria for the poor needed to estimate the budget. In practice, 
the providers always urged patients to pay user fees, even if patients had attestations 
affirmed by the village heads to declare they were poor and entitled to the exemptions. 
The providers would allow patients to delay payment (time exemptions) and they 
would provide money exemptions to the destitute (although the destitute were rarely 
found at this time). This resulted in a tiny proportion of fee revenues being spent on 
exemptions. Most of the exemptions benefited government employees, especially 
hospital staff, while the poor got many fewer exemptions. 
All public providers in SVK province had the same understanding as the households 
that the exemptions were for the destitute (who had neither assets nor relatives), not 
for the poor (who still had either assets or relatives). The providers in VTE capital and 
the policy makers perceived that the meaning of 'the destitute' was similar to 'the poor' 
and the terms could be used interchangeably. 
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9.3.3 Improving financial protection for the poor and the less-poor 
The data from the two sub-sections above indicate that the national policy on 
exemptions for the poor was ineffectively implemented. The villagers, especially the 
poor, lacked awareness of the exemption policy and they managed household crises 
due to the costs of health serviCes themselves. Some of them faced catastrophic 
expenditure and some had financial hardship. 
By analyzing the evidence from the study and the current context, a tentative plan for 
a scheme could be developed to assess the financial feasibility of financial protection 
not only for the poor but also for the less-poor. The scheme for the poor could initially 
cover the poor in the 47 poor districts (about 0.3 million people) and then later be 
expanded to cover the poor throughout the country (about 1.8 million people). Wealth 
ranking by village committee members could be used to identify the poor. After the 
wealth ranking, the rest of the villagers who were not entitled to the GES and SHI 
schemes could be registered in the scheme for the less-poor. The current CBHI could 
be transformed to be a mandatory scheme for the less-poor and be financed by 
household contributions, which would be possible in the two sampled villages. The 
contractual model with a capitation rate of 4.5 USD per person per year of the current 
CBHI was used to estimate the total financial requirement for the poor. In order to 
support the health service for the 1.8 million people, it would require additional 
resources of 9.1 million USD a year. The additional resources for the poor, together 
with the government budget for the MOH, accounted for 6.9% of the total government 
budget in 2005. The government budget could be sufficient to finance the poor. Co-
payment at point of service was suggested for these two new schemes. The MOH was 
suggested to be responsible for the new two schemes. By establishing the schemes for 
the poor and the less-poor combined with the current GES and SHI, the entire 
population could have financial risk protection. 
However, the suggested financing model could be readily applied to only two of the 
study villages, and conditions in the other two study villages were less conducive to the 
success of the model. In order to make the financing model practical, the Lao health 
system must achieve the prerequisite conditions from both demand and supply sides. 
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9.4 Discussion of findings 
This section discusses the overall findings of the study and is divided into three sub-
sections, in line with the three sub-sections presented in the previous section. The first 
sub-section focuses on illness, health utilization, cost of services and coping strategies 
of households. The second sub-section discusses experience in implementing the user 
fee and exemption policy in relating to its roles in protecting the poor and factors 
influencing its effectiveness. The last sub-section discusses the way forward for better 
protecting the health financial risk for the poor and the less-poor. 
9.4.1 Health service utilization and financial Implication to households 
Health service utilization 
The Behavioural Model by Anderson (1968) was used to structure data collection. It 
argues that use of health services is dependent on individual determinants and they 
are categorized into three components: (1) the predisposing characteristics, (2) 
enabling resources and (3) illness level or need. The village census presented patterns 
of health care utilization of individual villagers. The findings Indicate that health-
seeking behaviour differed by wealth group and area of residence. The interview data 
explained some factors influencing the decision making of the villagers on health care 
sought. These determinants found in the study could be classified Into three 
components as follows; 
• The predisposing characteristics. The study did not test whether or not use of 
service depended on demographic data (e.g. age, sex and marital status) due 
to the small sample size. The study found social structure and beliefs were 
related to the use of health services. The villagers in KY had a good opinion of 
the ex-head of the nearest health centre and they continued seeking care from 
him. On the other hand, some villagers felt they were not familiar with health 
staff and then it made them reluctant to seek care or to ask for delayed 
payment. Ethnicity directly influenced choice of care. Heetwas adopted in the 
hope of relieving the symptoms of Lao Theung patients, but not Lao Lum. 
Montenegro and Stephens (2006) used a few of these four criteria, namely 
cultural, political, spiritual and ecological aspects to define indignity and they 
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reported that indigenous people in Latin American countries have higher rates 
of mortality and morbidity than non-indigenous people. Ethnicity in Lao PDR is 
at least In part classified by ecology (as seen by their name which means low 
land, mid land and high land), and the thesis confirms the suggestion of 
Montenegro and Stephens (2006) that ethnicity can be one of the determinants 
of access to and use of hea Ith services. 
• The enabling resources. It was quite clear that ability to pay user fees was the 
major concern of the villagers. They strongly believed in paying user fees from 
their own pocket. They were not aware of the exemptions at public health 
providers. They complained several times that they did not have enough cash 
to go to public providers and were extremely worried about expensive care at 
the provincial hospital. The worst-off group were less able to access admission 
than the better-off. Price of services potentially related to ch oice of care. Costs 
of services at public health care providers were expensive (both transportation 
cost and service cost) compared to local providers (no transportation cost and 
fewer service cost). Meanwhile, public health providers were the least 
frequently used for OP treatment by the villagers and the local providers were 
the most frequently used. The geographical character of the village definitely 
affected decisions on the health care sought. Patients in TAL, the most 
disadvantaged village in terms of access to public health providers, had the 
lowest use of hospitalization while those in KK, the most advantaged village, 
had the highest. In addition, TAL patients sought care from several providers 
before being admitted to hospital. They tried to relieve symptoms from 
whatever source they could. They considered the public health providers as a 
last resort. 
• The illness level or need. Villagers were often heard to say that it was not 
serious or it was simple symptoms or the patient would natu rally recover by 
doing nothing. This implied a lack of awareness of symptoms or diseases by the 
villagers. Althoug h the study did not have an in-depth investigation of the root 
cause of villagers' perception, it could be predicted by the social structure of 
the villagers that they lacked knowledge of diseases and were unaware of the 
potential value of treatment. 
280 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
The decision on health care sought could be determined by a single factor but, 
normally, was determined by multiple factors which were interrelated (Anderson 1995). 
These determinants could result in differences in inclination for health care use. For 
example, households who strongly believed in the efficacy of treatment of their health 
staff, e.g. an ex-head of health centre in KY village, sought care sooner than those 
with less faith in him. On the other hand, a household in-depth interview of SPX 6 (Box 
6.4) presented a negative result of using health services. The household head did not 
seek care for his son and then he died. It was because of three determinants; 
disposing factors (was not familiar with health staff), enabling resource (lack of cash 
and transportation), and need (not serious condition). The main determinants of 
access to and use of health services of the villagers were not only physical access and 
user fees but also other factors such as ethnicity, attitudes toward health service, 
knowledge about disease, and perception of illness. 
Household coping strategies 
The villagers were not aware of the exemption policy and did not use it. They financed 
health care cost themselves with many types of coping strategies as noted earlier. The 
cost of OP treatment was normally smaller and could be more easily managed than the 
cost of admission. Some households adopted a single coping strategy bu t some applied 
multiple coping strategies. The study was able to describe only the 'type' of coping 
strategy for each service. It was not designed to investigate details of other 
dimensions of the coping strategies such as the sequence of different strategies, the 
level at which the strategy would be applied and the success of coping behaviour in 
terms of calamity aversion, minimizing adverse effects on household production and 
preserving household assets, as assessed by Sauerborn et al (1996). The study 
focused on the financial cost of health service and ignored indirect cost of services i.e. 
time costs. Therefore coping strategies of the study responded to the financial costs 
only, not the time costs which could be a larger proportion than financial cost, as 
discussed earlier. 
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9.4.2 The exemption policy implementation and providers' responses 
Promoting access for the poor under a user fee system 
User fees at government health providers can deter patients from accessing and using 
health services. Russell and Gilson (1997) recommend two key approaches to promote 
access for the poor within a user fee system. The first approach is 'perceptible service 
improvements'. Russell and Gilson argue that under the user fees, users would not 
decline to use the service when they valued it more highly than the money paid. Two 
supporting conditions for service improvements were a decentralized financial control 
which allowed rete ntion and use of revenue at the hospital and policy guidelines for 
promoting service improvement to benefit the poor. The second approach is 'carefully 
designed fee schedules with exemptions'. An effective implementation is required. 
The findings of the study revealed that the poor in Lao PDR were likely to get less 
benefit than other population groups under the user fee system. Regarding the first 
approach, decentralized financial control was implemented at the local level and 
hospitals had flexibility of use of fee revenue but the governm ent lacked policy 
guidelines for health provider management which supported the conversion of fee 
revenues into service improvement that benefited the poor. There was uncertainty as 
to whether the poor got benefit from fee revenues or not. The poor were less able to 
access public health providers. Nevertheless, to some extent, when the poor could 
access and use public health services, they could probably benefit from the availability 
of medicines in hospitals which were replenished by fee revenues and services 
provided by health staff which were partly paid for by fee revenues. For the second 
approach, the government never had guidelines for setting up fee schedules and the 
policy which exempted those unable to pay was inefficiently Implemented, for many 
reasons which are discussed in the next sub-section. 
factors inflyencing the effectiveness of exemption policv in D@ctlce 
The problems which have limited the success of the exemption policy In Lao PDR can 
be grouped into four themes: information, administration, resources, and socio-cultural 
and political constraints, as suggested by Gilson et al. (1995) and they are summarized 
in table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1 The determinants limited the success of Decree 52 Implementation 
Four groups of problems limited 
the success of exemption policy 
Implementation * 
• Informational constraints 
• Administrative constraints 
• Resource constraints 
• Soclo-cultural and political 
constraints 
lesson learnt from the exemption policy In lao PDR ** 
• Unclear content of the policy - no policy objectives 
• Lack of criteria to Identify the poor 
• No clear guidelines for Implementation 
• Weak promulgation strategies 
• No supervision from the MOH to local level 
• Lack of system for monitoring and evaluating 
• No government support for the provider who granted 
exemption 
• Different understandings on definition of eligible 
people among policy makers, providers and people 
• Policy got an endorsement but might lack political 
commitment 
Note: * Based on Gilson et al. (1995) 
** Findings from the study 
Informational constraints. The MOH lacked the necessary information to define explicit 
criteria for identifying the poor so this was missing from the exemption policy. Decree 
52 PM stated that the poor or the low income group, using a n attestation affirmed by 
government offices or village heads, would be exempted. Lack of explicit criteria 
created problems of interpretation between public health providers and patients. This 
resulted in the providers examining the economic status of patients and making their 
own decision on granting exemptions to the poor, even If they had an attestation from 
the village head. 
Administrative constraints. The policy had been promulgated from national level to 
providers and village levels through routine channels without serious consideration. 
This resulted in some health staff not clearly understanding the user fees and 
exemption policy. The local providers lacked supervision by the MOH and then there 
were great variations of understanding, interpretation and practice on user fees and 
exemption e.g. remitting obligatory remittances to local coffers, concepts of granting 
exemption to 'the destitute', not 'the poor', different reporting styles. Each hospital had 
its own understanding and modification of reporting user fees and exemptions which 
led to inaccurate figures on exemptions to the patients. In addition, the existing 
financial report tern plate was unable to display whether the poor got exemptions or 
not. 
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Resource constraints. The fee revenues were significant for public providers, especially 
for provincial hospitals (two thirds of the total hospital revenues) and district hospitals 
(one third of the total hospital revenue). Providers mainly spent revenue on 
replenishing medicines in the RDF. Revenue from user fees was useful for items which 
were not affordable within the government budget such as buying a computer, 
maintaining equipment and paying incentives to hospital staff. The providers had to 
cover the cost of exemptions from their own revenue; no government budget subsidy 
was given to hospitals. This resulted in a small portion of exemptions being granted 
(4% of the total expenditure from user fee revenue). Furthermore, sometimes, public 
health care providers were under pressure to provide 'obligatory remittances'. They 
were forced to collect user fees and remit a part of It to the local coffers. 
Socio-cultural and political constraints. Public providers and villagers believed in the 
concept of user fees. Providers reported that patients brought mon ey for hospital 
treatment and the providers urged patients to pay user fees at the point of service 
even if the patient had an attestation from the village head. Payment could be delayed 
when the patient did not have sufficient cash. Most providers were paid because they 
allowed delayed payment to patients with whom they were familiar. In terms of the 
households' perceptions, the villagers perceived that patients were responsible for 
paying user fees at point of service by using whatever coping mechanisms they could. 
The public health care providers in SVK Province and the villagers understood that the 
exemptions were for 'the destitute', not for them who were 'the poor'. The villagers did 
not expect free care from the providers and the providers felt reluctant to provide free 
care to the poor. The policy makers were not aware of the sensitivity between 'the 
poor' and 'the destitute'. The official policy on exemptions to the poor existed on paper 
and was endorsed by the government but political support for the implementation of 
the exemption policy was questionable. Political support is essential for the successful 
implementation of national pol icies. Political stability In Lao PDR is not a problem 
because there is only one party. The Party and the governm ent are naturally 
connected to each other. Theoretically, the political party formulates poliCies and the 
government finds the best ways of implementing them. When problems occur, the 
government responds to the Party's criticism and the people's criticism. Why the issue 
of health care costs for the poor had not become identified as a problem could not be 
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answered by this research. The complex interrelation of political support, accountability 
of the government and criticism of the Party's and government's performance by 
people regarding the exemption policy would require further investigation. 
The Lao experience reflects findings from some other countries emerging from 
communism. For example as found in the literature reviewed earlier, user fee policy in 
Vietnam was harmful to the poor and the exemptions to protect the very poor from 
treatment fees worked poorly in practice (Sepehri et al. 2003; Segall et al. 2002; Ensor 
and San 1996). catastrophiC health expenditure and impoverishment were found in 
Vietnam (Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2002). It should be noted that Vietnam and Lao PDR 
had some similarities. For example both countries had communist ideology, had 
transitional economies in the same period (1986-1990), and currently are in a 
liberalizing climate policy. 
9.4.3 Improving financial protection for the poor and the less-poor 
Generally, the cost at the public provider did not matter if (1) the patient was willing 
and able to pay for the cost of treatment or (2) the patient did not shoulder the full 
cost from their own pocket. Unfortunately, neither of these scenarios applied for the 
majority in the current situation in Lao PDR. The villagers did not have the ability to 
pay at all as they still lived in difficult circumstances and were very poor (an average 
consumption at 0.80 USD per person per day) which made the expensive services at 
public health providers well beyond their reach. The villagers also had to shoulder the 
full cost from their pocket as no health fina ncial protection system was provided for 
them - even the exemption for the poor did not work well. Ideally, the system could 
work in two ways - (1) by increasing the ability of the villagers to pay, e.g. reducing 
poverty or generating more income to the households and (2) by improving protection 
for the patient from paying user fees at public health providers. This idea is supported 
by Anderson and Newman (1973) who argue that among the three main determinants 
of health service use, enabling factors are the most mutable. This is important in 
developing policy to promote equita ble access to health services. It can be argued that 
the option (1) would be more difficult than the option (2). Poverty reduction would 
involve multi-sector development and be a long term process. When poverty reduction 
results in more income in the poor household to increase their necessary consumption, 
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it is still uncertain whether they would be willing to pay for health care. Households 
usually give high priority to food, shelter, clothes and tools for production, especially 
when they are ultra-poor. Investment in schOOling for children and saving for health 
care might not be their top priority. In addition, increasing willingness to pay for health 
care depends not only on the availability of money but also on other factors such as 
quality of care. Moreover, this study did not suggest poverty reduction as the first 
priority of the policy options because this is already within the responsibility of the 
Poverty Reduction Fund and it is hoped that this fund will achieve its objectives. 
The latter option, improving protection for the poor, is necessary in the health care 
delivery system where financial barriers inhibit access to public health services. This is 
the prime concern of the study. The findings from the study were analysed in line with 
the current context in Lao PDR. The study left some options of protecting the poor 
such as direct targeting (by maintaining Decree 52 with an im proved Implementation 
process), equity funds and cash transfers out of the suggestions. One of the main 
reasons for this was because of the existing framework of health Insurance schemes 
stipulated in the Curative Law 2005 and options were sought which were consistent 
with this framework. The study then suggested a financing model for protecting the 
poor and the less-poor applying the current CBHI with some modification. The 
characteristics of the two schemes for protecting the poor and the less-poor mainly 
came close to the common characteristics of community-financing defined by Jakab 
and Krishnan (2004), except for the characteristic of mandatory membership for the 
poor and the non-poor (table 9.2). 
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Table 9.2 Characteristics of the two schemes for the poor and the less-poor 
compared to a common concept of community-financing 
Characteristics of community-financing * 
• The community (geographic, religious, 
professional, ethnic) is actively engaged In 
mobilizing, pooling, and allocating resources 
for health care. 
• The benefiCiaries of the scheme have 
predominantly low Income, earning a 
subsistence from the Informal sector (rural 
and urban), or are socially excluded. 
• The schemes are based on voluntary 
engagement of the community (although 
not necessarily of the Individual community 
members). 
• The structure of resource mobilization and 
benefits reflect principles of solidarity. 
• The primary purpose of the scheme Is not 
commercial (that Is, not-for-profit). 
Characteristics of the two schemes for the 
poor and the less-poor ** 
• The two schemes have been designed to 
urge community participation. Villagers 
would be actively Involved not only In 
mobilizing, pooling and allocating resources 
but also In classifying members who would 
be in the poor scheme and the less-poor 
scheme. 
• The poor and the less-poor schemes would 
cover villagers who were not entitled to GES 
and SHI. 
• The poor would be automatically entitled to 
the scheme for the poor. The scheme for 
the less-poor would be a mandatory scheme 
in order to provide financial protection for 
the entire people. 
• The two schemes would be financed by tax 
and household pre-payment premium. The 
resources could reflect the principles of 
solidarity within the village, the sub-district, 
the district and the province. 
• The MOH would be In charge for 
administration, management, monitoring 
and evaluating. 
Note: * quoted from Jakab and Krishnan (2004) 
** The financing model proposed In this study 
The two schemes for the poor and the less-poor can be discussed according to three 
criteria of the health financing sub-functions: revenue collection, pooling and 
purchasing, as proposed by carrin et al (2005). For revenue collection, as enrolment of 
the two schemes for the poor and the less-poor was designed on a mandatory basis, 
membership would cover everyone in the village. It effectively provides an opportunity 
for financial protection of the vulnerable groups. The poorest would be included in the 
scheme, unlike the CBHI of other countries which usually do not recruit the poorest 
and socially excluded (Jakab and Krishnan 2004). The scheme for the less-poor was 
designed to be financed by households' prepayment premium. Nevertheless, carrin et 
al. (2005) suggested that within the context of CBHI, apart from household 
contributions, other contributions coming from central and/or local government, 
national or intern ational NGOs and bilateral donors could be sources of finance. For 
pooling, a combination of the two schemes together offers the best risk pooling 
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because every villager would be automatically entitled to either one scheme or the 
other. This design definitely could avoid the problem of adverse selection, the main 
obstacle in a voluntary CBHI scheme. It could allow redistributio n of the financial risk 
from high risk to low risk members and from wealthier to poorer members which would 
adequately offer financial protection for the needy. For purchasing, a contractual model 
with capitation was suggested to pay providers. The benefit package included OP 
services and hospital admiss ions. It was hoped that catastrophic expenditure could be 
avoided and the risk of impoverishment could be reduced. 
Importantly, not only financial barriers but also other important determinants of access 
and use of health services must be improved. As shown earlier, the financing model 
suited areas where local public providers and communities were ready to respond to 
health services but was not appropriate in remote areas where villagers had difficulty 
in reaching public health care providers. Hence, the financing model for the poor and 
the less-poor would be practical when the health delivery systems are fairly well 
functioning to provide comprehensive services (e.g. curative care, health education, 
health promotion and disease prevention) to communities and communities have good 
enough health education and attitudes to respond to the health system. At the least, 
there must be a sufficient number of health facilities with proper distribution between 
rural and urban areas and adequate supplies of medicines in hospitals and competent 
staff to provide services. 
The financing model of schemes for the poor and less-poor was proposed on the basis 
of in-depth studies in a few villages in one province, plus data collection from some 
public providers as well as extensive policy maker interviews and review of 
documentation. It is therefore necessary to have further exploration and assessment of 
acceptability and feasibility in a larger sample size of public health care providers and 
households, in order to be more confident a bout the suggested model. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
This is the final chapter of the thesis. It presents what the study has accomplished 
according to the objectives of the study. The study aimed to contribute to health 
financing policy on how to improve protection of the poor from health expenditure. The 
study's objectives were to (1) assess the socio-economic circumstances of villages and 
distinguish poverty differences between households, (2) assess health service 
utilization patterns and household Illness costs, (3) assess Illness cost burden to 
households including identifying catastrophic health expenditure of households and 
assess the strategies households use to cope with costs of Illness with an emphasis on 
taking up the exemption mechanism, (4) assess public health' care providers' behaviour 
and attitudes on exemption mechanisms, (5) assess the perceptions and preferences 
of national policy makers on fee exemption policy and implementation, and (6) analyse 
the financial implications of alternative protection mechanisms, and identify 
implications for pro-poor financing and suggest a financially viable financing model to 
improve ways of protecting the poor. 
The first section of the chapter presents conclusions on the main findings relating to 
the study objectives. The second section provides policy recommendations for the 
overall findings learnt in the study. The third section describes the contributions of the 
study to knowledge in the health care financing arena. The last section highlights areas 
for further research. 
10.1 Conclusions of findings 
The four sampled villages had difficult living conditions - a consumption level of less 
than 1 USD per person per day, facing hunger, poor infrastructure, Inadequate water, 
unsafe potable water, inconvenient transportation, poor hygiene and sanitation and 
poor access to public services. Their conditions were typical of rural areas without road 
of the Lao PDR. Between the villages, geography was the main determinant influencing 
the villagers' activity. The closer to the main road and market a village was, the more 
advantage it had in terms of solving a problem e.g. earning Income, combating 
hunger, and accessing health facilities when ill. Within the village, the poorer 
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households were more vulnerable to food insecurity, precarious shelter, fewer livestock 
and resources and need for hospital admission. 
Many of the villagers could not access health services when ill and some faced the 
negative outcome of death or disability. Predisposing components, enabling resources 
and illness level influenced the villagers' treatment seeking behaviour. The local 
facilities were the first choice whereas the public health providers were the last resort 
for the villagers due to many determinants e.g. physical access, financial barriers and 
perception of symptoms. Health services at public providers were the most expensive 
compared to those at local providers. User fees either small or large could cause 
household catastrophic health expenditure in all wealth grou ps, but were concentrated 
in the remote area and the worst-off and the middle group. Ethnic practices (e.g. using 
Heel) appeared to be one determinant for pushing households to catastrophic health 
expenditure. Some households could deal with the crisis themselves using a variety of 
coping strategies. However, the household who did not have coping strategies could be 
impoverished as a result of illness. The villagers did not expect any help f rom the 
government, including exemptions at public health providers. They did, however, hope 
to be allowed delayed payment when their cash was insufficient. 
Since 1995, the government has had the intention to protect the poor by offiCially 
endorsing and implementing the national policy on user fees and exemptions at public 
providers. The policy makers and providers were not aware of the actual objectives of 
the policy. The exemption policy has suffered from many implementation problems; 
informational, administrative, resource, socio-cultural and political constraints. The 
MOH did not have information about the poor due to lack of clear criteria to identify 
the poor. As a result, there was no financial support to the providers who granted the 
exemptions. The three key stakeholders had different perceptions and interpretation of 
details of the user fee and exemption policy. These resulted in a wide ra nge of 
practices on fee schedule, retention of fee revenues, restriction of exemption provision, 
and reporting system. Providers received little support from the government budget 
and they mainly operated by using the fee revenues. 
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The overall conditions were less beneficial to the poor and could even be harmful to 
the poor by discouraging them from using public health services. The study suggested 
a financing model to improve health financial protection to the poor and the less-poor. 
The government budget was financially capable of subsidizing the scheme for the poor. 
The mandatory contributory scheme for the less-poor was acceptable and financially 
feasible in the two sample villages. In theory, the suggested two schemes could 
achieve the objectives of the health financing sub-functions; revenue collection, risk 
pooling and purcha sing health services, and they would adequately protect the poor 
and the less-poor from financial risk. In order to successfully implement the new two 
schemes, prerequisite conditions of the health delivery system must be fulfilled before 
implementation and four groups of constraints found from the exemption policy 
implementation must be overcome. 
From the findings, it could be concluded that the villagers did not get much benefit 
from public investment for their routine lives e.g., transport infrastructure, public wells, 
hygiene and sanitation. When the villagers had a crisis such as facing hunger or 
getting sick, they managed the crisis by themselves with little support from the 
government. The worst-off (in terms of wealth and setting) were more vulnerable to 
crisis. Public health investment did not function effectively in areas such as maternal 
and child health services and public health training of VH V and TBA. Non -public health 
providers (e.g. traditional healers, private practitioners, private clinic, and private drug 
store) were significant for villagers because they were easily accessible and cheaper 
than public providers. Health services at public health providers were expensive but 
effective. Physical accessibility and user fees were barriers for villagers to using public 
health services. The government did not ensu re proper and equal access to public 
health services when needed. The user fee policy was successfully implemented for 
raising revenue and, to some extent, could improve th e quality of health services e.g. 
through replenishing drug supplies. However, the user fee policy did not accomplish its 
other two potential goals: to improve the efficiency of the health system and to 
promote equity of access to health services. The exemption policy has been 
ineffectively implemented which has resulted in no actual mechanism to protect the 
poor from paying user fees at public health providers. The government was not able to 
protect people, especially the poor, from catastrophiC expenditure and impoverishment 
due to illness cost. The situation urgently called for a major reform. The exploration of 
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the financing model to improve health financial risk protection for the poor and the 
less-poor suggested this financing model was theoretically possible when prerequisite 
conditions of the health system were in place and the system was ready to serve the 
goal of health financial risk protection. However, this is a huge challenge for the 
government. 
10.2 Policy recommendations 
Although the study focused on a system to protect the poor from health financial risk, 
the findings clea rly indicate that policy recommendations could go beyond that. Efforts 
to protect the poor and the less-poor are essential and a multi-sectoral approach to 
improve household living conditions is vital. This section will propose recommendations 
in the light of the conclusions specific to living conditions in the first sub-section. Policy 
recommendations related to health can be drawn for two main issues; (1) the health 
delivery system in order to ensure access by the household to health services when 
needed and (2) health financial risk protection for the poor and the less-poor. These 
two issues will be separately recommended in the second and third sub-sections. 
Living conditions 
Villagers need focused attention from the government in order to provide an 
acceptable standard of living conditions in rural areas, especially the remote areas. The 
most urgent focus should be on food security or better opportunity for agriculture, 
followed by other elements e.g. safe potable water, adequate water supply, hygiene, 
sanitation, and transportation. It would be helpful if the government were to provide a 
social safety net for the households by strengthening the social network within the 
community, for example to intensify inter-household support for combating lack of rice 
and hunger or to make support more systematic. Hygiene and sanitation could be 
improved through routine activities e.g. eating and drinking habits by promoting hea Ith 
education. It is hoped that these deficiencies in rural area of Lao PDR will be remedied 
by the NGPES. 
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Health care deliyerv 
The study recommends urgent action from the MOH to ensure access to health care 
services when it is needed by households in order to prevent negative health outcomes 
of death or disability, especially for curable disease. Health care delivery systems are 
fundamental for improving health financial risk protection for the poor and the less-
poor. The MOH should promote equity in access to public health providers among 
households belonging to different wealth groups and among villages with different 
geography. Basic health interventions like maternal and child services should be 
enthusiastically implemented by public health providers at all levels and intensively 
monitored by the MOH. Use of health services at the nearest health centre should be 
promoted because it is the cheapest (both service cost and transportation cost) among 
public providers. 
Further suggestions for health delivery relate to local and private providers - to 
reinforce the VHV and RDF and to formalize and strengthen existing traditional healer 
and private practitioners which were usually the first source of care. Available VHVs 
need to be trained and regularly supervised by senior health personnel In order to 
improve their capacity and to encourage them to playa major role In health 
development e.g. disease prevention and health promotion and health education in the 
community, rather than concentrate only on the distribution of medicines. An 
appropriate workload for each VHV should be taken into account. A VHV should not be 
a village head or village committee member who already has many tasks in hand. It is 
not necessary to invest in RDFs at village level where the village is locate d near a 
market and the villagers can easily access private drug stores. The private practitlone rs 
and healers in the village can be registered in the official health delivery system. They 
could be trained, supervised and evaluated by the staff of the health centre or district 
health office in order to ensure the quality of care that patients would get from them. 
In addition, policy attention should be given to the specific needs of the ethnic groups 
living in remote areas. Relevant actions might include: improving quality in remote 
facilities or strengthening traditional healers or licensing private practitioners to provide 
mobile care in remote areas. Action could be taken to promote health education on 
villagers' knowledge, attitude and practice about choosing services in order to avoid 
catastrophic expenditure from ethnic minority g roup practices such as Heet 
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Improving health financial risk protecti on to the poor and the less-poor 
The suggested financing model on the two schemes for protecting the poor and the 
less-poor from health financial risk would lead to a dramatic reform in the health 
financing system in Lao PDR. It would transform the financing system which is based 
on income from households' out-of-pocket expenditure into a system based on 
prepayment and tax-funding. A small amount of co-payment for user fees at point of 
service is recommended. This would preserve the providers' and the households' belief 
in the necessity of paying user fees. These are from the analysis of the study which 
took into account contextual factors or local conditions. It is recommended that this 
financing model must be further investigated in terms of the feasibility of the model 
from both demand and supply sides. If it appears feasible at national level, it needs 
also to be scrutinized in term s of the interests of concerned partners and the reactions 
of these partners to policy content, as suggested by Walt (1994). 
Implementation of the new two schemes would definitely require tremendous effort to 
overcome foreseen and unforeseen difficulties. The recommendations to deal with 
problems learnt from the implementation of Decree 52 PM can be drawn (table 10.1). 
Main recommendations are (1) clear policy statement with policy vision and goals, (2) 
official endorsement and political commitment, (3) strong leadership of the MOH to 
effectively implement the policy and (4) sufficient and sustainable financial 
compensation on health care costs to providers. 
The financing model for protecting the poor and less-poor from financial risk assumed 
no new investment in infrastructure and human resources. The model, then, could be 
applicable in some areas but not in other areas. In fact, the Lao health delivery system 
requires progressive development in order to ensure proper access to health services 
for the unwell. It is recommended that before the further development of mechanisms 
for financial protection, the M OH should seriously improve infrastructure and human 
resources in terms of adequacy and equitable distribution throughout the country. An 
accreditation system for health services is advocated in order to guar antee the 
standard of care offered by the providers which will encourage villagers to access and 
use public health services. 
294 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
Table 10.1 Policy recommendations based on lessons learnt from the 
implementation of Decree 52 PM 
Four groups of problems 
limited the success of 
exemption policy 
Implementation * 
• Informational constraints 
• Administrative constraints 
• Resource constraints 
• Soclo-cultural and political 
constraints 
Recommendations on the Implementation of the two 
schemes to protect the poor and the less-poor ** 
• Clear policy statements, objectives and contents 
• Identify the poor using wealth ranking by villager 
committee members 
• Production of practical guidelines 
• Strong leadership of the government (the MOH) to 
Implement the new two schemes with competent 
capacity to translate policy Into Implementation 
• Clear communication between policy makers and 
providers through effective approaches e.g. meetings, 
supervision visits, etc 
• Public Information campaign e.g. meetings with village 
leaders 
• Establish strong supervision of the MOH to local level 
• Establish effective monitoring system 
• Sufficient and sustainable resources to compensate 
providers on health costs 
• Support to using the existing local funds at local level 
(through decentralization) 
• Create awareness of the same understanding among 
stakeholders 
• OffiCial endorsement of the policy 
• Strong political commitment on Implementation 
Note: * Based on Gilson et al. (1995) 
** Recommended by the researcher 
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10.3 Contribution to knowledge 
In the international literature, studies relating to the implementation of user fees and 
exemptions policy have mainly been conducted in African countries (Russell and Gilson 
1997; WHO 2003; Creese and Kutzin 1995). A few multi-country studies have reviewed 
Asian countries e.g. Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand (Bitran and Giedion 2003) and 
a few have examined individual countries e.g. Thailand (Mills 1991; Gilson et al. 1998) 
and Vietnam (Sepehri et al. 2003; Segall et al. 2002; Ensor and San 1996). Only one 
study was carried out in Lao PDR (Paphassarang et al. 2002). Most studies have 
explored policy content and examined the effectiveness of the policy at the providers 
and/or the community level. 
Studies have rarely conducted comprehensive research on exemption policy Including 
information from policy makers, public health care providers and households ranging 
from the national to the community level. Two comprehensive studies have been 
carried out. One was conducted in Thailand, 'Exempting the Poor: A Review and 
Evaluation of the Low Income Card Scheme in Thailand', by Gilson et al. (1998). 
Another is this thesis. 
In addition to the research on the exemption policy, this thesis has contributed 
knowledge on health seeking experiences, cost burden indudi ng catastrophic 
expenditure in rural Lao POR and the strategies used to cope with illness-related costs, 
which have not previously been reported in the international literature. The thesiS 
identified catastrophic health expenditure of households in Lao POR, which is the first 
ever investigation in Lao PO R. 
The study demonstrates that wealth ranking by FGOs is feasible with cautious use. 
Wealth ranking can be used as a tool for identifying the worst-off households which 
comprise about 28% of the total households in villages in the rural areas of Lao. The 
study shows that wealth ranking results are fairly reliable for the top and the bottom 
households but its application must be prudent. The results from the Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) show that the mean score of the asset index obtained by 
the village census using household assets reasonably correlated with the results of the 
wealth ranking by FGOs. In every village, the better-off had the highest asset index 
296 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
score, the middle had a lower score and the worst-off had the lowest score. It was 
found that wealth ranking can differentiate the better-off from the worst-off but it 
cannot distinguish well the middle group. Wealth rankin g could be considered as a tool 
for identifying the poor in a setting where there is a lack of information to identify the 
poor. If it is used, its results must be carefully checked. It will be especially useful in 
developing countries where the majority of people reside in rural areas and work 
outside the formal market economy so that data on earnings are often not obtainable. 
In addition to identifying the poor, wealth ranking by FGDs could be used to examine 
equity in the health system. Other studies found in the international literature mostly 
measured health equity using quantitative data on household income or expenditure as 
mentioned earlier. 
Household income, expenditure and consumption are the most important parameters 
for measuring household catastrophiC health expenditure. Ideally, they should be 
obtained from every sampled household but, generally, this is costly and time-
consuming. Based on Health Economic Approaches (Seaman et al. 2000), this study 
constructed a framework for quantifying household consumption using wealth ranking 
by FGDs and a consumption survey in some sample households in each wealth group. 
This framework was practical and achieved the aim of quantifying an average 
household consumption per person per day for each wealth group. After that, it was 
possible to estimate the consumption of every household based on the number of 
members of each household. As a result, the study suggests the framework as an 
optional approach for quantifying household income, expenditure or consumption, 
especially where there are time constraints or budget limitations. 
The study revealed limitations of research on health care expenditure if only 
quantitative methods were used. The level of catastrophic health expenditure did not 
always echo the severity of household financial hardship from health costs. The actual 
consequences of catastrophiC illness cost for household livelihood depend on the 
capacity of the household to absorb health costs e.g. level of household income, 
capacity to mobilise additional resources. Some households could cope well and did not 
suffer from a 'catastrophiC' level of costs whereas some households were 
impoverished. In contrast, a zero value of health care cost (by not seeking care) did 
not always reflect a satisfactory consequence to the household. Some households 
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could easily recover from illness whereas for others the result was the catastrophic 
health outcome of disability or death. The situation was especially sad if the disease 
was curable. The study emphasized the value of a combination of quantitative methods 
for indicating the presence of the problem of catastrophic health expenditure and 
qualitative methods (e.g. household in-depth interview) to gain more insights about its 
consequences for household livelihood. Research on catastrophic health expenditure 
needs to be supplemented by a concern for catastrophic health outcomes, especially in 
least developed countries where problems of access to health care mean that need for 
health care is not necessarily translated into expenditure. 
The study also contributes data on the importance of compensation on health care 
costs to providers who granted exemptions. Inadequate or no financial support to 
providers makes the exemption policy far from a reality. The study showed a 
significant issue on the delicate definition of who is eligible for exemption which has 
never been reported in international literature. The definition of the poor and the 
destitute was one of the main factors undermining the success of the exemption policy. 
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10.4 Further research in Lao PDR 
This study has achieved the objective of addressing households' experience of health 
seeking, health care costs and coping strategies. However, the findings are from only 
four villages in a rural area. It could be expanded to cover a larger sample size of 
households and to urban settings which may have different result from a rural setting. 
Factors influencing the success of the exemption policy have been identified. A 
financing model for financial protection has been suggested based on the analysis of 
findings of the study and the current context and assessment of financial viability. 
Further research on providers and policy makers could aim to have a better 
understanding of (1) government capacity to implement policy, (2) the process of 
policy formulation and im plementation that favour the poor under a socialist ideology 
and (3) health financing under the decentralized system e.g. financing role of central 
government, local governor and public health providers. Research into the reactions of 
all concerned partners to the recommended policy options would serve to corroborate 
or refute the options a nd would com plete the process of policy development. 
The study has also indicated gaps in knowledge regarding health care finanCing. It 
found that many households, especially in rural areas, commonly adopted cost 
prevention by not seeking care when ill. This led to 'catastrophic health outcomes' of 
disability or death which then led to the impoverishment of some households and was 
considered as serious as catastrophiC health expenditure. The study was not designed 
to quantify how serious or how large this problem is. Research to quantify the 
magnitude of the problem and demonstrate the consequences of inaccessibility to 
health services is needed in order to shape a policy of improving infrastructure and 
health personnel of both the public and private sectors, Including local health facilities. 
Further research should pay greater attention not only to catastrophiC economic 
outcomes due to health care cost but also to the catastrophiC health outcomes of 
death or disability due to the inaccessibility of health services. 
The study found that the traditional ceremony of Heetis a special event in the 
household which is extremely costly. The ceremony was adopted only by the Lao 
Theung ethnic group, not the Lao Lum and it led to catastrophiC health expenditure in 
two households out of a total of three households. The findings suggest that health 
299 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
financial risk might be influenced by ethnic group. Further research in Lao PDR should 
assess the significance of ethnic minority groups, Lao Sung (10%) and Lao Theung 
(24% of total population), in term s of differences In health seeking patterns, health 
care costs and health outcomes. It also calls for the attention of international research 
on catastrophic health expenditure in relation to ethnic minorities. 
This study used a village census (cross sectional survey) and one-off household in-
depth interview to present the impact of health care costs on the household economy. 
It presented the strategies used by the household to mobilize resources for health 
care. It was not able to track the long term consequences of health care costs on the 
household. For example in the case of borrowing, It was not known how long the 
household had to repay debt, if the household suffered damaging cuts in consumption 
or if the household livelihood changed. Further research using longitudinal qualitative 
methods is suggested in order to gain insight Into how illness and Its costs affect 
household livelihood over time. Longitudinal household research can explain the 
processes of links between illness cost, impoverishment and livelihood change (R ussell 
and Gilson 2006). It will improve understanding on the demand-side which will be 
useful for policy options on improving health financial risk protection and health system 
performance. 
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Questionnaire For Cross-sectional Household Interview 
Interview date: ....................................... ·········· ............................ Vlllage ............................................................... . 
Ethnic group of hh head ............................................................... Religlon of hh head .......................................... . 
A: FAMILY STRUCTURE (Individuals age 15+, mother/guardians answer for Individuals < 15 and 60+) 
ID Name Relationship Sex Age Date Place of Birth Marital Literacy Highest 
to hh head of birth assistant status level of 
birth Read &. write education 1. Head 1. M (record 1. Husband 1. Single completed 2. Spouse 2. F edln 1. Farm 2. Relative 2. Married 
3. Own child comple 2. House 3. TBA 3. Widowed 1. Easily 
4. Step child ted 3.HC 4. H worker 4. Divorced 2. Difficult 
O.No 
5. Adopted child years, 4.DH S. No assist s. Separated 3. Not at all 
1. Primary 
6. Parent If age S.PH 6. Other 6. Ever· 9. OK 
2. Secondary 
7. Brother/sister less 6. other specify ....... married but 
3. Higher 
8. Grand child than 1 specify ... unknown (member 6+) 4. Non-formal 
9. Aunt/uncle 9. OK status 
curriculum 
year, S. Studying 10. Parent In-law record 9. OK 
11. Daughter/son "OOH, 9. OK 
In-law 99-
12. Sister/brother OK, do 
In-law not 
13. Other relatives know) 
14. Non-relative, 
servants 
Al A2 A3 A4 AS A6 A7 AS A9 AIO All 
R W 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
OS 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
315 
Occupation or main duties Disability 
ID In the past 12 months, what are your Is there any Type of 
main occupations or main duties? disabled disability 
person In the 
1. Growing rice household? 1. Visual 
2. Growing vegetable disability or 
3. Fishing [ ] Yes blindness 4. Rear livestock 2. Deaf or hard 
5. Sawing [ ] No of hearing 
6. Student 3. Mute 
7. House duties: manual husk rice, carrying water mark [/] to 4. Deaf and 8. Other house duties ......... mute 
9. Other specify ...... Indicate who 5. Body 
Is disabled disability (arm, 
mark [ I ] In item they usually do leg) 
6. Multiple 
disability 
7. Other .... 
Al2 Al3 Al" Al5 Al6 Al7 Al8 Al9 A20 A21 A22 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Ask part H: IMMUNIZAnON MODULE (children under 5 years old) 
before going to part B: BIRTH 
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Have ever get 
services (OP/IP) 
cause of PH DH Specify 
disability DH 
1. Since birth 1V 1V 
2. War 2N 2N 
3. Accident 
4. Drug 
5. Illness 
6. Other ...... 
A23 A24 A25 A26 
B: BIRTH (Individuals women 15-49) 
ID Have you Have How many For the For the How many How many How many How Age of 
ever you had abortions last last total live live births live births many your first 
gotten any have you pregnancy pregnancy, births are are deaths? pregnancy 
pregnant? abortion had? where did how many have you currently currently 
in the you get IT doses had In living In living In 
1. Yes course ........ ANC? did you your life? the same other 
2. No of your get? house? house? 
9. OK life? O. Never 
1. T8A Specify 
loYes 2.HC number of 
2. NO 3.0H IT doses 
9. OK 4. PH 
5. Other ... O. No 
1 
2 
3 
9. OK 
61 62 63 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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c: DEATH (Individuals women age 15-49 who have died children) 
No. of Name Sex Age at How Place of Cause of death Before Which type of health care providers did s/he 
death death many death death, did obtain before death? 
1. M years s/he 
cross 2. F ...... ago 1. Farm 1. homicide obtain any 1. Friend 
check did 2. Home 2. Commit health 2. Seang- Pao 
with s/he 2.HC suicide services? 3. Yao 
total die? 3.DH 3. Traffic 4. Herb 
death 4. PH accident 1. Yes 5. Health practitioner 
.... 5. On the 4. Drown 2. No 6.VHV 
way 5. Other 9.DK 7. Drug store 
6. Other ... accident 8. Private clinic 
6. Die during 9.HC 
pregnancy, 10. DH 
labor or 42 days 11. PH 
after birth 12. CH 
7. Illness 13. Private hospital 
8. Other ...... 14. Other ... 
9.DK 
Mark / for which Item used 
C2 C3 C4 CS C6 C7 • ... SI ... ~ ::l ~ ~ :! !:: !! !!: Ii! ... C1 ... N U U U U U U U U U U U U u u 
... N ,., .. 
III '" "- CD 
'" 
5! ... :::l ::l ~ ... 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
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D: INSURANCE, ILLNESS AND UTlUSATION (Individuals age 15+, mother/guardians answer for 
Individuals <15 and 60+) 
Insurance OP in the past 2 weeks IP In the last 12 mo. Exemptions and debt (In general) 
10 Insurance In the How How In the How many Do you Have you ever Have you ever 
scheme past 2 many many past 12 times had know about had experience on been put Into debt 
weeks times days months, you exemption? exemptions at list of the health 
O. No did were were have stayed In public health care providers? 
1. GES you you ill In you not you the 1. Yes providers? 
2. 555 get ill the past able te stayed hospitals? 2. No l.Yes 
3.CBHI or not 2 weeks gote at l.Yes 2. No 
4. Other .... feeling work or health .............. 2.No 
well? school provider 
........ because 5 e.g • Individual Individual age Individual age 
l.Yes of the He,OH, age 15+ 15+ 15+ 
2.No last PH, 
episode private 
of hospital? 
Illness? 
l.Yes 
..... 2.No 
01 02 03 D4 OS D6 07 08 09 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Note: ThiS page IS filter or screening questions. If yes for OP or IP, a separated questionnaire Will 
be used. If yes for exemptions, this will be a household in-depth interview. 
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E: DWELUNG-RELATED INDICATORS (Head of household and his or her spouse) 
1. Ownership status 
] 1. Owner 
[ ] 2. Rent 
] 4. Government or employer's house (no rent paid) 
] S. Other specify ........................ .. 
[ ] 3. Co-habltat without rent 
2. Major construction material: 
Roof 
TIle 
Zinc sheet 
Wood (Paen) 
Concrete 
Bamboo (Mai PaKJ 
Dry leaf (Sai To/idJ 
Dry arass ( Yaa) 
Others soecifv ........ 
Walls Floor 
--
3. What is the observed structural condition of the main dwelling? 
[ ] 1. seriously dilapidated ] 2. Needs major repairs 
4. What Is the electricity supply? 
[ ] 1. No ] 2. Yes, shared connection 
5. What Is the main source of lighting In your dwelling? 
] 1. Electricity ] 4. Battery flashlights 
[ ] 2. Kerosene, oil or gas lamps [ ] 5. No lights 
[ ] 3. candles 
6. What type of cooking-fuel source primarily Is used? 
] 1. Dung [ ] 4. Charcoal 
[ ] 2. Collected wood [ ] 5. Gas 
[ ] 3. Purchased wood [ ] 6. Electrldty 
7. What Is the main source of water for general used, drinking and cooking? 
General used Drinking 
Ploeline 
Ground water 
Well water 
Pond/River 
Rainwater 
Other soeclfv ........ 
To describe containers and 
take photo 
8. How do you treat your drinking water? (multiple choice of 1-3) 
[ ] 1. Nothing [ ] 3. Filter 
] 3. Sound structure 
] 3. Yes, own connection 
Cooklna 
[ ] 2. Boil ] 4. Add chemical/disinfectant/setting agent 
9. What type of toilet fadlity is available? 
] 1. Bush, field, or no facility 
[ ] 2. Pit toilet 
] 3. Flush toilet 
] 4. Other ....................... .. 
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F: Food security 
1. For the previous harvest season, for how many months did your household have enough rice of your own 
for consumption? 
Answer .................................. months 
2. In case that your household had not enough rice of your own for the whole year consumption, how do you 
deal with the problem? 
Answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... , ....................... . 
...................................................................................................................... , ............................................................ . 
..................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
3. Refer to above question; did you successfully deal with the lack of rice of your own? (adequate rice to 
consume) 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
4. For the previous harvest season, for how many months did your household have at least one day in the 
month without enough to eat? 
Answer ................................ months 
5. In case that your household faced hunger, how do you deal with the problem? 
Answer 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
6. For this harvest season 
Paddy stickY rice 
4.1 Has in the stock (how much, unit) 
4.2 Is it enough for the whole year consumption of your household? (1. Yes 2. No) 
4.3 If no from previous Q, how long can your household consume this amount? 
(from rno ....... to mo .......... ) 
4.4 Is it enough for sale or lending to someone? (1. Yes 2. No) 
4.5 If yes from previous Q, apart from household consumption, how much the total sale 
value or lending value will be? (unit of rice and price per unit) 
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G: Assets Number of selected assets owned by household 
Asset type Number owned Resale value at current market price 
Livestock 
1. Buffalo 
2. Cow 
3. Pig 
4. Goat 
5. Turkey 
6. Duck 
7. Chicken 
Transportation assets 
1. Cars 
2. Tak-Tak 
3. Motorcycles 
4. Bicycles 
5. Motor-boat 
Appliances 
1. Pan 
2. Pots for cooking 
3. Spade of frying pan 
4. Long-handle ladle 
5. Knife 
6. Tray for serving meal 
7. Bowl 
8. Spoon 
9. Mattress 
10. Blanket 
11. Television 
12. Video CD 
13. Refrigerator 
14. Electric cooker 
15. Gas cooker 
16. Electric kettle 
17. Washing machines 
18. Radio 
19. Fan 
20. Air condition 
21. Telephone 
22. Mobile phone 
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H. Immunization (Children under 5 years old) 
HH ID .................................... Name of HH head ......................................... . 
Child ID ................................. Chlld name .................................................... . 
Record from an Immunization card 
Yes 1 Day/month/year 
No 2 
-_/ __ /_---
DK9 
1. Is there a vaccination record card for this child? 
2.BCG 
3. Check BCG scar 
4. DPTl +Hep B 
5. DPT2+Hep B 
6. DPT3+Hep B 
7.0PVl 
8.0PV2 
9.0PV3 
10. Measles or MMR 
Mother's report when an Immunization card Is not available 
Yes 1 Number: 
No2 
DK9 
1. Has this child ever been given a BCG vaccination --
against tuberculosis-that is, an injection in the 
left shoulder that caused a scar? 
2. Check BCG scar --
3. Has this child ever been given "vaccination 
injectlons"-that Is, an injection in the thigh or 
buttocks-to prevent him/her from getting 
tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, Hepatitis 
B? How many times? 
4. Has this child ever been given "vaccination 
dropsn-tO prevent him/her from getting 
POUO? How many times has s/he been given 
these drops? 
5. Has this child ever been given "vaccination 
Injectionsn-that Is, a shot In the arm, at the 
age of 9 months or older-to prevent him/her 
from getting MEASLES ('ihunnu.",,)? 
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ILLNESS IN THE PREVIOUS TWO WEEKS: UTILIZATION, TRANSPORTATION AND EXPENDITURE OF THE LAST EPISODE 
Village .. ... .............. ...................... ..... ... ......... Name of hh head ............................ ....... ..... ..... .... . .lD of hh member ......... .. ... ..... .. .. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
.~ 0 <is 
0 0 Qli'6 .c 
'" £:e (I) .J::. Cl >- .... ....,±! ... 
.J::. Cl C 
.J::. .c -tJ > Cl~ '" U '" a. (I) 8g 'Qj ~ '" 0 0 ... '" '" ... ::J a .~ 'c U :I: > III .J::. (I)", (I) (I) ... (I) :I: Cit> ctu :I: :I: °C 0 0 Z::J UlCl. ::E :I: :I: a. c > :I: 0 Cl. U Cl..J::. 
Marl< [ I ] if yes 
Sequencing 
Name ...... ...... . 
Mode of transportation 
Travel t ime from home 
(hours for one wayt 
1. Total Cash expenses 
(kip: 1.1-1.7) 
1.1 Transportation expenses 
1.2 User charges 
1.3 Payment for gratitude 
1.4 Buying drug outside 
1.5 Informal payments 
1.6 Expense for care giver 
1.7 Other expenses e.g. liquor 
2. Total in-kind expense 
(wha~ kip - 2.1-2.5) 
2.1 Sacrificed livestock for 
healer ........ ................ ...............• 
2.2 Sacrificed livestock for 
healer ........................ ....... ..... ... 
2.3 
, 
2.4 
I 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
.~ 0 ~ 
0 0 I .0 III £E ~ Qliii .c 0\ >- ......,~ .... 
.c 0\ c: 
.c .0 -t; > O\~ III U ilia. Ql 8g 'iii ~ III 0 .... III III .... 2,9 .<! 'c > VI .c QI III 0 QI QI .... Ql I ct:a U I I I .~ a ~ Z :::> UlQ.. ~ I I a. c: > o VI I 0 Q.. U Q.. .c 0 
2.5 
3. Grand total expenses 
(3=2+1) 
Did you have enough cash from 
your own pocket at that time to 
pay total cost? 
LYes 2. No 
Did you know about 
exemption? LYes 2.No 
Did you ask for exemptions? 
LYes 2.No 
Did you get exemptions? 
Specify ........ O.no 
Why don't you ask exemption? 
Multiple answers see code 
Had you been put into debt list? 
LYes 2.No 
How many times in debt list? 
Specify .. ..... .... ....... 
How much debt in total? 
Specify .. .......... 
Could you repay the debt? 
LYes 2.No 
How did you repay debt? 
LCash 2.In kind 3.L.abour 
Did anyone give you 
something? (who what kip) 
Source 1 
Source 2 
Source 3 
Source 4 
Source 5 
Did you borrow cash or 
livestock? (source and kip) 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
.~ 0 ciS 
0 0 
.0 It) o£B !!! .,"iii .c 0> >- .....,~ ... 
.c 0> c 
.c .0 -t > O>~ It) U 1t)Q. OJ 8g It) 0 ... It)", ... 2£ >- > III £ .Qj ~ 0 ., I ._ c U I I I OJ It) OJ ... OJ ~U .~ a Z ::> VIa.. ~ I I Q. C > o III I 0 a.. U a.. .c 0 
Source 1 
Source 2 
Source 3 
Source 4 
Source S 
. 
Did you sell livestock? 
(what kip) 
Livestock 1 
Livestock 2 
Livestock 3 
Livestock 4 
Livestock S 
Did you sale other assets? 
(what kiD) 
Asset 1 
Asset 2 
Asset 3 
Asset 4 
AssetS 
To sum up for a ll heaJtf1 fatil ities 
Total cash ex.pense = ................................................................................................................... . kip 
In-kind payment = .......................................... .................................................. .............................. kip 
Total cash and in-kind payment = ................................................... ... ................... ......................... kip 
How long does it take your household to normally earn this arnount? ......................................................... . 
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Mode of transportation 
1. Walking 3. Motortyde 5. Tak-Tak 
2.8ic.yde 4. car 6. Boat 
Reasons for don't ask exemption 
1. Do not know 4. There are worse off patients 
2. Not eligible 5. Quality of care might be reduc.ecJ 
3. Stigmatization 6. Staff reluctant to give free care 
IUNESS IN THE PREVIOUS lWO WEEKS 
7. Public car 
S.Other ......• 
7. Complex process, not convenient 
8. Other specify ............................... . 
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ADMISSION IN THE PREVIOUS TWELVE MONTHS: UTIUZATION, TRANSPORTATION AND EXPENDITURE OF THE LAST EPISODE 
Village .......................................................... Name of hh head .............. .. ............ ............ .... .... .. .10 of hh member ............ ... .. .... .. 
a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
.~ .8 clS 
a a ~~ 10 £:e .2l 
.c Cl ~ ... 
.c Cl c 
.c .c -tj > Cl~ 10 U lOa. QJ 8g 'iij ~ rao ... ra ra ... ~~ .2: 'c > til .c QJra a QJ QJ ... QJ :I: 6::0 u :I: :I: :I: 0t: 0 0 Z ~ VlCl. ::E :I: :I: a. c > :I: 0 Cl. U Cl..c 
Mark [ I ] if yes 
Sequencing 
Name .. ........... 
How many days did you spend 
in the provider? (days) 
Mode of transportation 
Travel time from home 
(hours for one way) 
1. Total cash expenses 
(kip: 1.1-1.7) 
1.1 Transportation expenses 
1.2 User charges 
1.3 Payment for gratitude 
1.4 Buying drug outside 
1.5 Informal payments 
1.6 Expense for care giver 
1.7 Other expenses e.g. liquor 
2 .• Total in-kind expense 
(what.. kip - 2.1-2.5) 
2.1 Sacrificed livestock for 
healer ... ............... ..................... . 
2.2 Sacrificed livestock for 
healer ....................................... 
2.3 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
.~ 0 cl5 0 0 I .0 nl £E (I) (1)<0 £ 01 >- ~ .~ ...... ~ ... £ 01 C £ .0 -tj > 01(1) nlQ. (I) nl 0 ~ nl nl ... ~ ... > \I) .t:: 8g 'Qi ~ 0 :I: ... 0 ._ c U :I: :I: (I) nl (I) ... (I) '- .::: :I: 'i: 0 0 z ~ V) 0. ~ :I: :I: Q. C > oti 0. u :I: 0 0. U o..t:: 
2.4 
2.5 
3. Grand total expenses 
(3-2+1) 
Did you have enough cash from 
your own pocket at that time to 
pay total cost? 
l.Yes 2. No 
Did you know about 
exemotion? l.Yes 2.No 
Did you ask for exemptions? 
l.Yes 2.No 
Did you get exemptions? 
Soedfv ......•. O.no 
Why don't you ask for 
exemption? Multiple answers, 
see code 
Had you been put into debt list? 
l.Yes 2.No 
How many times in debt list? 
Spedfv .... ...... ........ 
How much debt in total? 
Spedfy ............ 
Could you repay the debt? 
l.Yes 2.No 
How did you repay debt? 
l.ca.sh 2.In kind 3.labour 
Did anyone give you ! 
sornethina? (who, what. kip) 
Source! 
Source 2 
Source 3 
Source 4 
Source 5 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
g 0 olS 0 0 .0 
'" £:e (l.I QI "iii ~ C\ >- ni u ...., ±:! ... :!: C\ c ~ .0 -tl > cn~ "' 0. (l.I 8g 'cu ~ '" 0 ... '" '" ... 2.9 .~ 'c > '" ~ (l.I '" 0 (l.I (l.I ... (l.I :I: c5::a u :I: :I: :I: "t: a ..., Z::::I Vl~ ~ :I: :I: 0. C > 0 ", I 0 ~ u ~~ 0 
Did you borrow cash or 
livestock? (source and kiD) 
Source 1 
Source 2 
Source 3 
Source 4 
Source 5 
Did you sell livestock? 
(what kip) 
Livestock 1 
Livestock 2 
Livestock 3 
Livestock 4 
Livestock 5 
Did you sell other a.ssets? I I 
(what kip) I 
Asset 1 
Asset 2 
Asset 3 
Asset 4 
Asset 5 
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To sum up for all health facilities 
Total cash expense = .................................................................................................................... kip 
In-kind payment = .......................................................................................................................... kip 
Total cash and in-kind payment = .................................................................................................. kip 
How long does it take your household to llOI1llaily earn this amount? .......................................................... . 
Mode of transportation 
1. Walking 3. Motorcycle 5. Tak-Tak 7. Public car 
2. Bicyde 4. car 6. Boat S.Other ......• 
Reasons for don't ask exemption 
1. Do not know 4. There are worse off patients 7. COmplex process, not convenient 
2. Not eligible 5. Quality of care might be reduced 8. Other specify ..............................•. 
3. Stigmatization 6. Staff reluctant to give free care 
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Household Consumption Questionnaire 
Interview date .................................................................................................. .. 
Village ......................................... Name of hh head ........................................... . 
1. Non-food expense in the last 30 days (rather frequent) 
In the past 30 days, has any member of your hh spent money on any How much did How many months In 
of the following Items? your hh the past 12 months did 
spend? your hh . ..Ql!rchase? 
No Yes Kill per month Month 
1 Tobacco, Cigarettes, dgars 
2 Liquor 
3 Newspapers or magazines 
.. Lottery 
5 Fare for bus or gasoline 
6 Regular worship 
7 Battery charging 
8 Washing powder 
9 Seasoning powder 
10 
2. Non-food during the past 12 months 
Purchase Gift 
Has your hh bought, How much did your Old you receive What Is the 
spent money on any hh spend for [ITEM] any [ITEM] IS I value of III the [ITEM] during the during the past 12 gift during the [ITEM] thlt you 
past 12 months? months? past 12 months? received IS I 
Mark/ as yes 
gift during the 
past 12 months? 
MlrkilS.m 
Kip Kip 
1 Clothes 
2 Footwear 
3 Personal care (soap, 
shamDOO. toothoaste etc.) 
.. Personal service (haircuts, 
shaving, etc.) 
5 Medldnes 
6 Book 
7 Communication 
8 Kitchen supplies 
9 Vehicle repair 
10 House repair/house rent 
11 Cooking-fuel 
332 
3. Food expense during 
Purchase Home DI'Oduction GlftlBorrowlnQ 
Has your How How How many How much did What was How many How much did What was 
hh manymo much do months In you consume the value of months In you consume the value of 
consumed In the you the past 12 In a typical the [FOOD] the past 12 In a typical the [FOOD] 
[FOOD] past 12 usually months did month? you months did month? you 
during months spend on your hh consumed your hh consumed In 
the past did your [FOOD] consume In a typical consume II typical 
12 hh In one of that you month from that you get month from 
months? purchase the grew or your own IS gift or gift or 
[FOOD]? months produced It prod uctlon? borrow borrowing? 
Mark I as that you home? from 
yes purchase others? 
? 
Months Klp/mo Months amt unit Kip Months amt unit Kip 
1 Beef 
2 Pork 
3 Turkey 
4 Duck 
5 Chicken 
6 Egg 
7 Fish 
8 Vegetable 
9 Bamboo 
shoots 
10 Chilli 
11 Fruits 
12 Salt 
13 Sticky rice 
14 Milk 
15 Sugar 
16 011 
17 Alcoholic 
beveraae 
18 Non-
alcoholiC 
beverage 
19 Tea/coffee 
20 Mise other 
food 
exoense 
21 
22 
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General Information of village 
1. Province: Savannakhet 
VILLAGE INFORMAnON 
By Key Informants Interview 
2. District ....................................................... . 
3. Sub-district .................................................. . 
4. Village name ................................................................................................................. . 
5. Area [] 1. Urban [] 2. Rural with road [ ] 3. Rural without road 
6. Name of head of village ....................................................................... . 
Have been In the position for ............... Years, Was re-appolnted ............ [ ] yes [ ] no 
7. Name and position In the village of Key Informants 
8. Interview date (dd/mm/yr) ............................................................................ . 
9. Time ............................ · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. ·· .......... · .. · .. · .. · .. · ..................................... . 
10. Number of households In the village ......................................... .. 
11. How many Inhabitants are there In this village, using the most update household listing of the village 
head, If available? 
Age group Total Male Female 
0-5 
6-15 
16-60 
60+ 
Total 
12. No. of primary school age children that should be In school (total) - to estimate enrolment rate 
(Information from the teacher/village head) 
Grade No. of teacher No. of student No. of children that should be 
In school 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Total 
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If KI Is the teacher, then ask main reasons why not In school? 
13. Is there a primary school In this village? 
] yes 
[ ] no, if no, where the nearest primary school? 
Name ............................................. ·· ....... · .. ·· .. · 
Distance from this village .............................. km 
How many minutes by walk ............................ minute, by blke ........................... mlnute 
The most accessible mode [ ] by walk [ ] by bike 
14. Adult literacy rate; 
No. of adult men who can read and write easily .............................................................. . 
No. of adult women who can read and write easily .............................................................. . 
Water, sanitation and public utilities 
15. Source of water for general use (indicate type, number, status and update to the map) 
16. What Is the main source of drinking water for people In the village? Old people usually boll water before 
drinking, how drinking water was treated? 
17. How many toilets are In the village? (Indicate type, number, status and update to the map If It Is toilet of 
the village) 
18. Is electricity available In the village? 
] yes 
[ ] no, If no, what are used, described (such as battery, small diesel electricity generator, solar cell) 
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19. How can this village be accessed? 
Mode of Dry season Rainy season How many of these 
transport (indicate month to month) (indicate month to month) transport available in the 
......................................... . ...................................... village 
Tak-tak* 
car 
Boat 
Motorcycle 
Other specify 
Note: tak-tak* refers to mini plough truck for farm (Diesel engine with additional equipment for plough and a 
wooden cart for transport) 
20. To which of the following are village members accessible? 
Radio [ ] yes [] no 
Newspaper ] yes ] no 
Television [ ] yes [] no 
Other............. [] yes [] no 
21. Is there any market in this village? 
[ ] yes 
[ ] no, if no, describe buying and selling method used by people in the village (example from Tang A Lal 
Village; no market in the village, buyer comes to the village, this Implies that Tang A Lal Is non-cash 
economy as mostly consumed their own produces.) 
22. Housing materials, what are ~ of the house In the village made of? Describe the material used. 
Floor: 
Roofs: 
Walls: 
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History of the village 
23. COuld you please tell us about history of the village? How many years has this village been settled?, 
relationship with other villages nearby, In term of ethnlclty, kinship, Issue of Intra family marriage? 
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Health care fadlltles 
24. How many health facilities In the village? 
No. Health facilities number Note-Ce.a. name) 
1. "UlilLtJ1 (Moh Yag) Spiritual healer 
In some cases, there Is no Moh Yao 
In the village, but Invited from other 
village to provide treatments) 
2. "uJilLlh (Mah PaQ) 
(Moh Yao believes In ghost while 
Moh Pao believes In his own spirit 
for healing patient.) 
3. Traditional herbal medicine (J:1gJ 
Yah PulYlt Baan) 
4. Traditional Birth Attendant ITBA) 
5. Village Health Volunteer (VHV) 
6. Village Revolvlna Drug Fund 
7. Private drua store 
8. Private practice bv doctor 
9. Private practice by medical assistant 
10. Private practice by nurse 
11. Private practice by other medical 
staff 
12. Health centre 
25. Are there any other health services for community? 
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How to reach the nearest health fadlltles and transportation cost 
26. The nearest health facilities of this village 
The nearest The nearest 
health centre district hospital 
Name 
Distance from village (km) 
Describe characteristics of road 
and photograph 
Walking 
Can people reach by foot? 
(yes I no) 
How long does It take time for 
walklngi (minutes) 
Public transport 
Is there public transport? 
(yes I no) 
Service hour of public transport 
How often public transport 
provides services, e.g. 
every ................. mlnutes 
Cost of public transport per 
person per trip (kip) 
Hired car 
Is there any car for hire (yes I 
no) If yes Indicate tvoe 
How much does hired car cost 
per trip (kip) 
Gasoline (Litre and Indicate 
Diesel I Benzene) 
Price of gasoline per litre 
How long hired car take time 
(minutes) 
The nearest 
provincial hospital 
27. Draw a map of village-health centre-district hospital-provincial hospital and describe condition of road 
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28. What are the three most preferred health facilities used by patients? 
Village mapping 
29. Draw a map of village and describe essential detail as much as possible e.g. households, water for 
general use (type, number, status), drinking water (type, number, status), school, health facilities (place 
ofTBA, VHV, He, ..... ), toilet of the village, market 
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WEALTH RANKING 
Name of village ................................. .. 
District ............................................ . 
Province ........................................ . 
Date ...................................................... Tlme ................................................................. . 
FGD number .......................................................................... . 
I ~ tl f FGD be d I h Genera In orma on 0 mem rs an DOS tlon In t e village 
No. Name Gender Age Position In the vlllaoe 
1-
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. Keolanee F 36 Research assistant 
8. Walaloorn F 36 Researcher 
Seating position of FGD members (put number of FGD members In the box) 
D D 
D D 
D 
Preparing name cards of households' head 
Identification of the poor household In this village 
1. Could you classify total households In the village Into three groups 
HH Identification number Total Total hh 
Grouping (by listing of the village head) hh members (filled by 
researcher) 
Better-off 
Middle 
The poor 
341 
2. According to Ql, what are criteria to Identify the poor household In your village? 
listing of criteria @Ised by EGo members 
No. Criteria Raised by whom Oolnlon of other members 
Take note: 
Consensus on the most five Important criteria to Identify the poor hOUsehold (The researcher tries to 
reach consensus on criteria among EGO members) 
1. (the most Important) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. (less Important) 
3. Now, we have Identified the poor households. Could you please rank this group from the worst 
household to the less worse household? 
4. In the worse group today, how many of them had stayed In middle or better group In the past five 
years? Who? Why? Describe detail (ThIs question will show class mobility during 2000-2005.) 
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S. In the middle group today, how many of them had stayed In better or worse group In the past five 
years? Who? Why? Describe detail (ThIs question will show class mobility during 2000-2005.) 
6. Refer to question 4, there are ....................... households who have stayed poor In the past five 
years (the repeated poor). Why do they stili stay poor? (Urge them to discuss main determinants of 
chroniC poverty) 
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HOUSEHOLDS' PERCEPTIONS 
ON USER FEES AND EXEMPTIONS 
Name of village ................................. .. 
District ............................................ . 
Province ........................................ . 
Date ......................... ···· .. · .. · .. ···· .. · .. · .. · .... · .... ·Tlme ................................................................. . 
FGD number .......................................................................... . 
General Information of FGD members and DOSltion In the villaae 
No. Name Gender Ace Position In the village 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. Keolanee F 36 Research assistant 
8. Walalporn F 36 Researcher 
Seating position of FGD members (put number of FGD members In the box) 
o o 
o D 
o 
User fees 
1. User fees 
Do any village members have to pay user fees at public health service? 
[ ] yes, why do they have to pay? (The researcher tries to probe asymmetrical power 
between demand and supply, between government and people.) 
[ ] no, why don't they have to pay? (The researcher tries to probe asymmetrical power 
between demand and supply, between government and people.) 
Take note: 
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Protecting the vulnerable group 
2. In practice today, how do patients deal with user fees when they have not enough cash at point of 
service? 
3. Do you know the government has a policy to exempt the poor from user fees? (Indicate name of 
FGO members and their knowledge of exempting policy) 
[ ] yes, there Is a policy 
[ ] no, there Is no policy 
[ ] don't know 
4. For those who know of a policy, describe the procedure how the poor are exempted 
S. Exemptions In the past year 
Non-poor hh Poor hh Total hh Note 
How many 
household 
Deeded 
exemptions? 
How many 
household 9Qt 
exemptions? 
Who (put hh 101? 
Researcher fills 
In the number of 
household who 
Deed~ but did 
.QQt..Qm 
exemptions 
Who (put hh 
10)? 
Why hh In above 
row did not get 
exemptions? 
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6. From above question, describe detail of village members who got exemptions. 
HHID Social ranking Health facility and Procedure how to get exemption 
(better-off, middle, type of service (OP 
Door) or IP) 
Note: 
7. Are the poor willing to take up exemption and why? (try to probe acceptance and stigmatization) 
[ ] yes, why 
[ ] no, why and how to improve 
8. Do you think health staff willing to give exemption for the poor or not, and why or what evidence? 
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9. Are there any patients who have Insufficient to cover their medical care cost? 
How many ....................... , .............................. please provide example 
case 1: Patient's name and address ................................................................................... .. 
Disease and type of services (OP or IP) ................................................................ .. 
Name of health care facility ..................................................................................... . 
How much medical bill was? ......................................................................... .. 
Why did not patient get exemption? (knowledge, attitude and/or experience on 
exemption) .............................................................................................................. . 
.................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
How did patient cope with medical cost? ......................................................... .. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
case 2: Patient's name and address .................................................................................... . 
Disease and type of services (OP or IP) ................................................................ .. 
Name of health care facility ..................................................................................... . 
How much medical bill was? ........................................................................... . 
Why did not patient get exemption? (knowledge, attitude and/or experience on 
exemption) ............................................................................................................. .. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
How did patient cope with medical cost? .......................................................... . 
.................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
case 3: Patient's name and address .................................................................................... . 
Disease and type of services (OP or IP) ................................................................ .. 
Name of health care facility ..................................................................................... . 
How much medical bill was? ........................................................................... . 
Why did not patient get exemption? (knowledge, attitude and/or experience on 
exemption) ....................................... · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .... ·· .............................................. . 
.................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
How did patient cope with medical cost? .......................................................... . 
.................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................. 
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Social network 
10. What village members do when they have not enough money to pay medical bill? 
..................................................... , ............................................................................................................. . 
..................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................... 0 
................................................................................. 
11. If village members need to borrow money, where do they get borrowed money, what Is the 
credibility and how much Is the Interest rate? 
..................................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................. 
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Barriers of access to public health care services: Insufficient to cover treatment cost 
12. Village members stop treatment because they have Insyfflclent to coyer the cost of treatment 
Case 1 
Who .................................................................................................................... . 
Address .............................................................................................................. . 
When ................................................................................................................. . 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ....................................................................................... . 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .............................................................. .. 
Other comment. ................................................................................................... . 
How to solve the problem .................................................................................. .. 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
Case 2 
Who ................................ · .... · .... · ...... · .... ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .......................................... . 
Address ......................... · .. · .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .......... · ...... · .. · .. · .... ·· .................................... . 
When ................................. ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · ........ · .. · .. · .. · .. ·· ...... ·· ................................... .. 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ....................................................................................... . 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members ............................................................... . 
Other comment. ................................................................................................... . 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.... , .................................................................................................................................... . 
Case 3 
Who ........................... ·· .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .. · .... · .. ·· .. · .. ···· .. · .... ·· .......................................... . 
Address ............................. ··· .. ···· .. ···· .. ···· ............................................................ . 
When ............................ · .... ·· .. · ........ · .... ·· .. · .. ···· .. · .. · .... ·· ....................................... . 
Where (health facility) .............................................. · .. · .. · .... ·· .. · .... ·· .. · .. · ............... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ....................................................................................... . 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .............................................................. .. 
Other comment. ................................................................................................... . 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
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Barriers of access to public health care services: due to transportation problem (cost 
and/or difficulty) 
13. Village members do not go to health facilities when they need due to transportation problem 
(cost and/or difficulty) 
easel 
Who .................................................................................................................... . 
Address .............................................................................................................. . 
When ................................................................................................................. . 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ....................................................................................... . 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .............................................................. .. 
Other comment. ................................................................................................... . 
How to solve the problem .................................................................................. .. 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
Case 2 
Who ................................. ·· .. · .. · .. ···· .... · .. ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .......................................... . 
Address ............................... · .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .... ·· .... ·· .. · .... · .. ·· ....................................... . 
When ..................................... ·.·· .. ···· .. · .. ··· .......................................................... . 
Where (health fadlity) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ....................................................................................... . 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .............................................................. .. 
Other comment. ............................. · .. ·· .. · .. · .. ···· .. · .. · .......... ·· .. · .. · .. · .......................... . 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
ease 3 
Who ........................... ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .... ·· .... ·· .... ·· .... ·· .. · .......................................... . 
Address ........................ ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · ........ · .... ·· .. · .. · .... ·· .. ··· .. · ..................................... . 
When ............................ ···· .. · .. ······· .. ······· .. · ......................................................... . 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patient .............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .............................................................. .. 
Other comment. ................................................................................................... . 
How to solve the problem .................................................................................. .. 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
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Barriers of access to public health care services: due to typical culture or norm or belief of 
community 
14. Village members do not go to health facilities or refuse services when they need due to culture or 
typical norm or belief of commynlty 
Case 1 
Who .................................................................................................................... . 
Address .............................................................................................................. . 
When ................................................................................................................. . 
Where (health facility) .. ....................................................................................... . 
What disease .. ..................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .. ............................................................ .. 
Other comment. ... ................................................................................................ . 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
Case 2 
Who ............................ · .... · ............ · .. · ........ · .. · .. · ........ · .. · .. · .................................... . 
Address .................................. · .. · ............. ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .... · .... · .................................. .. 
When .................................. · .. ······· .. ···· .. ······ ....................................................... . 
Where (health facility) ..... .................................................................................... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ..... ................................................................................. .. 
Outcome of patlent. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members ........ ...................................................... .. 
Other comment. ................................. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. ···· .. · .. · .. · .. · ............................. . 
How to solve the problem ..... ............................................................................. .. 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
case 3 
Who ................................ ··· .. ·········· .. ······· ............................................................ . 
Address ..................................... · .. · .. · .......... ·· .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .............................. . 
When ................................. ·· .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .... ·· .. · .. · ........ · .. · ....................................... . 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ....... ................................................................................................ . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patlent. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .. ............................................................ .. 
Other comment. ................................................................................................... . 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
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Barriers of access to public health care services: due to responsiveness of health staff 
15. Village members feel they (especially the poor) lost their dignity because of health staff behavloyr 
Case 1 
Who .................................................................................................................... . 
Address .............................................................................................................. . 
When ................................................................................................................. . 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .... .......................................................... .. 
Other comment. ................................................................................................... . 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
Case 2 
Who .................................. · .... ·· .. · .. · .... · .. · .. ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .......................................... . 
Address .............................................................................................................. . 
When ....................................................... · .... · .. ·· ........ ·· ...................................... . 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ..... .................................................................................................. . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patlent. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .............................................................. .. 
Other comment ................... · .. · ............................................................................. , 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
Case 3 
Who ............................ · .. · .. · .. "·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .. ·,,,,·, .. ,,, .. : ... , ... ,, ......................... . 
Addre5S ..................................... · .... ·· .. · .... ·· .......... ·· .. · .. · .. · .. , ................................. , 
When ......................... , ........... ············· .. · ............................................................ . 
Where (health facility) ...................... , ............................. " ......................... , ......... . 
What disease .. " ... , ... " ............ · .... ·· .. · .. · .... ··· .. ·,,·· .. · .. · .. · .... · ...... · .. · ........................... . 
Severity of this problem .................................. , ................................................... .. 
Outcome of patient ....... ....................................................................................... , 
Magnitude for overall village members ......................... " .. " ................. " ........ "" .. 
Other comment. ........................... · .. ·,,· .. ,,·· .. · .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · ............................. . 
How to solve the problem ......................... " ......................... ,,"", .. , ........ , ... , .. " .... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
....................................................... , .................................. , .... , ............ , .... , ....................... . 
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16. Village members feel reluctant to go to public health care provider because health staff can not 
understand local dialects 
easel 
Who ....................................................... · ............................................................ . 
Address .............................................................................................................. . 
When ................................................................................................................. . 
Where (health facility) ........................................................................................ .. 
What disease .. ..................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................ .. 
Magnitude for overall village members .... ........................................................... . 
Other comment. ..................................... '" ........................................................... . 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
... , ..................................................................................................................................... . 
ease 2 
Who ............................... · .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .... ··· .... · .. · .. ·· .... · .... ·· ....................................... . 
Address .............................................................................................................. . 
When ............................. ··· .. ················ .. ··· .......................................................... . 
Where (health facility) ........................................................................................ .. 
What disease ....................................................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................. . 
Magnitude for overall village members .............................................................. .. 
Other comment. ..................... · .. · .. ........................................................................ . 
HoW to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
ease 3 
Who ............................ · .... ··· .... · .... ·· .. ···· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .......................................... . 
Address ............................ ···· .. ···· .. ············· .. · ...................................................... . 
When ............................ ·· .... · .. · .. · .. ·· ...... ·· .. · .... ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · ....................................... . 
Where (health facility) ......................................................................................... . 
What disease ...................... · .. · .. · .......................................................................... . 
Severity of this problem ...................................................................................... .. 
Outcome of patient. ............................................................................................ .. 
Magnitude for overall village members .... .......................................................... .. 
Other comment. .............................. · .. · ................................................................ .. 
How to solve the problem ................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
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Guideline for two villages in Atsaphangthong District 
1. Financial protection for the poor: acceptability? 
2. Financial protection for the less-poor 
a. Voluntary or compulsory scheme 
b. Prepayment: 
i. acceptability 
II. how much 
Iii. per household or per Individual 
c. Co-payment 
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Guideline for Health Care Provider Interview 
Visit 
• Greeting and general chat 
• Introduce myself and team 
• Introduction for the interview 
• Consent questions 
General Information 
1. Date of interview ................................................................................................................................... . 
2. Time ............................... · .. · .. · ....... ·· .. · ..... · ..... · .. · .. · .. · .. · .............................................................................. . 
3. Place of Interview ................................................................................................................................... . 
4. Name of interviewers and seating 
Start interview 
Part 1 Information of Interviewee 
1.1 Name of interviewee ........................................ · .... · .... ··· .. · ................................................................... . 
1.2 Age ................................. ·· .. · .... · ...... · ........ · .. ···· .. · .... ·· ........................................................................... .. 
1.3 Highest education ......................................... · ............ ·· ....................................................................... . 
1.4 Experience profile 
Year- Year Position Department career of work 
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Part 2 OvelView of user fee policy 
2.1 Do you know user fee policy? From which sources? If It Is because of government policy, have you 
ever seen any document of this policy? Pis show the document. 
2.2 When it started Implementing In health facility, why 
Part 3 Policy interpretation and Implementation 
3.1 User fee: 
o Guidance for Implementation: from which department, document or verbal, when did you get 
guidance 
o What are the main purposes? 
o Who controls the fee policy at national level and provider level? 
o Adjustment of fee level 
3.2 Obligatorv remittance: 
o What are the main purposes? 
o Which level (percentage of total revenue, percentage of profit or fixed amount), Who decide 
o Should the obligatory remittance be remained or not? Why? Which level? 
3.3 exemption: 
o Guidance for Implementation: from which department, document or verbal, when did you get 
guidance 
o For whom 'the poor' or 'destitute' 
o What are the criteria to Identify 'the poor' or 'destitute'? 
o Who decides means testing? What criteria are used for means testing In practice? 
o Resources to finance exemptions (public resource or revenue from user fee), how to finance 
or how to request from government 
3.4 Institutional asoects at hospital level: 
o Which department Is In charge 
o Any guidance for hospital staff 
o Who monitor and evaluate at hospital level and upper level 
o Any support from MOH 
Part 4 General opinions on user fee policy and protecting the poor 
4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of user fees plus exemption compared to free care 
4.2 Government role on protecting the poor 
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Part 5 Request for information of 
5.1 Annual report in fiscal year 2005, 2004 and 2003 
o Revenue and expenditure annual report (budget, RDF and user charge) 
o Activity annual report 
5.2 Whatever format report or primary data of 
o The most updated fee schedule 
o Patients who had been put in debt list 
o Exemptions (amount, who got it) 
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Guideline for Policy maker Interview 
Visit 
• Greeting and general chat 
• Introduce yourself and team 
• Introduction for the Interview 
• Consent questions 
• Ask the respondent to give permission for tape-recording 
General Information 
1. Date of interview ................................................................................................................................... . 
2. Time ......................... · ........ · .. · .. · .... · .. ·· .... ·· .......... ·· .... ·· .. · ........................................................................... . 
3. Place of interview ................................................................................................................................... . 
4. Name of interviewers and seating 
Start interview 
Part 1 Information of Interviewee 
1.1 Name of interviewee ........................................................................................................................... . 
1.2 Age .............................. ·· .. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .... · .. ·· .... ····· .. · ................................................................................. .. 
1.3 Highest education ............................................................................................................................... . 
1.4 Experience profile 
Year- Year Position Deoartment Career of work 
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Part 2 Policy formulation 
2.1 Your relation with user fee policy (what position, which period) 
2.2 Background of user fee policy In Lao: when It started, why, who Initiated, who against 
2.3 Context: International and domestic context 
2.4 Why did it come with the content In Decree 52, 1995 (user fees, exemption and obligatory 
remittance) 
2.5 Why did it come with the content In Decree In Nov 2005 
Part 3 Policy Interpretation 
3.1 Decree 52, 1995 
3.1.1 Main purposes of Decree 52 
3.1.2 User fees: what are the main purposes? 
3.1.3 Obligatory remittance: what are the main purposes?, which level (percentage of total 
revenue, percentage of profit or fixed amount) 
3.1.4 Exemptions: Who Is a vulnerable group or low Income?, What are the criteria to Identify 
vulnerable group or low Income?, resources to finance exemptions (public resource or 
revenue from user fee), how to finance 
3.2 Curative Act, Nov 2005 
3.2.1 Main purposes of Curative Act, Nov 2005 
3.2.2 Obligatory remittance: which level (percentage of total revenue, percentage of profit or 
fixed amount) 
3.2.3 Funds: 
• Why separated funds e.g. student fund, monk fund, fund for the poor 
• Resources to finance funds 
• How to finance, which mechanism 
3.2.4 Advantages and disadvantages of Curative Act 2005 compared to Decree 521995 
Part 4 Policy Implementation 
4.1 Process of implementation: who take action, which channel (meeting, sending policy document), 
hoW long 
4.2 Guidance for Implementation: Any document, from which department 
4.3 User fee: Who controls the fee policy at national level and provider level? Adjustment of fee level 
(updating fees and income eligibility thresholds: subject to changing context) 
4.4 exemption: Who decides means testing? What criteria are used for means testing? 
4.5 Funding: Public resources available to finance exemptions 
4.6 Institutional aspects: which department Is In charge, dear gUidance, any support to Implementers, 
who monitor and evaluate 
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Part 5 General opinions on user fee policy and protecting the poor 
5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of user fees plus exemption compared to free care 
5.2 Obligatory remittance: should be retained or not? Why? Which level? 
5.3 Government role on protecting the poor 
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APPENDIX II 
Headings and sub-headings for qualitative analysis 
A) Households' experience on copjng strategies 
• Cost prevention 
o Not seeking care 
o Seeking care without cost 
• Cost management strategies 
o Using saving 
o Selling assets 
o Borrowing 
o Getting support 
o Delaying payment 
o Exemption 
B) Households' oerceptions towards yser fees 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Public services versus business 
Barrier to access care 
Stigma if getting free care 
Patient's responsibility 
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C) Providers' and policy makers' experiences and perceptions 
• Objectives of user fee and exemption policy 
• Expectation on user fee and exemption policy 
• Process of promulgation 
• Fee schedule 
o Process of setting up the fees 
o Frequency of updating the fees 
• Use of fee revenues 
o Obligatory remittances 
• Process of remitting the obligatory remittances 
• How much to remit 
• Achievement of the remitting 
o Use of the rest of the fee revenues 
• Exem ptions 
o Entitlement (the destitute versus the poor) 
o Practices 
o Attitudes 
o Subsidization from the government on exemptions 
• Reporting system of user fees and exemptions 
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APPENDIX III 
Health care cost burden of household 
Cost burden 
(monthly HH 
Health 
expenditure as 
ID Asset HH HH non-food % monthly HH 
of Wealth Index Consumption consumption non-food 
District Village HH group score (USD/day) % non-food (USD/day) consumption) 
1 1 01 2 -0.21635 7.01 0.12 0.84 
1 02 3 -1.7999 1.00 0.16 0.16 
1 1 03 3 -2.25075 1.66 0.16 0.27 
1 1 04 3 -1.13537 1.48 0.16 0.24 72.16% 
1 1 05 1 0.22053 5.05 0.30 1.52 
1 1 06 2 0.37646 4.70 0.12 0.56 
1 1 07 2 -0.34937 3.68 0.12 0.44 
1 08 3 -0.33874 2.27 0.16 0.36 354.39% 
1 09 2 1.12831 5.65 0.12 0.68 2. 11% 
1 10 3 -0.84237 1.66 0.16 0.27 
1 1 11 1 0.38422 4.95 0.30 1.48 
1 1 12 2 -0.70043 5.04 0.12 0.60 
1 1 13 3 -1.41335 1.66 0.16 0.27 44 .39% 
1 1 14 2 -0.24825 2.79 0.12 0.34 
1 15 3 -0.98639 1.18 0.16 0.19 
1 1 16 2 -0.22979 3.81 0.12 0.46 
1 1 17 3 -1.63116 2.40 0.16 0.38 7.43% 
18 2 -0.05405 2.52 0.12 0.30 
19 3 -1.17687 1.00 0.16 0.16 
1 20 2 0.92975 3.61 0.12 0.43 
1 1 21 2 1.08298 2.25 0.12 0.27 
1 1 22 3 -1.38417 2.10 0.16 0.34 
1 1 23 2 -1.82515 2.32 0.12 0.28 
1 1 24 2 -1.56675 2.04 0.12 0.25 11.65% 
1 25 2 -1.13706 3.00 0.12 0.36 
1 26 2 -0.36744 3.27 0.12 0.39 
1 27 2 0.0671 3.75 0.12 0.45 109.66% 
1 28 2 1.46578 3.47 0.12 0.42 1695.06% 
1 29 2 -1.09447 2.45 0.12 0.29 
1 30 3 -1.16025 1.53 0.16 0.24 
1 31 2 -0.8284 2.79 0.12 0.34 
1 32 3 -0.25202 3.71 0.16 0.59 
1 1 33 2 -0.91604 1.29 0.12 0.16 
1 1 34 2 0.19385 4.09 0.12 0.49 1.46% 
1 35 2 0.02527 4.36 0.12 0.52 
1 1 36 2 0.26935 6.61 0.12 0.79 16.84% 
1 37 2 0.8823 6.20 0.12 0.74 
1 1 38 2 
-1.0243 3.54 0.12 0.42 
1 1 39 2 -0.01826 4.70 0.12 0.56 88.68% 
1 1 40 1.82362 7.26 0.30 2.18 
1 1 41 2 0.61927 3.61 0.12 0.43 
1 1 42 3 -0.72379 2.79 0.16 0.45 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
ID 
of Wealth 
HH group 
43 3 
44 2 
45 2 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
Asset HH 
Index Consumptlon 
score (USD/day) 
-1.54065 1.97 
-0.9587 3.81 
-0.79108 3.47 
0.13301 
-0.19207 
-1.63148 
0.2232 
-0.02165 
-1.09554 
-0.67264 
-1.37552 
1.70813 
0.42637 
1.02653 
-0.78398 
1.25139 
0.81829 
1.36364 
-0.58475 
-0.73472 
-0.04706 
1.32283 
0.41286 
1.08192 
-0.05117 
0.16901 
1.10223 
0.87225 
1.95545 
0.51054 
1.1052 
1.02474 
-0.84815 
1.41283 
0.19412 
0.25746 
-0.68368 
1.04431 
-0.60505 
-2.19226 
0.73767 
-0.51876 
-0.51383 
-0.12503 
-1.59037 
1.82334 
-0.27318 
4.02 
3.00 
4.02 
5.72 
3.00 
2.97 
1.53 
2.79 
10.11 
3.40 
2.00 
1.84 
8.95 
8.74 
6.74 
3.47 
3.54 
3.03 
6.53 
2.68 
7.20 
1.99 
1.87 
3.74 
7.20 
9.20 
2.70 
3.76 
5.02 
1.89 
3.85 
0.99 
1.70 
1.12 
4.32 
2.12 
0.72 
1.99 
0.42 
0.61 
1.54 
0.91 
4.18 
2.53 
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% non-food 
0.16 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.16 
0.16 
0.12 
0.30 
0.12 
0.30 
0.12 
0.30 
0.30 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.20 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.23 
0.23 
0.20 
0.23 
0.23 
0.24 
0.23 
0.24 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.24 
0.20 
0.20 
0.24 
0.20 
0.24 
0.23 
0.20 
HH non-food 
consumption 
(USD/day) 
0.31 
0.46 
0.42 
0.48 
0.36 
0.48 
0.69 
0.36 
0.48 
0.24 
0.34 
3.03 
0.41 
0.60 
0.22 
2.68 
2.62 
0.81 
0.42 
0.42 
0.61 
1.50 
0.62 
1.65 
0.40 
0.37 
0.75 
1.65 
2.12 
0.54 
0.87 
1.15 
0.45 
0.89 
0.24 
0.34 
0.22 
0.86 
0.42 
0.17 
0.40 
0.08 
0.15 
0.31 
0.22 
0.96 
0.51 
Cost burden 
(monthly HH 
Health 
expenditure as 
% monthly HH 
non-food 
consumption) 
72.59% 
42.66% 
0.88% 
15.32% 
11.90% 
78.88% 
10.36% 
1.79% 
1.91% 
6.97% 
45.41% 
5.55% 
17.88% 
7.67% 
18.13% 
9.79% 
119.93% 
25 .09% 
11.62% 
District Village 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
ID 
of 
HH 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
, 29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
01 
02 
03 
04 
Wealth 
group 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
Asset 
Index 
SCOlJ! 
-0,02466 
0,9132 
-1.69707 
0,23161 
0,13404 
-1.06139 
0.21341 
2.2616 
1.56818 
1.27306 
0.21498 
1.16488 
1.03964 
1.64771 
-1.76872 
0.46448 
-1.48967 
0.06354 
-0.55309 
0.4237 
1.96205 
1.03472 
-0.57826 
-0.73069 
1.03093 
1.61112 
0.85585 
-0.34991 
-0.86184 
0.17776 
1.0223 
-0.35979 
0.87916 
0.76247 
0.92229 
0.17384 
-0.671 
-0.44314 
-0.62106 
-0.50707 
-0.84659 
-0.59769 
-1.39164 
0.5504 
0.34407 
-0.99685 
-0.43769 
HH 
Consumption 
(USD/day) 
1.52 
1.45 
1.20 
1.01 
1.99 
2.13 
1.99 
7.52 
10.26 
6.91 
4.47 
4.17 
3.15 
8.64 
2.84 
1.10 
1.48 
2.71 
3.76 
2.24 
6.60 
4.57 
5.18 
1.82 
7.82 
4.47 
1.14 
2.71 
2.06 
1.69 
2.20 
3.61 
6.10 
1.52 
4.17 
2.75 
4.13 
0.97 
1.74 
4.00 
1.23 
1.55 
1.48 
2.69 
4.67 
2.19 
3.82 
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0.24 
0.20 
0.24 
0.24 
0.20 
0.24 
0.20 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.18 
0.20 
0.18 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.20 
0.36 
0.36 
0.20 
0.18 
0.18 
0.20 
0.20 
0.18 
0.36 
0.20 
0.36 
0.20 
0.18 
0.20 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.28 
0.28 
0.33 
0.28 
HH non-food 
consumption 
(USD/day) 
0.36 
0.29 
0.29 
0.24 
0.40 
0.51 
0.40 
2.71 
3.69 
2.49 
1.61 
1.50 
1.13 
3.11 
0.51 
0.22 
0.27 
0.54 
0.75 
0.45 
2.38 
1.65 
1.87 
0.36 
2.82 
1.61 
0.23 
0.49 
0.37 
0.34 
0.44 
0.65 
2.19 
0.30 
1.50 
0.55 
0.74 
0.19 
0.31 
0.72 
0.22 
0.28 
0.27 
0.75 
1.31 
0.72 
1.07 
Cost burden 
(monthly HH 
Health 
expenditure as 
% monthly HH 
non-food 
consumption) 
9.81% 
4.97% 
12.48% 
7.63% 
24 .56% 
20.06% 
1.70% 
2.97% 
2.19% 
12.98% 
3.06% 
3.13% 
4.69% 
23 .81% 
127.04% 
2.47% 
Cost burden 
(monthly HH 
Health 
expenditure as 
ID Asset HH HH non-food % monthly HH 
of Wealth Index Consumption consumption non-food 
District Village HH group score (USD/day) % non-food (USD/day) consumption) 
2 4 OS 3 -1.26988 2.19 0.33 0.72 
2 4 06 2 0.18446 4.53 0.28 1.27 6.19% 
2 4 07 2 -0.10857 4.67 0.28 1.31 13.05% 
2 4 08 1 0.45958 7.52 0.39 2.93 
2 4 09 3 -1.08201 2.68 0.33 0.89 
2 4 10 3 -0.81287 2.11 0.33 0.70 
2 4 11 1 -0.15889 9.91 0.39 3.87 8.59% 
2 4 12 3 -0.28612 1.54 0.33 0.51 
2 4 13 1 0.6548 4.78 0.39 1.87 
2 4 14 2.57273 8.37 0.39 3.27 3.28% 
2 4 15 1 1.22904 15.72 0.39 6.13 
2 4 16 1.6155 11.79 0.39 4.60 3. 11% 
2 4 17 1 0.41445 7.18 0.39 2.80 
2 4 18 2 0.4117 5.81 0.28 1.63 
2 4 19 3 0.67454 4.31 0.33 1.42 1.51% 
2 4 20 3 -0.47737 3.09 0.33 1.02 
2 4 21 1 -0.22644 6.32 0.39 2.47 13.12% 
2 4 22 1 1.04826 9.40 0.39 3.67 11.84% 
2 4 23 -0.02664 9.40 0.39 3.67 1.17% 
2 4 24 1.23811 4.44 0.39 1.73 1.08% 
2 4 25 2 1.32929 5.52 0.28 1.55 0.92% 
2 4 26 2 -0.81889 5.66 0.28 1.59 9.28% 
2 4 27 0.80395 7.52 0.39 2.93 
2 4 28 1.75906 12.30 0.39 4.80 3.18% 
2 4 29 3 0.24373 2.60 0.33 0.86 
2 4 30 3 -1.4482 2.19 0.33 0.72 
2 4 31 2 0.08122 3.97 0.28 1.11 7.72% 
2 4 32 1 0.34274 3.25 0.39 1.27 
2 4 33 3 -0.52321 3.33 0.33 1.10 5.20% 
2 4 34 2 -0.38969 5.95 0.28 1.67 
2 4 35 3 -0.85779 3.01 0.33 0.99 
2 4 36 2 -1.17827 6.23 0.28 1.74 23.40% 
2 4 37 3 -0.59715 3.01 0.33 0.99 
2 4 38 3 -1.33645 2.19 0.33 0.72 
2 4 39 1 1.35563 5.64 0.39 2.20 1.01% 
2 4 40 2 0.28292 7.79 0.28 2.18 0.66% 
Note: District 1 = Phine district, District 2 = APT district 
Village 1 = TAL, Village 2 = KY, Village 3 = SPX, Village 4 = KK 
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APPENDIX V 
Decree 52 PM 
(English version - informal translation) 
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
PEACE INDEPENDENCE DEMOCRACY UNITY PROSPERITY 
The prime Minister's Office No. 52/PM 
Decree of Medical Services 
Based on the resolution from the 5th meeting of the Lao People's 
Revolutionary Party about the exemption policy for low income people 
Based on the proposal by the Minister of Health 
The Prime Minister has decided: 
PART I OVerall concept 
Article 1: Public workers who work for the Party and government employees, 
including retired people, will receive medical investigation and treatment without 
paying user charges from their own pocket. 
Article 2: Spouse and dependents (under 18 years of age) of public workers who 
work for the Party and government employees, including retired people, will receive 
medical investigation and treatment without paying user charges from their own 
pocket. (This applies only to those who are not in any institute.) 
Article 3: Students, monks and the poor or those with low income will receive 
medical investigation and treatment without paying user charges from their own 
pocket. 
Article 4: Citizens who are not covered by Articles 1, 2 or 3 will have to pay user 
charges for medical investigation and treatment from their own pocket. 
Article 5: For every event, either emergency or normal illnesses, patients will have 
access to and use of medical investigation and treatment at public health care 
providers. 
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PART II The conceRt of setting up and collecting user fees 
Article 6: User fees can be set and charged for seven items as follows; 
1. Medical records an d other documents 
2. Supplies 
3. Investigation services i.e. laboratory, radiology and other diagnosis 
4. Medicines for treatment purposes 
5. Medical appliances for phYSical therapy 
6. Charges for treatment (e.g. surgery, rehabilitation, acupuncture) 
7. Room and board 
Article 7: In order to serve patient's needs, hospital will ensure; 
1. provision of a room for patient 
2. enthusiastic provision of service, investigation and treatment for every 
event 
3. establishment of a system of setting up and collecting us er fees and 
reporting according to the financial rules 
PART III Actlyltles 
Article 8: The Central Hospital, Provincial Hospital and District Hospital will manage 
and operate the user fee system according to the guidelines issued by the Ministry 
of Health which depends on the individual proposal of each public health care 
provider. 
Any services at health centres will be provided free of charge. A charge is permitted 
for medicines. 
PART IV Confirmation for entitlement to exemption. 
Article 9: Public workers who work for the Party and govern ment employees can 
use documentary proof of their contribution (6% of salary to the Government 
Employee Scheme) to confirm their entitlement to exemptions. Retired people can 
use documentary proof of receiving an old age pension to confirm their entitlement 
to exemptions. 
Article 10: For the poor or people with low income people, the hospital will accept 
their entitlement according to attestation Issued by Ministry of Labour and Social 
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Welfare or by Department of Social Welfare at Provincial Gove rnor or by village 
heads. 
Article 11: For students and monks, the hospital will accept their entitlement 
according to their (student or monk) card or attestation issued by the Ministry of 
Education or by a related institution. 
PART V payment procedure 
Article 12: Patients covered in article 1 will be reimbursed for user fees from SOCial 
Security Funds by submitting the hospital's receipt to the Fund. This will depend on 
the guidelines of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. 
Article 13: The Ministry of Finance provides government budget to public health 
providers at all levels who serve patients covered in Article 2 and 3. The Ministry of 
Health is responsible for estimating annual budget and submitting a budget plan. 
Article 14: For uniformity in management, the Ministry of Health has declared the 
total amount of user fees in Article 6 to the Ministry of Finance. Twenty per cent of 
the user fees from investigation and treatment will be deducted and this amount will 
be remitted to the general revenue of the government. The rest of the fee revenue 
can be used by hospitals according to their plans, and if the revenue is inadequate, 
the government will subsidize accordingly. 
PART VI Final part 
Article 15: For the implementation of this decree, the Ministry of Health and Ministry 
of Labour and Social Welfare are responsible for issuing detailed guidelines in order 
to facilitate the activities of the Central Hospital, Department of Health, Department 
of Labour and Social Welfare at provincial and local level. This will assure an 
effective implementation of this decree. 
Article 16: The Prime Minister's Office, Ministers, other relevant organizations and 
local governors at all levels have responsibility for the implementation of this decree 
according to their relevant roles. 
Article 17: This decree is valid from the date of signature. 
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Vientiane, 26 June 1995 
Prime Minister 
